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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
 General introduction 
 1 
0. General introduction: definition, objective and scope 
Contemporary transplantation ethics is inextricably bound up with the ever-present 
scarcity of human cells, tissues and organs (‘grafts’) for transplantation. Due to the natural 
limits of the supply of vital organs and the expectation that the clinical needs for 
transplantation will continue to increase, there is no escaping tough trade-offs of the 
interests of some patients to receive a transplant against the interests of others. If we are 
to alleviate the suffering of the thousands of waiting list patients worldwide who currently 
cannot obtain a transplant in time, we must either root out the sources of disease or 
secure new remedies. 
 
Researchers are developing new technologies that yield the outlook of virtually limitless 
supplies of transplantable grafts. One of the possibilities to augment the supply is the use 
of organs, cells and tissues from specially bred, genetically modified animals. That 
procedure, named xenotransplantation, is (or at least, certain applications of it are) 
predicted to become routine clinical practice in the near future. 
 
It is not surprising that particularly that line of research is being pursued. In fact, some of 
the first grafts ever transplanted into humans were derived from animals. Nonetheless, the 
potential to sidestep scarcity by breeding an endless number of animals as sources of 
transplants for humans has generated ethical, cultural and regulatory questions that are 
entirely different from those that arose during the infancy of human-to-human 
transplantation. This dissertation has the aim to gain insight into the unique problems that 
emerge from this biotechnological procedure as well as to contribute to analyses and 
interpretations of the most troublesome inherent conflicts. 
 
0.1 Xenotransplantation definition 
 
The term ‘xenotransplantation’ (XTx) comes from the Greek word ‘xenos’ meaning 
‘foreign’. It stands for different technologies which intend to substitute inadequate 
organs, tissues or cells of one species for a live replacement taken from an individual of 
another species. Transplantations between individuals of the same species are called 
‘allotransplantations’ (ATx). Although xenotransplantation could in principle involve any 
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cross-species transplants, current usage of the term primarily denotes the transferral of 
organs, tissues and cells from pigs to humans. United States Public Health Service policy 
has defined xenotransplantation as: 
 
(…) any procedure that involves the transplantation, implantation, or infusion 
into a human recipient of either (a) live cells, tissues, or organs from a 
nonhuman animal source or (b) human body fluids, cells, tissues or organs that 
have had ex vivo contact with live nonhuman animal cells, tissues, or organs.1 
 
This definition includes: 
- the transplantation or implantation of any solid organs or tissues from an animal into a 
human patient to replace a diseased or damaged organ or tissue; 
- procedures in which animal cells are transplanted or implanted into a human patient to 
compensate for the malfunctioning of the patient’s own cells; 
- a variety of procedures involving contact between human and animal cells, tissues or 
organs outside the body. Ex vivo contact may for instance consist of cross-circulating a 
patient’s cells or fluids through an apparatus that consists of animal cells. Alternatively, 
the major blood vessels of a patient’s malfunctioning kidney or liver may be connected to 
an animal organ placed outside the body. Also included in that definition is the culturing of 
human cells or tissue with animal cells in the laboratory in order to acquire a larger supply 
of human cells or tissue (e.g. human stem cell lines or skin cells grown on animal feeder 
layers). 
 
Non-living animal products - such as pig heart valves, porcine insulin and vaccinations from 
animal sources or animal sera used for the culture of human cells - are not regarded as 
xenoproducts2. 
 
0.2 Why xenotransplantation? 
 
The greatest promise of xenotransplantation lies in the expectation of attaining a reliable, 
long-term solution to bridge the gap between the supply of and the demand for 
transplantable organs3. Specially engineered pigs could provide suitable organs for 
practically all patients in need, including infants, for whom the organ shortage is the most 
devastating. Xenotransplantation could also provide an acceptable alternative for those 
individuals who do not accept human organ donation for ethical or cultural reasons4. 
Moreover, proponents of this biotechnology state that safe and effective 
xenotransplantation would annul many of the practical and emotional burdens related to 
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the long waiting times for an available cadaveric donor organ. With a source of grafts 
readily available, the transplantation procedure can be scheduled and prepared well in 
advance. Recipient pre-treatment can be conducted and the quality of organs can be 
screened in detail. The pathophysiological consequences of the interval between the 
declaration of death and the process of removing, cooling and preserving organs can be 
avoided. The source animals can be genetically engineered so as to optimize the 
functioning and to provide other potential advantages to the recipient. In addition, it has 
been argued that animal grafts may not be receptive to the human autoimmune diseases or 
viral infections that may have caused the organ failure in the first place or that can 
threaten graft survival after allotransplantation. Xenotransplantation may also widen the 
indications for transplantation. An abundance of animal-derived cells and tissues could 
potentially address currently unmet medical needs such as incurable neurological diseases, 
epilepsy, chronic intractable pain syndromes, paraplegia due to spinal cord lesions and 
insulin dependent diabetes. 
 
0.3 Xenotransplantation ethics 
 
Xenotransplantation has been fraught with controversy in light of the magnitude of both 
the hoped-for benefits and perceived potential harms. The major conflict to date is 
between ‘those who want to get it right’ and ‘those who want to get it right now’. 
 
As indicated by Engels5, an ethical assessment of xenotransplantation must take into 
account both the individual level - where the expected benefits for the patient have to be 
weighed against the possibility of individual harm - and the possible collective harm 
xenotransplantation might cause. Given that the technology is fundamentally dependent 
on the use of animals, animal welfare and harm must also be assessed. 
 
Like all experimental medical procedures, xenotransplantation applications bear a 
potential of harm. Most evidently, xenotransplantation involves a higher risk of organ 
rejection than allotransplantation due to the genetic distance (discordance) between pigs 
and humans. It also increases the risk of complications such as new infections and tumour 
formation. That challenges the medical-ethical requirement of ascertaining that the risks 
outweigh the expected (medical) benefit and that both sides of the balance can be 
adequately conveyed to patients as part of the informed consent requirement. What 
distinguishes xenotransplantation from other medical procedures, however, is that the 
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nature of some of the harms at stake undercuts the validity of agreement on the 
benefit/risk (im)balance between patient and physician only. 
 
Unlike other fields of medical research, xenotransplantation involves the use of animals 
not only for pre-clinical experimentation, but also as the fundamental ingredient of the 
medical applications themselves. The question whether it is justifiable to use animals for 
‘spare parts’ for humans has gained in import in a society that has become increasingly 
sensitive to the welfare of nonhuman animals. Unlike humans, animals have no choice in 
whether its organs or tissue are removed or not for human use. The animals are therefore 
referred to as ‘source animals’ rather than ‘donors’. Xenotransplantation evokes 
objections towards the specific circumstances under which the source animals are born, 
raised and killed; circumstances that are said to compromise animal welfare and elicit 
significant suffering. To some, the use of animals as an end to human means is a denial of 
their right to life and renders them ‘the other victim’6 of the organ shortage dilemma. 
 
The most controversial issue from a societal standpoint, however, is the possibility that, in 
promoting individual benefit, xenotransplantation will also introduce a public health 
threat. Increasing concern has been expressed about the theoretical possibility that 
infectious agents from the source animal may be transmitted along with the xenograft and 
spread beyond the initial recipient to his or her close contacts and, at worse, to the 
community at large. It is well established – and topically illustrated by the recent outbreak 
of H5N1 Avian Influenza – that many of the infectious diseases that have emerged over the 
past decade can be traced back to animal-derived viruses, bacteria or prions that have 
passed onto or adapted in human hosts. Xenotransplantation appears to constitute a 
particularly pertinent health hazard. That is due to the fact that transplantation bypasses 
most of the patient’s usual protective physical and immunological barriers. There is also a 
lack of knowledge about the behaviour of source animal-derived infectious agents in 
immunosuppressed humans. 
 
The ‘dual level’ of risk constitutes a clash of two intuitively felt moral duties. By not 
pursuing xenotransplantation trials, we could be said to refrain from fully addressing the 
needs of waiting-list patients. By pursuing xenotransplantation trials, on the other hand, 
we could be helping some individuals at the cost of harming (possibly many) others. The 
question that arises is to what extent it is permissible for an individual to impose risks on 
others for his or her own benefit. The issue of just distribution of health burdens becomes 
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all the more intricate in recognition of the fact that viruses can hop borders and threaten 
populations that are unwilling or unable to participate in xenotransplantation medicine. 
 
Still other factors may impede permissibility of xenotransplantation on the individual-
societal level. Xenotransplantation abandons the concept of transplantation as an altruistic 
‘gift’ and renders it a matter of patentable products that are readily available upon 
purchase. Furthermore, our cultural depiction of pigs may evoke religious constraints or 
emotional aversion, which can contribute to exceptional difficulties to adjust to the 
xenotransplant psychologically (both for the recipient and his or her social environment). 
Cultural resistance to xenotransplantation is also related to the fact that it involves the 
creation of ‘animal/human chimeras’, entities characterized by the side-by-side presence 
of both human and animal cells. The intermixing of biological material from different 
species, particularly from humans and nonhuman animals, evokes various concerns. The 
fact that the source animals are genetically engineered to express human proteins – a 
procedure that aims to counter the first stages of xenograft rejection by the human 
immune system – raises objections against interfering with the nature of the animal or 
against interfering with nature as a whole for that matter. The fact that a xenograft 
recipient can also be seen as a composite of animal and human material raises concerns 
about the effects both on the identity of the host and on societal and philosophical notions 
of ‘humanness’ and related concepts of moral worth. 
 
0.4 Research objectives and outline 
 
This dissertation intends to contribute to the broader debate of how to weigh the potential 
benefits of xenotransplantation against the costs that it may infer on the relevant agents 
at stake. Within that scope, special attention will be focussed on possible harms that arise 
uniquely or predominantly within the context of xenotransplantation. For that reason, not 
all of the implications of this biotechnology will be considered in detail. In particular, we 
will not engage in the debate on whether xenoproducts undermine the value of altruistic 
organ donation or not. That issue will be rather broadly addressed in our discussion of 
proposals to augment human donation by offering an incentive. In effect, it is not a unique 
concern when considering other replacement technologies such as artificial organs and 
regenerative medicine. For the same reason, the question whether it is justified to 
allocate health care resources to what some may call an ‘exotic’ form of treatment will be 
only briefly considered in the general discussion. The aim of the ethical analysis here is to 
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supplement the international literature on xenotransplantation ethics by indicating 
lacunas, inconsistencies or incompatibilities in considering the major stumbling blocks to 
accepting xenotransplantation as a viable alternative. 
 
In PART ONE, we present three papers that indicate the raison d’être for 
xenotransplantation research. Chapter 1 sets outs the magnitude of the human donor 
shortage and the development of medical and societal approaches to facilitate human 
donor procurement. This chapter also includes considerations of medical efficacy, cost-
effectiveness and the comparative share of diseases treatable through transplantation in 
the most common causes of disability and death. Chapter 2 discusses what appears to be 
the core ethical controversy in the field of allotransplantation today: that some level of 
rationing is inescapable in light of the scarce commodity of donated grafts, leaving us to 
decide how best to allocate. Contention over what constitutes ‘fair’ selection has 
prompted various alternative suggestions to help resolve candidate ranking. Included are 
references to social parameters that have no direct medical relevance. We will consider in 
depth the proposal to resolve the issue of unfair allocation by granting priority to 
candidate recipients who are themselves registered as donors. Chapter 3 examines various 
alternative approaches that compete with xenotransplantation in the potential to acquire 
virtually limitless grafts for transplantation. The approaches include the commercialization 
of grafts from living providers, the development of artificial replacements and the use of 
stem cell technology to ‘grow your own’ grafts or to support failing tissues/organs. While 
those possibilities are attractive and promising, we demonstrate in which respect they are 
likely to fall short of providing a substantial pool of transplantable organs and tissues in 
the near future. 
 
PART TWO provides a brief overview of the xenotransplantation experiments attempted in 
the past and the clinical trials that are being pursued to date. This chapter outlines the 
state of xenotransplantation science and indicates the main barriers to its use as a 
successful clinical therapy. The review will clarify that the major brake on clinical 
applications is related to the possibility that xenotransplantation may cause adverse 
effects to third parties not involved with the potential clinical benefits. 
 
PART THREE is concerned with the animals used for humans’ benefits. This section 
addresses concerns about both intrinsic and consequentialist aspects of utilizing 
genetically manipulated source pigs for human transplant purposes. Chapter 5 investigates 
the validity of claims that it is intrinsically wrong to produce ‘humanized’ pigs for 
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xenotransplantation and categorizes such claims into several clusters of arguments: (a) 
arguments that focus on the so-called integrity of the genome, the organism and the 
species; (b) arguments expressing the belief that animals have a good of their own; and (c) 
arguments questioning the technological interference with the natural order. This analysis 
allows us to limit the definition of ‘harm’ to the sentient interests of the individual 
animals. Given that the thwarting of the animals’ interests is an inevitable element of the 
purpose for which they are bred, a justification thereof is the subject of the next chapter. 
In particular, we question the arguments underlying the common rationale that it is more 
ethical to use one type of animal (the pig) rather than another (the nonhuman primate) 
and investigate the morally significant distinctions between their interests. 
 
If it can be justified to use animals for xenotransplantation purposes, the question arises 
how to balance the patients’ autonomy and the rights of the broader public. The dual level 
of the virus risk is the subject of PART FOUR. The initial response to the awareness of the 
xenogeneic virus risk was a ‘precautionary’ approach, which voices the need to ‘look 
before you leap’ and ‘be safe rather than sorry’7. That position is increasingly being 
criticized as too risk-aversive. Regulatory agencies across the globe are attempting to 
stipulate the appropriate conditions under which xenotransplantation can be conducted in 
the clinic while safeguarding public health. Their solutions depend heavily on the need to 
install long-term surveillance and monitoring schemes of xenograft recipients and, in some 
cases, their contacts and the health care and nonhuman animal care workers involved.  
Chapters 7 and 8 address the ethical and practical difficulties that arise from asking human 
trials subjects to consent to lifelong monitoring requirements. It is argued that some of 
those requirements contravene generally accepted ethical codes and rights regarding 
experimentation on humans and severely limit patients’ autonomy. It is also shown that 
current public health measures cannot warrant watertight protection of public health. In 
light of those considerations, both chapters offer a different perspective of how to respond 
to the unknown potential for public health harm. Chapter 7 is concerned with the 
possibility that the risks of virus transmission cannot be excluded through pre-clinical 
(animal) models and can only be addressed through clinical trials involving humans. An 
alternative means of overcoming the safety and ethical issues is suggested: willed body 
donation for scientific research in the case of permanent vegetative status. Chapter 8 
reconsiders to what extent the public should be guaranteed protection from a 
xenotransplant-related health hazard. It is argued that the harm principle is not a moral 
absolute. In light of the increased optimism that the risk of xenogeneic viral infection is 
not as compelling as it was a decade ago, some level of public health threat would be 
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acceptable if the foreseeable aspects of the risk are accounted for and if the perception 
exists that the benefits are both substantive and attainable. Emphasis on the need to 
exclude foreseeable effects of xenogeneic virus transmission puts the ‘unique harm’ and 
accountability of this man-made technology into perspective and serves as a reminder of 
our duty to take ‘natural’ health hazards at least as seriously. 
 
The FIFTH SECTION deals with the ways in which the technology to transgress the boundary 
between humans and nonhuman animals threatens socially determined notions of identity. 
Chapter 9 addresses the fear that human/animal interchangeability will, either directly or 
indirectly, affect the way in which the human recipient experiences or perceives him- or 
herself. We represent several interpretations of how xenografting may interfere with 
symbolic, socio-cultural notions of the self and contribute to an exceptional psychological 
struggle to incorporate the transplant. The tenth and last chapter considers the 
implications of the creation of human/animal chimeras on what it means to be human. 
Here, we interpret xenotransplantation more broadly to include human-to-animal 
chimeras. Increasingly, animals are being developed to express a substantial amount of 
human cells so as to serve as research models to enhance our understanding of the 
aetiology and progression of human disease and to test new treatments. It is particularly 
within this field that controversy arises as to where to mark the boundaries for 
‘humanness’ and the particular dignity related to it. That setting offers a productive 
opportunity to test the notion of human dignity and to re-emphasize the grounds of moral 
worth as a matter of varying degree, dependent on the nature of the entity’s interests. 
 
The FINAL PART sets the venue for a brief summary of the major standpoints taken in the 
papers, for a general discussion of the most contested aspects of our argumentation and 
for tracing out the major implications of our standpoints. 
 General introduction 
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1 Transplantation medicine: evaluating its success 
 
Abstract 
 
Ever since the success rate of transplantation substantially improved through a better 
understanding and manipulation of the process of inter-individual organ and tissue 
rejection, the demand for human grafts for transplantation has gradually outgrown the 
supply. In response to that shortage, all possible means to increase the rate of 
transplantations are being sought and considered. In this chapter, we will review the 
various policies to facilitate donor procurement which have been adopted or proposed 
worldwide since the advent of transplantation medicine. Amongst the measures meant to 
augment the transplantation rate, radical modifications of the ‘dead donor rule’ have been 
proposed, requirements of consent for donations have been liberalized and the utility of 
cadaveric and living donations has been optimized. We will also address common 
justifications underlying this trend in terms of medical efficacy, cost-effectiveness and the 
proportion of indications for transplantation in the most common causes of disability and 
death in developed regions. 
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1.1 The shortage of human organs: a “formulaic” presentation 
 
A better understanding and manipulation of the process of inter-individual organ and tissue 
rejection has resulted in a substantial increase in the success of transplantation. The 
demand for human grafts for transplantation (i.e. 'allografts') has been outgrowing the 
supply ever since. Worldwide, organ procurement and donation networks indicate 
lengthening active transplant waiting lists and substantial death tolls, particularly for 
patients awaiting solid organ transplants of kidney, liver, heart, lung and pancreas. 
 
Per 1 January 2006, according to Eurotransplant (the international procurement and 
allocation organisation that covers Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands and Slovenia), 11,814 patients were enlisted as waiting for a kidney, 2,134 for 
a liver, 946 for a heart and 738 for lungs1. During 2004, a total of 1,449 patients died while 
awaiting a transplant2. On 18 January 2006 the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) 
counted 90,628 waiting list patients across the US3. That number includes patients who are 
waiting for multiple organs. Between January and October 2005 a total of 23,511 solid 
organ transplants were conducted from 12,090 (both living and cadaveric) donors4. Again, 
the gap between supply and demand is most pertinent for kidneys: a 4 per cent annual 
increase in the number of transplanted kidneys cannot sufficiently compensate for the 11 
per cent annual increase in demand5. As a result, people have to wait several years for a 
deceased donor kidney transplant6. In 2003 the US Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
Network (OPTN) reported a total of 7,147 deaths among the 114,442 patients on the 
waiting list (for all organs and on a national level)7. That amounts to an average of 19 to 20 
deaths a day. 
 
Those waiting list statistics may gravely underestimate the number of patients who 
actually require a transplant. For instance, in view of the scarcity of organs, a strict 
qualification of medical utility criteria is applied before a patient is considered eligible for 
the waiting list. Moreover, potential patients may not have infrastructural nor (in profit-
based health care systems) financial access to waiting list submission. Although the World 
Health Organization estimates that worldwide 80,000 organ transplants and 1.5 million 
tissue transplants are conducted annually8, it is believed that this amounts to as little as 5 
to 15 per cent of the number of transplants that would be carried out if the supply were 
unlimited9. 
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Basing the need for more transplants on statistical indications of demand/supply 
disparities is a criticisable approach. Joralemon argues that such a “formulaic 
presentation” misleadingly leads to the assumption that transplantation medicine is an 
“unquestionable good” that should be fully pursued10. This assumption, however, is not 
only inferred from waiting list statistics. The appraisal of the success of allotransplantation 
is reflected in the various policies that have been adopted or proposed worldwide since the 
advent of transplantation medicine to facilitate donor procurement. 
 
1.2 Policies to augment the human donor pool: an overview 
 
Amongst the measures meant to augment the transplantation rate, radical modifications of 
the ‘dead donor rule’ have been proposed, requirements of consent for donations have 
been eased and the utility of cadaveric and living donations has been optimized. 
 
1.2.1 Instrumental revisions of the ‘dead donor rule’ 
 
The ‘dead donor rule’, the most primary ethical and legal rule on the subject of human 
transplantation, stipulates that life-sustaining grafts may only be procured from humans 
after death. Traditionally, the rule implied that retrieval of hearts, lungs, and livers from 
a potential donor was permissible only after establishment of irreversible cessation of 
spontaneous respiration and circulation. However, with cardiac arrest, body tissues are 
deprived of blood flow and oxygen supply, due to which potentially transplantable organs 
and tissues rapidly deteriorate, rendering them unsuitable for transplantation. The scarcity 
of suitable grafts has prompted several suggestions and decisions to modify the dead donor 
rule entirely or to interpret it more broadly. 
 
Whole brain death 
 
The need for cadaveric donors generated a redefinition of death itself, with a shift from 
cardio-pulmonary to brain function criteria of death. In January 1968 The Ad Hoc 
Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death identified reliable clinical criteria for 
the diagnosis of respiratory-dependent patients who have lost all brain functions11. This 
group of patients had emerged from the development of intensive care medicine and life-
support systems. The position came up that patients in those conditions have reached the 
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point at which they ought to be treated as dead rather than as beings in a clinical state in 
which further treatment is futile. It was argued that irreversible loss of all functions of the 
brain correlates with the irreversible loss of one’s “personality, his conscious life, his 
uniqueness, his capacity for remembering, judging, reasoning, acting, enjoying, worrying, 
and so on.”12 The endorsement of the view that such a state constitutes death, is said to 
have served two purposes13. On the one hand, it aimed at alleviating the medical, 
technological and financial burdens posed by maintenance of those respiratory-dependent 
patients. It is nonetheless questionable whether these patients were a significant burden 
given the fact that they could be maintained for a mere maximum of hours or days only14. 
The main motivation for extending the criteria to declare someone dead, then, was to 
allow transplant surgeons to maintain artificial ventilation of a potential donor up to the 
point at which organ retrieval could be carried out. That limited the interval between the 
declaration of death and the process of removing, cooling, and preserving organs 
considerably. 
 
Higher brain death 
 
Shortly after the debate on the acceptability of using loss of brain functions as a criterion 
for death, a more complicated question emerged: precisely which brain functions are 
fundamental in terms of the death of the individual as a whole? One camp held on to the 
position that all brain function must be lost. A second camp took the view that it would be 
appropriate to treat an individual as dead even if some functions remain intact. 
Proponents of the latter view have argued for vital organ retrieval from anencephalic 
infants and patients in a permanent vegetative state, both conditions of ‘higher brain 
death’ in which brain stem functions (partially) remain, but either cerebral substance or 
function is irreversibly absent. The loss of higher brain functions renders the patient 
permanently unconscious and non-sentient up to the point at which cardiopulmonary and 
all brain functions cease to function as a matter of course. Several cases have been 
reported in which organs were harvested from an anencephalic baby15,16,17, but in each 
case, organ retrieval was conducted after the establishment of natural whole brain or 
cardiopulmonary death. To date, no requests have been accepted to allow donation from 
anencephalic babies18,19,20 or patients in a permanent vegetative state21,22 as an exception 
to the dead donor rule. 
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Elective ventilation 
 
Suggestions have also been made to use donors who are certain to die but have not yet 
met the criteria for either whole or higher brain death. In case of elective ventilation, 
ventilation is maintained in order to secure transplantable organs until brain death 
eventually does occur23. Elective ventilation would allow to keep a person’s heart and 
lungs operating in scenarios where patients have suffered severe, but not immediately 
lethal brain insult, and for whom death is imminent. This procedure runs counter to normal 
recommendations to let the patient die peacefully by withdrawing all treatment. It also 
challenges the common medical ethical norm, which gives patients the right to give or 
withhold consent to treatment, but which only applies to treatment intended to benefit 
the patient. 
 
Death row organ donation 
 
In the early 1990s a condemned prisoner in Georgia, US, offered to donate his organs as 
part of his death sentence and sued unsuccessfully for the denial of his request24. Ever 
since, serious debate has been held about the permissibility of procuring vital organs from 
willing persons at the moment of their execution25,26. Considering that capital punishment 
remains on the statute book in more than 100 countries worldwide, it is clear that such a 
decision could increase the availability of transplantable organs considerably. Although 
organs were obtained from guillotined prisoners in France in the 1950s, and US prisoners on 
life sentences were allowed to donate in the 1960s27, death row organ donation is currently 
prohibited in the United States and West European countries. A statute permitting prisoners to 
donate organs was briefly enacted in Taiwan (from 1990-1994) and is currently still into 
force in Singapore (since 1972) and China (since 1984)28. It is estimated that the Chinese 
procurement in line with ‘Rules Concerning the Utilization of Corpses or Organs from the Corpses 
of Executed Prisoners’ has resulted in the retrieval of up to 90 per cent of the nation’s 
transplant kidneys. China has also been the subject of criticism due to indications that the 
organs obtained from such prisoners are ‘sold’, a practice which the Chinese government 
recently said it would ban29. 
 
Non-heartbeating donation 
 
Due to the persistent organ shortage, retrieval of organs from persons declared dead on 
the basis of irreversible loss of heart function has been re-implemented. Cardiopulmonary 
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death remains a much more frequent cause of death than whole brain death. The 
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center proposed a non-heartbeating donor (NHBD) 
protocol in 199230. According to that proposal it would be allowed to take patients who 
have volunteered to become organ donors to the operating room before withdrawal of life 
support with the intention to retrieve organs as soon as the heart stops and death is 
pronounced. Various transplant centres have followed that lead. Initially only kidneys were 
deemed suitable due to the higher risk of problems related to the prolonged warm 
ischaemia (i.e. shortage of blood supply to the organ) before preservation31. To date, 
kidney, liver, and pancreas transplantations from controlled NHBDs appear to function well 
too, if the warm ischaemia time is less than 30-45 minutes and is followed by in situ 
perfusion cooling of the organs32. 
 
Survival lottery 
 
The most radical revision of the dead donor rule would consist in abandoning the 
requirement not to kill people altogether, in order to retrieve vital organs. In a famous 
1975 paper ‘Survival Lottery’, John Harris developed an argument for arbitrarily killing 
persons to provide organs for others33. His argument is based on the consideration that the 
benefits in terms of lives saved far outweigh the costs in terms of lives lost on the one 
hand, and on the assertion that there is no fundamental difference between a physician 
who kills directly and one who kills indirectly through failure to provide available life-
saving medical procedures. Harris proposed a ‘lottery’ system (random selection) in which 
all citizens run equal risks of being sacrificed. Acceptance of this procedure would depend 
on the acknowledgement that everyone’s individual chances of living are increased by that 
plan, as organ donation would no longer depend on the few people who volunteer to 
donate. 
 
1.2.2 Augmenting the consent rate for cadaveric donation 
 
Several efforts have been made to enhance the effectiveness of requests for consent to 
postmortem donation. Additionally, proposals have been put forward to circumvent the 
need for expressed prior consent altogether. 
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Expressed consent (opting in) 
 
In most nations, organ donation depends on the generosity of donors and their autonomous 
decision to make a lifesaving ‘gift’. Their procurement protocols therefore emphasize the 
need of a prior valid expression of the deceased person’s wishes to donate. Nevertheless, 
with increasing indications that the number of individuals who express their consent during 
their lifetimes is insufficient, there has been much focus has on strategies to facilitate the 
donation process. 
 
Required request  
 
In most nations with opting-in legislation, including the US, consent may be requested from 
the next of kin in case prior expressed consent of the deceased is lacking. Nevertheless, 
various surveys estimate that only 40 to 60 per cent of the total potential donors in the US 
actually donate or have surrogates donate on their behalf and have their organs used34. 
Attempts to maximize recovery of donors include the 1987 amendment of the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act that obliges hospitals and emergency personnel to develop procedures 
of ‘routine inquiry/required request’35. This provision requires hospitals to ask patients, 
each time they are admitted, or their families, when the patient is dead, about the 
patient’s desire for organ donation. If the patient expresses the intent to donate his or her 
organs, that information is added to the patient's record. Additionally, the Pennsylvania 
law Act 102 requires hospitals to call the regional organ procurement organisation 
regarding every patient’s death to determine the suitability of his or her organs for 
donation36. 
 
Improved communication 
 
Many expressed consent legislations are faced with a well-known ambivalence between a 
widely shared positive attitude towards organ donation on the one hand, and resistance to 
act upon this attitude when the potential donor is a former loved one or the imagined 
dead self on the other37. To address the unwillingness to consent between surviving 
relatives, North American procurement organisations now approach families in a more 
affirmative way, actively endorsing the presumption that people generally support 
postmortem donation, and that it is indeed the right thing to do38. That ‘presumptive 
approach’ seemingly gives the family the opportunity to ‘opt-out’ rather than ‘in’. 
Internationally, focus has also been directed towards expanded training for those who 
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must ask for the consent39. The lack of consent to organ donation has also prompted 
identification of subpopulations less likely to embrace organ donation. Studies indicate 
direct correlations between willingness to donate and prior family discussions on the 
subject, level of formal education, and the extent of accurate knowledge about organ 
donation/transplantation40. Presumably, appropriate public exposure would provoke more 
family discussion and more frequent declaration of one’s wishes to donate. It could also 
counterbalance psychological inhibitions to donation, such as the mistaken belief that one 
will receive less than adequate medical care if identified as a donor, and lack of skill in 
making decisions at highly stressful times41. Studies have shown that improvement 
measures in the whole donation process have resulted in an immediate overall increase of 
donation rates of up to 59 per cent after 1 year in 10 countries42. 
 
Required response (mandated choice) 
 
Under mandated choice, all competent adults would be obliged to decide on their 
willingness to donate organs upon their death43. Suggestions have been made to request 
one’s status as organ donor on tax returns, driver’s license applications, or official 
identification cards, and to not accept those applications without an expressed decision44. 
The choice would be binding – unless modified by a written directive at any time – and 
could not be overridden by the family unless that person has granted his or her family veto 
power. A variant of required response was tried out in the Netherlands in 1998 but was 
found to have a backfiring effect on the donation rate. Twelve million Dutch adults 
received a donor registration form in which they were asked to register which (if any) 
organs and tissues may be obtained in the case of brain death. Only four million people 
filled out the forms and sent them in, of whom 34 per cent registered an objection45. Pilot 
studies of the mandated choice model in Virginia and Texas were not encouraging either46. 
 
Presumed consent (opting out) 
 
At least thirteen European countries, some of which are leading organ procurement 
countries worldwide, operate under presumed consent legislation. Within such a system, 
an individual’s wish to donate is presumed in the absence of an actual statement.  Unless 
an individual ‘opts out’ by registering an explicit objection during his or her lifetime, the 
authorities can assume that he or she has permitted donation. The reasoning underlying 
implementations of ‘presumed consent’ is that people often do not express consent due to 
negligence or lack of knowledge about the process of consent, rather than fundamental 
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objection. The impact of changing to a presumed consent system on the donor 
procurement is in some cases quite compelling. Belgium, for instance, which passed the 
bill for presumed consent on 13 June 1986, obtained 37.4 donated kidneys per million in 
1988, compared to 20 kidneys donated per million in 198547. Three years after the law was 
passed, Leuven saw its donor rate rise from 15 to 40 donors per year. Antwerp, which did 
not switch to presumed consent, maintained its previous levels. 
 
Although consent is presumed in the lack of explicit individual objection, the surviving 
relatives retain the opportunity to oppose this (and actually do in approximately 15 per 
cent of potential brain dead donation48). As such, many presumed consent systems 
encourage additional expressed consent to evade potential conflicts with family members. 
Since the launch of a public campaign on organ donation in June 2005, Belgium has 
witnessed a near doubling of the number of positive registrations (48,9 per cent)49. 
 
Conscription without consent 
 
Suggestions have been made to surpass the need for consent altogether, on the basis of 
societal appropriation (‘conscription’/‘routine salvage’) of cadaveric organs50. Some states 
of the US have modified the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act to allow for ‘tailored’ routine 
salvaging. Under certain circumstances, organs may be procured when there is ‘no known 
objection,’ of the deceased individual, when there are at least symbolic indications of 
donor preference and if all attempts to reach and consult the family were unsuccessful51. 
While the routine salvaging of grafts from deceased individuals could dramatically increase 
the organ procurement rate, it is feared that it would damage public trust in the medical 
profession. This assumption lacks large-scale empirical support at this moment, although 
Spital conducted a modest telephone survey (n=1014) in continental US and found that 66 
per cent of the respondents opposed organ conscription52. 
 
Consent by incentive 
 
Given the lack of altruistic donations, various ideas have emerged to boost the willingness 
of potential donors and/or surviving relatives to donate by way of an incentive. Among the 
many plans that have been outlined in keeping with this idea, a distinction can be made 
between incentives for living and cadaveric donation on the one hand, and between direct 
payment for the donated organs or other – more modest – incentives, on the other. 
Incentives for cadaveric donations may be directed both to the relatives at the time of a 
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donor’s death, or to the actual donor during his or her lifetime. A ‘future contract’ could 
be established to commit a donor to the decision to donate after death, and would, for 
instance, consist in offering the prospective donors life insurance coverage, an income or 
estate tax incentive, free medical care, or priority for either him/herself or family 
members in case they themselves come to need transplants in the future. Alternatively, 
incentives for cadaveric donation for surviving relatives could include reimbursement of 
funeral expenses or a financial contribution to a chosen charitable organisation53,54,55. In 
1994 the Pennsylvania Funeral Benefits Pilot Program was proposed, intending to offer 
surviving donor relatives US $3,000 for funeral expenses. (Please note that all references 
to dollars hereafter are US currency.) Due to opposition from the State Health 
Department, the program, which was finally launched eight years later, was severely 
altered and consisted of a mere $300 benefit to pay for food and lodging costs incurred by 
a donor or a donor’s family56. More recently, US legislation introduced a proposal to offer 
living organ donors a one-time tax credit of up to $5,000 to help to cover personal 
expenses57. In comparison with the other suggested incentives, reimbursement of donor 
related expenses for living donors is well received and is explicitly allowed elsewhere (in 
particular in Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, and the US)58. Conversely, the direct purchase of organs from live donors 
has yet to be legalized (we will discuss this issue further in Chapter 3). The movement in 
favour of commercialization is nonetheless steadily gaining strength, partly as a response 
to the illegal traffic in organs59. Direct financial gain proposals are generally focused on 
the idea to create a private or governmental supervisory agency that manages a market-
driven procurement system of cadaveric or living donors. The distribution of organs, once 
collected, could be organized exactly as it is today60, or by highest bid. Assessments 
indicate that a vendor program would be a cost-effective system for society61. 
 
1.2.3 Optimising living donor utility 
 
The first successful clinical organ allotransplant was conducted on 23 December 1954 
under the direction of Joseph Murray. A kidney was transplanted between two identical 
twin brothers and resulted in nine-year recipient survival62. Thanks to the growing 
experience since, the results of transplants from living donors have improved and the 
practices of using unrelated donors and of transplanting segments of vital organs have 
increased. 
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Expanded pool of living donors 
 
As recently as 1991 the World Health Organization recommended that living organ donation 
should be restricted to the use of genetically related donors in light of better matches and 
the related higher likelihood of graft survival63. Developments in clinical 
immunosuppression have nonetheless allowed substantial improvements in the results of 
zero-antigen-matched living donor transplants.  Kidneys from unrelated donors have 
achieved long-term survival rates (five-year graft survivals of 72 per cent), which are 
comparable to those for parent donor grafts64. Moreover, owing to the advantages of 
elective performance of transplant procedures and reduced preservation times, living 
donor grafts result in better allograft function and long-term survival than cadaveric donor 
grafts. Consequently, kidney donations from individuals who are related to their recipients 
only through emotional bonds (friends and spouses) and, at some centres, even people who 
are not related to their recipients at all, are now considered acceptable65. In the United 
States genetically unrelated individuals account for 33 per cent of the living donor pool66. 
The prevalence of anonymous living kidney donation remains rare, but has nonetheless 
increased fourfold in the past 5 years67. The pool of compatible living donors is further 
expanded through paired exchanges between two donor-recipient pairs. In those cases, 
there is a cross-donation from two willing living donors who are incompatible with their 
desired recipient but compatible with the other donor’s desired recipient. From the same 
principle, living donors may also exchange their kidney for cadaveric organs68. 
 
Expanded pool of transplantable organs 
 
Because of improvements in surgical techniques and immunosuppression regimens, 
segments of pancreas, intestine, liver, and lung are now also transplantable from living 
donors. The liver is among the few internal human organs capable of natural regeneration 
and can restore up to 75 per cent of lost tissue. Transplants of segments of the liver from 
live donors were initiated in 199469 and, while kidney donation remains by far the most 
frequent type of living organ donation, over 500 liver segment transplants have been 
conducted worldwide70. The shortage of lung grafts from cadaveric donors has also 
prompted the development of a technique for performing lung lobe transplantation from 
living donors71. In most cases, the recipient receives bilateral lobar transplants from two 
different living donors. There has been no perioperative or long-term mortality following 
lobectomy for living lobar lung transplantation, although risk of death between 0.5 and 1 
per cent has been quoted72. Living donor partial pancreas transplantation is a very new 
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procedure; the first transplant was conducted in January 200573. Even living heart donation 
is considered a possibility nowadays. In rare events, it can be determined that a deceased 
donor lung will function best in a recipient if transplanted in conjunction with the 
deceased donor heart. In that case, the prospective recipient’s healthy heart is removed 
and becomes available for others on the transplant waiting list. Such living heart donation 
occurred recently, on 14 January 2006, from a four-month old domino transplant 
recipient74. 
 
1.2.4 Optimising cadaveric donor utility 
 
Expanded criteria donors (marginal donors) 
 
The crisis of organ shortage has compelled strategies to maximize donor utility beyond 
former contraindications related to donor age, comorbidities and systemic disease. It is 
believed that that approach can increase the current organ supply by 25 to 30 per cent75. 
The use of such ‘expanded criteria donors’ generally implies a higher risk of suboptimal 
graft function and survival, although recent data support the policy to relieve restrictions 
related to donor age, diabetes, hypertension, or presence of multiple arteries, providing 
pre-transplant biopsy is acceptable. For liver transplantation – for which almost none of 
the most commonly used contraindications admitted in 1986 are valid today76 -a similar 
level of function between livers of elderly donors and younger donors has been reported77. 
Other studies have indicated that the long-term functioning of two marginal donor kidneys 
transplanted in one recipient is similar and in some cases even superior to that of a single 
ideal kidney78,79. Transplants of grafts infected with viral hepatitis are also considered and 
may provide medical utility for recipients who have Hepatitis B induced liver disease, for 
instance, or for seronegative recipients in conjunction with appropriate antiviral 
preventive treatment. 
 
Split liver transplantation 
 
The liver’s above mentioned capacity for natural regeneration also allows for two 
recipients to receive functioning liver grafts from one donor. An adult donor is divided in 
such a way that the left lateral liver graft can be transplanted into a small child and the 
right extended liver graft into an adult80. One of the major advantages of this procedure is 
that it increases the pool of transplantable livers for small children, for whom the shortage 
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of organs is most extreme. Comparisons of the predicted lifetimes between whole liver 
transplantation for an adult recipient on the one hand and a split liver transplantation for 
both an adult and paediatric recipient on the other hand, suggest that split liver 
transplantation results in a net gain in life years. It also contributes to a larger number of 
successfully transplanted recipients using the existing supply of donor livers, even 
considering the higher rate of re-transplantation and death associated with these 
procedures81. 
 
Organ reuse 
 
The need to maximize donor utility has also induced the reuse of previously transplanted 
organs, such as a kidney or a liver, after early post-transplant death of the initial 
recipient. Recently, three case studies of liver re-transplants have been reported, 
demonstrating that livers may be safely reused as long as the graft was of good quality in 
the initial donor and was working well in the initial recipient. The authors note that 11 
such re-transplants appear in the UNOS database from 1 October 1987 through 31 March 
200482. During this period, nine recipients were alive with a functioning graft. Previous 
case reports of liver reuse in Europe have also indicated reasonable survival rates83. 
 
1.3 Transplantation: saving lives, the quality of life and health care 
expenses 
 
It is abundantly clear that all possible means to increase the rate of allotransplantations 
are being sought and considered. Against these efforts, however, critics call into question 
whether transplantation is currently the most attractive, or indeed, the only therapeutic 
option for the various diseases for which organ or tissue transplantation is now deployed. 
They argue for the need to prevent organ failure – rather than ‘pick up the pieces’ 
afterwards –, to take into account alternative therapies for organ failure, and to reallocate 
substantial financial, research, and institutional resources to less ‘exotic’ forms of health 
care, which will benefit a larger patient population. Critics also call into question the 
medical efficacy of transplantation in terms of quality of life and life years gained, by 
drawing attention to the adverse, sometimes life-threatening effects related to long-term 
post-transplant immunosuppression. 
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Improved prevention strategies for various diseases could indeed partly ease the transplant 
burden, at least in theory. For instance, pancreas or pancreatic islet cell transplants have 
been introduced as a viable therapy for diabetes. That disease is becoming alarmingly 
prevalent in western nations. With one in every adult having either Type 1 or 2 diabetes 
within the New York region, the problem has recently been identified as a genuine 
epidemic84. Left untreated, Type 1 diabetes can result in major organ failure, amongst 
other complications, and currently accounts for more than 40 per cent of the cases of end 
stage kidney failure in the US85. Nevertheless, although the growing incidence of diabetes 
parallels the increase in obesity, which is to a large extent avoidable, recent reports 
suggest that Type 1 – and perhaps one fifth of the cases of Type 2 diabetes as well – also 
has a genetic basis86. Similarly, some organ pathologies can be congenitally acquired. 
Cancer, inflammation, infection or trauma are still other unpredictable and often 
misinterpreted causes of organ failure. Even in those cases in which prevention is 
appropriate, compliance of individuals to advice regarding healthier life styles cannot be 
controlled or enforced. Preventive measures on longer terms will also come too late for 
those who will need a transplant during the next decade(s)87. 
 
In terms of medical efficacy, organ allotransplantation has evolved to be the preferred 
treatment for severe failure of the heart, lungs, liver and kidneys88. The use of 
immunosuppressants before the so-called cyclosporine era had a high death toll. 
Azathioprine, for instance, was administered until the early 1980s and related to an 
average mortality of 40 per cent at one year post-transplant89. The subsequent 
introduction of cyclosporine in 1983 resulted in demonstrably improved outcomes in terms 
of kidney, liver and cardiac graft survival, life years and quality of life gained90. Continued 
progress has been made in methods of immunosuppression, tissue typing, organ 
preservation, and surgical techniques91. The one-year survival of deceased donor kidney 
grafts is said to have improved from 82.1 +/- 0.5 per cent to 89.0 +/- 0.3 per cent between 
1993 and 200292, and the survival rates now exceed survival on dialysis. Cascalho and Platt 
note a three-year graft and function survival, almost without any form of rejection, for 77 
per cent of cardiac transplants, 81 per cent of kidney transplants and 72 per cent of liver 
transplants93. In a US study of all patients awaiting a deceased donor organ transplant – as 
enlisted in the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients – between 1995 and 2002, 
Schnitzler et al. found that per organ donor, 30.8 additional life years are obtained, 
distributed over an average 2.9 different solid organ transplant recipients94. The use of all 
solid organs from a single donor provides 55.8 additional life years distributed over six 
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recipients. Liver, heart and kidney transplants contribute most to the overall life year 
gain. 
 
The success achieved in transplant medicine has prompted the use of replacement 
therapies for non-vital disorders. As such, transplants of bone marrow, cornea, heart 
valve, skin, knee and various cellular transplants were introduced at the end of the 
twentieth century to contribute to the quality of life of many patients. In recent years the 
techniques to perform hand, limb and face transplants are being developed. 
 
On a critical note, however, modern transplantation medicine is not without its drawbacks. 
In spite of improved short-term survival rates and a general triumph over acute rejection, 
results of five to ten years after transplantation still leave much to be desired. Recent 
data imply that long-term risk of graft loss – as a result of chronic tissue rejection and slow 
deterioration in function – may even have worsened95. The incidence of secondary disease 
as a result of long-term immunosuppression is also considerable. Amongst the various 
complications are kidney failure, hypertension, diabetes, increased incidence of cancer 
and, most commonly, cardiovascular disease96. It remains to be seen whether chronic 
rejection can be controlled. An exciting way ahead lies in research focused on developing 
immunological tolerance, a state in which a recipient lacks immune reactivity to the donor 
tissue but remains responsive to all other stimuli. Nevertheless, even if long-term graft loss 
cannot be prevented, a suboptimal solution to end stage organ disease may be acceptable 
in light of the life-and-death nature of the transplant. 
 
Furthermore, transplantation medicine is indeed a costly affair, with substantial expenses 
related to donor organ retrieval, the transplant operation and long-term care of the 
transplant patient97. Factoring in five years of follow-up charges, estimated transplant 
expenses range from an average of $100,00098 for a kidney transplant to $3,000,000 for 
heart, heart-lung, and lung transplants and nearly $400,000 for a liver transplant99. 
Nonetheless, for most indications for which patients are currently put on the waiting list, 
transplantation is the most cost-effective therapy available. Many studies have established 
that successful renal transplantation (granted that graft survival and function is greater 
than 1.5 years) is more cost-effective than dialysis in the treatment of end stage renal 
failure100,101,102. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), kidney transplantation produces savings of 63 per cent103. Pancreas transplantation 
is also more cost-effective compared to other treatment options for Type-1 diabetics with 
end stage renal disease104. The cost-effectiveness of liver transplantation is less clear in 
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cases of alcoholic liver disease, but is in general less costly than the alternative of no 
transplantation at all105. Additional support for cost-effectiveness is found in the 
economical advantages provided by re-entry of the transplant recipient into the 
employment market and in comparison to costs related to an enduring organ shortage106. 
 
A further argument in favour of allocating a substantial proportion of the health care 
budget to the field of transplantation lies in the fact that many of the diseases that are 
potentially treatable through transplantation are the most common causes of disability and 
death in developed countries. 
 
Developing Countries  # Deaths Developed Countries # Deaths 
HIV/AIDS 2 678 000 Ischaemic heart disease 3 512 000 
Lower respiratory infections 2 643 000 Cerebrovascular disease 3 346 000 
Ischaemic heart disease 2 484 000 Chron. obstructive pulmon. 
disease 
1 829 000 
Diarrhoeal diseases 1 793 000 Lower respiratory infections 1 180 000 
Cerebrovascular disease 1 381 000 Trachea/bronchus/lung 
cancers 
938 000 
Childhood diseases 1 217 000 Road traffic accidents 669 000 
Malaria 1 103 000 Stomach cancer 657 000 
Tuberculosis 1 021 000 Hypertensive heart disease 635 000 
Chron. obstructive pulmon. 
Disease 
748 000 Tuberculosis 571 000 
Measles 674 000 Self-inflicted 499 000 
WHO: Leading Causes of Death in 2001107 
 
Contrary to the developing world, non-communicable disease by far constitutes the 
greatest cause of mortality within the industrialized world. US statistics specify that heart 
disease and malignant neoplasms (cancer) – were the nation’s major causes of death in 
2002, representing more than half of all deaths (respectively 28.5 and 22.8 per cent)108. 
For advanced pulmonary and heart diseases, treatment with drugs or restorative surgery 
may not be possible. Cancer is in itself a leading cause of organ failure109. Moreover, it has 
been suggested that future application of molecular diagnosis will be able to identify 
cancer in its earliest stages and pre-emptive transplantation would be a useful strategy to 
prevent the cancer from spreading110. 
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Parallel to medical advances and the aging of western nation populations, a continued 
lengthening of the list of diseases for which transplantation may be of benefit is expected. 
The number of patients who will succumb to end stage renal disease in the US is estimated 
to increase at an annual rate of 7-8 per cent111. One person in five who reaches 65 years of 
age is expected to receive some form of organ replacement during his or her life span112. 
Transplantation may also increasingly address non-organ failure related complications that 
arise as a result of an aging population, such as neurodegenerative disease. Indeed, neural 
transplantation has evolved over the last twenty years as a potentially curative approach 
for Parkinson’s and Huntington’s diseases as well as for demyelination, stroke and spinal 
cord injury. Particularly with regard to Parkinson’s, the hopes of reversing the 
neurodegenerative processes are high. Although transplantation practices in those cases 
are still in an experimental stage, a review of all published results of patients with 
Parkinson’s disease transplanted with human embryonic tissue found that most recipients 
improved significantly in motor skills and L-dopa administration, at least within the first 6 
post-transplant months113. In a few patients, outstanding results have been achieved, with 
completely normalized dopamine production allowing them to quit L-dopa treatment 
completely114. Granted that islet allotransplantation is becoming a desired treatment for 
the majority of Type 1 diabetes patients, it is clear that the case for expanding the supply 
of such transplantable cells, as well as organs, should not be undervalued. 
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2 The ethics of organ allocation: frustrations in the face of finitude1 
 
Adapted from: RAVELINGIEN A, KROM A. Earning points for moral behaviour. 
Organ allocation based on reciprocity. International Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 2005; 19(1): 73-83. 
 
Abstract 
 
Although not uncontested, the goal of organ and tissue replacement technology – as a 
means to delay individuals’ “human finitude” – has been accommodated within a general 
frame of mind. Particularly for circumstances under which the only alternative for 
transplantation is death, there even appears to be a positive moral duty to pursue 
transplantation. For those who acknowledge a positive right to transplantation medicine, 
its purpose must not be rationed for health care economic savings. Unfortunately, some 
level of rationing is inescapable in light of the scarce commodity of donated grafts, 
particularly organs, leaving us to decide how best to allocate. Contention over what 
constitutes ‘fair’ selection has prompted various alternative suggestions to help resolve 
candidate ranking. Included are references to social parameters that have no direct 
medical relevance – such as age, deservingness or contribution to society. Recently, a 
Dutch philosopher, Govert den Hartogh, proposed a form of directed donation in which 
priority would be granted to candidate recipients who are themselves registered as donors. 
Given the prevalence of similar suggestions in international debates and the fact that den 
Hartogh’s account provides one of the most well thought-out plans to manage the organ 
shortage crisis, we will, in what follows, consider the matter in some depth. We will 
suggest that steering organ allocation towards those who are themselves willing to donate 
organs is both an ineffective and a morally questionable means of attempting to improve 
procurement and allocation of transplantable organs. Suggestions to curb the eligibility to 
a life-saving transplant will nonetheless persist as long as there is a shortage of organs. 
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2.1 A right to transplantation? 
 
It is undeniable that most of the aforementioned steps and suggestions to augment the 
transplant rate have been fraught with controversy in one way or another. Indeed, many of 
these controversies have helped shape – or, some would argue, directly brought forth – the 
content and focus of ‘bioethics’ as a distinct discipline2. Since the advent of 
allotransplantation, Renée Fox and Judith Swazey (and many others after them) have 
explored the various ethical and social aspects which emerged from the replacement 
technology3,4,5, many of which – as will be discussed from section three onwards – resurface 
in the context of xenotransplantation. Fox and Swazey were among the first in the field of 
transplantation to identify and comment upon complex problems of determining the death 
of a mechanically-assisted patient, of weighing the acceptability of immune rejection 
related risks and of deciding who shall live when both financial and graft sources are 
limited. They also analysed the various psychological and social experiences of all involved 
in the process of human-to-human ‘spare part’ donation. This included an anthropological 
inquiry into the moral obligation of humans to donate parts of their bodies to others, 
whether known or unknown, related or unrelated. They addressed the meaning and 
significance of the ‘gift’ of life-saving organ donation, a gift which is ultimately not 
repayable. They raised questions regarding the extent to which body replacement 
technology evokes recipient and societal views of the body as bionic, replaceable, 
adjustable. 
 
After 40 years of firsthand research in the sociology and anthropology of organ 
replacement, these pioneers have recently recalled their involvement in the field, 
unconvinced by some of the assumptions on which organ transplantation is moving ahead: 
 
(…) the “not-totally rational beliefs that transplantation is an unequivocally and 
unconditionally good way of sustaining lives, [and] that the more organs 
proffered, procured, and transplanted the better”; the “death is the enemy” to 
be “overcome” outlook that energizes these medical-surgical acts; and the 
hubris-ridden unwillingness to recognize and consent to our human finitude 
that this perspective implies.6 
 
The quote serves here to demonstrate two realities. Firstly, it draws attention to ongoing 
cultural resistance to some of the implications of organ donation and transplantation. The 
ethical problems Fox and Swazey identified half a century ago remain of import and 
reappear in contemporary controversies surrounding the correlation between requirements 
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for consent for donation and the surviving interests of the dead, the imperative to view 
transplantation as a matter of voluntary gift, and defences of personal ownership over and 
commercialization of body parts. Cultural consensus is also lacking regarding one of the 
basic fundaments of transplantation practice: the view that whole brain death entails the 
death of the individual. Japan, for instance, witnessed only fourteen cases of 
transplantation from brain dead donors up to 2001 due to society-wide rejection of this 
concept and the related notion that the essence of humans lies in self-consciousness and 
rationality7. By contrast, the negative feedback also exemplifies the extent to which the 
goal of organ (and tissue) replacement technology – as a means to delay individuals’ 
“human finitude” – has been accommodated within a general frame of mind, at least 
within those parts of the world where it has become routine medicine. Particularly for 
circumstances under which the only alternative for transplantation is death, there even 
appears to be a positive moral duty to pursue transplantation further. The continuous 
efforts taken to increase human graft procurement suggest that, on a broad societal level, 
the most pertinent moral argument related to transplantation medicine is that precisely 
more should be done to facilitate transplant activities. In fact, various authors will support 
this positive duty even at the expense of other widely held ethical norms – such as the 
requirement for prior consent for postmortem donation. John Harris defends the latter 
argument in a rhetoric of common sense: 
 
Why is there ever an obligation to rescue? Why do we have a health care system 
set up to remedy “unfortunate states of affairs”? I know that rhetorical 
questions are not arguments (…) but I am confident that simply asking the 
questions will show the moral poverty of any person, or any philosophy, that 
could even ask such a question with a straight face! I have to say that someone 
who does not see that the remediable suffering of others creates obligations is 
simply not a moral agent.8 
 
Framing transplantation in terms of a moral duty evokes a sense of entitlement to 
transplantation, as part and parcel of the right to health care. In spite of the fact that the 
scope of any positive right to health care is necessarily limited by the many competing 
claims for the finite health care (budgetary) resources on which it rests, reasonable 
justifications of a claim to transplantation can be made from the perspective of maximized 
net aggregate benefit calculations and the maximin principle. As stated in the previous 
chapter, transplantation medicine promotes net aggregate welfare in terms of the 
population proportion that could potentially benefit from transplantation, as well as in 
terms of reduced overall health care costs. Alternatively, the maximin principle would 
suggest moral preference for those distributive decisions that maximize the wellbeing of 
the worst off, regardless of the net aggregate societal benefit on the whole. The 
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suggestion can be derived from applying John Rawls’ theory of distributive justice of social 
goods, which impartially takes into account the interests of all members of the moral 
community. The impartiality is assured by what Rawls calls ‘original position negotiations’: 
imaginary discussions regarding the interests of various societal positions from behind a 
‘veil of ignorance’ under the consideration that “no one knows his place in society, his 
class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune on the distribution of 
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.”9 Having omitted the 
individual, actual vantage point, the negotiators tend to make decisions that serve the 
best interests for all. Game theoretically, it is in everyone’s interest that basic social 
resources and practices are reserved primarily for the least well off. In applying this 
general account of distributive justice to the distribution of health care resources, a case 
can be made that – at least within the developed world – the right to transplantation 
medicine outweighs entitlement to many other forms of health care. According to Norman 
Daniels, health care is a special case of rights to equality of opportunity10 (the equivalent, 
or condition even, of ‘basic social goods’) and should be distributed according to the 
extent to which a normal range of opportunities is protected. Disease and disability 
restrict an individual’s range of opportunities, which would otherwise compromise his/her 
‘normal functioning’. The degree of lacking opportunities has an enormous impact on 
access to basic social practices and participation in all spheres of social life. Consequently, 
the most compelling claims for health care are for those therapies that maximize the 
opportunity of the least well off. Again, as indicated in the previous chapter – in terms of 
life-expectancy, quality of life, morbidity and mortality rates – it is clear that many forms 
of transplant medicine, particularly in the treatment of premature end stage organ failure, 
stand the test of maximizing the minimum ‘opportunity’ position. 
 
For those who acknowledge a positive right to transplantation medicine, its purpose must 
not be rationed for health care economic savings. Unfortunately, some level of rationing is 
inescapable in light of the scarce commodity of organs for transplant, leaving us to decide 
how best to allocate. Which waiting list candidates are most entitled to a transplant? A 
precursor of the dilemma arose in traditional medical ethics in a different form, as the 
choice between saving one of two desperately ill patients when only one physician is 
available11. In the current context, however, the predicament is a large-scale, daily 
matter, and has caused the public to view the transplant physicians as ‘gatekeepers’ of 
life12. 
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2.2 ‘Right’ and ‘wrong’ in distributing the right to transplantation 
 
The argument could be made that each waiting list candidate should have equal 
opportunity for receiving a life-saving organ transplant, regardless of what his or her 
chances of benefiting from it are. However, giving all candidates equal chances at 
selection – without taking into account their various qualities of life, potential survival and 
strength of desire for a transplant – would go against our notions of medical efficiency and 
fairness13. Surveys have established that most transplant physicians would prefer allocation 
according to probability of good outcome14. This principle of ‘medical utility’ would favour 
allocation to those recipients who have the highest chance of benefiting and surviving from 
the transplant. This principle alone, however, is equally inadequate to fulfil a notion of 
fair and efficient distribution, since the interpretation of medical utility is not entirely 
dependent on medical facts15, but rather on how those facts are valued. It does not help us 
to choose between, for instance, a patient who has the greatest chance of graft survival; a 
patient who has the greatest predicted years of survival; a patient who would receive the 
greatest relief from suffering or morbidity; and yet another patient who would get the 
most personal satisfaction out of the transplant16. The present allocation formula of most 
policies compromises between considerations of medical utility and justice or fairness17, 
aiming for acceptable results in terms of patient survival and quality of life while also 
considering other factors, such as urgency of need (favouring those patients who are 
sickest and most likely to die) and waiting time. 
 
Nevertheless, dispute over the relative weight of these factors remains. Contention over 
what constitutes ‘fair’ selection has prompted various alternative suggestions to help 
resolve candidate ranking. Included are references to social parameters that have no 
direct medical relevance – such as age, deservingness or contribution to society. 
Historically, elderly patients were not admitted to the waiting list under the presumption 
that younger candidates would obtain greater benefit18. In light of improved results, 
however, the controversy has shifted to the moral question whether elderly persons or 
repeat transplant recipients deserve an equal shot at an organ in comparison to young 
patients or patients who have not yet been transplanted19. Psychosocial or lifestyle criteria 
have also come under scrutiny. Suggestions have been made to exclude HIV-patients20, 
criminals21, mentally incompetent patients22 and patients who require a transplant as a 
result of alcoholic liver disease (ALD)23 from the waiting list. An alternative means of 
rationing the scarce ‘goods’ is by offering candidate donors the opportunity to designate 
the selection criteria for a future donation themselves. So-called directed donations – 
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which restrict the allocation to a particular person, institution, ethnic group or age 
category24 – have to some extent been introduced in the past. In 2002, for instance, 
California State Senator Jeff Denham introduced legislation that allowed donors to debar 
allocation to prisoners25. The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) has formally 
rejected directed donations, claiming that it is discriminatory and threatens to undermine 
the whole logic behind the anonymity-based allocation process. 
 
Directed donation raises interesting questions. For instance, the argument has been made 
that, despite it being discriminatory, it is better to permit directed donation than obtain 
no donation at all. By prohibiting this form of donation, the organs will go to waste and be 
of benefit to no one. Still a different argument can be made in defence of directed 
donation to certain racial groups. Although minority ethnic populations in the United 
States have an increased risk of developing end stage renal disease compared to whites, 
data indicate that white dialysis patients have more than double the chances of receiving a 
kidney transplant than black patients26. This is in part due to profound racial differences in 
antigen expression and the fact that black individuals have less well-defined HLA antigenic 
specificities than do white patients.  Directed donation to black patients could thus be 
defended as a means to lessen the gap in cross-racial antigen matching. 
 
The debate surrounding the role of social criteria in the selection of candidate recipients is 
far from resolved and will remain an intrinsic aspect of the organ scarcity. Recently, a 
Dutch philosopher, Govert den Hartogh, proposed a form of directed donation in which 
priority would be granted to candidate recipients who are themselves registered as donors. 
In the opinion of den Hartogh, the procurement and allocation of donor organs should be 
seen as a system of reciprocity and not of goodwill and voluntary altruism. Given the 
prevalence of similar suggestions in international debates27 and the fact that den Hartogh’s 
account provides one of the most well thought-out plans to manage the organ shortage 
crisis, it is expedient to consider the matter in some depth. 
 
2.3 Earning points for moral behaviour 
 
In its own effort to ethically reduce the organ shortage, the Netherlands established the 
required consent law (opting-in) in 1998, emphasizing the need of explicit consent to 
donation by the potential donor or – if lacking – the next of kin. The rate of heartbeating 
cadaveric organ donations has nevertheless reached a disquieting plateau during the past 
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years. A recent increase in both living and non-heartbeating donations can only partly 
compensate for the widening gap between supply and demand. A comparative study with 
several Western European and other countries reveals that, among those Western European 
countries, the Netherlands is ranked third lowest in numbers of cadaveric organ donors per 
million inhabitants. With 12.3 effectuated donations per million inhabitants in 2001, the 
Netherlands is unable to meet the need for donor organs28. Approximately 20 per cent of 
the adult Dutch population is registered as organ donor29. Of the cases in which the will of 
the deceased is unknown and the decision is left to the next of kin – still the biggest source 
of donor organs – the family refuses in roughly 60 per cent of the cases. The family refuses 
even in 6 to 10 per cent of the cases where the deceased was registered as donor30. In 
addition, when the potential donor is not listed in the donor registry, potential donor 
organs are wasted, as the family is often not even asked for permission31. It is within the 
context of this relatively low donation rate that Govert den Hartogh, Professor of Ethics at 
Amsterdam University, suggests that the practice of organ donation should be structured in 
a radically different way. In his study ‘Gift or contribution?’ he defends a change to a type 
of presumed consent system in which organ donation is seen as fulfilling a duty to 
contribute in a reciprocal relationship. 
 
2.3.1 Proposal outline 
 
According to den Hartogh, the current opting-in system must be replaced by an opting-out 
system, which he trusts will be more profitable. Within such a system – also known as 
‘presumed consent’ – everyone is in principle regarded as a potential donor, unless the 
individual registered an explicit objection during his or her lifetime. Nevertheless, 
presuming consent in case of non-registration is still subject to doubt and leaves 
insuperable room for inappropriate family objections. Surviving relatives may be inclined 
to take non-registration as a sign of implicit objection and withhold their consent as a 
consequence, thereby negatively influencing transplantation rates. It is therefore 
important to anticipate ambivalent situations and to encourage people as much as possible 
to register their will to donate as well. Den Hartogh proposes to give those who have 
explicitly registered as organ donors, priority in receiving an organ should they ever need 
one. Such a priority position for registered donors could be guaranteed, he thinks, by 
granting them ‘bonus points’ if they are ever on the waiting list. Accordingly, donors would 
have better chances of receiving an organ if they were ever to need a transplant 
themselves. 
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The specific outline of den Hartogh’s proposal draws on an analysis of what he believes to 
be major false preconceptions within Dutch donation and procurement processes. He 
believes that the apparent Dutch preference for the opting-in system is based on a 
mistaken focus on the interests that are to be protected by the demand for express 
consent. The argumentations in favour of consent emphasize the need to protect the right 
to self-determination and bodily integrity. In the opinion of the author, these interests 
become drastically reduced after death. As for self-determination, after death the only 
decisions that remain in practice relate to the type of donation (donating your organs for 
transplantation or donating your body to science) and the type of funeral. Even this self-
determination is violated in view of the voice that the family members are still given in 
the matter. Accordingly, violations of bodily integrity lose much of their relevance after 
death and must be weighed against the overriding goal, which in this case is the more 
urgent need of third parties (the potential organ recipients). Moreover, the emphasis on 
self-determination and autonomy is inconsistent. If the right to determine what happens to 
your body is in fact so important, why is it that others, most often the family, can take 
over or even veto that right once you have passed away? 
 
Furthermore, the current donation model is based on the false idea that organ donation is 
ultimately a donation, a voluntarily gift that is in no way obliging. According to den 
Hartogh, there is no question of 'non-commitment' in the realm of organ donation. 
Thoughts on both the ‘Samaritan duty’ to help a person in serious need and the ‘duty of 
fairness’ lead him to determine that organ donation is in fact a matter of fulfilling one’s 
duty to help and contribute. It is through this insight only that we can thwart the ‘free 
rider’ who takes advantage of the fact that it is in everyone’s interest that donor organs 
should be available, but in nobody’s direct interest that his or her own organs are made 
available. 
 
The Samaritan duty – the ‘duty of easy rescue’ – stipulates that you should help a person a) 
if he or she is in serious need; b) provided such action does not involve too high a cost to 
you; and c) provided you are in a unique position to offer help. The Samaritan duty would 
for instance apply if you were a coincidental passer-by who witnesses a child drowning. 
Provided that you can swim, and the cost of rescuing the child would be nothing more than 
a set of wet clothes, it is generally regarded a duty – in some countries legally mandatory – 
to help that child from drowning. Den Hartogh argues that the same goes for cadaveric 
organ donation. According to him, it is clear that the patients on the waiting list are in 
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serious need. The possible costs of postmortem organ donation are outweighed by the 
benefits to the patient. The organs are of no use to you after death, but can save 
another’s life. As for the latter criterion, a donor is not literally in a unique position to 
offer help to the patient in need. In principle, anyone can be a donor. Nevertheless, a 
'one-to-one' relationship can be formed when – with the help of a certain amount of 
coordination – the donor's organs are allocated to the first suitable person on the waiting 
list.  
 
With ‘the principle of fairness’, den Hartogh turns to a second duty. Instead of supporting 
the notions of solidarity and charity, the author uses the ‘principle of fairness’ to indicate 
an obligation to contribute to what can become a system of mutually assured help. The 
principle of fairness implies that, in an undertaking offering reciprocal benefits to all 
parties involved, those who recognize these benefits have an obligation to make an honest 
contribution and not to take unfair advantage of other people's contributions. Organ 
donation, in the author’s view, comes down to developing a common asset (the 'organ 
pool'), which is created on the basis of a collective effort (the collection of individual 
donations). The benefits of the contribution counterbalance the costs and are potentially 
relevant to everyone. In this case, since in principle anyone may at some time need a 
transplant, it is certainly in everyone’s interest to be able to draw upon the available 
organ pool. According to den Hartogh, a person who objects to organ donation thereby 
indicates that he or she opposes the common asset that it produces.  Hence, at least in 
principle, this person has no claim to an organ. Everyone must be given the opportunity 
both to live and to die in accordance with his or her own beliefs. It is ultimately 
inconsistent to refuse to consent to donation but at the same time think it fair to still 
potentially receive a donor organ. 
 
Den Hartogh cannot guarantee that implementation of his proposal would substantially 
resolve the allocation problem, but he is reassured that it would not in any case work to 
anyone's disadvantage. Subsequently, he explains that awarding registered donors a 
priority position does not imply that those who have not registered or have objected are 
completely excluded from allocation. They are simply subordinated to registered donors. 
Although it would be in accordance with the fairness principle that a person should take 
responsibility for the choice he/she made not to donate, den Hartogh feels that offering no 
prospect of transplantation would elicit the counterargument that everyone has a right to 
lifesaving help. Moreover, den Hartogh acknowledges that there may still be people who 
wish to register as donors on a truly altruistic basis, preferring to direct their donation 
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unconditionally to anyone in need, rather than limit it to other registered donors. 
Therefore, he introduces the option of ‘free’ donation (in contrast to a ‘restricted’ 
donation). If a donor specifically chooses this option, then the bonus points would not be 
taken into account in allocating his/her organs. This is also the case with donors made 
available by family consent, in case the donor was not registered. 
 
The bonus point system could easily be implemented into the currently used point 
allocation systems. As points are allocated on the basis of, for instance, waiting time, 
geographical distance between donor and candidate recipient, and the supply demand of 
donations in the member state concerned, extra points could also be allocated on the basis 
of donor registration. 
 
2.3.2 Discussion 
 
Den Hartogh's proposal needs to be situated within the growing realization that voluntary 
gifts alone cannot provide a sufficient number of donor organs. The adaptations to the 
1998 Dutch organ law that he is suggesting are far-reaching, but touch upon some of the 
most current controversies in transplantation ethics. The idea of viewing organ donation as 
an undertaking involving mutual benefit rather than as a matter of charity is not new. It 
was suggested at the time of birth of the science of organ transplantation – ten days after 
the first heart transplant in 1967. At that time, Joshua Lederberg argued that organs 
should by preference go to those who themselves are prepared to donate32. The same 
notion has led to the establishment of the United States based ‘Life Sharers’, a growing yet 
unofficial donor network founded on the premise that one must first be prepared to give 
before one can receive33. The members of Life Sharers consent to postmortem organ 
donation on the condition that other group members have first claim to the organs and 
tissues. If no suitable recipient is found within the group, then the organs can be allotted 
to non-members. Ultimately, of course, a claim on reciprocity is the basis of various 
suggestions (and practices) on financial compensation for donors or donor’s families. 
 
The fact that den Hartogh abandons the concept of donation as a ‘gift’ does not in itself 
constitute a problem, nor does it necessarily diminish the moral significance of the 
donating process. Indeed, the argument is increasingly being heard that organ donation 
does not need to be linked to altruism. In any case, a so-called altruistic donation does not 
preclude self-interest. Consider, for example, the need to give meaning to one's own death 
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or to that of a fellow human being. Nevertheless, this specific idea of giving donors bonus 
points for their moral behaviour gives rise to several difficulties. This is especially the case 
when addressing the two questions that are a pertinent part of assessing initiatives to 
boost donation: (1) how effective will the initiative be; and (2) how should it be assessed 
morally? 
 
What dreams are made of 
 
We identify three major concerns that throw doubt upon the likelihood that the reciprocity 
system as presented by den Hartogh will significantly increase the donor pool. 
 
Our first concern has to do with the content of the reciprocity. If den Hartogh wants 
people to register their will to donate within a presumed consent system, he does need to 
give them some type of ‘incentive’. The strength of a presumed consent system lies 
precisely in the fact that consent is given by not registering. Although the type of incentive 
den Hartogh offers registered donors – the guarantee of a certain priority arrangement on 
the waiting list – is practically attainable, it is worth questioning whether it will be 
sufficiently rewarding to motivate people to donate and if it will actually benefit donors 
fundamentally. It is difficult to anticipate the impact a donor bonus point would have in 
relation to the other allocation points taken into account. Even granted that such a bonus 
point would make a significant difference on the waiting list, the promised ‘priority 
position’ is still dependent on other factors, such as the number of other registered donors 
on the waiting list. It is paradoxical that the more registered donors there are, the less 
advantage an individual gains by registering. It is conceivable that such unclear benefit 
diminishes the appeal of positive registration, and of the entire proposal for that matter. 
 
Our second concern has to do with den Hartogh’s expectations related to a change of 
procurement system. While he acknowledges that other practical steps are required in 
order to increase the donation rate, such as donor education and donor counselling, great 
focus of his proposal is on the need to step away from the opting-in system. However, we 
are not convinced of the need to attribute that much influence to the type of procurement 
system with regard to the donation rate, as this remains a matter of debate. A hasty 
comparison between the top donating countries would indeed allow for attributing the 
difference to the procurement systems used: Spain, Austria, Belgium and Portugal all have 
a presumed consent system. However, while it is true that, between 1995 and 2002, the 
Dutch number of effectuated donors decreased by 11 per cent34, other countries –including 
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those with an opting-out system– have also witnessed a decline of the number of donors in 
the past years. Moreover, while the refusal rate of Holland is relatively high (60 per cent) 
compared to that of Spain (opting-out, 22 per cent), low refusal rates are also possible in 
an opting-in system (see for instance the UK, 30 per cent). Sweden has an opt-out law but 
at the same time obtains a donation rate that is lower than that of the UK, which does not.  
In fact, implementation of presumed consent in Sweden did not have any visible effect on 
the number of donors. Also, within the opting-in system, the number of cadaveric organ 
donors in the Netherlands did increase from 202 in 2002 up to 222 in 200335. With this 
increase of 10 per cent Holland is almost back at the level of 1995 (228). Recent research 
also suggests that, while the donor potential of the Netherlands is currently much lower 
than that of Belgium, the donor efficiency –the total number of organs actually procured in 
relation to the donor potential– is very similar (respectively 6,8 and 6,7)36. 
 
All these findings suggest that it is too easy to think of a one-to-one relation between high 
refusal rates and opting-in (or between low refusal rates and opting-out). While in general 
terms presumed consent is much more productive than expressed consent, the success of a 
procurement organization is also highly dependent on other factors. It is known, for 
instance, that in Spain ten strategies are used to remove the objections of the relatives. 
Those strategies are not conceptually linked to the opting-out system and can in principle 
be applied in the setting of an opting-in system as well. In fact, the success of the Spanish 
model was not a direct result of the implementation of presumed consent, but rather due 
to the establishment of the National Transplant Organization in 198937. Many have voiced 
the opinion that it is not so much the procurement system, but rather the effective 
approach to surviving relatives and efficient donor recognition that are of paramount 
importance. The importance of donor recognition and routine request for donation is well 
illustrated by the results of ‘Gift of Life’, a North American organ procurement 
organisation covering a population of more than 9.8 million (residents of parts of New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania, and all of the state of Delaware). Since 1994 the number of 
donations within the Gift of Life region has grown by 75 per cent, as compared to a 
national increase of only 19.6 per cent over the same period38. This remarkable increase is 
thought to be due to three measures that were introduced by the Pennsylvania Act 102 in 
1994: routine referral of every dying person, donor registration upon obtaining one's 
driver's license, and ongoing awareness-raising campaigns aimed at the general public. The 
introduction of these simple measures has had an enormous impact. During the past five to 
six years, better results have been achieved within the Gift of Life opting-in system than in 
Part one   Frustrations in the face of finitude 
 47 
the much praised Spanish model. In 2001, for example, Spain had 32.5 postmortem organ 
donations per million inhabitants; this figure was 36.4 for Gift of Life in the same year39. 
 
A last concern with regard to the effectiveness of den Hartogh’s proposal is most directly 
problematic to the author: the public rejects his proposal. The Rathenau Institute 
conducted a public survey to examine the opinion of the Dutch population on different 
legal organ procurement systems -including the one outlined by den Hartogh. The survey 
clearly indicates that the majority of the Dutch population takes offence at the idea of 
organ donation in terms of reciprocity, even if such a system were to produce an increase 
of 20 per cent in donor organs40. These results go very much against den Hartogh’s 
interesting game theoretical explanation for the paradox that nearly everyone has a 
positive attitude towards organ donation, while at the same time only few people are 
willing to donate their organs (in the Netherlands one out of every five adults). What is 
keeping them from registering as a donor is the fear of being exploited, according to den 
Hartogh. They are afraid that their organs might go to a non-donor and that there will be 
no organ available should they themselves ever need one. The survey showed, however, 
that the different procurement systems did nothing to change the willingness to donate, 
only the willingness to register the willingness to donate. 
 
The ‘good’, the ‘bad’, and the outcast 
 
The negative results of the public survey suggest that there is something morally or at 
least emotionally troublesome about reciprocity within the donation setting. This comes as 
a surprise when we think of common situations in which many people feel that they are 
obliged to respond in kind to those who are benevolent, but that, on the other hand, they 
owe nothing to profiteers. This ‘it’s your own fault’ reasoning implies that individuals 
themselves are at fault and should take responsibility for their choices. Why would the role 
of personal responsibility not apply when the choices come down to being eligible for an 
organ or not? This is essentially an ethical criterion. While the selection of candidate 
recipients is largely based on objective reasons in light of medical success, points are also 
allocated on the basis of various moral criteria. Extra points will generally be given, for 
instance, for long waiting times and if the waiting list patient is a minor or if he or she has 
been a living donor41. 
 
The emphasis on personal responsibility within the practice of medicine is nevertheless a 
new and still very controversial matter of debate since responsibility is for the most part 
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not taken into account in relation to a health disorder. The ‘It’s your own fault’ reasoning 
is not applied when, for example, someone is brought into the Emergency Room who has 
had an accident under the influence of alcohol. We would find such a rigid moralistic 
standard inappropriate in such a situation. Moreover, even though there is disagreement 
within the organ transplant debate as to whether a smoker or an alcoholic has just as much 
right to an organ as someone who does not smoke or drink, the question of blame is not 
consequently raised. Other causes of organ disorders that could just as easily be included 
in the debate on personal responsibility – such as heart and vascular diseases caused by 
stressful lifestyle and improper diet; and kidney failure caused by failure to maintain blood 
pressure42 – are not brought into the discussion. In such situations one could nevertheless 
also argue that ‘you chose yourself for the behaviour that involved a predictable risk of 
ending up in trouble,’43 and so you have to accept the consequences. Nearly every disorder 
has an anamnesis for which the individual to a certain extent bears responsibility. Whether 
certain rights should be restricted when an individual fails to exercise his or her own 
responsibility is itself a question requiring further discussion. Den Hartogh avoids getting 
too entangled in this discussion, by rightly pointing out that while the role of personal 
responsibility for one’s own state of health is often very complex, in this case it only refers 
to the decision whether or not to donate. 
 
Still another potential source of unease, however, relates to the assumption that the 
implementation of the system as den Hartogh presents it would at least not put anyone at 
a disadvantage. If the value of the bonus points is appropriately chosen so that it will only 
make a difference in case of equal medical suitability, the system is presented as a win-
win situation. The registered donors end up higher on the waiting list when the donations 
are ‘restricted’, and non-donors – in the worst case – remain in precisely the same 
situation as before. This is problematic in two respects. For one, as indicated, it is 
precisely the guarantee of a better position that is regarded as a stimulating factor for 
registration as a donor. We mentioned above that this guarantee may be too weak.  Two, 
it is questionable that it would not set anyone back. This is only the case if you assume 
that the organs intended for ‘restricted donation’ would otherwise be lost, i.e. that in the 
current system they would not be donated. Those who are registered donors in the current 
system, however, may be among the few motivated enough to register to restricted 
donation. Given their commitment to decision-making regarding donation, it is conceivable 
that they will reflect on complying with the reciprocity option and that they will be willing 
to take trouble to adjust their registration. Hence, the possibility remains that these 
individuals are largely the only people who would register as donors and who would include 
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the option of restricted donation in the new system. This way, the amount of available 
donors might not change. The number of organs that the so-called ‘parasites’ could then 
count on would greatly decline, and this would indeed mean a step backwards for them. Of 
course den Hartogh would see no problem in this, because it is the indirect consequence of 
their own decision not to donate. But is it really that simple? What about people who 
cannot or are not allowed to donate? As Arthur Caplan points out in the discussion 
regarding Life Sharers – it would mean a step backwards for the people who are already on 
the waiting list because, in view of their poor health, they are simply no longer capable of 
donating organs44. What should be done, moreover, with minors who come to need a 
transplant but who have not yet registered (or who have not yet even been able to 
register) as donors? 
 
Finally, the reference to the concept of Samaritan duty is not sufficiently compelling. The 
introduction of this concept is helpful in reminding us of our shared societal responsibility 
to avoid or minimize suffering wherever and whenever possible. However, the three 
criteria den Hartogh lists are too vague and not uniquely applicable to the duty of donating 
organs. Particularly the first criterion, that a person must be in ‘serious need’, is not 
unproblematic. How much loss of quality of life is enough for the criterion to be satisfied? 
This is not to deny that people on the waiting list are often very badly off, or to say that 
people who are not suffering enough according to the criterion should not get an organ 
transplant. But it is very difficult to draw the line between cases of serious need and 
others, especially given the fact that many waiting list patients can temporarily be helped 
by other, imperfect means (dialysis, medicine, etc.). What is of serious need to one 
individual may not be perceived by another in the same manner. Moreover – and with 
regard to the second criterion of this duty – even if it can be agreed that the help someone 
offers by donating his or her organs is of little cost, the analogy with the drowning case is 
relatively weak and inconsistent with other means of offering life-saving help within and 
beyond health care. As Hamer and Rivlin suggest in their discussion of John Harris’ 
controversial suggestion to oblige organ donation, for instance: 
 
Although most of us would probably find someone who did not stoop to pull a 
drowning child from a shallow pond to be morally lacking, we do not give all 
the blood we can give (…), we do not give all our spare money to charity, we do 
not all place ourselves on the bone marrow register. And we do not think 
ourselves morally blameworthy if we spend some of our time idly watching 
television or going on holiday rather than working for the underprivileged.45 
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More importantly, even less demanding examples of donating just 5 per cent of our income 
to charity, or of donating blood merely once a year are not regarded as Samaritan duties, 
while arguably just as much in accordance with the three criteria as donating organs after 
death. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
Steering organ allocation towards those who are themselves willing to donate organs is 
both an ineffective and morally questionable means of attempting to improve procurement 
and allocation of transplantable organs. Suggestions to harshen the criteria of eligibility to 
a life-saving transplant will nonetheless persist as long as there is a shortage of organs. It is 
likely that, along with an efficient procurement procedure, a greater number of donations 
and transplantations will rest predominantly on diminishing the percentage of family 
objections. As we will see in the subsequent chapter, however, shortage is inevitable if we 
are to limit the pool of transplantable grafts to those obtained from human donations. 
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3 Organs galore: an overview of emerging alternatives to the 
donation model 
 
Abstract 
 
While the impact of continuous efforts to increase the pool of postmortem donors should 
not be underestimated, it has been suggested that cadaveric donation will never be the 
final solution to the organ shortage. If we wish to augment the transplantation rate 
substantially, efforts should be made to maximize living donation or to find alternative 
sources of transplantable grafts. This chapter gives an overview of various approaches that 
are currently being explored: (a) the commercialization of grafts from living providers; (b) 
the development of artificial replacements; (c) the use of stem cell technology to ‘grow 
your own’ grafts or to support failing tissues or organs. The intention of this chapter is to 
demonstrate in which respect those alternatives are likely to fall short of providing a 
substantial pool of transplantable organs and tissues in the near future. The current lack of 
viable alternatives motivates a persistent interest in the development of suitable animal-
derived cells, tissues and organs for transplantation. 
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3.1 Not enough deaths to save the dying 
 
The impact of continuous efforts to increase the pool of postmortem donors should not be 
underestimated and it will remain pivotal that donation is further encouraged and the 
procurement process further optimized. That said, it is important to understand that, 
however much the procurement system is improved, cadaveric donation will never be the 
final solution to the organ shortage. The largest study of the organ donor potential ever 
conducted in the US indicates that the supply of cadaveric donor grafts unavoidably falls 
short, even in the theoretical case in which all brain-dead potential donors become actual 
donors and the demand for organs remains constant1. Evans has expressed a similar 
prognosis2,3. Indeed, it is very unlikely that the demand rate will remain constant. During 
the past years, the number of patients awaiting transplantation has grown exponentially. 
This trend is unlikely to disappear because the conditions for which transplantation is the 
appropriate treatment are constantly expanding. Furthermore, the prevalence of brain 
death is rare. Most clinically brain dead patients owe their state to a cerebrovascular 
accident or a severe cranial/brain injury. The number of potential postmortem donors is 
declining inversely proportional to the heightening of safety measures to prevent motor 
vehicle accidents. Also, the major reason for non-recovery from postmortem donors is poor 
organ quality. Nearly 50 per cent of the organs of brain-dead potential donors in the US are 
simply unsuitable4.  
 
If we wish to augment the transplantation rate substantially, efforts should be made to 
maximize living donation or to find alternative sources of transplantable grafts. This 
chapter provides an overview of various approaches that are currently being explored for 
this end: (a) the commercialization of grafts from living providers, (b) the development of 
artificial replacements, and (c) the use of stem cell technology to ‘grow your own’ grafts 
or to support failing tissues/organs. Realizing that particularly the latter technologies may 
improve substantially over time, the intention of this chapter is to demonstrate in which 
respect those alternatives are likely to fall short of providing a substantial pool of 
transplantable organs and tissues in the near future. The current lack of viable alternatives 
motivates a persistent interest in the development of suitable animal-derived cells, tissues 
and organs for transplantation.  
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3.2 Maximizing living ‘donation’: commercialized transplantation 
 
3.2.1 Transplant tourism  
 
In 1983 Dr H. Barry Jacobs founded the International Kidney Exchange, Ltd., offering 
thousands of US transplant centres to serve as a kidney broker for end stage renal diseased 
patients5. The initiative never materialized but generated heated debate and was 
addressed in the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise 
transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human 
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.6 
 
By 1989, 20 other nations, the World Health Organization and a range of international 
transplant associations had passed similar prohibitions7,8. Commercial dealings in human 
body parts have also been outlawed by the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine (article 21)9. A study of the legislation of 24 countries (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, US) shows that all those nations have a general prohibition against 
direct commercial dealings in human organs10.  
 
That rare manifestation of international legal consensus has not precluded a black market 
trade of organs. Ever since the 1980s there have been continuous indications of ‘transplant 
tourism’, with prosperous patients travelling to other parts of the world to purchase the 
transplantable kidneys for which they would otherwise have to wait indefinitely in their 
resident country. The first ‘tourists’ were mainly Asians and residents of Gulf States who 
travelled to India – a nation that severely criminalizes organ trade –, China and other parts 
of Asia (e.g. Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea)11. Access to the potentially life-saving 
therapy has been rendered a matter of ‘seek and ye shall find’ over the entire world. In 
three years time, 300 Israeli were reported to have received kidneys from donors in 
Estonia, Bulgaria and Turkey at an average price of $40,00012. Allegedly, whole transplant 
teams travel from places where commercial transplants are prohibited to more permissive 
places to facilitate the surgery13. Kidney donors are often solicited through advertisements 
in the newspaper14. Alternatively, worldwide, Internet sites have been launched to provide 
a venue in which potential recipients can make electronic pleas for an organ and hope to 
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attract a donation (whether paid or not) from the general public15,16. In 1999 a “fully 
functional kidney” was put up on the Internet auction site eBay, bringing in bids of up to 
$7.5 million until the company interrupted the sale17,18. 
 
The conviction that financial inducements are necessary to motivate living donation has 
become increasingly prevalent. Economists argue that shortage is inevitable whenever the 
price of a good is held below its market demand. Nobel Prize-winning economist Gary 
Becker and Julio Elias estimate that by pricing kidneys at $15,000 and liver segments at 
$32,000 (due to the higher health risk for the donor), enough donors could be attracted to 
close the gap between supply and demand19. Aside from the potential impact that system 
is believed to have on the transplant rate, the argument has been put forward that 
regularization of a trade system should also be considered in order to protect patients 
from the current dangers of the clandestine free trade20. However, those proposals run up 
against firm ethical, legal and cultural barriers.  
 
3.2.2 Arguments against commercialization 
 
To many, the notion of financial inducement for donation is subject to serious ethical 
perversions. Common criticisms refer to fears that a market-driven organ supply would 
undermine the spirit of altruism and render human beings and their parts mere 
commodities. It is also feared that such a practice would coerce the poor to jeopardize 
their health and benefit only the rich.   
 
Ever since the use of the first cadaveric organs for transplantation, organ procurement has 
been presented as a ‘gift of life’, linking the connotations of organ ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’ 
to notions of generosity and altruism. To some, references to charity constitute the pillars 
of the social and ethical meaning of the whole transplantation business and form the 
prerequisite for public support21. It is also feared that abandoning the view of donation as 
a social duty will sabotage the development of cadaveric and related living donation. This 
would be particularly harmful for transplant programs involving those grafts that can only 
be obtained from cadaveric donors. Other appeals to preserve the ‘gift rhetoric’ indicate 
the psychological advantage of this approach. Sells, for instance, refers to the way in 
which altruistic voluntary donation contributes to positive self-esteem22. According to 
Joralemon, a non-materialist conception of the body and the act of generous sacrifice 
promotes a meaningful connection of the organs to the self23. Others confirm the belief 
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that, at least symbolically, organs help define who we are, and hence, that the selling of 
an organ is the selling of parts of the self24. It fundamentally renders the body “dis-organ-
ized”25 and reduces its parts to alienable, economic products26. It is also argued that paid 
donation would entice only poor people to provide the kidneys, whereas access to the 
organs gained would be restricted to the rich. Additionally, it is claimed that the consent 
of the donor cannot be voluntary, because it is motivated by poverty and despair. By 
offering a substantial financial ‘reward’, a potential organ provider is encouraged (or 
perhaps even forced by other stake holders) to do something he or she otherwise would not 
be inclined to do. Worse still, the retrieval of a kidney or liver/lung segment goes against 
the donor's best interests and makes him or her disproportionately susceptible for certain 
health risks. 
 
3.2.3 Arguments in defence of commercialization 
 
The grounds for condemning the commercialization of living donation have been 
countered with strong arguments in defence. For instance, the idea that selling body parts 
would threaten one’s sense of self is rebutted in reference to the increasing and overtly 
commercial transactions of human sperm and oocytes27, which relate much more strongly 
to personal identity than do internal organs (apart from the brain). Furthermore, it is not 
particularly the selling of organs that ‘de-organ-izes’ the self, it is the ability to remove 
and replace the organs. In other words, it is the practice of transplantation itself – rather 
than the commercialization of body parts – that is being rejected. In addition, the view 
that body parts are intrinsically unrelated to a monetary value is hardly consistent with the 
fact that there are now more than 50 artificial body parts for sale28. 
 
As the discussion of den Hartogh’s proposal also demonstrated, the imperative to depend 
on public ‘goodwill’ is not directly compelling. Indeed, Siminoff and Chillag ask us to 
consider the adverse consequences of the ‘gift of life’ metaphor29. In the footsteps of Fox 
and Swazey30, they refer to Mauss’ Gift Exchange Theory that clearly implies that gift-
giving is related to expected reciprocity. In acknowledgment of the fact that the gift of 
life is not commensurable, transplant recipients often experience an overwhelming sense 
of debt31. A grave sense of responsibility for their second chance of life also occurs when 
the donor organs do not function appropriately in their new host environment, particularly 
when derived from a living donor. Another argument against the appeal of ‘altruism’ is 
that the metaphor of the ‘gift of life’ is in itself inconsistent with the fact that the ‘gift’ is 
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always related to charges for the transplant services and the medication32. Others have 
revealed the paradox that the donor is the only one involved in the field of transplantation 
who is not in one way or another rewarded for his or her services33. In the knowledge that 
donors suffer financial stress from donor-associated costs and difficulties in re-entering 
employment34,35, it can be argued that it is exploitative not to reimburse the donor at all. 
Furthermore, the metaphor is ineffective: family consent to postmortal donation is rarely 
motivated by the willingness to make a gift, but rather by the hope that the deceased will 
somehow live on36. 
 
On the other hand, a trade in organs does not directly oppose the gift-giving model of 
organ donation. Robert Veatch makes that case referring to the fact that, as early as 1968, 
it was argued appropriate for society to take viable body parts from the dead without 
formal permission37. In contrast to that approach, a market model is more consistent with 
the contemporary emphasis on the rights of the individual to consent or to refuse. Both 
consented donation and trade models are based on the principle that our body belongs to 
us, and that we enjoy the right to decide whether or not to ‘give’ our organs away. 
Viewing parts of the body as matters of property, which the individual may dispose of, at 
once also limits the extent to which others can exploit it. As Andrews argues, by treating 
body parts as the individual’s property, there is a legal basis for protections that may not 
exist under themes of privacy, autonomy, assault, or infliction of emotional distress. This 
ownership will become increasingly important in light of requests to preserve bodily 
materials for future medical use, such as bone marrow for gene therapy38. 
 
The idea that organ trade involves severe abuse of the poor partly stems from urban 
legends. For years, sensational stories have been circulating of street children in Honduras, 
Guatemala, Argentina and Brazil being kidnapped and murdered for their organs. These 
allegations remain without evidence and are likely to reflect the mistrust of certain 
populations against the western transplantation enterprise. This mistrust has a historical 
root. At the turn of the 18th century, corpses obtained by grave robbers (‘body snatchers’) 
were sold to anatomists in lucrative black markets during times of shortage39. 
Alternatively, as suggested by the Bellagio Task Force, the urban legends are inspired by 
past incidences of child abduction for sexual abuse or for illegal adoption40. In Guatemala, 
particularly, inhabitants are convinced that foreigners steal children and this belief has 
merged with stories of Americans taking babies for their organs41. 
 
Part one   Organs galore 
 60 
That is not to say that there is no exploitation of organ providers in current trade systems. 
Most black markets in developing nations involve brokers whose very intent it is to exploit 
the poor. Nonetheless, it is not an essential part of a market system: “It is one thing for 
people to have the right to treat their own bodies as property, quite another to allow 
others to treat a person as property.”42 Indeed, proponents of a regulated market system 
believe that regulation is the only way to eliminate currently concealed forms of 
exploitation. Suitable oversight could guarantee fair reimbursement for and fully informed 
consent from the donor. Moreover, whereas the organs would be retrieved by a market 
approach, implementation of a welfare system for the distribution of the obtained supply 
could guarantee equitable access for the poor. 
 
A famous argument in favour of organ trade is that prohibition perpetuates rather than 
prevents the exploitable position of the potential vendors. Defenders of this view regard 
kidney trade as an opportunity for the poor to enhance their position from an in se 
exploitable situation. Even underpaid vendors may use the extra income to change future 
economic prospects or to broaden their opportunities. In a London court trial of doctors 
involved in organ trade, one of the kidney vendors was a Turkish man who needed the 
money to buy medicines for his daughter who was suffering from tuberculosis. Poor and 
unemployed, he maintained that this was his only opportunity for saving her43. This 
generates the idea that the problem is not the selling of organs, but rather the reasons for 
wanting to sell organs. Radcliffe-Richards et al. make that point as follows: 
 
(…) trying to end exploitation by prohibition is rather like ending slum dwelling 
by bulldozing slums; it ends the evil in that form, but only by making it worse 
for the victims. If we want to protect the exploited, we can do it only by 
removing the poverty that makes them vulnerable, or, failing that, by 
controlling the trade. There is much more scope for exploitation and abuse 
when a supply of desperately wanted goods is made illegal.44 
 
Critics may emphasize that the financial incentives inhibit full acknowledgement of the 
health risks associated to living organ donation. There is indeed a small, but real risk for 
the living donor, particularly for donations of liver segments. According to a systematic 
review of the literature on adult-to-adult living donor liver transplantation up to January 
2004, donor mortality was 12 to 13 in about 6,000 procedures (0.2 per cent), with a higher 
risk (0.23 to 0.5 per cent) for right lobe donors45. Given the short history of living donor 
liver transplantation procedures, little data are available regarding long-term outcomes. 
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Against that, it must be noted that the highest morbidity rates for donors have been 
reported in clandestine trades in developing nations, precisely due to the lack of a control 
mechanism, which would guarantee proper medical care. Lack of or deficiency in HLA-
matching and pre-transplant workup of recipients and donors often leads to poor 
outcomes, including serious infectious complications such as viral hepatitis46,47 and HIV48. 
Non-infectious medical complications, including congestive cardiac failure, post-transplant 
diabetes mellitus and acute myocardial infarction, have been reported among patients 
returning to Israel after receiving living unrelated donor transplants in Iraq or India49. In a 
survey of vendors in Chennai, India, 86 per cent of the respondents reported deterioration 
in health after kidney retrieval50. 
 
Furthermore, it has been remarked that the risks are overemphasized once the notion of 
financial compensation is considered51. The normal risk of donating a kidney at the age of 
35 is comparable to the risk associated with driving a car to work 16 miles a day52. 
Moreover, if we are to object that people opt for this health risk, our objection should be 
consistent with other hazardous behaviours that poor people are disproportionately 
compelled to conduct: for instance, their decisions to buy a cheaper but less safe car, or 
to take a physically dangerous job such as high-steel construction53. A strong case can thus 
be made that “loss of autonomy results from poverty, not from paid donation.”54 
 
3.2.4 Reality check: an illustration from Iran 
 
The arguments in defence of commercialising organ donation are sufficiently compelling to 
warrant further discussion. Suffice it here to conclude that the prohibitive forces 
nevertheless remain strong, rendering it unlikely that a trade regulation will be endorsed 
in Western nations any time soon. As mentioned in the first chapter, initiatives to ease the 
prohibition have been restricted to proposals that allow limited reimbursement of the 
donor’s time, expenses and recovery. 
 
Aside of China, which, we noted, plans to ban the trade of organs from executed prisoners, 
there is one nation in which organ trade is supported on a governmental level. In Iran, 
where the cadaveric transplantation act is rejected, living unrelated renal donor 
transplantation amounts to approximately 90 per cent of all transplants55. The great 
majority of ‘donors’ are vendors. The procedure set off as ‘rewarded giving’ to donors by 
recipients directly. In 1997 a law was passed, instructing the payment of 10 million Rials 
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(the equivalent of $1,219) to each vendor. The money is obtained from the governmental 
budget, allowing equal access for all citizens to the purchase of a kidney transplant. In 
addition to this sum of money, the prospective recipient often offers the vendor extra 
advantages, such as employment opportunities. As a result of these enticements, the 
waiting lists for candidate recipients have dissolved56 and have ironically been replaced by 
long donor waiting lists57. 
 
Nonetheless, this example appears to be bad advertisement for market proposals in terms 
of donor welfare and the overall impact on transplant programs. Despite governmental 
oversight of the trade and the fact that the compensation is substantial with regard to the 
local life standard, the effects of the transplants are often adverse for the donor. 
Zargooshi reports that almost none of the criteria for acceptable living unrelated renal 
donation and follow-up are met58. Moreover, in his survey of the motivations of Iranian 
kidney vendors (n=100), the majority of the donors claimed that they had not been able to 
use the money to free themselves from poverty or debt. In a different survey on the 
quality of life of vendor donors (n=300), Zargooshi found that persistent poverty prevented 
the majority of the donors from attending follow-up visits59. Vending also had negative 
effects on employment in 65 per cent and caused severe postoperative depression for 71 
per cent of the vendors. Almost half of the vendors surveyed would opt for a shortening of 
life by more than ten years and substantial loss of property in return for their preoperative 
condition60. The respondents referred to three vendors who set themselves on fire after 
becoming severely depressed because their life conditions remained unaltered. This 
particular example also partly confirms the prediction61 that living unrelated donor 
programs will hinder the growth of cadaveric transplant programs and living related 
donation. All related donors demanded money for their kidney from their family member 
and felt that their offer deserved priority over that from strangers. 
 
Remaining controversy surrounding organ trades – and the potential adverse effects on 
acquisition of other grafts that cannot be obtained from living donors – have propelled 
efforts to fabricate organs and tissues from scratch or to provide engineered mechanisms 
of support for the damaged body parts. 
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3.3 Artificial organs and support devices 
 
For decades now, research has focused on developing implantable artificial organs to 
augment or replace organ functions. While that has resulted in several devices offering 
temporary support of failing organs, the current stage of technology is still lacking in the 
ability to provide optimal and permanent solutions that sufficiently enhance quality of life. 
 
3.3.1 Artificial kidney and dialysis 
 
A first important step towards the creation of artificial replacements was the development 
of the artificial kidney by Kolff in 1944. The machine was created to substitute the 
malfunctioning kidney’s main filtering function. The procedure involved separating 
particles in the patient’s blood by differences in ability to pass through a semi-permeable 
membrane. The successful diffusion of toxins and waste products had a profound impact on 
pushing back the mortality rate related to kidney disease62. With the first kidney 
transplantation trials, the machine provided both pre- and postoperative support of the 
recipients. 
 
Kidney dialysis remains an effective means to stretch time until a transplantable kidney 
becomes available. The treatment nevertheless has severe effects on the patients’ quality 
of life. Patients are connected to the external machine for a minimum of 12 hours a week. 
Aside of their being hospital-bound, they must follow strict diets and limit their intake of 
fluids. The dialysis machine does not automatically adapt to changes in a patient’s body 
functions. Hence, the blood must be constantly monitored and laboratory tested. While 
the kidney is more than just a filter, the dialysis does not compensate for those other lost 
functions. As a result, many early dialysis patients developed severe complications, 
including bone disease, anaemia and even mental deterioration (‘dialysis dementia’)63. 
Those effects were caused by respectively the loss of vitamin D conversion (which 
regulates the absorption of calcium), deprivation of erythropoietin (EPO) production (a 
hormone which stimulates bone marrow to make oxygen-carrying red blood cells) and 
toxicity due to the presence of aluminium in the dialysis fluids. Given the fact that many 
of the organ’s complex functions depend on integration with other organs, the 
development of fully implantable kidney duplicates seems remote. The closest treatment 
currently available is peritoneal dialysis, which uses a patient’s own membrane around the 
intestines to diffuse and withdraw the body’s fluids through implanted catheters. The 
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technique enhances mobility, but it requires an enormous effort of the patient to routinely 
adopt sterile technique. 
 
3.3.2 Liver support systems 
 
Although complete understanding of its many functions is still lacking, the liver is known to 
play a major role in metabolism, drug detoxification, glycogen storage, plasma protein 
synthesis and bile production. Accumulative toxicity caused by liver failure leads to a wide 
range of complications, ultimately resulting in coma and death. However, because of the 
liver’s regenerative abilities, liver failure is often reversible if a temporary liver substitute 
is provided64. Two main approaches have been used to reinforce liver regeneration: non-
biological and hybrid biological artificial support65. 
 
Early artificial means to increase the survival rates of patients with liver failure relied on 
an external bank of activated charcoal columns to filter out harmful substances from the 
blood. However, that technique showed no improvement in long-term survival since it did 
not replace other liver functions. Alternatively, plasma exchange – a technique in which a 
patient’s plasma is separated from the blood and replaced with an equivalent dose of fresh 
frozen plasma – allows for both removal of hepatic toxins and replacement of various 
beneficial factors. Here too, no significant improvement of patient survival has been 
observed66. Conversely, reports of substantially prolonged patient survival have been 
indicated in randomized, controlled trials of the Molecular Adsorbents Recirculating 
System (MARS)67. That system consists of an albumin-enriched dialysate, charcoal filter and 
ion exchange compound that filter out albumin-bound toxic metabolites. However, MARS 
only substitutes for the filtration and detoxifying function of the liver and may even 
remove essential factors that are involved in hepatic regeneration68. 
 
Both extracorporeal whole liver perfusion and hybrid biological artificial support have been 
applied to replace the liver’s synthetic functions, metabolic role, and removal and 
detoxification of harmful substances. The main merit of this technology is that it may 
bridge time to allow for full rehabilitation of the liver’s normal functions or to find a donor 
liver for transplantation. Extracorporeal perfusion involves the use of an external liver 
through which the patient’s waste products are metabolized. Due to shortage of human 
livers, mainly pig livers are being considered in this area. Given that this is a form of 
xenotransplantation, this procedure will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. In hybrid 
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biological artificial support, isolated, metabolically active liver cells - either implanted in 
the patient or perfused extracorporeally within a synthetic framework - replace liver 
functions69. The best results have been obtained with devices in which the hepatocytes -
through which the patient’s blood or plasma is passed – have formed an aggregation of 
functional liver tissue. Such extracorporeal bioartificial support containing active human 
cells has also been developed for pancreas and kidney70,71. Due to the scarcity of human 
cell supply, however, recent interest in bioartificial devices has focused on the use of 
porcine cells or human stem cells. 
 
3.3.3 Lung replacement technology 
 
The earliest efforts to develop implantable artificial lungs were reported in the 1970s72. 
Nevertheless, to this day, chronic irreversible pulmonary failure is only treatable by lung 
transplantation. Unlike liver and kidney substitutes, artificial lung support is inadequate to 
serve as a bridge to transplantation73. The difficulty lies in the need to provide persistent 
oxygen supplies rapidly enough while adapting to changes in demands on oxygen 
requirements and carbon dioxide removal. 
 
For decades, mechanical ventilators have been used to deliver volumes of air to the 
patient’s lungs through a tube in the windpipe. The level of oxygen must be adapted 
continuously to meet the patient’s needs. The technique is aggressive and can cause a 
build-up of free radicals or overstretch scarred lung tissue74. An advanced procedure, the 
extracorporeal membrane oxygenator (ECMO), passes oxygen-poor blood from large veins 
through an oxygenator and returns the oxygenated blood to the heart or directly to the 
lungs. While this device has been used successfully on patients affected by severe 
respiratory failure, it is non-ambulatory and has all the other discomforts related to 
extracorporeal assistance. Moreover, the procedure is complex, expensive, time-consuming 
and labour-intensive and offers many sites for bacterial infection75. Intravenous systems – 
such as the intravascular oxygenator system (IVOX) and the intravenous membrane 
oxygenator (IMO) – have also been developed. They can be inserted into the patient’s 
largest chest veins and allow for oxygen-carbon dioxide transfer of the blood within the 
implanted system. However, those systems imply limited space for gas exchange and 
cannot function independently as a bridge-to-recovery or transplant. Improved, larger 
versions of the model replace a patient’s non-functional lung and can be fully contained 
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within the chest cavity. Preliminary experiments suggest sufficient gas exchange supply, 
but it is unknown how long the device can endure implantation76. 
 
3.3.4 Total and partial heart replacements 
 
The heart can be considered the least complex of the solid organs: a muscular pump 
supplies the circulatory system with oxygenated blood from the lungs and transports 
nutrients, wastes and gases to and from all cells in the body. Total heart replacement, 
however, remains a challenge, despite significant advances in the technology over the past 
10 years. Although the first successful bridge to cardiac transplant was through the use of 
a total artificial heart (in 1969) 77, best results are currently obtained by a range of devices 
which offer partial heart support. 
 
Left ventricular assist devices (LVAD) assist in the pumping of the left ventricle of the 
heart in patients with left ventricular failure. With the original heart still in place, the 
regulation of the rhythmic pumping pattern and responses to signals from the rest of the 
body are maintained. LVADs have been successful both as bridges to cardiac 
transplantation and as long-term support78. The first of such devices – the Heartmate 
implantable pneumatic (IP) LVAD – was accepted for routine use in 199479. In ten years 
time, an estimated 7,000 LVADs have been implanted worldwide80. Modern models are 
totally implantable and provide quiet continuous flow.  Nevertheless, the success is not 
unquestioned, with concern remaining over their inability to manage the patients’ liability 
to irregular heartbeats81. In addition, infections, inflow valve insufficiency, bleeding, renal 
and multi-organ failure are included among the possible complications82. Furthermore, this 
procedure is not suitable for therapeutic use in patients with severe biventricular failure. 
 
The first recipients of a total artificial heart (TAH) succumbed to infectious complications. 
With the development of more sophisticated forms of immunosuppression, long-term 
therapy appeared feasible. In 1982, the Jarvik-7 – a total, biventricular artificial heart – 
was implanted into a 61-year-old patient suffering end stage congestive heart failure83. 
The implant was made from aluminium and polyurethane and consisted of two separate 
ventricles, which were grafted to the native cavities and great vessels. The power supply 
depended on an externalized, 400-pound air compressor. Post-transplant, the patient 
struggled with many life-threatening complications and finally surrendered to multi-organ 
failure after 112 days84. The US Food and Drug Administration suspended the use of this 
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model in 1990. Advanced models entered the clinic from 1993 on, and have shown survival 
rates sufficient to bridge time for a transplant in 70 to 90 per cent85. Still, mortality and 
morbidity were most commonly related to multi-organ failure, renal dysfunction and 
infection. The only TAH replacement designed for permanent therapy to date is AbioCor86. 
Clinical trials of this first fully contained artificial heart initiated on 2 July 2001. With total 
implantability, the sites for microbial infection are minimized and comfort is maximized87. 
As the device depends on an external battery pack, methods are also being designed to 
circumvent this88,89. However, the size of the device (comparable to a grapefruit) does not 
facilitate implantation in smaller patients90. Furthermore, its rhythmic movement burdens 
the surrounding, particularly softer connective tissues. The trial results of the use of 
AbioCor TAH have not been very encouraging. In 2003 only two of the eleven recipients of 
such a heart were reported to be alive. The others died within an average of five months. 
One recipient’s widow sued the company claiming that her husband “had no quality of life 
and his essential human dignity had been taken from him.”91 No cardiac replacement 
device that stands the test as a destination therapy has been developed yet. A TAH that 
can regulate the flow rate according to internal signals such as those from the central 
nervous system, is not achievable by the current state of science92. That renders the need 
for a donor heart transplant inevitable. 
 
3.4 Bioengineered regeneration of tissues and organs 
 
3.4.1 Regenerative medicine: a look into the future 
 
Regenerative medicine is the most promising future therapy in terms of restoring or 
replacing lost or damaged organs and tissues. It holds the prospect of constructing 
transplantable grafts that fulfil the physiologic and metabolic requirements better than 
mechanical and even donated human substitutes93,94. The technology consists of the 
combined use of living cells with regenerative capacities and tissue engineering 
techniques. Isolated living cells with regenerative capacities may be cultured outside the 
body and implanted in situ in the patient as a prospective therapy for a variety of 
diseases, such as Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s disease, diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis and 
myocardial infarction95. Future applications of regenerative cells would imply stimulating 
them to mimic the complex functions, mechanics and three-dimensional structures of 
whole organs. The ultimate advantage lies in the possibility to grow replacements that are 
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genetically identical to the prospective recipient and would thereby alleviate the need for 
immunosuppression. 
 
3.4.2 Regenerative cells 
 
Various sources of cells can be used for tissue repair and regeneration. They include 
embryonic stem cells, adult stem cells and mature (non-stem) cells, all of which may be 
autologous (same individual), allogeneic (same species, different individual), or 
xenogeneic (different species). The success of their regenerative abilities is dependent on 
the cells’ potential to divide and produce more cells (proliferation) and to develop into 
various other cell types (differentiation). Due to the continuous cell specialization during 
embryonic development, the cells’ levels of potencies can be distinguished in terms of the 
developmental stage in which they were produced. 
 
Mature (non-stem) cells are found in humans after birth. They have the lowest 
proliferative potential and at the same time the highest level of specialization, thereby 
drastically restricting the number of cells that can be cultured and the range of tissues the 
cell cultures can support. Although the use of chondrocytes has proved successful in 
repairing cartilage and keratinocytes for treatment of burns96, stem cells are a much 
preferred source for regeneration of multiple cell lineage tissues. 
 
Adult stem (AS) cells, also found in humans after birth, can differentiate into a limited 
number of specialized cell types, typically the cell type of a particular organ/tissue or of 
the area in the body from which they emerged. These ‘multipotent’ cells can be found in 
specific places all over the body, including bone marrow, blood vessels, dental pulp, the 
digestive epithelium, the retina, liver, foetal chord, umbilical chord and even in the 
brain97. Their natural role is to replace damaged or lost tissue, as illustrated by the daily 
renewal of 200 billion red blood cells by haematopoietic stem cells. Recent research 
suggests that AS cells have a greater plasticity and differentiation potential than previously 
expected. For instance, the differentiation of mesenchymal stem cells into mature 
hepatocytes and neural cells has been reported98. Indications of increased AS cell plasticity 
have given rise to new procedures, including treatment of myocardial infarction by 
microinjection of haematopoietic cells and mesenchymal cells from the patient’s own bone 
marrow99. Progenitor cells (which are the most specialized stem cells) from bone marrow 
have been applied to treat cartilage and liver damage, spinal cord injury, and most 
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recently diabetes100. Nonetheless, controversy remains whether the multilineages obtained 
are generated solely by the differentiation of a single stem cell or not101. Moreover, 
although many different kinds of multipotent stem cells have been identified, AS cells that 
could give rise to all cell and tissue types have not yet been found. There is also emerging 
evidence that those stem cells inevitably lose their ability to divide and differentiate at a 
certain point. Furthermore, AS cells are difficult to isolate, slow to culture in vitro and 
susceptible to DNA abnormalities. 
 
Embryonic stems (ES) cells have the greatest differentiation potential and develop in 
early embryonic stages. Totipotent stem cells can be obtained from up to eight cell 
divisions and are the ‘mother cells’ of all embryonic cell types and extra-embryonic 
membranes. Pluripotent stem cells, which can be obtained from the inner cell mass of 
blastocysts (consisting of 50 to 150 cells), are more differentiated but maintain the 
capacity to generate virtually all cell types that make up an adult body. The trump of 
these cells is that they can be expanded almost indefinitely in an undifferentiated state in 
vitro and manipulated to generate embryoid bodies, which are cell aggregations that 
contain all three embryonic germ layers (endoderm, ectoderm, mesoderm)102,103. The 
isolation of human ES cells104 and the successful differentiation into neurons, skin, 
cardiomyocytes, pancreatic, haematopoietic, endothelial and muscle cells105,106 suggest the 
viability of manipulating those cells to produce an unlimited supply of practically all tissue 
and organ types. 
 
Although regenerative medicine is considered the holy grail of medicine107, the major 
difficulty restricting its clinical use is the need to learn how to instruct a stem cell to 
differentiate into only the cell type required108. Unanswered questions regarding the 
manipulability of ES cell growth and differentiation retain the research largely to an 
experimental stage. Additionally, it is not known how the stem cells should be implanted 
so that they would take up the optimal anatomical position. Moreover, both AS cells and ES 
cells pose an as yet uncontrollable risk of forming unwanted tissues and tumours. In 
comparison with AS cells, however, ES cells have some significant drawbacks. They are 
obtained from a non-autologous source and may thus engender a severe immune 
response109. Furthermore, human ES cell lines are necessarily derived from either leftover 
embryos generated through in vitro fertilization or from embryos created especially for the 
purpose of stem cell research110. The destruction of blastocyst-stage embryos for the 
harvesting of ES cells has raised tense ethical and political concerns. 
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3.4.3 Therapeutic cloning  
 
The immunological barrier to the use of human ES cells is theoretically removable through 
therapeutic cloning, through parthogenesis, or through the creation of immunotolerant ES 
cell lines111. Particularly therapeutic cloning – also called somatic cell nuclear transfer – is 
considered to be a feasible approach to create an inexhaustible supply of host-compatible 
replacement tissue112. The procedure consists in transferring the nucleus from a mature 
donor cell into an enucleated oocyte. The oocyte cytoplasm has the capacity to 
‘reprogram’ the DNA of the nucleus so that the process of cell division is recommenced and 
stem cells are generated. The technique holds the prospect of deriving ES cells from the 
blastocysts and producing healthy, functional substitutes of the donor cell that can then be 
re-transplanted into the specific damaged sites of the patient’s body. As the cells are 
obtained from the donor’s cell nucleus, they are genetically identical to all cells of that 
individual’s body and will not undergo rejection after transplantation. The procedure, as a 
way to provide cells and tissues for transplantation, is also subject to less cultural 
rejection (objections on the basis of ethical and/or social considerations) in comparison 
with reproductive cloning113. Contrary to reproductive cloning, the blastocyst is not 
transplanted back to the uterus. The first demonstration of the use of therapeutic cloning 
for the regeneration of tissues in vivo was the successful production of cloned, host-
compatible bovine renal and cardiac muscle structures114. In May 2005 Woo Suk Hwang and 
colleagues documented the successful cloning of 31 human embryos and the production of 
11 human ES cell lines115. That report had us believe that we were well on our way to 
acquiring various self-compatible cell types that could be employed in a wide range of 
replacement therapies. Unfortunately, Hwang’s cell lines were fabricated116 and the first 
human ES cells obtained from cloned embryos still lies ahead. Although research in this 
field persists, important improvements are required in the many steps involved in nuclear 
transfer before we can readily produce viable sources of cells. 
 
3.4.4 Organogenesis 
 
Once an adequate amount of stem cells can be expanded from a cloned, compatible 
source, the challenge will be to reproduce the complex micro-anatomical structures and 
functions of multi-tissue organ structures117. They cannot be generated through the 
potencies of cell grafts alone. The outlook of growing solid organs (organogenesis) from 
tissue specific organoids (an organisation of cells into an organ-like structure) is aided by 
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recent advances in bioengineering techniques118. It is hoped that further progress will allow 
to seed sufficient amounts of suitable cells onto biodegradable scaffolds and to coax them 
to proliferate and specialize into an organized array of the desired living tissue type. 
 
Over thirty different tissues have been developed over the past two decades, many of 
which have been shown to function in animal models119,120. Various types of skin121, 
cartilage replacement122, bone123 and blood vessels124 have been successfully developed for 
clinical use in humans. Recent advances have also been made in the tissue engineering of 
more complex, composite tissues through the conjunction of two or more cell lineages125. 
The engineering of gastrointestinal and urologic tissues is in an early stage126. Full-sized, 
three-dimensional, functional organs have not been generated yet. 
 
The greatest difficulty is creating the various tissue components that form a particular 
organ and coaxing them to function as a harmonious whole. While heart valves have been 
constructed, the outlook of constructing coronary vessels, muscle and other miscellaneous 
parts in a multi-chambered bioreactor, by contrast, remains remote127. Biomaterials 
provide a functional three-dimensional framework on which the cells can be seeded and 
grown. Theoretically, these structures would, once implanted, allow the cells to synthesize 
into new tissues while providing an intermediary for the transport of cells and appropriate 
bioactive factors to desired sites in the body128. However, the development of proper 
scaffoldings encounters very high requirements. In early stages, the biomaterial should 
support the matrix structural integrity of the engineered tissue. In later stages, however, 
the scaffold should biodegrade at a rate that coincides as much as possible with the rate of 
new tissue formation129. 
 
Furthermore, to sustain the growth and development of organogenesis in vivo, the 
engineered tissues must integrate and function with the patient’s circulatory and nervous 
system.  In theory, a capillary network can be pre-constructed in the tissue in vitro and 
afterwards be connected to the patient’s circulatory system by microsurgery. This concept 
was pioneered by Vacanti and colleagues and has resulted in the gradual production of 
capillary patterns with a biodegradable elastomer130,131. ‘Printing technology’ has emerged 
as a fascinating alternative in the long run. It consists in using an inkjet mechanism to 
print precise volumes of single cells and spherical cell aggregates – ‘bio-ink’ – into 
successive layers of biodegradable gel.  Theoretically, this technology could allow the 
printing of a branching vascular tree as part of the aggregate organ-forming structures. 
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The research has advanced to the stage in which endothelial cells (the cells that line blood 
vessels) are printed in a set of stacked rings132. 
 
3.4.5 Nonhuman animal growth environments 
 
Cascalho and Platt have argued against the feasibility of growing vascularized and 
innervated organs inside the patient due to the burden the tissue growth would impose on 
the already affected system133,134. They suggest the use of animals as growth environments 
for the completion of organogenesis. The procedure could consist in transplanting early-
staged human embryonic organs (organ primordia) into an animal and allowing them to 
mature into compatible grafts for transplantation. Preliminary animal experiments suggest 
that animal organ primordia, obtained at the proper moment in embryonic development, 
automatically grow and differentiate along defined organ-committed lines135. Hammerman 
has shown that renal primordia transplanted into animals also become vascularized by host 
blood vessels, excrete waste, and support life in animals that lack both kidneys136,137. 
 
The proposed approach presents one of the newest (and least developed) research plans of 
xenotransplantation science and is indicative of the persistent interest in this field. It 
suggests that the use of nonhuman animals either as hosts for human organogenesis, or as 
sources of genetically manipulated tissues and organs, stands closer to providing unlimited, 
fully functional replacements than any of the alternative approaches discussed above. 
Nevertheless, xenotransplantation has also been unexpectedly slow in moving to the clinic 
and that is due to both technical/biological and cultural constraints. The following chapter 
will outline the current constraints against conducting clinical xenotransplantation. 
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4 Barriers to clinical xenotransplantation 
 
Adapted from: Ravelingien A. Xenotransplantation: an update on the safety of 
using pigs for transplantation. Flemish Veterinary Journal – Forthcoming. 
 
Abstract 
 
While xenotransplantation is generally regarded as an extraordinary field of contemporary 
medical research, there have been attempts to use animal cells and tissues for 
transplantation and transfusion in humans since the 17th century. Some of the first organs 
transplanted in humans were also derived from animals. A brief overview of the history of 
xenotransplantation reveals that, during the past, the greatest barrier to clinical success 
was hyperacute rejection: a complement-mediated response to the source animal tissue 
that results in the destruction of xenografts within minutes. In the past decade, great 
progress has been made in countering this form of rejection, but further success is 
thwarted by the gradual awareness of subsequent processes of rejection and physiological 
incompatibilities. Nonetheless, during this time, reluctance to move forward to the clinic 
has predominantly been related to the fear that xenotransplantation will unleash new 
infectious disease in the prospective recipient and his or her surroundings. This chapter 
gives an outline of the state of xenotransplantation science and the main barriers to its use 
as a successful clinical therapy. 
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To do nothing, or to prevent others from doing anything, is itself a type of experiment, 
for the prevention of experimentation is tantamount to the assumption of responsibility 
for an experiment different from the one proposed.1 
 
 
4.1 Standing the test of time 
 
To assign a date to the outset of xenotransplantation, many will refer to the Greek legend 
of Daedalus, who grafted bird feathers to his arms and the arms of his son, Icarus, to 
escape from the island prison of King Minos. Perhaps surprisingly, the real history of 
xenotransplantation is also longstanding and features investigations that are themselves 
remarkable enough to have become legendary. In those experiments, all types of animals – 
frogs, cats, dogs, rats, rabbits, chickens, cockerels, pigeons, sheep, apes and pigs – have 
been considered as potential sources for clinical treatment2. 
 
The oldest xenotransplantations performed in humans involved transfusions of animal 
blood and were reported as early as 16283. A famous example is the transfusion of a lamb’s 
blood, conducted by Jean-Baptiste Davis, physician of King Louis XIV, and Paul Emmerez in 
16674. The recipient was a young man who suffered severe fever. The physicians were 
convinced that the symptoms had vanished as a result of the transfusion and subsequently 
applied the procedure for various other conditions, including mental illness. Indeed, as 
people believed that the lamb’s blood would transfer the animal’s docile and calm 
character, such xenotransfusions were a particularly popular treatment for problems of 
temper in 19th -century Britain5. 
 
The first documentation on tissue xenotransplantation also dates from the 17th century, 
with the report of successful engraftment of a piece of canine cranial bone to repair a 
soldier’s injured skull in 16686. During the ensuing development of skin 
xenotransplantation, peculiar experiments included the grafting of a rat onto a crow’s 
chest in 1860 and the grafting of skin flaps still attached to a living lamb to the back of a 
young burn victim in 18807. A decade later, much of the interest in xenotransplantation 
concentrated on testicle grafts due to their alleged potential for human revitalization. 
Brown-Séquard, a 72-year-old French-American physician and physiologist, explored the 
concept in 1889, injecting himself with an extract of crushed testicles from dog and guinea 
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pig8. He claimed that the injections rejuvenated the strength and capacities that had been 
lessened through old age. Thirty-one years later, Serge Voronoff further developed those 
early attempts at endocrinology with the transplantation of slices of chimpanzee and 
baboon testicles in men9. Those transplants can be considered the “Viagra of the 1920s”10. 
The same surgeon also transplanted ape ovaries into women in an attempt to reverse 
menopause. In an extraordinary experiment, Voronoff even conducted the reverse 
transplantation of a woman’s ovary into a female chimpanzee and subsequently, although 
without result, inseminated human sperm. 
 
Remarkably, the earliest attempts at clinical kidney and heart transplantation were also 
from animals to humans. Whereas the first human kidney transplant was performed in 
1933, kidney xenotransplants were attempted at the beginning of the 20th century. In 1905 
Princetau inserted slices of rabbit kidney in the kidney of a child with renal insufficiency11. 
Having perfected the technique of vascular anastomosis (the surgical connection of the 
graft’s vessels to the vascular network of the recipient) that was developed by Alexis 
Carrel in 1902, Mathieu Jaboulay conducted what is considered the first true organ 
transplantation in 190612. The procedure involved connecting the renal vessels of a sheep 
and a goat kidney, respectively, to the bend of the elbow of two patients who were dying 
of renal failure13. Attempts to connect xenogeneic kidneys to the thighs or arms of human 
recipients persisted until 192314. The first heart fully transplanted into a human was 
derived from a chimpanzee (named Bino) and carried out on 23 January 196415. The 
transplant surgeon, James Hardy, was almost four years ahead of the first human-to-
human heart transplantation, which was conducted by Christiaan Barnard in December 
196716. 
 
The initial solid organ xenotransplantations were desperate measures to save terminally ill 
patients in cases where no alternative treatment was available. The survival rates of the 
first animal organ recipients were extremely poor: the patients died in a matter of hours 
or days after the surgery. With evidence of better results with allografts, 
allotransplantation rapidly became the approach to which most interest and research was 
dedicated17. Nevertheless, the appeal of using animals as sources of grafts resurfaced out 
of sheer necessity since human donors were similarly hard to come by before the 
implementation and endorsement of clinical brain death18. Between 1963 and 1984, a total 
of 39 kidney, liver and heart xenotransplants into humans were reported. The organs were 
primarily obtained from baboons, rhesus monkeys and chimpanzees, which clearly provided 
better results than organs from any other animal species19. In the early 1960s, use of 
Part two   Barriers to the clinic 
 85 
chemical immunosuppressants to counter rejection of human transplant grafts was 
initiated. Keith Reetsma was the first to apply specified immunosuppressive therapies in a 
nonhuman primate-to-human transplantation in 1963. One year later, the same surgeon 
obtained a 9-month survival in a recipient of a chimpanzee kidney showing no indication of 
organ rejection20. This remains the longest survival ever recorded for the 
xenotransplantation of an organ. All other organ xenotransplants in humans reported to 
date have lasted no longer than 70 days21. 
 
Probably the most controversial xenotransplantation ever performed was the 
transplantation of a baboon heart to a 12-day old female baby known as ‘Baby Fae’. 
Leonard Bailey conducted the transplant on 26 October 1984 in the hope of rescuing the 
child, who suffered from hypoplastic left-heart syndrome, from imminent death. What at 
first appeared a successful and ambitious endeavour ended in the baby’s death 20 days 
after the surgery due to rejection of the ABO-mismatched organ22. Thomas Starzl had also 
unsuccessfully attempted paediatric organ xenotransplants earlier, between 1969 and 
1974. One of the trials included the transplantation of a chimpanzee liver to a 7-month-old 
boy. He only survived for 26 hours23. The public outrage provoked by the death of Baby Fae 
suggests that Bailey’s failed attempt was the last straw that broke the camel’s back and 
marked the beginning of another de facto moratorium. The event caused heated public 
debate about the acceptability of using nonhuman primates as organ sources. It was also 
questioned whether the transplant had not intended clinical research rather than clinical 
treatment24. Only in the early 1990’s, again propelled by the scarcity of human donors, 
were organ xenotransplants given another go. By this time, progress had been made in the 
development of new immunosuppressive regimens and in genetic engineering techniques to 
manipulate donor-recipient incompatibility. During that period, five solid organ 
xenotransplants were performed, involving both baboon hearts and pig livers25. One 
recipient of a baboon liver survived for 70 days. The other recipients died within a matter 
of hours or days. For all solid organ xenotransplantations, the immunological barrier was 
the principal hurdle to improvements in recipient survival rates. 
 
More recent and successful clinical applications of xenotransplantation have consisted of 
cellular xenotransplants and ex vivo perfusions of diseased livers and kidneys. As explained 
in the previous section, with perfusion, the major blood vessels of the organs are 
connected and cross-circulated to an animal kidney or liver placed outside the body. The 
first cross-circulation experiment dates from 1967, and involved connecting the arm of a 
deeply hepatic comatose woman to the leg of a baboon. The baboon’s kidney excreted 
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about 5 litres of the patient’s fluid and allowed the patient to awake from coma26. The 
potential to reverse deep coma related to fulminant hepatic failure has since been 
demonstrated with livers from various animal species27. Attempts to restore or temporarily 
support the function of organs through linkage with animal organs, have also included 
extracorporeal perfusion of the heart and spleen and even oxygenation of the lungs28. 
Alternatively, bioartificial liver devices, in which the patient’s plasma is guided through 
primary porcine hepatocytes, have been applied to patients with acute liver 
failure29,30,31,32. Some studies indicated improvement in survival; sufficient enough to 
bridge time for a liver transplantation or for the patient’s own liver to recover33,34. 
However, a general review of the clinical experience in extracorporeal pig liver perfusion 
as a hepatic assist in acute liver failure demonstrates no significant advantage of this 
approach over  conventional intensive care therapy35. Similarly, no significant benefit has 
been demonstrated in the randomized control trial of the HepatAssist bioartificial liver 
unit36. 
 
Clinical trials of cellular xenotransplants have included injections of porcine pancreatic 
islet cells in insulin-dependent diabetic patients37,38,39,40,41,42, baboon HIV-resistant 
haematopoietic cells to treat a patient with AIDS43, encapsulated chromaffin cells from 
newborn calves to treat chronic pain44, and porcine neural cells for the treatment of 
patients with Parkinson’s disease45,46,47, Huntington’s disease48, epilepsy and stroke49,50. 
Additionally, an estimated 1,000 burn patients have been treated with autologous skin 
cells, which are also considered a type of xenotransplantation because they were grown on 
mouse feeder layers51. The most encouraging results are found in cellular xenotransplants 
for the treatment of diabetes, chronic pain and Parkinson’s. 
 
4.2 Biological barriers to clinical xenotransplantation 
 
4.2.1 Immunological incompatibility 
 
As evident from the many dismal attempts in the past, whether xenogeneic cellular, tissue 
and organ grafts may constitute a future replacement for human grafts, depends in the 
first place on whether the tissue will be sufficiently tolerated by the human immune 
system. The incompatibility of cross-species grafts causes more intense and challenging 
immunological reactions than grafts transplanted between humans and continues to inhibit 
Part two   Barriers to the clinic 
 87 
effective clinical use of most xenotransplantation applications52. The precise mechanisms 
that underlie xenograft rejection were not known at the time the first organ 
xenotransplants were performed (in fact, at the time of Jaboulay’s first attempts, Karl 
Landsteiner was still studying the ABO system of blood groups53) and remain incompletely 
understood to date. Nevertheless, some level of interspecies immunological incompatibility 
had been indicated since the beginning of the 19th century. In 1816 and 1818, respectively, 
John Henry Lealock and James Blundell demonstrated from various cross-species animal 
transfusion models that donor and recipient must be of the same species. In 1863 Paul Bert 
published ‘On animal transplantation’, a doctoral thesis in which he demonstrated that 
blood could be successfully cross-circulated between two rats but not between a rat and a 
pig. In his recommendations, he noted that transplantations between different species, 
particularly between an animal and a human, should be avoided54. 
 
Xenotransplantation research has not only persisted despite that early recommendation, it 
has heightened the immunological challenge by choosing an evolutionary disparate species 
as the source animal. As mentioned above, throughout the history of xenotransplantation, 
a number of source species have been considered, amongst which the primate has shown 
to provide the best results. Most recently, tilapia fish have been proposed as a source of 
pancreatic cells and both mouse and insect cells have been used to generate human cells 
in culture55. Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that the pig is currently the most preferred 
source animal for most replacement cells and all organs. The primate is considered an 
inappropriate source of xenografts due to both practical and ethical considerations (which 
will be addressed in the following section). The evolutionary distance between pigs and 
humans, however, gives rise to greater physiological and biochemical incompatibilities and 
causes destruction of the xenograft within minutes to hours after transplantation. The 
most problematic barriers do not involve responses to antigen incompatibilities in blood 
groups, as is the case in allotransplantation. While the antigen expression of pig blood 
groups is comparably weak as it is, herds of pigs have even been created which carry the 
universal donor blood type O56. Rather, the most drastic phase of xenogeneic rejection is 
due to a natural immunological response that developed millions of years ago to offer 
protection against intruding microorganisms57. 
 
Hyperacute rejection  
 
Hyperacute rejection occurs when a transplant between discordant (widely divergent) 
species elicits natural antibodies, known as ‘xenoreactive natural antibodies’, which target 
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the species-specific donor tissue. In the early 1990s it was discovered that pig-to-human 
transplants evoked human xenoreactive antibodies against a sugar molecule called 
galactose-(α1-3)-galactose (Galα1-3Gal) that is present in the lining of porcine blood 
vessels58. This carbohydrate is expressed by many animal species, but humans, apes and 
Old World monkeys have lost the capacity to produce it in the course of evolution59. As a 
result, our bodies produce natural antibodies to the antigen as a protection mechanism. 
Indeed, the Gal sugar molecules are also found on the surface of certain bacteria, viruses 
and parasites. It is known that at least 85 per cent of human xenoreactive natural 
antibodies are targeted specifically to Galα1-3Gal60. The impact of xenoreactive natural 
antibody activation is profound. When the human immune mechanism comes into contact 
with a porcine vascularized xenograft, the organ turns into a black, swollen and mottled 
mass within several minutes or hours. The circulating natural antibodies quickly bind to the 
Galα1-3Gal and activate a destructive succession of nearly three dozen proteins, which is 
known as ‘complement’. The process starts with damaging, and often destroying, the 
endothelial cells that compose the cell lining of the cavities of the heart and blood/lymph 
vessels. Consequently, the process of blood coagulation (for example, clot formation in the 
blood) is initiated, causing thrombosis, which in turn obstructs the xenograft and 
surrounding tissues from sufficient blood flow. Ultimately, the damages in the endothelium 
result in the exposure of the underlying matrix, the breakdown of metabolic and oxygen 
pathways and the rapid death of the recipient. Hyperacute rejection develops in all organ 
xenotransplants between discordant species, but does not pose as much of a problem for 
cell or tissue xenotransplantation. 
 
Hyperacute rejection can be overcome if we can circumvent the binding of the antibodies 
to the Gal sugar by either eliminating the xenoreactive natural antibodies or by inhibiting 
complement. Advances in this area have come up with a range of possible strategies and 
no longer render this form of rejection the major obstacle to xenotransplantation in pre-
clinical models. Importantly, however, this progress led to the understanding that 
hyperacute rejection is only one of several rejection processes that inevitably develop 
within days after transplantation. 
 
Subsequent rejection phases 
 
Acute vascular rejection occurs over days to weeks and, although the exact biology is not 
fully understood, also consists of the progressive destruction of the pig blood vessels. It 
appears as a delayed form of hyperacute rejection (and is sometimes also referred to as 
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‘delayed vascular rejection’) as it involves persistent attacks of xenoreactive antibodies. 
Nevertheless, it has been shown that it is a different process and that xenoreactive 
antibodies trigger it61. Those anti-donor antibodies play the most significant part in the 
rejection process, but certain white blood cells, such as T lymphocytes (‘killer cells’) and 
macrophages, are also involved. Acute vascular rejection damages the inner layer of the 
coronary arteries, and may result in scarring, endothelial cell swelling and activation and a 
decrease in blood flow62. 
 
Acute cellular rejection progresses over weeks or months after xenotransplantation and 
resembles the immunological reaction that occurs after allotransplantation. The process 
generally involves the destruction of the xenogeneic epithelial cells, which are responsible 
for the function of the transplant tissues. The attack is predominantly generated by host T 
lymphocytes that intrude the xenograft and directly attack its cells (hence, the term 
‘cellular rejection’). T lymphocytes play a major role in fighting infection and are capable 
of ‘memorizing’ the antigens they have detected, allowing for a quick response when the 
antigen is re-introduced. This type of rejection has not presented a major barrier to the 
survival of pre-clinical xenotransplants, but that may be the effect of the use of high and 
clinically intolerable doses of immunosuppressive drugs. 
 
Chronic rejection may take many months or years. Due to the limited survival obtained to 
date, it has not been widely observed in xenotransplantation experiments. It is however 
the major constraint to long-term success in allotransplantation. The process is poorly 
understood but may result in the narrowing of blood vessels to the extent that the 
attached tissue is starved of essential nutrients. 
 
4.2.2 Host or source animal manipulations 
 
In order to circumvent the various stages of rejection, pig-to-human immune compatibility 
must be enhanced either by manipulating the prospective source animal and/or its grafts, 
or by suppressing the immune system of the recipient prior to xenotransplantation. 
 
Source animal modifications 
 
Genetic manipulations of the source animals have provided the most successful strategies 
for circumventing hyperacute rejection in pre-clinical models. In this sense, and in 
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comparison with nonhuman primates, pigs are a particularly rewarding species given the 
relative ease with which they can be genetically manipulated to express extrinsic genes63. 
The procedures involve manipulating the pig’s genome so that the animal’s cells, tissues 
and organs are partly ‘human’ – or, at least, recognized as such by the human patient’s 
immune system. 
 
Transgenic pigs The first successful approach to counter anti-Gal antibody mediated 
complement activation consisted of genetically engineering pigs to express human 
complement regulatory proteins64. The rationale underlying this approach is that the 
human complement-regulatory proteins will be able to protect better against human 
complement. Over the past decade, several strains of transgenic pigs that express one or 
more human complement regulatory genes have been bred. The first transgenic pig was 
born on 23 December 1992 after injection of a small amount of human DNA into fertilized 
sow eggs65. ‘Astrid’, as the resulting piglet was named, expressed human decay-
accelerating factor (hDAF). In 1995 transgenic pigs were produced which expressed both 
the hDAF and CD59 human complement regulatory proteins66. When transplanted into 
baboons, such transgenic grafts provided survival advantage over wild-type pig grafts of up 
to 30 hours67. Wild-type pig grafts were typically hyperacutely rejected in less than 80 
minutes. Life-supporting (‘orthotopic’) hearts obtained from hDAF transgenic pigs have 
since achieved survival of a month in nonhuman primates68. Life-supporting transgenic 
renal xenografts have obtained a maximum survival time of 78 days69. In baboons, the 
transgenesis has effectively down-regulated activity of the complement cascade without 
any form of immunosuppression70. The continuous development of multi-transgenic pigs 
has shown to provide even greater protection against human complement-mediated 
damage71,72. These more advanced genetic manipulations of the pig genome into offspring 
have been facilitated by the development of somatic cell nuclear transfer (cloning) 
technology in pigs, with the first cloned pigs born on 5 March 200073. Nonetheless, even 
when hyperacute rejection is avoided, the hDAF transgenic organs transplanted into 
nonhuman primates eventually undergo a rejection process that mimics acute vascular 
rejection. 
 
GalT-KO pigs The introduction of the technique of nuclear transfer in pigs soon allowed for 
an alternative source animal modifications to prevent hyperacute rejection. The technique 
consists of ‘knocking out’ the gene for α1,3-galactosyltransferase in order to avoid 
synthesis of Galα1-3Gal. The production of cloned piglets that lack one allele of the gene – 
‘Gal-T knockout (GalT-KO) pigs’– was reported in 2002 by two independent research 
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teams74,75. Shortly after, in August 2002, PPL Therapeutics announced the production of 
the first double knockout piglets, which lack both copies of the α1,3-galacotsyltransferase 
gene76. GalT-KO pigs have allowed for further increase in survival rates in 
xenotransplantations of hearts and kidneys to primates in comparison with the use of hDAF 
pigs. In vivo results of a non-life supporting (‘heterotopic’)heart transplant in a pig-to-
baboon model obtained maximum graft survival of 179 days, the longest survival recorded 
of pig-to-nonhuman-primate organ transplantation to date77,78. In non-life-supporting 
(heterotopic) transplants, the native organ is kept in place and the xenogeneic organ is 
transplanted in a different location within the body. Life-supporting xenotransplantation of 
a GalT-KO kidney resulted in survival of more than 80 days in nonhuman primates with no 
evidence of rejection79. 
 
Both strategies, especially when combined, are effective measures against hyperacute 
rejection. Further improvement of survival seems likely, provided that progress in site-
specific genetic and transgenic modifications continues. Nonetheless, the human host may 
still not tolerate the xenografts as well as the allografts with conventional 
immunosuppressive regimens80. 
 
Transfer of human stem cells or primordia into developing animals should also allow for 
the creation of ‘humanized’ grafts. Preliminary experiments have been conducted to 
generate animal grafts that express a significant amount of human cells81. Almeida-Porada 
et al. injected human stem cells in developing sheep and found that the human cells 
contributed to the sheep’s blood, bone, liver, heart and nervous system82. Others have 
established the differentiation of human stem cells (derived from bone marrow) into 
human chondrocytes, adipocytes, myocytes, cardiomyocytes, bone marrow stromal cells 
and thymic stroma83. The human cells persisted in the xenogeneic sheep environment for 
up to 13 months. Ultimately, the hope exists that use can be made of a patient’s own stem 
cells. If these cells were to be injected into developing animals, the animals may, once 
born, express a sufficient amount of that patient’s cells in the grafts required. The genetic 
similarity between host grafts and recipient would thereby dismiss major immunological 
incompatibilities. The use of an animal ‘host’ as a growth environment for human 
embryonic developing organ primordia, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is also 
promising. The advantages of that approach include the fact that early staged organs, 
obtained at the proper time during embryogenesis, automatically differentiate into the 
desired tissue and facilitate vascularization. Furthermore, pre-clinical data suggest that 
kidney and pancreatic primordia can be effectively transplanted across both concordant 
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(rat to mouse) and highly discordant (pig to rodent) xenogeneic barriers84. Nonetheless, 
the success of the pre-clinical studies in large animal models has been constrained by the 
failure to identify the optimal gestation time for transplantation into the animal host 
environment85. Moreover, it will be essential that the embryonic organs do not come into 
contact with the host antigens. Such contact could cause the production of epitopes and 
thereby elicit an immune response. 
 
Immunoisolation by encapsulation of transplanted tissue appears to be a particularly 
feasible approach to avoid rejection in cellular xenotransplantation. The procedure 
consists of encapsulating cells or small tissues in a semi-permeable membrane that cannot 
be penetrated by destructive factors but does facilitate two-way diffusion of nutrients 
from the host circulation and desired products from the xenograft. Alternatively, the 
xenogeneic cells or tissues are placed in a tubular scaffold that becomes subcutaneously 
covered with connective tissue (collagen) from the recipient. The effectiveness of porcine 
neonatal islet immunoisolation was suggested by reports of long-term reversal of diabetes 
in nude mice and normalized blood glucose levels in diabetic monkeys for up to 803 days86. 
Clinical transplantation of encapsulated human islets resulted in insulin independence for 
more than nine months in one diabetic patient87. The technique appears to improve 
survival rates of xenogeneic islet cells transplanted in humans as well. Whereas the first 
trial of porcine islet xenotransplantation in 1994 showed no improvement in the patient’s 
insulin requirement88, a recent attempt using encased porcine islet and Sertoli cells (the 
latter which have been found to consist of an immunomodulating factor) appears 
encouraging89. At follow-up four years after the xenotransplants, 50 per cent of the human 
recipients (n=12) had a significantly reduced insulin requirement; two patients had 
achieved temporary insulin-independence. However, it is important to note that these 
results are not uncontested (we will address this further in the General Discussion). 
 
Xenograft recipient modifications 
 
As an alternative to source animal modifications, the immunological incompatibilities 
between pig and human may be decreased or suppressed by modifications in the potential 
recipient prior to a xenotransplantation. 
 
The most obvious approach would be the use of immunosuppressive drugs similar to those 
applied in the field of allotransplantation. Unfortunately, the therapies that generally 
suppress the immune response in allotransplantation are not aggressive enough to counter 
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rejection of nonhuman animal grafts. Adapted regimens would be highly toxic and are not 
clinically tolerable at the present time. While research into drugs that avoid the activation 
of complement and blood coagulation persists90, it is unlikely that those drugs will provide 
long-term solutions. 
 
Initial strategies to prevent hyperacute rejection aimed at diminishing the presence of 
xenoreactive antibodies. In 1966 Perper and Najarian first attempted that approach pre-
clinically by perfusing the prospective recipient animal’s blood through the kidneys of 
source animals. Later techniques involved the use of plasmapheresis and, more recently, 
specific depletion of xenoreactive antibodies has been achieved using affinity columns that 
bear Gal 1,3Gal. Depletion of xenoreactive antibodies using immunoabsorption columns, in 
conjunction with plasmapheresis and immunosuppression, has also countered acute 
vascular rejection. Another method to prevent hyperacute rejection was the 
administration of cobra venom factor to activate complement so that it would be 
consumed by the time the grafts are transplanted. Other agents are being considered as 
means to ‘interrupt’ the complement cascade91. 
 
Ideally, however, the recipient should be altered so that the immune system completely, 
and permanently, tolerates the foreign graft. That state, known as ‘immunological 
tolerance’, is the destination of further allotransplantation research as well. Described as 
‘the immunological holy grail’92, tolerance is a condition in which the immune system 
tolerates specific donor cells, tissues and organs as if they were its own, but remains 
responsive to other invading microorganisms. It would completely alleviate the need for 
any additional immunosuppressive therapy. Apart from the medical utility associated with 
drug independence, tolerance may be the only chance for long-term effective discordant 
xenotransplantation. 
 
Various approaches to induce immunological tolerance exist, including haematopoietic 
stem cell transplantation, transplantation of porcine thymus tissue (part of the immune 
system which generates T-cells), molecular chimerism using a gene therapy approach and 
temporary depletion of T-cells or induction of T-suppressor cells93. Early efforts to induce 
tolerance in animal models mainly consisted of introducing species-foreign cells into foetal 
animals before their immune system was (fully) developed. While it could theoretically be 
feasible in humans as well, that method is not practicable. There are severe ethical 
barriers against creating human embryonic cross-species chimeras and potentially harmful 
effects of introducing porcine cells on further embryonic development are unknown. 
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Importantly, moreover, as it is not predictable which foetuses will need a transplant in the 
future, that approach would require that all foetuses carried to term should be sensitized 
to porcine cells94. Alternative approaches primarily involve the temporary destruction of 
the host’s immune system (for instance, through radiation of T lymphocyte regulators or 
whole body irradiation) so that it will renew itself only after transplantation of foreign 
cells, allowing for the co-presence of both recipient and donor (most commonly, bone 
marrow) cells. Those techniques are not without risk for patients and have produced rather 
disappointing results in terms of persistent anti-pig antibody production95. The failure to 
overcome returning antibody production has also been observed after thymic 
transplantation96, xenoreactive antibody depletion97 and molecular chimerism, in which 
animal genes instead of cells are transplanted in the immunosuppressed host98. 
 
4.2.3 Physiological incompatibility 
 
While the feat of human tolerance to xenografts still lies ahead, long-term success of pig-
to-human transplants is also left wanting by other potential incompatibilities between the 
species. Those incompatibilities can manifest themselves in differences on physiological, 
homeostatic, metabolic and hormonal levels and remain largely unexplored. 
 
The major disparities between human and porcine physiology that have been identified so 
far include differences in haematology, enzymes, hormones and liver metabolism. 
Sufficient resemblances in terms of growth factors and substance supply, control and 
transport are crucial for the integration of solid organ xenografts in a host environment. 
Theoretically, incompatibilities in growth hormone could produce over- or undersized 
growth of the xenotransplant. Illustrative in this respect is the production of giant mice 
after insertion of bovine or porcine growth hormone gene in its genome. However, as 
pertains to known differences between human and pig growth hormones (by up to 19 per 
cent), no severe incompatibilities are expected99. Indeed, miniature swine breeds have 
been identified which provide organs that, in comparison with other species, best 
approximate adult human size. Of persistent concern, by contrast, is the fact that the 
specific carrier molecules that transport substances such as hormones throughout the 
body, are species-specific. Furthermore, the levels of circulating electrolytes, sugars and 
other biochemical products maintained by organs may also vary between pigs and 
primates. The disturbances in haematology are of most concern. Many coagulatory 
disturbances have been indicated in various pig-to-nonhuman-primate xenotransplants100 
Part two   Barriers to the clinic 
 95 
and pose an increased risk of bleeding disorders and vascular thrombosis101. Adverse 
clotting may contribute to xenotransplant rejection and problems related to circulation 
incompatibility may inhibit the delivery of oxygen and nutrients and removal of waste 
substances102. Differences between humans and pigs have also been found with regard to 
haematocrit, blood composition, blood viscosity, red blood cell surface area and diameter 
– all of which may contribute to a weak integration of the xenograft in human 
microenvironments. 
 
Due to the horizontal posture of pigs, concern has also raised about incompatibilities of 
the heart in terms of heart valve size, pulmonary circulation, and other physiologic 
functions103. However, postural changes do not appear to affect the function of porcine 
hearts – nor of lungs and kidneys for that matter – when transplanted in nonhuman 
primates104. In fact, of all solid organ xenotransplants, the heart appears to be the least 
susceptible to major physiological incompatibility problems. Concordant monkey-to-
baboon cardiac xenotransplantation has achieved the longest survival rates ever recorded 
in the history of xenotransplantation (up to 540 days)105. In a cautious note, however, it 
must be added that improved survival of transplants between more disparate species may 
reveal important anatomical differences with regard to innervation of the heart106. In 
comparison, the increased survival rates achieved after transplantation of transgenic 
porcine kidneys into nonhuman primates have allowed for a more detailed study of the 
physiological effects of discordant kidney xenotransplantations. It has been suggested that 
porcine erythropoietin, a hormone that is responsible for the control of normal blood cell 
production in the bone marrow, will not function in humans because primate 
erythropoietin receptors do not recognize the pig version107. Cross-species transplantation 
of the liver has also expressed significant species-specific differences, particularly in 
respect to the structure and composition of transport proteins such as serum albumin108. 
Further investigations to assess the extent to which pig livers can maintain normal human 
homeostatic mechanisms, are required. The level of physiological compatibility between 
human and porcine lungs is currently the least understood, since porcine lung 
xenotransplants have not sustained survival of nonhuman primates beyond a few hours109. 
 
While the biological barriers to solid organ xenotransplantation remain substantial, various 
cellular replacements prove to be more compatible with the functions of the native cells. 
Pig islet cells provide adequate blood levels of glucose in humans. Moreover, while 
xenogeneic islet transplantation is known to initiate an immediate inflammatory reaction 
in human blood, which causes coagulation, that effect appears to be manageable by 
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appropriate drug regimens110. Porcine neural cells are also a good match in terms of 
structure and function. Various animal studies have provided proof of principle that 
xenogeneic neural tissue can survive and function and that it can reduce the symptoms of 
neurodegenerative disease. The studies even suggest that the level of neural cell 
migration, innervation and integration is better compared to equivalent allografted 
tissue111,112,113. The first neural xenograft survival in the human brain was documented in 
1997114. Embryonic pig cells had been implanted into a patient with Parkinson’s disease 
and were found to have generated pig dopaminergic and other neural cells. The neurons 
had grown axon extensions into the host brain and evoked only low reactivity from human 
microglia and T-cells. Nonetheless, while some neurons survived over seven months, large 
numbers of dopaminergic neurons had only poor graft survival. A different study, three 
years later, reported follow-up results one year after the successful transplantation of 
embryonic porcine ventral mesencephalic tissue in twelve Parkinson’s patients115. The 
results showed that the tissue was well tolerated without serious adverse effects. Overall 
rates of Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale scores improved by 19 per cent and three 
patients, who had received particular immunosuppressive regimens including cyclosporine, 
improved over 30 per cent. Those results are similar to the initial experience with 
unilateral human embryonic allograft transplantation, although in the latter case much less 
cells are transplanted (in this study, 12 million embryonic pig neurons were transplanted!). 
Apparently, although the immune rejection in the brain is thought to be rather weak, most 
of the xenografts nevertheless undergo rejection for lack of proper protection measures. 
Defining the optimal environment for long-term neural cell growth and the appropriate 
concentrations of cells also remains a challenge116. Again, it must be noted that many of 
the specific physiologic problems associated with each type of xenograft, cannot be 
conclusively identified until substantially longer graft survival rates are achieved in 
nonhuman primates and humans. 
 
4.3 Restricting the emergence of xenogeneic infectious disease 
 
Although significant progress has been made in the understanding and approach of 
immunological and physiological incompatibilities, it is clear that many challenges remain 
to be met before xenotransplantation, of organs in particular, will be a viable routine 
therapy for waiting list patients. Precisely at what point pre-clinical efficacy is sufficient 
to warrant clinical applications in humans is, however, unclear. In 2000, the 
Xenotransplantation Advisory Committee suggested that trials of cardiac and lung 
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xenotransplantations should be considered when approximately 60 per cent of primates 
survive life-supporting pig organ transplants for at least three months117. The Spanish 
Xenotransplantation Commission suggested survival and proper function of the grafts for at 
least six months in nonhuman primates118. In comparison with the start of 
allotransplantation, those are rather demanding requisites. Norman Shumway, for 
instance, felt that survival for 4 to 21 days among 85 per cent of dog recipients of cardiac 
transplantation was sufficient to warrant the move to clinical trials119. The argument could 
be put forward that, in a situation where a patient is sure to die soon without a transplant, 
even the most extreme operative mortality rate is acceptable. It has also been noted that 
the pre-clinical survival rate requirements should distinguish between the various types of 
xenografts. In this sense, perhaps, short survival rates of xenogenic cellular 
xenotransplants may be acceptable to warrant further progress in clinical research, 
provided that the graft malfunction is not dangerous for the patient. Nevertheless, 
currently, authorized xenotransplantation trials of whichever type of xenograft are 
extremely rare. The major brake on further progress is clearly related to the possibility 
that xenotransplantation may facilitate adverse effects to third parties not involved with 
the potential clinical benefits. The concern has been raised that infectious agents derived 
from animals may be transferred along with the xenograft and endanger public health. 
 
4.3.1 Contemporary relevance 
 
The distress over the risk of unleashing infectious epidemics, or at worse pandemics, from 
exposure to animal material could not be more topical. At the time of writing, daily news 
reports detail the cautious measures being undertaken to prevent a further outbreak of 
avian influenza A/(H5N1). That strain is highly contagious to all bird types, although not all 
infected bird types show symptoms of infection. Most bird species, such as domestic 
poultry, rapidly develop fatal disease. The spread of the virus is striking. The virus has 
affected poultry in a surface area extending from south-east Asia to parts of Europe120. 
Although influenza viruses are normally highly species-specific, this particular strain has 
also caused human infection and severe disease. Importantly, of all avian influenza strains 
viruses that have been transmitted to humans throughout history, H5N1 has resulted in the 
greatest number of human deaths. On 21 February 2006, and since the start of the current 
outbreak in December 2003, 340 human cases of avian influenza A/(H5N1) and 184 deaths 
were confirmed121. The WHO describes the situation as a phase 3 (out of 6) of pandemic 
alert: the virus subtype is transmitted to humans, but has not yet endured spread among 
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humans122. Nevertheless, the risk that the H5N1 virus – if given enough opportunities – will 
develop the characteristics it needs to start a human influenza pandemic is of greatest 
concern. The relevance of the concern lies in the fact that a wide range of human diseases 
have been acquired through the transmission of viruses, bacteria, or prions from an animal 
to a human (zoonosis) throughout history. The best-known example is the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Compelling evidence exists that a simian variant (SIV) from 
sooty mangabeys is the recent ancestor of HIV-2 and that SIV from chimpanzees is the 
predecessor of certain types of HIV-1123. New zoonoses have emerged particularly in the 
last fifteen years, and are estimated to make up 75 per cent of all emerging infectious 
diseases124. Examples include Ebola, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, rabies, West Nile virus, 
Nipah, Hendra and Menangle viruses, Hantavirus, monkey pox and Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS). Transfer of zoonosis may occur through either direct contact (for 
instance, through a bite from an infected animal) or indirect contact (for example, through 
the consumption of contaminated food)125. Threats have emerged from both exotic hosts 
(cf. Ebola) and domesticated animals (cf. the new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease 
emerged from cattle herds in the UK). Various situations may give rise to new infections, 
but current ecological and microbiological aspects enhance the possibilities. Previously 
unrecognized infections often appear as a result of ecologic transformations and anti-
microbial resistance developing in existing agents126. 
 
4.3.2 Xenozoonosis 
 
Hypothetically, xenotransplantation could allow transmission of zoonosis along with the 
xenograft (xenozoonosis) and contamination could extend beyond the individual transplant 
patient, to their intimate contacts, health care workers and the public at large. Despite 
the long history of attempts at xenotransplantation, serious concern regarding the public 
health hazard materialized particularly in the second half of the 1990s. Arguably, that is 
due to improved understanding of and sensitivity towards zoonotic disease, a looming 
threat of biological terrorism and the potential for rapid, global spread of infectious 
disease through mass air travel. The urgency to establish rigid regulations so to protect the 
public from xenogeneic infection was particularly felt in the United Kingdom, which had 
just experienced the crisis over BSE127. In October 1999 the UK became the first nation in 
the world to adopt a formal regime of preventive measures against xenogeneic virus 
transfer. Specific regulation with regard to xenotransplantation public health risks 
initiated with the launch of an Advisory Group on the Ethics of Xenotransplantation near 
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the end of 1995. In its report to the British Health Department, published in 1997, several 
detailed conditions for further xenotransplantation research were stipulated128. The group 
requested the establishment of a regulatory body to oversee national development of 
xenotransplantation. That resulted in the creation of the United Kingdom 
Xenotransplantation Interim Regulatory Authority (UKXIRA). While the US had initially 
authorized local hospital review committees to approve all clinical xenotransplantation 
investigations, the US Public Health Service also felt the need to optimize the protection 
of public health and requested a central control mechanism in 1996129. As a result, the 
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Xenotransplantation (SACX) was set up to serve as the 
national authority over all aspects concerning the scientific development and clinical 
application of xenotransplantation (although it has by now been disestablished due to the 
low xenotransplantation activity). Governmental advisory commissions have since been set 
up in Canada, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, Australia and New 
Zealand. 
 
One of the important recommendations made by the Advisory Group on the Ethics of 
Xenotransplantation (and subsequently adopted by the UKXIRA and the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA)130) was to preclude the use of nonhuman primates as xenotransplant 
source animals due to the genetic proximity between humans and nonhuman primates. The 
increased likelihood of virus transfer from nonhuman primates was suggested by the global 
spread of HIV-1 and contamination of simian virus in early poliovirus vaccines in the 
1950s131. The dangers specific to primate-to-human xenotransplantation have indeed been 
affirmed: a postmortem blood analysis of a baboon liver recipient indicated infection of 
simian cytomegalovirus infection132. 
 
The subsequent use of pigs as source animals caused less theoretical concerns regarding 
transmission of novel pathogens. Pigs have lived in domestication with humans for 
thousands of years and diagnostic tests and husbandry practices are capable of reducing 
many of the infectious risks we have come to know since. However, a new de facto 
moratorium on clinical applications of xenotransplantation came in 1997 after the 
discoveries that porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs) were able to infect human 
primary cells and cell lines in vitro and could adapt to those cells by serial transmission on 
uninfected cells133,134. 
 
Species-specific endogenous retroviruses are present in the DNA of all mammals 
adequately studied to date, including humans. As such, and in contrast to exogenous 
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retroviruses, endogenous retroviruses are integrated in all cells of the host body, and thus 
difficult to exclude. Although the viruses are no longer capable of causing active infection 
in their native host, they may induce infection upon transfer to another species – as is 
illustrated by the transfer of HIV through non-pathologic simian carriers. To this day, the 
risk of creating a xenotransplant related epidemic, or at worse pandemic, remains 
unquantifiable. No PERV-related disease has been shown to occur in humans to date and 
there is no way of estimating the risk of infection. Nevertheless, a cautious approach is 
supported by the fact that precisely viruses that persist asymptomatically in quiescent or 
latent phases, constitute the greatest hazard to public health. Those viruses can 
hypothetically spread easily without being noticed. Moreover, the severity of the danger of 
PERVs is emphasized in light of known homology to other retroviruses, such as feline 
leukaemia virus (FeLV) or murine leukaemia virus (MuLV), which induce tumours or 
immunodeficiency in the infected host135. Furthermore, the risk of virus transfer is 
enhanced by the fact that transplantation bypasses most of the patient’s usual protective 
physical and immunological barriers and due to lack of knowledge about the behaviour of 
source animal-derived infectious agents in immunosuppressed humans. 
 
4.3.3 Regulatory constraints to clinical applications 
 
Evidence of PERV infections in vitro and fears that there may be other, undiscovered 
transmissible agents compelled several pleas for a moratorium on clinical 
xenotransplantation136,137,138. Currently, public consultations in Norway, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Australia and Canada have resulted in the conclusion that 
xenotransplantation should not start in those nations until critical safety issues are 
resolved. In most nations, however, between 1997 and 1999 a temporary de facto 
moratorium in name of the precautionary principle has been replaced by tighter national 
oversight. Although that oversight is rarely embedded in a legal framework specific to 
xenotransplantation, various regulatory and advisory authorities have published detailed 
safety protocols for xenotransplantation research and clinical trials. The protocol review 
pertains to the procurement and screening of source animals, the clinical and pre-clinical 
testing of xenotransplantation products and the post-xenotransplant 
monitoring/surveillance of recipients. The following is a summary of the most significant 
requirements as stipulated in the latest guidelines provided by the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA)139 and Public Health Services (PHS)140, the UKXIRA141,142,143, the Council 
of Europe Committee of Ministers (COECM)144,145, the European Agency for the Evaluation of 
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Medical Products (EMEA)146, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD)147,148 and the World Health Organization (WHO)149,150. 
 
Xenotransplant source animal screening 
 
As a precondition for appropriate source animal health status, the animals must be derived 
from closed herds with documented health screening programs. The prospective source 
animals should be bred and housed in barrier facilities that are free of designated 
pathogens. No natural, non-sterile feeds should be used. Specified protocols for monitoring 
and diagnosing disease and infectious agents in the herd should be in place. Source animals 
should be screened for a list of infectious agents as generated by experts on infectious 
diseases of the species involved. Special consideration should be given to infectious agents 
known to infect the source animal, known to cause zoonoses, or known to occur in latent 
state. In addition, general assays for recognition of classes of agents should also be 
applied. Biological specimens should be routinely collected and tested for infectious agents 
by appropriate assays. Those samples must be archived for future purposes to facilitate 
identification of infections after the grafts have been retrieved and/or transplanted (the 
recommended durations of storage range from 20 to 50 years). In addition, detailed 
information concerning the health status of the source animals – including all illnesses, 
treatments, drugs and medical care involved – should be documented consistently. Several 
weeks prior to harvest of the grafts, the individual source animals should be quarantined 
and screened extensively. Transportation of source animals should be avoided if possible. 
Postmortem, the animals must not enter the food/feed chain. Special care should also be 
taken to monitor the health of humans who are in regular contact with the animals. All 
animal caretakers must minimally consent to the procurement of baseline samples. 
Additional screening may include periodic sampling and storage of serum or plasma. 
 
All pre-clinical xenotransplantation studies must comply with the monitoring procedures of 
source animals intended for use in clinical trials. Human cells that have been co-cultured 
with nonhuman animal cells (such as embryonic stem cells derived from murine feeder 
layer cells) are also included in xenotransplantation regulation, but require less detailed 
documentations of the health status of source animal colonies. 
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Xenotransplant product screening 
 
Once the xenografts are retrieved from the source animal, additional efforts must be 
conducted to analyze and record the safety status. Stringent sterility requirements apply 
in every step of the process. For those grafts that must be transplanted immediately upon 
retrieval, the screening should be conducted on biopsy samples. For cells and tissues that 
are stored, processed, or expanded before transplantation, further research should specify 
the identity, purity and potency of the active components. Appropriate procedures for 
inactivation or removal of infectious agents should be developed and applied. Extra efforts 
may be required to differentiate newly emerging viruses or viruses for which specific 
assays have not yet been developed. Samples of all xenografts and/or products derived 
from xenografts should be cryo-preserved and archived for further testing. 
 
Xenotransplant recipient screening 
 
The greatest challenge in addressing the risk of infectious disease during clinical 
applications of xenotransplantation, is the need to assure the safety of the recipient’s 
contact populations. They include close contacts – such as family, friends, and health care 
providers – as well as the community at large. In response to the public health threat, the 
guidelines restrict clinical xenotransplantation to those transplantation centres that have 
sufficient know-how to test for potentially causative xenogeneic infectious agents in vitro 
and in vivo or that have established collaborations with relevant experts. The tests should 
enable the identification of latent infectious agents and should be adapted to recognize 
new pathogens as well. Diagnostic testing should not be limited to the event that the 
recipients show indications of disease, but will continue with decreasing frequency 
throughout the lifetime of the recipients even when he or she is asymptomatic. Lifelong 
surveillance programs require the repeated procurement, laboratory analysis and long-
term conservation of biological specimens in order to detect potentially latent viruses. The 
screening will continue postmortem with autopsy and extensive histopathological 
assessments of all samples and cultures of the recipient. All data collected during follow-
up must be available for investigation for up to fifty years after the transplant. Throughout 
that process, all adverse events must be recorded and reported. Identification of a 
potentially hazardous infectious agent calls for instant notification of the relevant health 
authorities. 
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Long-term medical monitoring is applicable even if the clinical trial fails to obtain 
sufficient graft survival. The consenting trial participant looses his or her right to withdraw 
from the experiment (‘imposed extended compliance’). In case the participant fails to 
comply with the constraints associated with xenotransplantation, public health authorities 
may, if necessary, force compliance. The recipient should consent to the potential need 
for confinement or specialized medical housing. Current and future close contacts should 
also be notified of the infection risk and will also be asked to take appropriate measures to 
restrict exposure to others. Close contacts are generally defined as those persons who bear 
the risk of intimate contact with the xenotransplant recipient’s bodily fluids (including 
blood and saliva). The prospective recipients are responsible for taking appropriate 
precautions for sexual and non-sexual contact. They and their intimate contacts will be 
precluded from donating blood, ova, sperm, or any other body parts for use in humans. 
 
The recipient has the responsibility to ensure traceability of his or her whereabouts and 
must inform the medical team of possible changes of address. Various nations are 
developing computerized registers of all xenotransplant product recipients in order to 
facilitate the tracking process. Maintaining biological specimens in a central archive or in 
an interactive network should also facilitate rapid detection of infectious disease. 
Although the data of the patients should be managed in accordance with the principle of 
confidentiality, this principle may be breached if the immediate interest of public health is 
at stake. 
 
Unless very high assurance of safety can be verified, the initial trial participants will most 
likely be patients with serious or life-threatening diseases for whom appropriate 
alternative therapies are lacking. Given the stringent public health measures, the 
prospective recipients must be screened to assess the likeliness of long-term lifestyle 
requirement compliance. Only in desperate situations, and when there are sufficient 
scientific indications to anticipate a life-saving benefit, should patients incapable of giving 
informed consent (including incompetent children) be considered as potential recipients. 
 
Global public health surveillance 
 
In 2000 the Council of Europe’s Working Party on Xenotransplantation conducted a survey 
of the legal and regulatory frameworks relevant to xenotransplantation within 27 states151. 
While 80 per cent of the responding nations of the states required that specific 
authorization should be obtained before clinical trials on humans are conducted, only 26 
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per cent had a specific framework to deal with clinical xenotransplantation protocols. Only 
36 per cent had guidelines for clinical xenotransplantation application. A mere 26 per cent 
had established measures to respond to a xenogeneic infectious outbreak. In the 
understanding that the risks of xenogeneic virus are not confined to the nation in which an 
outbreak initially occurs, the COECM, WHO, EMEA, OECD and the International 
Xenotransplantation Association (IXA) have emphasized the need to establish transnational 
harmonization of accepted norms for xenotransplantation surveillance. The 
recommendations specify that clinical applications of xenotransplantation cannot be 
carried out without effective national regulatory control and surveillance mechanisms 
and/or without specific authorization. Additionally, they mandate rapid collection, 
evaluation and communication of relevant data on a global scale through the development 
of international or interconnected database registries. Adverse effects of a 
xenotransplantation must be reported proactively to the national public health authorities 
of other states concerned. A system for international, cross-border tracking of the 
recipients should be installed and protective measures to prevent secondary infection 
should be standardized. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
Xenotransplantation stands ‘the test of time’ in terms of the persistent pursuit of that 
approach to alleviate various human diseases for which human donor grafts are currently 
lacking. However, with regard to the short survival rates obtained in solid organ 
xenotransplantation, it clearly fails the test of time in order to be established as an 
effective therapy. It remains to be seen whether and, if so, when further progress in 
immunology and physiology will provide adequate xenograft survival in humans. For now, 
imminent xenotransplant trials are limited to direct implantations of porcine cells for the 
treatment of liver failure, diabetes, and neurological disorders152. In retrospect to the 
introductory quote, it is noteworthy that various regulations have been put in place to 
control but not immobilize further xenotransplantation research all together. The 
remaining part of this thesis is contributed to an analysis and evaluation of the ethical 
issues that have arisen along with the development of xenotransplantation. 
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5 To the core of porcine matter: questioning the inherent 
immorality of producing transgenic pigs for xenotransplantation 
 
Adapted from: Ravelingien A, Braeckman J. To the core of porcine matter: 
questioning the inherent immorality of producing transgenic pigs. 
Xenotransplantation 2004; 11: 371-375. 
 
Abstract 
 
The production of transgenic pigs for xenotransplantation is based on an urgent human 
need for transplantable organs. Although the particular genetic modifications are small 
and do not alter the organism phenotypically, several authors consider it morally 
problematic. This chapter attempts to establish whether there are genuine reasons to 
refrain from producing ‘humanized’ pigs for xenotransplantation. We distinguish two types 
of ethical arguments often confused in debating the matter: consequentialist and inherent 
arguments. Whereas the first type of argument pertains to the potentially negative effects 
of the procedure, the second type claims that genetic engineering of animals is 
‘inherently’ wrong; that the action itself – regardless of the effects – is to be considered 
immoral. This chapter will focus on the latter claims, which can be categorized into 
several clusters of arguments: (a) arguments that focus on the so-called integrity of the 
genome, the organism and the species; (b) arguments expressing the belief that animals 
have a good of their own; and (c) arguments questioning the technological interference 
with the natural order. We will demonstrate that the claim that it is ‘inherently wrong’ to 
tinker with the genetic make-up of animals, is not self-evident and even hard to maintain 
having investigated the underlying presumptions. Sound resistance to producing transgenic 
pigs is restricted to concerns regarding the concrete effects of the applications. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Transgenic technology (transgenesis) involves the deliberate transfer of external DNA that 
renders the recipient a new, foreign property. The major utility of the technology lies in 
the possibility to allow for the desired expression of otherwise species-specific genes and 
traits in different species and for the subsequent transfer to the host’s offspring. The 
initial method, which was first shown to be effective in 19801, consisted in introducing 
foreign DNA obtained with recombinant techniques into a newly fertilized mammalian egg. 
The DNA was shown to integrate into and proliferate with the recipient’s native genome 
and eventually contributed to all cells of the developing animal (including gametes). The 
production of transgenic animals has become widespread since the development of the 
first transgenic mouse in 1981. In agriculture, animals are commonly manipulated to 
produce quantitative and qualitative changes in animal products that cannot emerge by 
conventional selection, for instance a larger production of milk, or the production of milk 
with enhanced qualitative properties (such as reduced lactose or cholesterol and increased 
concentrations of protein)2. If the animals are made to consist of particular human genes, 
they may develop into preferred models for human disease or even provide human protein-
generated medicines. Transgenesis of human genes into the genome of pigs has also 
allowed for the production of porcine grafts that are specially adapted to serve as 
potential replacement grafts for transplantation in humans. The prospect of using porcine 
grafts to meet the shortage of human cells, tissues and organs for transplantation is still 
remote due to problems related to immunology, the potential transfer of xenozoonosis and 
features involving the physiological interaction between the xenograft organ and the host. 
Nevertheless, the transgenic intervention of source animals to express human complement 
inhibitors such as DAH and hCD59 has proven to be effective to counter the first stages of 
hyperacute rejection and to reduce the risk of complement activation3. It thereby 
constitutes one of the major advances in xenotransplantation research. 
 
Although the production of what some call ‘humanized’ pigs is based on an urgent human 
need for transplantable organs, the production of transgenic animals raises distinct moral 
questions4,5. Various surveys have established that, although approval of transgenic 
manipulation of animals increases when carried out for the sake of medical progress, the 
general public adheres to strongly held moral objections to the genetic engineering of 
animals. Indeed, one public opinion poll reports a higher level of resistance towards the 
genetic engineering of animals than of humans, at least within the context of the genetic 
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engineering of food animals6. The aversion towards the production of transgenic animals 
can be seen as an echo of the public mistrust that has occurred ever since recombinant 
DNA research emerged in the early 1970’s. That development implied a breaking point in 
history as it gave man the capacity to redesign living beings across the intuitively felt most 
stringent species boundaries. As John Harris phrased it: 
 
We are now able to transcend the limitations of particular species and combine 
the virtues (and vices) of different species and indeed programme into species 
new attributes never before a feature of any species. We can, or eventually 
will be able to, create new ‘transgenic’ creatures of unprecedented nature and 
qualities.7 
 
As is often the case with ethically charged issues, the creation of transgenic source animals 
is brought up for discussion with a jumble of both consequentialist and inherent-concern 
arguments. The consequentialist arguments against transgenesis point to the potential 
effects of the transgenesis, while the inherent-concern arguments question the 
acceptability of the principle itself. It is the latter kind of argument we are interested in 
here. The inherent-concern arguments claim that the manipulation of the genetic material 
is fundamentally wrong for its own sake – i.e. that the mere action itself, regardless of the 
effects, should be considered immoral. If that is the case, then the discussion needs not be 
taken further. If not, the arguments do not stand in evaluating the procedure. The focus 
should then be shifted towards other, consequentialist arguments in an attempt to 
establish whether there are genuine reasons to refrain from producing humanized pigs.  It 
is from that perspective that it is worthwhile to examine arguments claiming that it is 
‘inherently’ wrong to tinker with the genetic make-up of pigs (or that of any other 
animals). 
 
5.2 Wrong for the sake of it 
 
Although genetic manipulation has from the outset been promising, its appeal has not been 
widespread. To this day, the public perception is still largely that genetic engineering is 
‘morally wrong’8,9 and several surveys have established that particularly inherent concerns 
– as opposed to concerns regarding the effects – are the prevalent moral criteria in 
biotechnology debates10,11,12,13. Based on a study of the literature on the ethics of 
genetically manipulating animals, and on an inquiry of both written and oral objections 
from several animal welfare organizations (Belgium, UK, USA) against the production of 
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transgenic pigs for xenotransplantation specifically, we believe that the major ‘inherent’ 
moral objections can be categorized into three clusters of arguments. 
 
A first set of arguments could be called ‘Integrity Arguments’. They are all based on the 
idea that the genome, the individual organism, or the species should remain intact as a 
whole. A second category implies the ‘Intrinsic Value Arguments’: arguments that animals 
have a value of their own, independent of their relation or utility to humans. A third 
cluster is made up of the ‘Sanctity of Nature Arguments’: arguments questioning the 
technological interference with the so-called natural order. 
 
We will demonstrate that none of the arguments pertaining to any of those broader 
clusters is valid as such and that the production of transgenic pigs for xenotransplantation 
is not ‘inherently’ wrong. That will lead to the conclusion that valid resistance to 
transgenesis is restricted to concerns regarding the concrete effects of the applications. 
 
5.2.1 Integrity arguments 
 
The ‘integrity arguments’ referred to here are based on the idea that transgenesis goes 
against the moral status attributed to the ‘wholeness’ of an organism, its genome or the 
species to which it belongs14. The concept of integrity, as vague as it is, implies that the 
state of being in any one of those levels is complete, undivided, or unimpaired. Authors 
who defend integrity arguments refer to a harmonious – quasi sacrosanct – unity that 
merits a respectful attitude irreconcilable with transgenic interventions15. 
 
A first subgroup of adherents of the concept feels that transgenesis fails to respect the 
genetic integrity of animals. By adding genetic material from other sources, transgenesis 
alters genetic host sequences and is said to thereby undermine the interrelated parts of 
the unique genetic ‘whole’. The proponents assert that, by introducing foreign DNA into an 
animal’s genome, the integrity is violated “at its most fundamental level”16. Of all the 
arguments at issue here, this is perhaps the least convincing one. To start with, it is highly 
unlikely that the transgenesis required for xenotransplantation purposes is a threat to 
genetic integrity as it consists in the relatively precise transfer of only one or two genes. 
That aside, one could rightfully question whether there is such a thing as ‘genetic 
integrity’ at all, whether it can possess a moral status and whether violating the genetic 
integrity – no matter how it is defined – is specific to the procedures of transgenesis. 
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Advocates of ‘genetic integrity arguments’ seem to presume that it is the genetic make-up 
that is responsible for the unique traits of an individual animal. The ‘unique’ identity of an 
organism is naturally very hard to establish through reference to its genome alone. Of 
course, monozygotic twins (and clones, for that matter) illustrate perfectly the fact that 
the so-called ‘nature’ of an individual organism is the result of the interplay between 
genes and environmental factors. Furthermore, if anything, the genome of any one 
organism can hardly be unambiguously characterised by uniqueness, given that the most 
distantly related organisms share the majority of the genes. From that perspective, even 
the insertion of much more human genes in the genome of pigs is relative. Even if the 
concept of genetic integrity was more compelling, alterations in the genetic make-up of an 
organism are not specific to transgenesis. In general, the genome is not an unchanging, all-
determinant essence, but the unplanned result of evolution. At a more individual level, the 
genome is constantly subject to change and division through, for instance, spontaneous 
DNA mutations and viruses. It is also far from clear why genetic integrity merits moral 
acknowledgement. Several opponents to that idea suggest that it is a fallacy to derive 
moral status from the biology of organisms rather than from their psychology. Savulescu, 
for instance, believes that the distinction between humans and chimpanzees should be 
drawn from the psychological differences – in the ability to reason, to act on the basis of 
normative reasons, to believe, among others – rather than from the mere 1.5 per cent of  
DNA that we do not share with each other17. 
 
The fact that all species share a genetic basis also pinpoints some of the flaws in defending 
integrity on a species level. ‘Species integrity’ is used to refer to the unity of 
characteristics, qualities and dispositions that are specific to a species. Those traits are 
said to be shared by all members of the same species, by domesticated as well as wild 
animals. The arguments usually assert that it is wrong to interfere with the seemingly fixed 
boundaries that distinguish the different unique sets of species traits, which have been 
developed over hundreds of thousands of years and constitute an ecological harmony. A pig 
is a pig, and not a partly human pig. 
 
This type of argument, too, has become less prevalent, perhaps because it has become 
more and more clear that there is no one way to delineate what a species is, let alone to 
define its particular integrity. At present, the biological literature consists of up to 22 
different interpretations of what constitutes a ‘species’, thereby undermining the 
existence of a universally compelling concept18. Each of the taxonomies outline very 
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different defining characteristics, due to the lack of an unchanging set of species traits 
from which one can draw fixed species identities and boundaries19,20,21,22,23. We owe that 
anti-essentialist insight to Charles Darwin, who demonstrated that the process of variation 
and selection is the drive of the continuous variety in nature. The evolutionary theory does 
not explain for any biological integrity, to the contrary. Indeed, Charles Darwin found 
evidence for the theory, and in particular for the theory of evolution by natural selection, 
in the preliminary changes in animal traits engineered by breeders and farmers through 
artificial selection among naturally occurring variants24. A species is a categorical and, 
therefore, abstract word, and any reference to its ‘integrity’ is based on the qualities and 
characteristics of the individual members that are thought to somehow relate to each 
other. Even if we were to support – for the sake of argument – the perhaps most prevalent 
and paradigmatic definition of a ‘species’ – the biological species concept – which 
delineates a species as a reproductively isolated group whose members can interbreed and 
produce fertile offspring, transgenesis is unlikely to threaten that unity. Although at a 
genetic level the DNA of two species are combined, the production of transgenic pigs is 
still very far from creating crossbreeds. A microorganism with recombinant DNA usually 
still shows major similarities with its predecessors. And while we have created many 
radically new variants of crossbreeds (‘tiglons’, ‘beefalos’, etc.), we have never created a 
‘new’ species that is reproductive and at the same time reproductively detached from the 
related animals. 
 
Those who support integrity on the level of the individual organism argue that its ‘fullness 
of being’ must be respected, referring to the ‘wholeness’ and ‘completeness’ of the 
animal, including behaviour that is constitutive of the capabilities characteristic of the 
animal’s ‘nature’. According to one interpretation, integrity implies: 
 
(…) the wholeness and completeness of the animal and the species-specific 
balance of the creature, as well as the animal’s capacity to maintain itself 
independent in an environment suitable to the species.25 
 
Although the word has a nice ring to it, the notion of integrity is extremely abstract and it 
remains difficult to fully grasp its meaning, should it actually have one. It becomes devoid 
of any meaning when applied in cases where the animal itself is not even aware of the 
changes to its ‘wholeness and completeness’. The most widely used technique of 
transgenesis, pronuclear microinjection, consists of injecting the human DNA into the 
genetic material of a newly fertilized egg26. In another technique, the procedure is 
conducted even before the fertilization, the human DNA being inserted in the swine sperm, 
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which will later be used for fertilization27. As one author puts it: how can we speak of the 
integrity of an animal at the moment that it does not yet exist?28 Furthermore, while an 
organism’s defining characteristics can be affected by concrete changes in the habitat of 
the individual animal or by obvious physical handicaps, there is no reason why a transgenic 
pig should differ substantially from one that has not been subject to genetic manipulation, 
granted that the procedure was a success. Although we do not believe in such an essence, 
if we grant - again for the sake of the argument - that there is such a thing as ‘the pigness’ 
of the pig, the pig does not seem to lose any of its ‘pigness’ through the insertion of one or 
more human genes meant to counter immunological rejection. 
 
5.2.2 Intrinsic value arguments 
 
There are different interpretations of the notion of intrinsic value and different reasons for 
attributing it. Generally, the concept stands for the conviction that animals have a value 
of their own29 and that that value is independent of other things, persons or interests30. In 
this sense, the intrinsic value of an animal exceeds the utility value it has for humans, a 
notion that finds growing support in our society. The strength of the argument results from 
the intensification of the way animals are being used and reduced to instruments of 
technology. Although the instrumental – and thus anthropocentric – approach towards 
animals is not exclusively associated with biotechnology, it is said to be enhanced by 
recent trends of genetic manipulation and by the reduction of ‘living wholes’ to DNA.  
More importantly, perhaps, the transgenesis is not applied to alleviate or prevent a 
genomic defect in the animal, but rather to optimize its biology for human utility31. 
 
Several authors emphasize that only by acknowledging that animals are of value for their 
own sake, they become an object of true moral concern. The concept of intrinsic value – 
sometimes considered a sacred quality32 – is thus meant to extend the moral domain from 
humans to other entities, animals and, in some interpretations, even plants or the whole 
of nature. While we acknowledge the importance of extending the domain of moral 
concern to include animals, we believe that reference to an intrinsic value is a weak and 
unconvincing foundation of such reasoning and is, in any case, irrelevant within this 
context of genetic manipulation. 
 
The argument that animals have intrinsic value is most often derived from the Kantian 
maxim, which summons us never to treat others as a means only, but as ‘ends’ in 
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themselves. In extending respect for one’s ‘ends’ to animals, most authors refer to the 
concept of ‘telos’, a concept that verges on the notion of integrity. Aristotle defined telos 
as the full flourishing stage of a creature’s existence and used it as a tool to derive and 
explain the nature and existence of its chief functional and physical characteristics33. In 
talk of the intrinsic value and goodness of an animal, telos is used to refer to the set of 
traits that constitute the specific nature and needs that are characteristic of an animal 
(including physical constitution, behavioural and psychosocial repertoire). The 
conservation of normal development and expression of telos is granted an absolute value34. 
 
It is nevertheless well contested whether there can in fact be an absolute value inherent 
to animals. Generally, intrinsic-argument objections arise in response to situations that 
cause the animal to alienate from a given set of functional needs and that result in 
frustrations of the animal in the inability to fully fulfil its telos. Those arguments thus 
relate to the potential effects of transgenesis, rather than to the principle itself. 
Furthermore, the argument can be made that the intrinsic value related to an animal’s 
telos is highly conditional rather than absolute. Indeed, the value is made dependent of 
the extent to which the animal is aware of the suffering that relates to the inability to 
satisfy its nature. Those prevailing interpretations are extensions of an anthropocentric 
viewpoint as they pertain to sentient (‘higher’) animals only and constitute what Henk 
Verhoog calls the ‘zoocentric approach’35. Even for sentient animals, reference to the 
moral value of their specific natural telos does not constitute sufficient reason to sustain 
it. Indeed, the compromise position taken by Bernard Rollin rests on the argument that: 
 
One cannot argue that because it is wrong to violate the various aspects of a 
certain animal’s telos, given the telos, it is therefore wrong to change the 
telos.36 
 
While Rollin objects to violations of the nature-specific interests of an animal, given the 
frustration that would cause to its telos, he advocates the introduction of entirely novel 
sets of functional needs and interests, or at least the removal of those interests that would 
cause suffering. He illustrates his point with the example of battery farm chickens: if one 
could eliminate their nesting urge, that would not be wrong, as the chickens would no 
longer suffer from being caged37. Against that viewpoint, Verhoog defends a ‘biocentric 
approach’ in which all living beings are said to have a good of their own that is the product 
of evolutionary history and that merits respect regardless of sentient suffering38. For Alan 
Holland, too, the notion of intrinsic value of a being’s telos is absolute. Even beneficent 
changes to an animal’s telos “puts respect for the states of a subject above respect for the 
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subject” and would not avoid the criticism that  “one was using an animal’s nature as a 
means, and failing to respect its ends in the process.”39 
 
A well-known counter-argument to the concept of intrinsic value is the claim that animals 
cannot have a value independent of humans40. In other words, the intrinsic value of 
animals is not an objective one, but rather a (subjectively) attributed one. As the capacity 
to attribute value is specific to humans, it is a fallacy to say that animals or any other 
natural entities can have an absolute and objective value of their own. The value itself 
does not exist ‘out there’. That is not necessarily a reason to reject the validity of the 
concept. Indeed, van den Bos concludes that, as the intrinsic value of an animal is not 
based on any objective referent aside of the human referent, it is the responsibility of 
humans in their relationship with animals to properly include them in the moral domain41. 
That is again a very anthropocentric view, which the author admits, but it allows for a 
respectful attitude towards animals that is proportionate to the respect due to humanity. 
According to those authors, the moral worth of animals is not necessarily absolute. There 
may be compelling reasons to allow infringements on the intrinsic value with regard to the 
moral concern due to humans42. In that sense, one could argue that the potential to save 
lives through xenotransplantation would to some degree justify infringements on the 
intrinsic value of the source animals. 
 
What is left, then, of the so-called ‘intrinsic value’? If a value is intrinsic, then by 
definition it belongs to the thing itself, and is acknowledged and recognized, rather than 
attributed. What is the meaning of an intrinsic value when it is dependent on the goodwill 
of people, and of the negotiation that is constantly made between this value and other 
(man-related), potentially more stringent values? The concept is not only contradictory 
and hollow, it is also superfluous: we do not need the notion of ‘intrinsic value’ to take up 
moral responsibility towards animals (nor towards humans, for that matter). It suffices that 
we acknowledge their interests, of which an interest in freedom of pain and stress is the 
most elemental, and which are in fact matters of consequences rather than inherent 
concerns (we will explore that issue in further detail in the next chapter). Furthermore, 
even if there were such a thing as intrinsic (animal) value, then it would still be absurd to 
say that it could be threatened by the manipulation of genes. That would be like saying 
that a person with an artificial leg or dentures has lost some of his or her intrinsic value. 
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5.2.3 Sanctity of nature arguments 
 
The key notion in all ‘sanctity of nature arguments’ is that genetic engineering is immoral 
in so far as it blurs species boundaries, meddles with nature, violates the sanctity of life, 
intervenes with a natural order and stimulates human’s inappropriate pretension to 
omnipotence. Rollin puts the underlying presumption as follows: 
 
There are certain things man was not meant to do (…), and genetic engineering 
of animals is one of them.43 
 
With regard to our discussion here, two commonly held convictions can be distinguished: 
the production of transgenic animals is a violation of either divine creation or of the 
natural order. From both perspectives, the idea arises that he who elevates himself to 
manipulating processes of life, goes too far. Those are the well-known ‘playing God’-
arguments, and the dangers of the illusion of man almighty have been cited since 
antiquity. 
 
The first type of argumentation is based on the belief that the transgenesis goes against 
the will of God, granted the belief that he created living things, each according to its own 
kind. That claim is not self-evident as there is, of course, no objective reason why one 
should prefer such interpretation to the non-normative scientific conception of nature. 
Again, we owe to Darwin the insight that no living being has been specifically created; that 
the variation of fauna and flora is the result of a continuous and unplanned selection 
mechanism allowing new and beneficial traits to be passed on. 
 
The second type of argumentation, just as ‘mystical’ in character as the previous one, 
pertains to the presumption that nature is unique and sacred and should not be altered. 
Transgenesis is then seen as a violation of the natural order and of the natural spontaneous 
development. However, the assertion that what does not lie in the course of nature is 
wrong by definition, is based on invalid rhetoric. 
 
For one, the claim that something is or is not ‘natural’ can be interpreted and valued in 
different ways according to the context and intent. Once again, we have to make do with a 
very ambiguous term. Let us say, for instance, that we define ‘natural’ in very general 
terms, as that which is the product of a development in nature, of the laws creating and 
controlling things in the universe. Following that description, the production of transgenic 
pigs is, in fact, a very ‘natural’ phenomenon as it is based on the application of nature’s 
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laws. In that sense, all that occurs, even in a laboratory, is a product of natural processes, 
explicable in terms of natural science. Furthermore, transgenesis does not contravene the 
spontaneous development of nature since it can occur in nature without the intervention 
of man. Indeed, in an alternative method to obtain transgenesis, retroviruses are used as 
‘vectors’ for transferring foreign DNA into sperm precursors and oocytes, building upon 
their natural ability to become integrated into the genome of different hosts. Following a 
different interpretation of ‘natural’, however, one might stipulate that transgressing 
species boundaries may be a very natural thing for retroviruses to do, while it is not 
natural for humans to do so44. But what we are asserting then is that the wrongness lies in 
the interference of man into nature and that ‘nature’ should be more specifically defined 
as the process unrelated to human intent. Such a view relates to the fundamental 
conception of nature as distinguished from the domain of culture. If that is so, then, as has 
long been argued, one should level this objection to traditional breeding methods, which 
also cause alterations to the animal’s genome through a specific human intent and 
intervention. Moreover, such a concept gravely limits what is often intuitively regarded as 
nature. Even forestry is a clear example of how man interferes with nature. As a matter of 
fact, it is extremely difficult to think of examples of what is referred to as purely ‘natural’ 
in this sense, as human interference has intertwined with nature at very many levels in the 
advancement of civilization. 
 
Secondly, further motivation is required for maintaining that the natural genomic make-up 
of an animal is of greater value than that which has undergone genetic manipulation. It is 
an odd step to attribute moral status to natural development, a development that is not 
consciously aware of good or evil45, that is simply not interested because it does not have 
the capacity to care, and is the result of the interplay between coincidence and selection, 
rather than of planned design. Claims that what is ‘natural’ is better than that which is 
‘unnatural’ also preclude the fact that natural events are not automatically good and can 
have negative as well as positive effects. That is an insight we constantly endorse when we 
attempt to improve the natural state of ourselves and of our environment through curative 
and preventive medicine, agriculture, urbanization, etc. The underlying evaluation of our 
so called pretension to interfere with nature should not be based on whether or not we 
have the right to do so, but whether the action will attain worthy goals. 
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5.3 Concluding remarks 
 
During the past decade, public awareness of the moral status of animals has increased and 
has caused extensive debate on matters of genetic manipulation. With regard to the 
production of transgenic pigs for xenotransplantation purposes, it is, however, in no way 
evident that that application is in itself immoral. Accordingly, we should not allow such 
arguments to stop or hinder the development of something that is of potential benefit to 
humans. It is, indeed, still uncertain whether either this or any other technique will ever 
allow a future of unlimited, safe and effective xenotransplantation for humans with organ 
failure. Nevertheless, it should be clear that the type of reasoning we have focused on 
here should not stand in the way of exploring that potential. 
 
Although we reject the inherent arguments, we are not saying that the production of 
transgenic pigs for xenotransplantation purposes is entirely unproblematic. The concrete 
consequences of the procedure are of interest in their own right. In the shift to 
consequentialist arguments, perhaps the specific context of breeding transgenic pigs for 
xenotransplantation purposes would dismantle an exaggerated and unnecessary emphasis 
on various potentially bad outcomes in comparison with other applications of transgenesis. 
For instance, discussions on the use of transgenesis often reveal the concern that the 
application will have baleful environmental impacts46,47,48. The prospect of loss of genetic 
diversity and of causing ecological imbalance, however relevant for some applications of 
transgenesis, is of little concern here as the genetic alterations are negligible. Moreover, it 
could still be argued that, as new genes are inserted rather than removed, transgenesis 
may be thought of as a potential for increasing rather than threatening genetic variation49. 
The experiments under discussion here are also less invasive than experiments that induce 
deliberate changes to central animal functions and that can reasonably be expected to 
have resultant effects upon animal welfare. In an early experiment to enhance food 
animals, for instance, researchers inserted the gene for human growth hormone into pig 
embryos and found that the resulting animals suffered a painful arthritic condition so 
severe that the experiment was discontinued and the pigs euthanized50. 
 
Nevertheless, there is plausibly more to say for the idea that producing transgenic ‘source 
animals’ can have harmful effects on the pigs themselves, even if no changes in phenotype 
are intended. In general, transgenic procedures have a bad reputation in that they have 
been subject to trial and error, yielding imperfect and fairly unpredictable expression of 
transgenes. Due to the poorly controlled integration of DNA, the possibility exists that a 
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transgene will insert in an unintended physiologically important region of the genome, 
leading to unexpected harmful physiological effects. It is also possible that transgene 
insertion could inactivate a tumour-suppressor gene or lead to unrelated, harmful 
mutations of the foreign DNA in the host’s genome51. However, such outcomes have only 
rarely been observed52. More common is the event that the transgenes are not, or 
insufficiently, expressed. Of the animals developed through pronuclear microinjection, 
only 10 to 40 per cent test positive for transgene genetic sequences53. This necessitates 
the killing of the majority of the non-transgenic offspring that fails to become transgenic. 
Further killing occurs when, depending on the degree of precision of genetic manipulation 
required, the transgenic offspring do not satisfy desired criteria of transgene expression54. 
In our setting also, the sow may suffer from the particular procedures involved in 
pronuclear microinjection, including the retrieval of embryos for genetic manipulation and 
the subsequent reinsertion in the womb55. Sperm-mediated transgenesis allows for the 
transgenesis to occur upon fertilization and, if coupled with artificial insemination, proves 
to be non-invasive in comparison, but has not been established as an equally viable 
method. 
 
The question that the potential consequences of transgenesis raise is whether the harm 
done to the animals can be justified in light of the prospective benefits that may arise 
from the procedure. Adverse effects on animal welfare are however not only related to 
unsuccessful or intrusive transgenesis, but are most typically observed as a consequence of 
the surgical procedures subsequent to transgenesis, inappropriate accommodation and 
laboratory conditions as well as the specific purposes for which the animals are bred56,57. 
Granted that the killing and suffering of porcine source animals is an inevitable element of 
the purpose for which they are bred – to provide specified-pathogen-free transplantable 
grafts – a discussion on the justification thereof will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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6 Use of pigs for xenotransplantation: the speciesism by proxy 
syndrome. 
 
Adapted from: Ravelingien A. Use of pigs for xenotransplantation: the 
speciesism by proxy syndrome. Xenotransplantation 2005; 12(3): 235-239. 
 
Abstract 
 
One of the most pertinent ethical issues related to xenotransplantation is the question 
whether the use of animals as sources of cells, tissues and organs for animal-to-human 
transplantation, is acceptable. Justifications of that practice often shift focus from this 
question to the question whether it is more ethical to use one type of animal (the pig) 
rather than another (the nonhuman primate). This chapter examines the tenuousness of 
three ethical arguments commonly rehearsed in defence of choosing the pig as source 
animal: (a) that the use of pigs for human purposes is embedded in a long tradition; (b) 
that pigs are not an endangered species; and (c) that they do not share the cognitive and 
emotional capacities with humans to the same extent that primates do. On first thoughts, 
those arguments seem translucent and the debate intelligible. However, this chapter will 
show that those arguments fail to demonstrate that it is in fact acceptable to use pigs as 
xenograft sources. The lack of clear morally relevant distinctions between pigs and 
primates will be the main point of criticism towards common justifications of using pigs as 
source animals. Further justifications will be evaluated in light of contesting views and 
modern animal welfare theories. 
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The Pig, if I am not mistaken, 
Supplies us sausage, ham, and Bacon. 
Let others say his heart is big, 
I think it stupid of the Pig.1 
 
6.1 Introduction: from primate to pig 
 
One of the most obvious issues in discussing the ethics of xenotransplantation is the 
question if we may breed and kill animals on a large scale to serve as sources of 
transplantable cells, tissues and organs for humans. In recent debates on 
xenotransplantation, interest in animal welfare issues associated with the production of 
pigs as sources of xenografts seems to have faded somewhat. Many experts will agree that 
the question if use of animals is morally acceptable has made way for questions if the 
technique will ever be safe for humans. Moreover, it seems as though the question if it is 
acceptable to use animals as sources of grafts is replaced by the question if it is more 
ethical to use one type of animal (the pig) rather than another (the nonhuman primate). 
 
As noted in the fourth chapter, ever since the early 17th century, clinical 
xenotransplantation has been attempted using all types of animals (including sheep, 
rabbits and frogs). For most of the early trials in the 20th century, however, the animal of 
choice was the baboon or chimpanzee. The use of these (higher) nonhuman primates was 
thought to best warrant graft survival because of their genetic and anatomic similarity 
with humans. Today, the confined breeding of large populations of chimpanzees or 
baboons for ‘spare parts’ is troublesome2 and has been condemned by various regulatory 
authorities3,4,5. The reluctance towards using nonhuman primates is rooted in serious 
practical problems, which include incompatibilities in organ size, their slow breeding 
potential and a higher risk of cross-species virus transfer. There are also sufficient and 
convincing ethical reasons that stand in the way of using nonhuman primates as sources of 
xenografts. Well-cited are concerns based on their humanlike traits, their relatively scarce 
use for human purposes and their potential for extinction6,7. 
  
It is often argued that these objections are by-passed when considering the use of pigs as 
source animals. The pig:  
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(…) although domesticated and familiar, is too distant to evoke the same 
feelings we have for primates, has the correct-size organs, is probably less 
likely to pass on infections, breeds rapidly, and is not endangered; moreover, 
millions of them are eaten every year.8 
 
Justifications to use pigs thereby elicit much less opposition and find wide regulatory 
support. I find this ‘comparative method’ – which is commonly applied in the literature – a 
weak foundation for dismissing opposition towards xenotransplantation from an animal 
welfare point of view. Even for convinced advocates, it may be worthwhile to examine 
some of the weaknesses that shelter within each of the following arguments: (a) that the 
use of pigs for human purposes is embedded in a long tradition; (b) that pigs are not an 
endangered species; and (c) that they do not share the cognitive and emotional capacities 
with humans to the same extent that primates do. 
 
Those who feel that the rearing of pigs as xenograft sources is wrong generally refer to the 
unacceptability of exploiting and killing pigs to serve as resource utilities for humans. In 
addition, objections are raised towards the specific circumstances under which the pigs 
are born, raised, and killed – circumstances which are said to compromise animal welfare 
and elicit significant suffering9,10. It must be noted that welfare issues are not as much of 
an issue in most cellular xenotransplantations, in which case the cells can in principle be 
obtained from pig foetuses. For those animals that are brought to life as sources of 
transplantable organs, by contrast, and as noted in the previous chapter, some degree of 
physical suffering may result from unsuccessful transgenesis procedures. Arguably, this is 
the only type of physical suffering that cannot be excluded, granted that high and 
exemplary standards for the housing and care of the animals are complied with. Indeed, 
some xenotransplantation guidelines provide detailed instructions to take proper care in 
achieving an appropriate atmosphere and temperature, a healthy diet, environmental 
enrichment, and other biological needs of animals11. Conceivably, if these standards are 
met, the remaining suffering at issue is of a ‘psychological’ rather than of a directly 
‘physical’ nature. Psychological distress may in particular result from the high health 
status required to optimize the safety and quality of the animal grafts prior to clinical use. 
Most importantly, to reduce the risk of xenozoonosis after transplantation of porcine 
grafts, stringent measures are taken to prevent contamination of certain bacteria and virus 
in the source animals12. With this intent, the pigs are often brought forth by way of 
hysterotomy and the sow is killed once the piglets are retrieved.  The young are foster fed 
by gloved human hands and reared in barrier facilities free of identified pathogens 
(Qualified Pathogen Free conditions). The conditions under which they are reared are 
comparable to those of laboratory animals with restrained space allowances. These 
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facilities are barren, sterile environments that potentially subject the pigs to sensory 
deprivation and deny the manifestation of natural behaviour like rooting and foraging13. 
The pigs are subjected to extensive and routine infection tests and confined to living in 
small groups. This may deprive them of sufficient social interaction, particularly the weeks 
before the harvest of the xenografts, during which the animals must be quarantined. 
Additional stress is conceivable due to transportation prior to the killing, which might be 
necessary if the distance to the transplantation site would compromise the quality of the 
xenograft. In light of these concerns, a justification of organ xenotransplantation must be 
carefully considered. 
 
6.2 The prize animal 
 
Despite the fact that baboon and chimpanzee organs are both anatomically and 
physiologically similar to human organs and – in comparison to non-primate xenografts – 
have a smaller chance of being instantly rejected by the human recipient’s immune 
system, two practical arguments support preference for the use of porcine organs. First, 
baboon and chimpanzee organs are too small and appear to be suitable for paediatric 
transplant recipients only. Second, the genetic relationship between nonhuman primates 
and humans is so close that it increases the risk of virus transmission. 
 
As for the problems related to organ size, it is especially the size of primate hearts that is 
of concern. The problem should be less obvious regarding the use of kidneys, for which size 
is not so relevant, and the liver, which is to a large extent capable of regenerating14. 
Nonetheless, herds of miniature swine have been bred that have a body weight similar to 
human adults and provide us with all organs of adequate size15. However, given that there 
is much more to effective transplantation than merely matching organ size, this is as far as 
the direct physical advantages of using pigs extend. As reviewed in the fourth chapter, 
severe immunological and physiological obstacles form an enormous obstacle to effective 
transplantation of organs from this discordant species16,17. Furthermore, while the species 
barrier between nonhuman primates and humans is particularly easy for viruses to cross, 
history has in fact taught us that close contact with pigs is not without risks either. We 
currently know of various viruses in pigs, which have elicited serious morbidity and 
mortality when transmitted to humans18. Particularly illustrative in this respect is the 1918 
influenza virus, which killed up to 50 million people19. The 1998 outbreak of the pig-
derived Nipah virus in Malaysia unforeseeably caused systemic infections in humans and 
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killed more than half of the 200 people infected20. Containment of the source animals in 
specified pathogen free environments and highly sensitive assays could eliminate these and 
other identified exogenous viruses. Recent advances in research have also diminished fears 
with regard to the replicant and recombination competence of several known porcine 
endogenous retroviruses21,22,23. Nonetheless, such measures cannot exclude the possibility 
that there are other, unknown and undetectable viruses that could be harmful in a human 
host. Those uncertainties make way for a varying taxation of the virus risk and do not 
render the validity of using pigs for safety reasons self-evident. 
 
Perhaps the most obvious practical consideration is the fact that pigs, in contrast to 
primates, are relatively easy to breed, to genetically manipulate and to develop 
industrially. The use of higher primates as source animals would not resolve the current 
organ shortage, for it would be practically impossible to derive a sufficient amount of 
organs. The breeding of primates is difficult and time-consuming24, with a very low 
reproduction rate (one offspring per gestation). Pigs, by contrast, have a good breeding 
potential (between 5 to 12 piglets per litter) and rapid growth to reproductive maturity. 
The fact that maintenance of a pig breed is much less costly than of baboons adds 
relevancy to that argument as well. Apart from those considerations, it is not directly clear 
that pigs should be used for practical reasons. Similarly, the persuasiveness of commonly 
held moral arguments supportive of a preference for pigs remain contestable. 
 
One common moral reason to justify the use of pigs over primates rests on the fact that we 
have a long tradition of slaughtering pigs for human purposes. While nonhuman primates 
are, at least in western culture, not killed for food, pork has provided nutrition for 
thousands of years and currently constitutes the greatest proportion of the world’s meat 
consumption (with 98.1 million pigs killed in 2000 in the US alone25). Even in medicine, the 
pig is used for its heart valves and skin grafts and for the production of other porcine-
based pharmaceuticals26. Hence, the rationale is that, given the longstanding tradition, it 
would be inconsistent to deny use of pigs for that additional purpose27. While it is probable 
that the general public sees little or no moral distinction between killing pigs for food or 
for medicine28, that reasoning is a tenuous justification from several points of view. 
 
For one, it could be argued that to determine if an action is right or wrong, it should not 
have to depend on whether or not it is embedded in tradition. Tradition and custom might 
be the standard for intuition; however, they should not serve as the ultimate point of 
reference for ethics. Put simply, otherwise we could not ethically condemn practices that 
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were longstanding but are – for good reasons – no longer tolerated, such as slavery and 
child labour. It would be misleading to conclude that xenotransplantation is ethical, given 
the tradition of pig slaughtering is not in itself indisputably ethical. To those who believe 
that the killing of pigs for human ends is problematic, a deeper motivation is in place. It 
may for instance be argued that, whereas the killing of pigs for food is unethical, the 
killing of pigs for medicine is valuable, since use is made of one life to save others. Two, 
there may be a point after which it is felt that xenotransplantation is not merely part of 
the tradition of killing pigs, but actually exceeds standard practice by introducing a 
significant increase of the amount of animals killed and a new way of consuming animals. 
That concern may be heightened by fears that the animals will be inefficiently used, for 
instance, if one pig is to be killed for only one organ transplant. Conceivably, one could 
argue that the slow progress obtained in survival rates of pre-clinical animal 
xenotransplantation research has already involved a significant waste of animal resources. 
Three, perhaps the killing of the animals is not the focus of moral concern, in that it may 
be argued that the killing in itself does not necessarily elicit suffering. Such reasoning 
could lead us to reserve our moral concern for the suffering during upbringing. Proponents 
of such a view may defend the killing of a source animal in comparison with the gruesome 
alternative of subsequently harvesting its organs, tissues and cells. Focus on the quality of 
life could also lead one to argue for the use of pigs as sources of xenografts rather than as 
sources of consumable meat products, given the cruel conditions of most pig meat 
industries. However much you argue for or against the case, an ethical evaluation of 
sacrificing pigs for xenotransplantation is not derivable from reference to the longstanding 
tradition of slaughtering pigs. 
 
A second commonly maintained moral argument holds that large-scale use of chimpanzees 
and baboons for xenotransplantation is unethical, as it would imply a significant pressure 
on their species-survival29. Accordingly, due to the fact that the ‘pig species’ is not 
endangered, the use of pigs as xenograft sources is ethical. Following that train of thought, 
however, if chimpanzees or baboons were not (potentially) endangered, the ethical 
judgment should be different. Indeed, Donnelly, for instance, points out that it could be 
morally legitimate to use chimpanzees in xenotransplantation research if it did not 
threaten the species30. That implies that the good of the species outweighs that of the 
individual. Subordinating the individual to the group is a debatable defence of animal 
welfare and has, in our opinion, been persuasively countered by Bernard Rollin in noting 
that: 
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As far as we are concerned, it may be far worse to kill the last ten Siberian 
tigers than ten other Siberian tigers when there are many of them. (…) But as 
far as the tigers are concerned, they don’t know or care whether they are the 
last, and thus it is equally wrong from a tiger’s perspective (if it is wrong) to 
kill any ten or the last ten.31 
 
While it remains questionable if an individual tiger can conceptualize or care about its own 
death, it is evident that a ‘species’ – be it that of a tiger or of a pig – cannot. The term 
‘species’ is an abstract collective noun and does not refer to a sentient being. If the ‘pig 
species’ were to become extinct, that could only be of concern to pigs in the form of their 
individual and concrete suffering. Likewise, pigs used as a xenograft source are not solaced 
by the thought that, although they may suffer and die, The Pig will never cease to exist. 
 
A last and undoubtedly most complicated argument we would like to discuss here holds 
that exploitation of pigs is less problematic than exploitation of primates as pigs do not 
share cognitive and emotional capacities with humans to the extent that primates do. That 
argument can be interpreted in at least two ways. Either it implies that pigs are too 
distant from humans and, as such, are not part of their ‘moral community’, whereas 
primates are. Or it implies that pigs do not have the capacity to suffer from the physical or 
psychological consequences of being bred for organs to the extent that primates do. 
Neither of these interpretations warrants that the exploitation of pigs is unproblematic. 
 
As for the first interpretation, a lot of unease towards using primates for research stems 
from their ‘kinship’ to humans. They seem too closely related to us, and their behaviour 
too similar to ours, to feel that they are not due some of the moral concern we would 
express towards other humans. Especially the Great Apes share many characteristics in 
terms of mental and emotional capabilities, characteristics which most of us would include 
in describing what it means to be human. Pigs, by contrast, do not appear to share many of 
those characteristics and show much more profound differences with humans. 
 
While that may be the case, it has been well-argued that: 
 
(…) the issue is not whether they are different, but whether they are different 
in morally relevant respects.32 
 
Unless the moral relevancy of having or lacking such characteristics is demonstrated, 
differential treatment on the basis of kinship is a vulnerable target of ‘speciesism’ critics. 
Speciesism is said to be comparable to racism and sexism in that it contains a prejudice 
against members of another group (another species) in favour of the own group. While 
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there is a noteworthy volume of literature that embraces speciesism33, many authors have 
shown that it is inconsistent and unattainable. A mere description of the characteristics 
generally possessed by a group – in this case, Great Apes and humans – will in itself not 
justify morally distinguishing between other groups. And according to Peter Singer: 
 
(…) it is not difficult to see that there is no morally important feature which all 
human beings possess, and no nonhuman animals have.34 
 
Singer attacks the presumptions underlying the common belief that the interests of 
humans are superior to those of other animals. He argues that the grounds for giving 
animals unequal consideration must also apply for different human beings. The idea is 
illustrated by the ‘argument from marginal cases’: the argument that the characteristics 
that are said to make humans morally distinct from animals, are lacking in atypical humans 
such as infants or mentally handicapped. Consequently, we should grant both atypical 
humans and animals with similar interests the same consideration. Given the strongly held 
claim that all human beings are equal, it would seem better to uplift the moral concern for 
the interests of such animals rather than to downgrade the concern for atypical humans. 
 
In our case, however, the argument is not speciesist towards primates. Here, a species is 
excluded from moral concern with reference to a species that we have not excluded. I call 
it a ‘speciesism by proxy’ in that the speciesism has merely been shoved further away. 
Granted that certain nonhuman primates do have some of the higher cognitive and 
emotional capacities pigs lack, it is not directly clear why this would merit different 
treatment. Following the marginal argument, for instance, one could find difficulty in 
defending the use of pigs over primates when little or no difference can be made between 
a very ‘clever’ pig and an utterly ‘stupid’ chimpanzee. The only reasonably relevant 
differences in emotional and mental capacities that would allow for us to subordinate the 
interests of pigs to those of humans and nonhuman primates would relate to indications 
that pigs cannot significantly experience the harm done to their interests. That is 
ultimately the subject of the second interpretation: the idea that pigs cannot suffer from 
the exploitation involved in xenotransplantation to the extent that primates can. 
Comparing the capacity to suffer between different animals and weighing its moral 
relevance is, however, an extremely complex issue and even more subject to debate. 
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6.3 Hogging moral status 
 
Sykes et al. observe that according to some authors, whether or not an animal should be 
used as a source animal, should depend on whether the animal is sufficiently aware so as 
to be able to suffer from it35. It is worth questioning whether a xenopig can suffer in such a 
degree that it can feel harmed by the specific conditions of its upbringing: the lack of a 
natural environment and the inability to express certain natural behaviours amongst the 
sow and siblings. In the words of Duncan: 
 
Has a pig that’s never seen a mud hole ever imagined one? Wanted one? 
Needed one? Felt deprived when it didn’t have one?36 
 
The problem we are confronted with here is extremely difficult as we are asked to find 
evidence for something that is ultimately a subjective experience, not accessible to 
outsiders. The peculiarity of such subjective experiences, however, is just as striking 
amongst humans as it is between humans and nonhuman animals37. We seldom doubt that 
other humans actually do have subjective experiences and we generally gather our 
intuition from the resemblance between their behaviour (their expressions of pain, for 
instance) and our own, and from similarities in physiology and anatomy. Accordingly, 
analogies between humans and many animals in behaviour and homologies in the nervous 
system are increasingly depended on as a means of inferring information about their inner 
life38. While we stretch the anatomical analogy between a pig and a human organ to the 
limit, it would be unreasonable to suggest that homologies in behaviour differ completely 
in relation to inner subjective states. 
 
6.3.1 A clever pig extracts a deep root 
 
The perception that humans have formed of pigs throughout the domestication of these 
animals may to a great extent preclude the observation of significant behavioural 
similarities between pigs and humans. Arran Stibbe points out that our presuppositions of 
pigs being “ignorant, greedy, untidy, stubborn, selfish, badly behaved and fat” once 
provided a necessary barrier between humans and pigs, “overcoming cultural taboos 
against killing those who are close to us”39. Increasing knowledge of pig behaviour is 
starting to undermine that negative image. Given the right opportunities, even a layman 
will observe that pigs are in fact very clean and social animals, able to communicate with 
each other using a wide range of sounds. Pigs are prone to the so-called Porcine Stress 
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Syndrome and may show stressful, aggressive behaviour (tail-biting) in barren and 
overcrowded environments. Experimental tests demonstrate that pigs also have several 
complex inquisitive, problem-solving and anticipatory capacities which allow them to 
strategically interact with their environment. Research by Wood-Gush et al. demonstrates 
their motivation to explore novel stimuli independent of any primary reinforcement. In one 
study, it was found that piglets housed in barren environments spend more time 
investigating a novel area or a novel object than more fortunate animals40. A second study 
demonstrated preference for an area with a new object over an area with a known 
object41. Experimental settings have also provided evidence that pigs are able to 
anticipate long-term consequences and act accordingly. In a preference test that provided 
different spaces, each relating to different periods of confinement, pigs quickly 
anticipated the duration of confinement in each setting and opted to enter those spaces 
that had short- or medium-term confinement42. According to Stanley Curtis, professor of 
animal sciences at Pennsylvania State University, pigs are in some respects as ‘clever’ as 
chimpanzees. Curtis has trained pigs to manipulate joysticks with their snouts and to ‘play 
videogames’ on a computer and believes that the animals thereby demonstrated important 
problem solving abilities43. 
 
At the very least, observations of subjective experiences in pigs are highly suggestive of a 
capacity to process experiences, which is much more complex than a direct reflex to pain 
or discomfort. The relevant question then – if we accept that those processing capacities 
are indicative of a capacity to suffer ‘psychologically’ – is whether that capacity is 
compelling enough for us to condemn their use as xenograft sources. 
 
6.3.2 The moral relevance of suffering 
 
Most reports and guidelines on the use of pigs in xenotransplantation demonstrate that 
that is not the case. For instance, in an influential report on ethical issues raised by 
xenotransplantation, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics emphasized the role of self-
awareness as the guarantee that pigs do not suffer significantly: 
 
Most significantly, for the purposes of this discussion, it has been argued that 
suffering and death are uniquely painful to a self-aware being who not only 
senses pain but can also perceive the damage being done to his or her self and 
future.44 
 
Part three   The speciesism by proxy syndrome 
 142 
Self-awareness is held to be the prerequisite of any form of ‘personhood’, and is said to be 
dependent on: 
 
(…) a high degree of intelligence, the capacity to make comparisons and 
judgments, and a language with which to articulate. 
 
Here, again, a list of defining and distinguishing characteristics is given. But in contrast to 
a clearly speciesist approach, a reason is included as to why such characteristics must be 
taken into account. The idea is that self-awareness is the guarantee that there is a 
capacity to suffer significantly. 
 
It is generally accepted that higher primates possess complicated cognitive processes, and 
several (less generally accepted) studies provide proof of self-awareness through mirror 
tests and even symbolic language usage in certain chimpanzees45,46. Hence, a cautious and 
respectful position would judge that most of the higher anthropoids should not be 
subjected to such forms of distress, as it would cause significant suffering. Pigs seem to 
lack the important prerequisites for ‘unique pain’ and thus appear to be rightly excluded 
from equal moral concern. Nevertheless, the criteria used here rest on shaky grounds. 
 
To begin with, identification of the relevancy of self-awareness with regard to suffering 
and pain should be consistent. As such, it is flawed to exclude use of certain primates as 
source animals but to tolerate continued and large-scale use of baboons and certain 
monkeys for xenotransplantation vivisectionist research purposes. That practice 
demonstrably elicits much more suffering than being bred as source animal. Indeed, a 
detailed investigation of a British xenotransplantation research facility (under the direction 
of Imutran) – submitted to the British Home Office – reported a great deal of suffering that 
was the result of post-xenotransplant rejection and infection47. Second, the Nuffield 
Council interpretation of unique suffering is debatable. Focus on the higher cognitive 
prerequisites of self-awareness could lead us to exclude Alzheimer patients from the 
relevant moral concern, and we do not believe that that lies in their intention. 
Furthermore, and notwithstanding the broad philosophical tradition in which consciousness 
is based on language, there is growing conviction that self-awareness is not the direct 
effect of an innate capacity to form words and sentences. Damasio, for one, gives a 
convincing account of why the basis of self-awareness must be nonverbal, in that the 
starting point of language is always the translation of non-linguistic events, relations and 
concepts into words and sentences48. Other authors stress the importance of nonverbal 
communication skills in many animals, including powerful olfactory perceptive 
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mechanisms49. Alternative interpretations of self-awareness exist that do not necessarily 
require language or the other highly cognitive criteria. In fact, it could be argued that the 
word ‘self-awareness’ is a tautology: you cannot be aware without having a self. You 
cannot be aware of anything without knowing that it is your awareness. When a bee stings 
you, you will at the very least be aware of the fact that you have been stung. That 
elementary form of self-consciousness – ‘sensation’ – has nothing to do with any form of 
cognition. In this sense, the basis of self-consciousness is sentience; the capacity to 
experience episodes of positively or negatively valued awareness. Animal liberationist 
views will argue that it is in the interest of all sentient animals to seek positive 
experiences and avoid negative ones, no matter what the size or shape of the individual 
experiencing it. To the extent that both pigs and nonhuman primates share that interest, it 
deserves equal consideration. 
 
The moral significance of sentient experience forms the major obstacle to justifying use of 
pigs for xenotransplantation purposes. Animal welfare objections are not directly bypassed 
in reference to a higher complexity of self-awareness. The Nuffield Council suggests that 
self-awareness implies an ability to anticipate the future to some degree, to regret that 
the confinement will stand in the way of further pleasure seeking. It is not per se clear 
that a pig’s lack of such a level of awareness constitutes less of an assault on its immediate 
interests and why this would merit unequal consideration. In fact, the opposite may be the 
case: being kept in isolation and in a barren environment could arguably be a greater 
source of harm to the interest to seek pleasure and prevent suffering for a pig than for a 
human. A human, precisely because it has the ability to foresee and understand what will 
happen, how long the isolation will last and why it is enforced, may suffer less than the 
pig, whose awareness of frustration, anxiety or deficiency cannot be put in perspective in 
a similar way. The major strength of the referring to the concept of self-awareness, 
nonetheless, lies in the suggestion that a pig cannot be harmed as much death as humans 
can. 
 
6.4 Life is what happens while you are busy making plans 
 
The argument could be made that, whereas pigs have a capacity to suffer that should be 
taken into account, killing cannot harm them because they cannot suffer from their being 
killed. Granted that they are slaughtered humanely (painlessly, unexpected, and with no 
additional stresses), pigs are not aware of the fact that life is taken from them, and thus 
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cannot be thwarted in their interests. Conversely, critics may still deny that the harm is 
eliminated by eliminating the experience of harm done to one’s interest. Indeed, 
otherwise one could suggest that the humane, unexpected and unconscious killing of 
humans does not constitute a harm either. The harm that would result from the killing, no 
matter how humane, would consist in the fact that the individual is prevented from 
seeking further pleasure that could have been experienced in a normal life. It is at that 
level that self-awareness provides a significant distinction between the interests of pigs on 
the one hand, and primates and humans on the other, and that distinction is acknowledged 
even by the most dedicated defenders of animal rights. 
 
Consider, for example, the motivations of Tom Regan – perhaps the most renowned animal 
rights advocate – to condemn the use of a baboon to save the life of Baby Fae50. Regan 
claimed that the baboon was the ‘other victim’ because the animal was not indifferent 
towards whether it kept its heart or not. Regan argued for the fact that the baboon had a 
life to live and reasoned that the duration and quality of that life mattered to the animal.  
In considering that animal as a ‘subject-of-a-life’, instead of an object that is subjected to 
indifferent living, he constructed the idea that it has the right to be treated with respect 
and, consequently, the right to enjoy its independent life without deliberate interference 
from human moral agents. That argument constitutes the basis to counter utilitarian 
calculations that assign value to an animal’s life in terms of the net aggregate benefits 
that can be obtained from utilizing that life. The latter approach would, for instance, 
imply that the killing of one pig could provide sufficient organs to save the lives of six 
humans51 and thus would thus enhance the total balance of respect for the interest to 
pursue pleasant experiences. While Regan disallows a trade-off of an animal’s right to life 
for greater benefits, he does acknowledge that the degree of respect due to the interest of 
an independent life varies depending on the kind of animal. When considering a lifeboat 
thought-experiment where we must sacrifice one of four normal adult humans or one dog, 
Regan acknowledges that it would be unreasonable to deny that the death of the dog 
would be as great a harm as the death of any of the four humans52. The unequal 
consideration of an interest to enjoy one’s life is justified in relation to an unequal 
interest to enjoy one’s life. 
 
The dilemma that originates from the need for alternative sources of organs, cells and 
tissues, also constitutes a type of lifeboat scenario: in order to save the lives of humans on 
the waiting list for xenotransplantation, pigs must be thrown overboard. The notion of self-
awareness can be more specifically applied as a guarantee that the lives of self-aware 
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humans are qualitatively superior to those of the merely sentient. It is on that basis that 
most animal rights theorists – who will nonetheless persist in emphasizing the interest of 
all sentient beings to experience the most joyful life possible – will believe that pigs 
cannot suffer from death to the same extent that humans can. Pigs, although they may 
have a form of self-awareness, are not persons and cannot be harmed to the extent that 
persons can. The distinction between persons and non-persons, as indicated by the 
Nuffield Council, is related to the notion of a biographical identity. Persons have an 
interest not merely in the experience of pleasant over negative experiences, but also in 
actively pursuing such experiences in the future. The precondition of having an interest for 
that future is that one can conceive of oneself as existing into the future and is able to 
initiate action in pursuit of long-term goals. Those conditions far exceed merely sentient 
self-awareness. 
 
The argument that it is acceptable to grant unequal consideration on the basis of the 
presence or lack of this ‘life journey interest’ can be based on both quantitative and 
qualitative evaluations of the good of the interest. A utilitarian will be inclined to consider 
the total balance of joy experienced by both persons and nonpersons. In that sense, 
persons have considerably greater joy than nonpersons, as the planning of a life journey 
itself, the striving for certain goals, relates to many (if not, most) of our greatest joys53. In 
qualitative terms, the experiences of a life journey are of superior value because persons 
are not indifferent towards the choice between living one’s long-term life plans or living 
shorter spans of lives, even if the aggregate duration and total net welfare is equivalent in 
both cases54. 
 
Dispute may remain whether each of those accounts (along with many other alternative 
constructions) can completely preclude the possibility that persons are to a certain extent 
also replaceable. Nonetheless, much less disagreement will arise in considering that, to 
the extent that pigs lack such a biographical consciousness (which we assume they do), the 
greater interests of persons can outweigh the harm to the pigs. The greater interests of 
persons with regard to xenotransplantation relate to an increase in the total amount of 
pleasure of existing persons (waiting list patients) by saving them from premature death. 
An alternative view that focuses on increasing the total amount of pleasure for the pigs, 
regardless of the effect on the welfare of persons, but is much less compelling. One could 
perhaps claim that: 
 
The pig has a stronger interest than anyone in the demand for xenografts. If 
there were sufficient human grafts, there would be no pigs at all.55 
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This argument is sensitive to the suffering of sentient beings, but reduces that sentience to 
an interchangeable receptacle of experiences. However, the ‘stronger interest’ of the pig 
is dependent on whether or not its shorter life span does provide more pleasure than 
suffering. To equate the total proportion of welfare of a pig’s natural life span to the 
combined welfare of various pigs with shorter life spans the additional burdens xenopigs 
may endure must be taken into account. It is conceivable that a creature would have been 
better off never having existed and is thus harmed by being brought under existence rather 
than that it offers a welfare ‘replacement’ of the pigs that have been killed for 
xenotransplantation before. 
 
An argument could be made that xenopigs live and die under much more comfortable, 
humane circumstances and do not have a ‘bad bargain’ in comparison with pigs raised for 
agriculture or other forms of industry, or even compared to pigs in the wild, which are 
subjected to nature’s cruelties. However, it is unclear why the condition of animals that 
are brought into existence to specifically serve human purposes should be compared to the 
condition of those that are not56. Moreover, reference to worse conditions of other 
domesticated pigs may demonstrate the need to enhance the conditions of farm animals 
rather than proof that the conditions of xenopigs are acceptable. It does nonetheless seem 
reasonable to accept that the ‘greater good’ may to some extent even outweigh the harm 
to the pigs during their upbringing, unrelated to their death. From that perspective, Singer 
compares the suffering of animals in the food industry with the benefits people derive 
from eating them. He concluded that the discomfort and pain suffered by farm animals 
was not counterbalanced by the benefits for humans, which are purely of an aesthetic and 
nutritional nature57. Conversely, he argues that nonpersons can be used in those cases in 
which that use would give rise to more good than harm: the use of animals to save human 
lives would be permissible, whereas their use to produce nonvital products would be 
contestable. In that sense, the direct benefits of using xenopigs to save the thousands of 
waiting list patients, overrides whatever interest the pigs may (consciously) have in 
preserving their life, particularly if the most measures are taken to maximize the pig’s 
quality of life and to kill it humanely. Where precisely we draw the line in resolving the 
conflict between the welfare of persons and nonpersons will itself be a matter of dispute58. 
Nevertheless, the ethical burden of proof lies on the side of those who argue that harm 
done to animal welfare is clearly outweighed by good consequences. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
We have identified several common justifications for the use of pigs as source animals. 
Although the many arguments we have considered make a very convincing case against the 
use of nonhuman primates, they do not as such make way for the unproblematic use of pigs 
instead. First, the practical reasons for using xenografts from pigs instead of primates 
underestimate the many stumbling blocks concerning safety and effectiveness. Moreover, 
the most common moral justifications rest on presumptions that themselves need further 
discussion or clarification. As such, it will not suffice to simply refer to the tradition of 
slaughtering pigs for human purposes. Nor will it be sufficient to ensure that the 
instrumental use of a large amount of animals will not threaten species survival. And 
preferring the use of pigs to primates merely on the basis of human-like, familiar 
characteristics, is no less speciesist than excluding chimpanzees from moral concern on the 
basis of lack of certain human-like characteristics. In fact, it is a ‘speciesism by proxy’. 
The question should be which characteristics are ethically relevant and focus is then 
rightly shifted to the capacity to suffer. In establishing that nonhuman primates can suffer 
significantly from the psychological harm associated with xenotransplantation, it would be 
wrong to feel reassured that pigs couldn't. Nevertheless, there are sound arguments that 
do not undervalue the suffering and harm done to the pigs and at the same time provide 
reasonable justifications of those harms. Ultimately, those arguments rest on a trade-off 
with pertinently greater harms. 
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7 Eliminating the risk of secondary xenogeneic virus transfer 
 
Adapted from: Ravelingien A, Mortier F, Mortier E, Kerremans I, Braeckman J. 
Proceeding with clinical trials of animal to human organ transplantation: a way 
out of the dilemma. Journal of Medical Ethics 2004; 30: 92-98. 
 
Abstract 
 
The transplantation of porcine organs to humans could in the future be a solution to the 
worldwide organ shortage, but is to date still highly experimental. Further research on the 
potential effects of crossing the species barrier is essential before clinical application is 
acceptable. However, many crucial questions on efficacy and safety will ultimately only be 
answered by well-designed and controlled solid organ xenotransplantation trials on 
humans. The question then rises of what conditions are necessary in order to resume 
clinical trials if risks of PERV-transmission cannot be excluded through pre-clinical models. 
An alternative means of overcoming the safety and ethical issues is: willed body donation 
for scientific research in the case of permanent vegetative status (PVS). In this chapter the 
argument will be presented that conducting trials on such bodies with prior consent is 
preferable to the use of human subjects without lack of brain function. 
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7.1 Introduction 
 
According to the Eurotransplant International Foundation – the second largest organ 
procurement system in the world – the demand for organ transplantation continues to grow 
at 15 per cent per year1. The increase is likely to persist because of the shortage of human 
donors and the fact that improved technical skills and anti-rejection medication make 
transplantation an advisable treatment for more and more disorders. The lengthening 
waiting lists have compelled experts to search for an unlimited source of organs for 
transplantation. According to some, that is exactly what xenotransplantation has to offer 
in the near future. 
 
‘Xenotransplantation’ refers to the practice of transplanting, implanting, or infusing living 
cells, tissues, or organs from one species to another. The term can also imply the ex vivo 
contact of bodily fluids, cells or tissues between different species2. In what follows, we will 
mainly address xenotransplantation as the transplantation of a solid organ graft from pigs 
to humans for orthotopic (life-saving) use. 
 
The procedure is still highly experimental. To date no experiments of solid organ 
xenotransplantation on humans can be called successful. While a few transplantations of 
porcine islet cells and foetal neuronal cells have taken place during the past ten years, 
immunological adverse reactions of xenograft organs have limited the best survival rates of 
recipients to a few months (with the exception of one case of nine-month survival)3. 
 
For that reason and along with the fact that in the past several questionable clinical trials 
have been conducted (including the Baby Fae case)4, xenotransplantation has often 
appeared in a bad light. In past attempts to override the cross species barrier, 
xenotransplantation researchers have had to deal with a long list of objections. Those 
include objections based on religious constraints, legislation, emotional aversion, the rights 
and welfare of animals, the financial interests of stakeholders, uncertainties concerning 
the safety of the procedure and the high costs that are involved. Although all of those 
problems are important, the scope of this paper is limited to questions regarding the safety 
of the procedure, as this is to date the main challenge to progress in the clinical 
application of solid organ xenotransplantation. We will argue that experimenting on 
permanent vegetative status (PVS) bodies with prior consent has important advantages 
with regard to safety and ethical issues. 
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7.2 Safety issues 
 
Over recent years, most medical attention has been focused on problems to overcome 
immunological barriers. As detailed in the fourth chapter, genetic manipulation of the 
source animals allows for the elimination of a certain porcine gene or the insertion of 
particular human genes so as to prevent the human immune system from activating 
hyperacute rejection. Nevertheless, there are other forms of rejection that still need to be 
overcome and of which the pathogenesis is not yet fully known5. Several researchers 
believe that those forms of rejection can be overcome by new immunosuppressive agents 
or by additional genetic modification of the source animals. So far this has not been 
established. In addition, many physiological incompatibilities between the widely divergent 
species are yet another series of problems that remain largely unexplored6. It is therefore 
highly questionable whether a genetically engineered porcine organ will one day support 
the life of a human. 
 
Moreover, ever since Patience et al. provided evidence that variants of porcine endogenous 
retrovirus (PERV) could infect human cells7, the issue of potential transmission of 
infectious agents to a human recipient has repeatedly been raised in discussions on safety. 
Proof has been gathered of in vitro in co-culture human cell line infection by at least three 
variants of the provirus8, and recent studies have elicited infection of certain nonhuman 
primate cells9. Furthermore, one in vivo model has been shown prone to PERV infection10. 
In vivo studies in nonhuman primate models showed no evidence of PERV infection11. There 
is also no proof of humans infected after limited exposure to porcine cells12,13,14,15, 
although persistent microchimerism has been shown many years after exposure16. 
 
At time of writing (2003), few data address the degree of risk for a new viral infection 
through xenotransplantation. Recent research does seem to point out that that risk is lower 
than previously thought17,18. Extensive lists have been designed of possible pathogens 
resulting from a xenograft implant and sensitive assays have been developed to detect 
potential endogenous and exogenous viruses that may remain in the carefully bred 
specified pathogen free swine19. Nevertheless, some scientists have stressed that one can 
never be certain whether or not an organ is carrying a dangerous virus, due to the fact that 
some viruses may be unfamiliar, or latently present20. The post-xenotransplantation 
infection results already obtained are mainly acquired from tests on isolated cells – no long-
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term survival of a whole organ xenotransplantation model in humans has been obtained – 
and are thus restricted. Therefore the peril of unleashing a new epidemic through 
xenotransplantation remains. The fact that the techniques sought to prevent xenograft 
rejection lower the barrier for transmission of disease21 and that genetic modification of 
pigs may cause adaptation of the animal viruses22 support this fear. It has also been argued 
that the complete removal of PERV via selective breeding and knockout technologies is 
difficult, as multiple copies are present in the DNA of all porcine cells23. 
 
7.2.1 Moving ahead 
 
Both in the UK and the USA, oversight agencies are nonetheless willing to further pursue 
xenotransplantation research. It is indeed conceivable that we are overestimating the 
magnitude of the problem. As we cannot currently predict the consequences of 
transplantation of a transgenic porcine organ into a human, we must also bear in mind the 
possibility that no transmission of dangerous, uncontrollable viruses will occur. In that 
case, many would find it immoral to deny the possibility of a life-saving intervention if it is 
one day thought feasible. It would be questionable to still allow transplant teams to 
increasingly rely on problematic strategies to widen the donor pool, such as the use of 
organs from so-called marginal donors. The use of organs from elderly donors24 and donors 
with a health condition25,26 is not an attractive alternative to the prospect of transplanting 
compatible, healthy porcine organs. Safe and effective xenotransplantation would not only 
resolve the current allograft shortage, it would also annul the high financial and emotional 
burdens associated with long waiting times for an available donor organ and allow for a 
precisely scheduled transplant, thereby overcoming many practical problems for the 
transplant team. Also, specially engineered pigs may one day provide suitable organs for 
infants, for whom the organ shortage is the most devastating. 
 
7.2.2 Proceeding with limited xenotransplantation trials and experiments 
involving human subjects 
 
Research restricted to tests on infected human blood samples in controlled laboratories 
cannot cover all possible consequences that viruses may have on living human bodies. That 
is also the case for in vivo animal models, although they do form instructive opportunities 
for basic research. Even trials on nonhuman primates, although assumed to produce the 
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most convincing results due to the great genetic similarities with humans, cannot produce 
conclusive results given the fact that both species react differently to certain viruses. 
Large-scale use of primates as experimental subjects is also ethically very problematic, 
precisely because of the great similarity to humans, not only genetically but also on a 
cognitive and emotional level. 
 
Further progress in pre-clinical studies is necessary before clinical trials of solid organ 
xenografts can be reconsidered. Nevertheless, it is well established that many crucial 
questions on efficacy and safety, including those regarding the side effects of 
immunosuppressive drugs, the presence of infection and features involving the 
physiological interaction between the xenograft organ and the host, will ultimately only be 
answered by well-designed and controlled solid organ xenotransplantation trials on 
humans27. On which conditions, given the risks and ethical issues involved, such clinical 
trials should be resumed in due time, is the question we will examine in what follows. 
 
7.3 A proposal for body donation in case of cortical brain death 
 
7.3.1 Living human subjects 
 
Proceeding with limited experimentation and trials on human subjects will ultimately be 
the inevitable step in order to investigate the consequences that the advanced 
xenotransplantation procedures may have on a human body. Although that research will 
ultimately depend on experimentation involving living human subjects, it is not an ideal 
starting point. As the Council of Europe has recently suggested, such clinical 
experimentation must first have evident therapeutic benefit to the recipient and exclude 
all risks to public health28. 
 
In the case of xenotransplantation, it is conceivable that certain individual transplant 
patients, facing death, will express their voluntary willingness to participate in new 
clinical trials of xenotransplantation, even if therapeutic benefit is not fully established. 
Such prospective trial participants may have little chance of surviving if they are not given 
an alternative to allotransplantation, and may therefore find the unknown consequences of 
the xenotransplant acceptable. However, such a situation would be most problematic. 
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For one, as the risk of unleashing a pandemic outweighs the benefits to the individual 
recipients, that would violate one of the most basic medical norms requiring a balance 
between the predictable risks and burdens and foreseeable benefits to the subject or to 
others29. Moreover, some extreme measures would be required in order to protect public 
health, and some of these conflict with the rights of human experimental subjects as well 
as with some basic human rights. Because of the ill-defined risks, future experimental 
xenograft recipients will have to consent to possible constraints of monitoring and to 
precautionary measures that restrict social and personal contact. Minimally, the first new 
recipients will be asked to permit long-term monitoring along with indefinite testing and 
preservation of samples30. Attempts to trace and study possible unknown viruses – let alone 
to control real outbreaks – are however lacking when limited to collecting blood and tissue 
samples. Most guidelines therefore include the prerequisite that relevant contacts must be 
informed about the experimental subject’s status of xenograft recipient, above all those 
who are submitted to possible contact with their bodily fluids. Especially cautious 
measures will have to be observed with respect to behaviour towards sexual partners, who 
will probably be required to undergo regular testing as well. The recipients will perhaps 
also be advised against having children. In extremis, if contagious infection does occur, the 
surveillance could go as far as placing the experimental subjects in solitary confinement 
for an indefinite time, allowing almost no exposure at all31. 
 
Even with the awareness that precautionary measures of that kind are necessary from the 
perspective of public health matters, it is hard to see how such drastic measures may be 
imposed on the subjects. That many of the suggested restrictions are difficult to justify, is 
an opinion articulated in an early report by the Nuffield Council32. When considering some 
of the harsher constraints, the recipient is not merely inflicted with the physical risks of 
infection and of immunological harms, but also with a denial of significant psychological 
interests. At stake here are intrusions of the right to non-interference in personal affairs 
and private life, the protection of confidential information, and – in the theoretical case of 
isolation – the right to liberty. According to the Council of Europe, violations of those rights 
are justifiable: “(...) for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases (...)” and 
“as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of (...) public safety (...), for the protection of health and morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others”33. It is precisely for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others that quarantine measures are imposed in cases of natural virus 
outbreaks. Nevertheless, requiring a prospective xenograft recipient to consent to such 
restrictions of his or her rights even before there is evidence of a health hazard would 
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involve a setback of significant psychological interests for the recipient – and conceivably, 
to the close contacts in his or her social environment as well. Ideally, the interests of the 
research subjects are the prime consideration. The trials should enhance the patient’s 
quality of life, not impose an extra burden. 
 
Besides that, genuine problems arise concerning the requirement of informed consent. 
First, in no way can the recipients be fully informed of the possible consequences of the 
experiment, due to the fact that the possible effects are unquantifiable. Second, given the 
likeliness that the participants to such trials will be driven by despair, doubts may arise 
regarding the voluntariness of their participation. In addition, it is not unthinkable that the 
patient will disagree with his former consent over time. The consequences of a 
participant’s decision to withdraw from the research after the experiment – a basic right 
formulated in the Declaration of Helsinki34 – would be drastic. Finally, the requirement of 
consent is already complicated enough regarding individual patients; in that case it would 
call for plural consent from close contacts and possibly even public consent. Although 
attempts to achieve public consent have recently been made35, it is clearly quite hard to 
attain for individual experimental cases of xenotransplantation. 
 
Summarizing, xenotransplantation trials on living human subjects would intrude upon 
generally accepted ethical codes and rights regarding experimentation on humans. Those 
guidelines can all be grasped by the norm that the physician must “(...) protect the life, 
health, privacy, and dignity of the human subject”36. Presuming that the alternative to 
xenotransplantation is a valuable one, however, the concern about the loss of the 
substantial knowledge that could be gained from experimental trials must remain. Future 
clinical trials of xenotransplantation must first and foremost be safe and in conformity 
with ethical principles. If this is not feasible, alternative means of obtaining information 
about human bodily reactions to long-term xenograft exposure are necessary. In what 
follows, we will explore and examine the possibilities of experimenting with human 
subjects who can neither be harmed by the side effects of the experiment nor be an 
infectious hazard to others. 
 
7.3.2 Living human bodies 
 
From a research perspective, the most instructive situation would be the acquisition of 
sufficient data from non-therapeutic experiments on biologically active human bodies. 
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From an ethical perspective, on the contrary, the need to protect the physical and 
psychological wellbeing of the subjects and the broader community is of paramount 
importance. Given those discordant interests, experiments should ideally be conducted on 
humans who, although alive in the biological sense, do not suffer from health risks or 
restrictions on their personal and social life. That means that the ideal research subjects 
should lack the essential aspects of human existence to which human rights and medical-
ethical principles are attributed, while they are nonetheless biologically active. 
 
In this respect, it could be argued that such living bodies are comparable with the bodies 
of the brain dead and one could thus suggest the use of brain dead bodies as research 
subjects. Brain dead bodies – ‘living cadavers’, as they were once called37 – are bodies with 
total loss of brain function that are connected to a mechanical ventilator that sustains 
some somatic functioning. Conducting xenotransplantation experiments on the whole brain 
dead is conceivable, as it is technically possible to transplant porcine organs in such 
bodies, while the basic bodily functions – such as breathing and steady blood flow – are 
artificially maintained. From an ethical point of view, that would be an attractive situation 
because it would enable complete examination of the xenotransplantation effects. It 
would also drastically minimize the risks of contagion from possible viruses, as the bodies 
experimented on could be quarantined for an indefinite time. That situation would be 
preferable to the use of living patients, given that a brain dead body, lacking the sentience 
of its biological existence, cannot suffer from the otherwise psychologically distressing 
constraints nor from the physical consequences of the transplantation. Research would 
evidently benefit from those experiments, as they could increase our understanding of 
potential viral infections and immunological reactions without putting the population at 
risk. That advantage could be optimized if it were then decided to halt all other trials of 
xenotransplantation until the results of those small-scale trials were evaluated. 
 
There are however practical problems with such a scenario. With whole brain death, 
relatively no significant bodily function will work on its own. The techniques used to keep 
basic bodily functions working may prove sufficient to keep organs and tissues from 
deteriorating; they do not ensure a relatively normal bodily reaction to the xenograft. 
Moreover, the mechanical devices designed to keep the body biologically active cannot 
continue doing so indefinitely, perhaps not long enough to ensure the absence of latent 
viruses. 
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Are the ideal experimental subjects of the sort described purely theoretical, then? One 
cannot help but think of ‘patients’ who are in a permanent vegetative state (the very word 
‘vegetative’ implying that these are bodies in such mere biological existence), a state that 
can last for many years until it results in biological death. 
 
As defined by Jennett and Plum38, the vegetative state is a clinical condition of profound 
brain damage that is characterized by both a loss of awareness and preserved arousal. In 
the literature, there is not much clarity on the term as the distinction between vegetative 
state, persistent vegetative state, and permanent vegetative state is often neglected. The 
Multi-Society Task Force on PVS has attempted to provide us with better delineated 
stipulation, employing the term ‘persistent’ to describe those cases in which the 
vegetative state lasts for more than one, three, or 12 months, according to aetiology; 
whereas the term ‘permanent’ is used to imply the irreversibility of the condition39. It is 
the latter meaning, characterized by irreversible abolition of consciousness, we wish to 
address here. 
 
With the term ‘Permanent Vegetative State’, we refer to a state in which all functioning 
of the cerebral cortex – the core of consciousness – is permanently lost, and yet the brain 
stem (or parts of it) is still working. It is marked by preserved autonomic and vegetative 
functions despite irreversible mental impairment. Reflex motor actions such as 
spontaneous eye opening, yawning, chewing and grimacing still occur, as well as 
spontaneous respiration and physiologic features of sleep and wakefulness. Nevertheless, a 
patient having lapsed into a PVS lacks awareness and cognition, which is apparent in, for 
example, the inability of purposeful, voluntary, and reproducible responses to 
stimulation40. Precise information on the prevalence of PVS is lacking, but studies show 
that the condition occurs fairly regularly. Estimates indicate that in the US alone there are 
between 10,000 to 25,000 adults and between 4,000 to 10,000 children in PVS41. 
 
Due to the fact that spontaneous breathing and reflex motor actions remain present, it is 
counterintuitive to think of these patients as dead. At present, our society emphasizes the 
irreversible cessation of all brain functions as the main criterion for diagnosing death. 
However, debate on this criterion has been ongoing since the standard of whole brain 
death was proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine 
the Definition of Brain Death in 196842. Robert Veatch was a pioneer in challenging the 
need of total lack of brain function and stressed the importance of sentient and socially 
interactive existence43. No proposals concerning a higher brain death criterion have been 
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legally endorsed as yet and therefore a body in PVS is still statutory a living patient. Still, 
one could argue that even the term ‘patient’ is inappropriate in relation to the condition, 
because the word generally refers to a living person, while a body in PVS has permanently 
lost all forms of personhood. Regardless of the ongoing dispute on what constitutes 
personhood, a precondition to be a person is the capacity for cognitive and affective 
mental functioning, which is inextricably bound with the notion of awareness. The parts of 
the brain that are crucial in terms of the mind and sentient existence are irreversibly lost 
in a PVS body. The organism can no longer experience pain and pleasure nor any other 
feelings; it does not have any awareness of the environment or the self and has no capacity 
for information integration. PVS bodies have no interest in maintaining their biological life, 
nor do they value it, as they have permanently lost the capacity to acquire values. That is 
in fact the idea behind former case specific court approvals for the removal of feeding 
tubes: they acknowledge the fact that the PVS body has no interests in treatments it may 
or may not receive. Likewise, one could argue, it is of no interest to a PVS body whether 
the body is involved in clinical xenotransplantation trials or not, as it can neither benefit 
from the advantages nor suffer from the disadvantages that are associated. Having no 
capacity for any mental activity whatsoever and thus left in a state of complete 
unconsciousness, it is reasonable to say that in fact a PVS body has no interests at all, a 
rationale often rehearsed in the literature. 
 
Of course, the idea we are suggesting here is not entirely new. Over the past years, some 
philosophers have defended the opinion to legalize the use of organs from cortically dead 
bodies for transplantation44. Proponents have argued that it is ‘intrinsically moral’ to use 
the organs of anencephalic neonates, who lack functioning cerebral hemispheres, as that 
would allow some good to come from their tragic situation45. They claim that the lives of 
other children could be maintained, while at the same time a meaning is given to the short 
and non-sentient existence of the anencephalics. In fact, the American Medical 
Association’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs briefly took that position as early as 
198846. Several philosophers apply similar argumentations in favour of organ retrieval from 
PVS bodies once the decision has been made to allow those bodies to die through 
withdrawal of all treatment47. The arguments appealed to are based on a conviction that 
such bodies are irreversibly non-sentient and non-cognitive and thereby have no interest in 
being biologically maintained, whereas their organs could save the lives of many. 
 
Regardless of the intention of the authors, one could logically derive from their suggestion 
concerning retrieval of organs for transplantation purposes the idea that it is permissible 
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to treat PVS bodies the way we currently treat the bodies of the whole brain dead. Based 
on the idea that PVS – if established that the decisive brain damage is permanent – implies 
the death of the person, we are of the opinion that not only the donation of organs but 
also of the entire body for scientific research should be permissible for PVS bodies on the 
condition that former consent has been obtained. Moreover, while potential organ 
donations from PVS bodies would increase the amount of donor organs available, they will 
still fall short in meeting demand and will thus be of limited value. By contrast, the 
implications of willed body donation in case of cortical death for xenotransplantation 
related research are far-reaching. As the autonomic and vegetative functions of PVS bodies 
can often be maintained for years, their use would allow the opportunity to fully test the 
long-term consequences of a solid organ xenotransplantation. This can potentially 
contribute to the progress necessary before large-scale clinical application to a potentially 
unlimited number of recipients can be considered. 
 
7.4 Discussion: the unbearable lightness of not-being 
 
The suggestion offered here raises several questions. Ultimately, it is about consented 
donation of the body to science in the case of cortical brain death. In our view, the 
following major concerns remain: (1) the need for certain diagnosis of the irreversibility of 
the state; (2) the need for sufficient and relevant functioning of a body in PVS; (3) the 
need for prior and informed consent by the person ending up as a PVS body. 
 
(1) The problem of establishing the irreversibility of loss of cognitive capacity is often 
cited. Although diagnostic certainty of cortical brain death is an indisputable prerequisite 
for our suggestion, dispute exists over the ability of scientific medicine to achieve that 
certainty. PVS is taken to be essentially permanent three months after non-traumatic and 
twelve months after traumatic brain injury48. However, rare reports exist of recovery with 
moderate disability after non-traumatic PVS lasting eighteen months and traumatic PVS 
lasting for thirty-six months49. Recent research suggests that therapies can be designed to 
induce ‘patients’ to emerge from PVS50. There is still disagreement over whether 
exceptional cases of ‘awakening’ are due to a lack of diagnostic certainty or whether they 
are just incidents of misdiagnosis. It is indeed a challenge to ensure complete and 
irreversible loss of capacity for consciousness, because the diagnosis depends on providing 
evidence of a negative, an absence. However, beyond a certain point, hope for bringing 
back the most rudimentary form of consciousness is gone. New techniques are constantly 
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being developed to specify that point with accuracy. Positron emission tomography51 and 
studies on the magnetic resonance of the brain52, among other things, are important 
efforts in understanding the neural processes underlying the vegetative state. If in the 
future such techniques prove to be reliable, then we could be certain that the experiments 
we are suggesting would be limited to bodies that are demonstrably irreversibly cortically 
destroyed. 
 
(2) A second possible obstacle to the realization of our proposal is that it may be 
discovered that a body in PVS, and in particular the immune system, does not sufficiently 
function like a normal body with unaffected brain functioning. If so, there were no reason 
to prefer our scenario to the use of animal models, as neither approach would attain the 
compelling conclusions on the safety of the procedure. However, at present there is no 
clarity about that. Were this to be the case, then our suggestion would indeed be useless 
within the framework of xenotransplantation trials, although it would still make sense for 
many other forms of scientific research. 
 
(3) If it can be accepted that PVS bodies can be regarded as dead, then experimenting on 
them is legitimate under the same conditions as experiments on cadavers. Training and 
refining invasive technical skills on cadavers or newly deceased patients is not an 
uncommon practice in medicine due to a lack of suitable educational alternatives for those 
procedures. Multiple surveys have shown that the general public does not disapprove of 
that method53. It is generally deemed ethically acceptable when perceived as an 
educational opportunity that will benefit many patients dependent on the technical, life-
saving skills practiced. However, as a substantial prerequisite of all scientific research on 
human bodily material, former consent would be necessary to ensure that the experiments 
are not conducted against the personal wishes of the deceased person. Registering a ‘living 
will’ is a means of ensuring that the right to self-determination is respected after death. 
 
An additional argument in favour of allowing the donation of one’s body for scientific 
experimentation in case of a permanent vegetative state, can be drawn from some 
people’s refusal to grant that a cadaver and a dead person may be treated alike. Over the 
past century, we have gone a long way before acknowledging that whole brain death (also 
formerly described as ‘hopelessly unconscious patients’54) is a sufficient condition of death 
of the individual. However, much controversy over the legitimacy of that concept still 
exists today. It has been suggested that the concept of death is not inextricably bound 
with the criteria of whole brain death. Debate exists, for instance, on the equation of 
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brain death to the cessation of integrated functioning of the entire body55. There is also 
evidence that weakens the idea that there is a total absence of all brain function at the 
moment ‘whole brain death’ is determined56. In contrast with what the term presumes, the 
declaration of whole brain death is in medical practice often based on the irreversible 
cessation of particular brain functions, while other brain activity – deemed irrelevant in 
deciding whether a person is dead or alive – remains. It is the death of the brainstem that 
is the decisive criterion because all higher brain activity is assumed dependent on lower 
brain activity (and that suggests that there is a tendency to think less of the lower brain 
functions in terms of defining life and to emphasize the critical role of the higher, cortical 
forms). 
 
It seems that there is still much conflict about what constitutes death, even among 
experts. Because convictions about death are not absolute, one might argue that in the 
end it should be left to the individual himself to choose the criterion/criteria of death he 
or she wishes to endorse in a living will. Robert Veatch formerly formulated that idea. He 
proposed to legally tolerate religious and philosophical objections to a uniform definition 
of death, 
 
(...) a conscientious objection that permits patients to choose, while 
competent, an alternative definition of death provided that it is within reason 
and does not pose serious public or other societal concerns.57 
 
Veatch argues that it goes against the fundaments of liberal pluralism to prevent 
individuals with dissenting religious and philosophical views from incorporating other 
definitions of death. 
 
With regard to our suggestion, a testamentary will relating to postmortem research is 
required, allowing an individual to indicate the concept(s) that best corresponds to the 
individual’s own concept of death (be it cardiopulmonary, whole brain or cortical brain 
death). Such a will would also allow a person – keen to help science – to stipulate his or her 
wish to donate the body or certain bodily materials to science in accordance with that 
concept of death. In the latter case, one could - should one desire - specify the type of 
research he or she wants to participate in. In that way, one could, for example, opt to 
participate in the xenotransplantation trials discussed. Information could be provided to 
instruct those interested in the different types of research and the consequences they will 
have on the body. Perhaps such a deliberately expressed wish could be recorded on 
identification documents or in a whole body donor registry. 
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Some important questions remain when considering allowing people to donate their body to 
science in accordance with individual conceptions of death. 
 
Firstly, it may be put forward that the general public will not welcome such a shift in 
policy. If permitting willed body donation in case of PVS implies that we go against some of 
the most fundamental convictions on life and death matters held by relatives, physicians, 
and the general public, our suggestion could cause public distrust and outrage. However, 
studies on public attitudes show conflicting evidence. On the one hand, reports on organ 
donation indicate continued discomfort among respondents – including physicians – over 
the equation of whole brain death with the death of the patient58. On the other hand, 
several studies suggest rather unconventional attitudes towards cortical brain death. One 
American study showed that 89 per cent of respondents thought it ethical to withdraw life-
prolonging treatment in cases of PVS and almost two thirds held that it is ethical to use the 
organs of PVS bodies59. Besides that, no consensus on what constitutes death is required in 
order to implement our suggestion, as the emphasis is on personal beliefs. 
 
Secondly, it may be suggested that conducting experiments on PVS bodies is disrespectful 
of the deceased person, because invasive procedures and mutilating treatments would be 
applied. However, such experimentation on cadavers is deemed acceptable under certain 
circumstances. If similar conditions are met in the case of PVS and if prior consent is 
legitimate, experimenting on PVS bodies is no more disrespectful than current postmortem 
research. Also, assuming that a deceased person has no interests (our argument for 
allowing experimentation to be conducted on PVS bodies in the first place), one could 
conclude that a PVS body likewise has no interests in whether or not its prior wishes are 
respected. Deciding to acknowledge the personal wishes as expressed in a will in spite of 
that, speaks in favour of respect for the dead. The same cannot be said of all postmortem 
research conducted today. There have been various indications that some hospitals retain 
body parts after death for medical or research purposes, without prior consent or 
discussion with the next of kin. Moreover, the type of willed body donation that we suggest 
here is not just respectful of the wishes of the deceased; it also promotes other values, 
because use is made of the body to increase medical knowledge and help others. 
 
A final issue concerns the question whether decisions regarding the scientific and medical 
use of the body are ultimately restricted to the person who died or whether relatives or 
other parties involved are entitled to decide. That is a topical concern. Recent literature 
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reports that most adults believe that consent from family members prior to practicing 
procedures on the newly dead is advisable60,61. New Zealand is one country that has legally 
enforced the right of a formal family veto to override the deceased’s directive in relation 
to retention of body parts62. The arguments highlight the enduring interests of others after 
death. It is important to consider the effect PVS body donation would have on the family. 
With regard to our suggestion, one could indeed claim that while the suffering of the PVS 
body may not be at stake, the relatives are emotionally involved in the way the body is 
treated and, as such, should have a say in the matter as well. As a PVS body is not a corpse 
ready for burial, it is conceivable that conducting experiments on it will be very distressing 
to them. 
 
When considering the interests of relatives, a similarity as well as a distinction can be 
drawn between donation of a cadaveric body and of a PVS body for scientific purposes. 
Both practices are comparable in that the disposal of the bodily remains is uncertain. That 
implies that either the two practices should be equally condemned, or equally permitted. 
The main difference, however, lies in the fact that the scientific or medical use of the 
warm bodies of deceased persons (higher cortical or whole brain death) evokes entirely 
different emotional reactions compared to the use of a “cold” cadaver. 
 
In spite of that emotional distress, there are many cases where the testamentary wishes of 
an individual take priority over the emotional involvement of the family. In many 
countries, for instance, advance directives concerning end of life decisions (both refusal of 
treatment and – as in Belgium and the Netherlands – request for actively ending the life) of 
those who become permanently or even irreversibly unconscious are respected regardless 
of the objections of relatives. As persons who are irreversibly unconscious or ‘dead’ no 
longer have any interests, one could in principle argue that testaments – of any kind – have 
no stringent power. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that the transfer of property and 
patrimony and the wishes concerning end of life decisions or preferences with regard to 
burial, are arranged according to the terms of a will. The precise intention of having a will 
is to ensure that an individual’s wishes are followed, even if that person no longer has a 
stake in his wishes being followed because he no longer exists in that sense. In the case of 
PVS body donation, relatives may even be helped by the fact that the deceased has 
stipulated his wish to body donation in case of cortical death. They may be consoled by the 
altruistic nature of the donation and by the fact that body donation is something the 
deceased deliberately chose. 
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8 Xenotransplantation and the harm principle: factoring out 
foreseen risk 
 
Adapted from: Ravelingien A. Foreseen risk and benefit in xenotransplantation: 
time to bring home the bacon. Submitted. 
 
Abstract 
 
Xenotransplantation – the transplantation, implantation, or infusion of live cells, tissues or 
organs from a nonhuman animal source into humans – is being considered as an alternative 
strategy to alleviate the shortage of human grafts. The pursuit of this technology is 
nonetheless restricted by an unquantifiable risk that the use of animal grafts will unleash 
new zoonoses that may affect the public at large. In this chapter we will demonstrate that 
the regulatory measures taken to prevent secondary infections, currently do not warrant 
full-blown protection of public health. This reality forces us to reconsider the extent to 
which the public should be guaranteed protection from a xenotransplant-related health 
hazard. In pondering that question, we will suggest that the permissibility of health 
hazards posed by emerging (bio)technologies is dependent on the perception that the 
benefits are both substantive and attainable and on the duty to account for foreseeable 
risks. In that sense, there is both good and bad news for the acceptability of 
xenotransplantation. An increased understanding of the infectious agents that are known 
to pose a health risk, allows to relate the man-made health threat to risks that have a 
natural origin. Even if it is eventually possible to exclude all foreseeable risk factors, 
however, the onus for those wishing to implement xenotransplantation procedures in the 
clinic lies in demonstrating greater proof of the benefits which they have long promised to 
provide. 
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8.1 Dealing with the risk of a xenogeneic pandemic 
 
The possibility of infecting patients with either recognized or novel infectious agents 
transmitted from xenotransplantation products is perhaps the most important argument 
restricting clinical use of xenotransplantation practice. 
 
It is well established – and topically illustrated by the recent outbreak of H5N1 Avian 
Influenza – that nearly all of the infectious diseases that have emerged over the past 
decade can be traced to animal-derived viruses, bacteria, or prions that have passed onto 
or adapted in human hosts1. Xenotransplantation appears to pose a particularly pertinent 
health hazard. That is due to the fact that transplantation bypasses most of the patient’s 
usual protective physical and immunological barriers. There is also lack of knowledge 
about the behaviour of source animal-derived infectious agents in immunosuppressed 
humans. Moreover, the risk of xenogeneic virus transfer materialized with evidence that a 
family of porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs) can infect human primary cells and cell 
lines in vitro and can adapt to those cells by serial transmission on uninfected cells2,3. In 
contrast to exogenous retroviruses, endogenous retroviruses are deemed particularly 
problematic because they are resident as proviruses in the DNA of the host, and thus 
difficult to exclude. Three classes of the infectious type-C endogenous retrovirus (PERV-A, 
PERV-B, PERV-C) were identified. Those classes share profound sequences homologies but 
are substantially different in the receptor-binding region of the viral surface env gene4. 
 
In a cautious, initial attempt to define and determine the seriousness of the risk posed by 
the use of pigs as xenograft source animals, Patience et al. identified several questions 
that needed answering before we can decide whether xenotransplantation experiments on 
humans should proceed5. More knowledge was required in terms of the microorganisms 
present in the donor animals, the likeliness of cross-species microbe transfer to cause 
disease in humans, and the likeliness of and capacity for potential cross-species microbe 
transfer to elicit a human pandemic. Pending the answers to these questions, several pleas 
for a moratorium were made6,7,8. In most regulatory authorities, however, a brief de facto 
moratorium in 1998-1999 in name of the precautionary principle has been replaced by 
stringent national oversight of adherence to detailed monitoring requirements9,10,11. All 
regulations mandate that the source animals should be specified pathogen-free and bred in 
bio-secure environments. A thorough, ongoing system of infection detection is required 
during the entire process leading to and following clinical application. The detection 
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procedures will minimally consist of routine systematic collection, analysis, and 
interpretation of archive specimens taken from the source animals, recipients, close 
contacts, caregivers and medical staff. The surveillance requirements will impose lifelong 
constraints on the prospective recipients and possibly their close contacts. Some of those 
constraints may conflict with an individual’s right to confidentiality, mobility and liberty12. 
Among the more stringent requirements, it has been suggested that the prospective trial 
recipients should refrain from having children13. In the understanding that the risks of 
xenogeneic virus are not confined to the nation in which an outbreak initially occurs, great 
effort has been put to establish international cooperation for the protection of public 
health on a global scale. The Council of Europe14, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)15, the World Health Organization (WHO)16, the 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medical Products (EMEA)17 and the International 
Xenotransplantation Association (IXA)18 have urged international collaboration to develop 
universal standards of good practice. Those institutes recommend that clinical applications 
of xenotransplantation are not to be carried out without effective national regulatory 
control and surveillance mechanisms and/or without specific authorization. Additionally, 
they mandate international harmonization of accepted norms for surveillance and data and 
require rapid exchange of scientific clinical information. 
 
Many have questioned whether those measures are both a feasible and an acceptable 
means to restrict the propagation of xenogeneic infectious diseases. The need for long-
term (potentially lifelong) monitoring will undoubtedly have an effect on the freedom and 
privacy of prospective xenograft recipients and their close contacts, who will also be asked 
to undergo testing. It is particularly unclear whether that is something we may demand 
from patients who aim to improve their quality of life19. Moreover, and given the high rates 
of non-compliance to health recommendations after an allotransplantation20, it is unclear 
whether the consenting recipients would be continuously willing and able to adhere to the 
extensive and stringent supervision. Importantly, while consenting xenotransplant 
recipients would necessarily lose the right to withdraw from the research after the 
experiment, the legal means by which compliance can (and should) be enforced prior to a 
demonstrable state of public health emergency have not yet been set in place21,22. 
 
The feasibility of stringent xenotransplantation oversight is also undermined in reference 
to the trials that have been conducted without regulatory oversight in the past and those 
which slip through the net of international oversight today. Unless the patients who have 
already undergone a xenotransplant prior to the stringent regulation can be identified and 
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controlled, the risk of (latent) xenogeneic infection is out there. There are also verbal 
reports that pig-to-human transplant experiments are currently being conducted in 
countries without proper oversight23,24. Those reports indicate that at least 400 islet 
transplants and 2,000 bovine cell transplants for pain relief have been conducted in China 
so far. In Russia, allegedly hundreds (possibly more than 800) of rabbit islet transplants 
have been done. That opens the door for the risks of ‘xenotourism’, in which case a 
patient may seek a xeno-‘therapy’ in those specific nations where they are available. The 
xenotourist may perhaps mistakenly assume that established oversight is in place, or be 
kept unaware of the potential dangers inherent in the unconventional procedures. It is 
therefore unlikely that such a patient will attune to appropriate precautions25. An advisory 
group assembled by the World Health Organization suggests that such practices should be 
stopped26. However, the means to do that are still lacking. 
 
In light of those practical and ethical difficulties in preventing secondary infections, 
protection of public health is not guaranteed. That reality forces us to reconsider to what 
extent the public should be guaranteed protection from a xenotransplant-related health 
hazard. A re-examination of the duty to prevent public health harms is also encouraged by 
the increased optimism that the risk of xenogeneic viral infection is not as compelling as it 
was a decade ago. 
 
8.2 Do as you wish, but do not make a nuisance of yourself to others 
 
Xenotransplantation involves the conflict of two intuitively felt moral duties. By not 
pursuing xenotransplantation trials, we are refraining from helping waiting-list patients 
who currently have no alternative to life-saving treatment. In other words, we are 
potentially allowing preventable deaths. By pursuing xenotransplantation trials, on the 
other hand, we could help some individuals at the cost of harming (possibly many) others, 
with harm broadly defined as affecting someone’s interests adversely. 
 
The above-mentioned approaches to exclude the possibility of virus transmission or 
proposals to ban xenotransplantation altogether, suggest that the duty not to harm others 
is the weightiest principle. That would seem to reflect the maxim “Above all [or first] do 
no harm” (Primum non nocere), which is sometimes (although incorrectly) deemed the 
essential principle underlying the Hippocratic tradition of medical ethics27. Within a purely 
medical ethics context, however, the duty not to harm would not necessarily enjoy priority 
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over the duty to provide benefit. The principles serve as a guide for good clinical practice 
to patients and have a prima facie character rather than a definite hierarchy28. Whether or 
not in a given situation the principle of beneficence overrules the principle of 
nonmaleficence is co-dependent upon two other principles: respect for persons and 
equitable distribution of benefits and burdens. In considering the role of those principles, 
it seems to matter whether the person to be harmed is the very same person who is to be 
the beneficiary or some other person. 
 
In Kantian ethics, acknowledging a person’s autonomy implies viewing persons as ends in 
themselves and not merely as a means to the ends of others. Each person merits respect 
for his or her ‘private sphere’, in which he or she is sovereign and free to determine his or 
her own destiny. As a moral notion to guide our acts, that implies that an individual with 
the necessary critical mental capacities to act as an autonomous agent may not be 
restrained by controlling interferences from others. Strong defence of personal sovereignty 
will grant autonomous beings the right to act in such a way that is of harm to them – even 
when the decisions are unreasonable or when they imply an alienation rather than 
fulfilment of autonomy – as long as the act is done voluntarily and knowingly of the 
effects29. Milder trends towards anti-paternalism are more apparent in the medical 
context. A patient is generally assigned a right to consent to medical research or therapies 
that are potentially harmful to his or her health on the additionally specified condition 
that the risks are reasonable in relation to the potential benefits. From that perspective, 
we can imagine that a recipient will be willing to accept a xenotransplant, fully knowing of 
the potential of xenogeneic virus transmission. That harm may to a certain extent and in 
severe cases be counterbalanced by the benefits. Nevertheless, the least stringent and 
most basic limit of personal sovereignty is set to those harms that are also other-
regarding30. This is the harm principle introduced by John Stuart Mill: 
 
The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is 
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his 
independence is, of right, absolute.31 
 
The duty to respect the autonomy of others makes a strong case against the moral 
permissibility of secondary xenogeneic virus transfer. The case could also be made in 
reference to the fact that, for the general population, the harm of a xenogeneic epidemic 
will not be counterbalanced by the benefits. That is particularly compelling when placing 
the notion of just health distribution in a global context. The developing world, most parts 
of which lack even the most minimal health care, will not have access to the benefits of 
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that expensive technology (in effect, a critique against most high-tech medical therapies) 
but will rather be confronted with yet another health burden. 
 
The conflict between the autonomy of the beneficiary and the autonomy of persons other 
than the patient being treated, could possibly be resolved if those others were to consent 
to the acceptability of the harm involved in xenotransplantation (perhaps, in the belief 
that they themselves may one day benefit from the therapy). However, consent of all 
those potentially involved in the harm at stake is virtually impossible, because in effect, 
the whole world is. In practice, seeking collective consent applies to public consultations 
on a national level. The important role of public input in the decision whether or not to 
proceed with xenotransplantation has indeed been endorsed32,33, but so far, the various 
national efforts have not yielded unanimously positive acceptance rates. Rather to the 
contrary. Public consultations in Canada, the Netherlands and Australia resulted in overall 
recommendations not to proceed with clinical trials until the risks were better understood 
and could be better managed34. When such nations decide not to engage in further trials, 
assurance that they will be protected from the harm they do not wish to accept is 
conditional, as the harms of infectious disease will not be restricted to the country in 
which the transplant is performed. In a sense, any country that engages in this research 
chooses to run the risks for everyone. 
 
The moral weight of the harm principle is deeply engrained in our common sense morality. 
In fact, we will generally conclude that duties not to injure others are more compelling 
than duties to prevent harm or to provide benefit. A classic thought experiment often used 
to illustrate this is one in which we are asked to consider saving the lives of five patients 
on the waiting list by killing an innocent person in order to retrieve his or her vital 
organs35. While that act would bring about the best consequences in terms of lives saved, 
most of us would object to the means by which the lives are saved. The moral 
impermissibility of such harm is not necessarily grounded in deontological principles: it can 
be supported on consequentialist grounds as well. The consequentialist could maintain 
that, although initially most lives are saved, killing a person for his or her organs would 
render the results worse overall. For instance, if the transplants were unsuccessful, the 
lives of all six people rather than five would go lost. Alternatively, if the killing were 
brought to light, the distress that could cause among the public would diminish the overall 
welfare. Moreover, if the public were to lose trust in the medical community and refrain 
from seeking medical help, that could result in the unnecessary loss of many more lives. 
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Notwithstanding this, even the duty not to harm others is not a moral absolute. Where the 
outcomes are clearly favourable in terms of overall results, this is a consideration to which 
even some deontic theories would not be entirely insensitive36. In other words, the 
constraint against doing harm to others can be outweighed. The problem, however, is that 
opinions may vary regarding the point at which the harm is counterbalanced. There is no 
clear amount of benefit that must be at stake before the constraint against doing harm can 
be forsaken. Kagan indicates that the threshold is rather a function of the size and nature 
of the harm that has to be done to bring about the good results37. The difficulty of 
balancing benefit and harm is further complicated in those cases in which we are not asked 
to consider the permissibility of doing harm, but only a risk of doing harm. The nature of 
the problem is highlighted by the fact that few of our everyday acts involve no risk of 
harming someone else. Some of those everyday acts – Kagan gives the example of driving 
cars38 – imply risks of serious, life-threatening harm. That suggests that the permissibility 
of imposing risk of harm to others is not solely dependent on the nature and size of harm 
at risk, the probability that the harm will occur is also taken into account. The higher the 
risk, so it would seem, the higher the threshold. 
 
Establishing the permissibility of risk seems highly intangible in the case of 
xenotransplantation. The number of people at stake in both benefits and harms is 
potentially large-scale, while the size and nature of the harm – whether it be a harmless 
influenza or a fatal pandemic, the range in between, or neither – and the probability that 
any of those scenarios will occur are essentially uncertain and unquantifiable. Given that 
the “scientific-descriptive” component of risk assessment is thereby lacking, we are 
compelled to make do with a second component, which involves an individual and social 
normative basis39. In what follows, we borrow two analogies in an attempt to provide 
additional factors which play a role in the perception and acceptance of man-made public 
health hazards. 
 
8.3 The ethics of man-made public health hazards 
 
8.3.1 Analogies 
 
In her account of the conflict of individual and public interests inherent in 
xenotransplantation, Martine Rothblatt compares the situation to the prior development of 
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two similarly risky biotechnologies40. In both cases, the technologies harboured a great 
potential benefit and imposed risks of equally grave harm to the public. Nevertheless, the 
situations deviate in terms of tolerance of the risks. In what follows, we hope to shed light 
upon the permissibility of the risk of xenogeneic infections by investigating the factors that 
might have led to the different risk perceptions. 
 
The first analogy is drawn in reference to the emergence of antibiotics, which became a 
treatment option for a range of bacterial infections in the 1940s41. Rothblatt notes that the 
antibiotics were administered with knowledge that improper use could lead to the 
generation of resistant forms of bacteria, which in turn could form a major public health 
hazard. Indeed, within a few decades, excessive use of antibiotics has rendered entire new 
species of antibiotic resistant bacteria, which cause an increasing death toll. The 
widespread use of antibiotics in both animals and humans has given rise to new human-
borne pathogens as well as new antibiotic-resistant zoonoses and constitutes an enduring 
risk of creating an antibiotic-resistant pandemic. Rothblatt observes that, in contrast to 
the current attitude towards xenotransplantation, there is no mention of banning or 
severely restricting the practice. Indeed, the public is willing to accept the risks, as well as 
the existing harms, in light of the life-saving benefits provided and in the confidence that 
public health regulations can timely manage the severe harms. 
 
The second analogy is drawn in reference to the development and study of recombinant 
DNA technology42. In that case, the potential scientific and social benefits were not a 
sufficient justification and the development of the research went hand-in-hand with 
efforts to control and contain public health hazards. Here too, the potential hazards 
related to infections from bacteria and viruses. They were taken seriously from the start 
and some of the world’s prime molecular biologists voluntarily implemented a temporary 
moratorium on the research. In February 1975 stringent requirements were set for the 
continuation of genetic experimentation. During the Asilomar meeting, the scientific 
expert invitees were confronted with ultimate uncertainty whether or not cancers or new 
infectious diseases could result from the splicing of genes and transfer of chromosomes. 
Consequently, they decided rather to be on the safe side and protective measures were 
established in accordance with a classification of risk. Experiments that were clearly safe 
were permitted on the bench top; (possibly) dangerous experiments were restricted to 
confined areas. Those recommendations have since been adopted by governmental 
agencies worldwide. 
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Rothblatt uses the above-mentioned analogies to demonstrate the way forward for 
xenotransplantation experimentation and clinical practice. The antibiotics analogy 
highlights certain conditions, which render public health hazards acceptable. The 
permissibility is a function of the perception of benefits and of the trust that the harm can 
be effectively controlled once it occurs43. The emergence of recombinant DNA research 
regulation teaches us that mechanisms can be put in place beforehand to constrain the 
risks to public health while not necessarily quashing the potentially beneficial research 
itself44. Rothblatt concludes that xenotransplantation can be ethically pursued if similar 
measures are put in place in advance to detect and restrict related infectious outbreaks 
globally45. 
 
In my view, it is precisely the distinctions between those analogies which provide for extra 
factors to be weighed when questioning the permissibility of man-made public health 
hazards. 
 
8.3.2 Foreseeable risk 
 
Arguably, the anticipation of a significant potential for benefit was greater in the advent 
of antibiotics than in the emergence of recombinant DNA technology. The potency of 
antibiotics to decrease the high percentages of mortality and complications due to 
infectious diseases was apparent upon its discovery in 1928: pre-clinical data demonstrated 
the ability to destroy a common bacterium that was associated with sometimes fatal 
infections (Staphylococcus aureus)46. A decade after that discovery, during which diverse 
technical difficulties were overcome, Howard Florey, Ernst Chain and Norman Heatley 
were able to show penicillin’s capability to provide cures for a wide variety of conditions. 
By contrast, the advances in therapeutic applications of recombinant DNA technology have 
been slower and the importance of its potential much more contested. 
 
The recombinant DNA analogy also shows evidence of less public trust that the risks will be 
manageable at the moment they occur. Instead, it illustrates a focus on preventing the 
risks beforehand. That may very well be a partial effect of the various time frames. 
Furthermore, although in both cases the risks were known before the technologies were 
put to widespread use, the two situations appear distinguishable in terms of the extent to 
which the risks were predictable and the moral importance of accounting for foreseeable 
adverse effects. 
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Rothblatt indicates that the invention of new antibiotics in the 1950s and 1960s convinced 
society that the emergence of sub-types of antibiotic-resistant bacteria should not pose a 
great problem47. That trust arguably echoed the confidence and public support of medical 
and other scientific research at a time when laboratory efforts had successfully been 
mobilized for war48. The fruits of those experiments were reaped in the scientific boom 
years of the 1950s. Asilomar, by contrast, is indicative of a turning point in the ethics of 
science. It marked the first time that scientists engaged a social contract with society. The 
moral impermissibility of knowingly exposing a population to manufactured risks appears 
to have increased in significance during the past century. That may relate to the fact that 
many risks associated with contemporary technology transgress former spatial and 
temporary limits49. 
 
While it appears of paramount importance to take advance account of the risks posed by 
emerging biotechnologies, there is an important distinction with respect to the extent to 
which the risks can in fact be foreseen in advance. In the case of antibiotics, the first 
warnings of the risks arose well after applications on soldiers and only one year prior to 
widespread clinical use. Antibiotic resistance was marked as a real threat only after two 
cases of lethal resistant bacterial infections in patients occurred in the 1970s50. That was 
well after the scientists were in the position to exclude that kind of harm beforehand. By 
contrast, the controversy surrounding recombinant DNA started with evidence of successful 
insertion of hybrid genes into E. coli51, of which the adverse effects were evident before 
they occurred. In that case, the scientists were in the position to exclude them from 
occurring altogether. We believe that that distinction is particularly relevant in 
understanding the reluctance to accept the public hazard posed by xenotransplantation. 
 
Although the impact of the worst-case harms of xenotransplantation is similar to the 
impact of the HIV pandemic, much more stringent monitoring and surveillance measures 
are imposed on the xenograft recipient than on a patient affected by HIV. It has been 
proposed that the crucial distinction lies in the fact that xenotransplantation will be 
introduced purposely as a clinical experiment, whereas HIV is an ‘experiment’ of nature52. 
It appears to make a difference to us whether harm was due to natural causes or knowingly 
brought about by the action of another person. That difference is tied to notions of 
individual responsibility and human agency53. This is not to say that moral responsibility is 
attributed to only those effects that were purposely pursued. Rather, the underlying 
reasoning would seem to be that we are in the position now to annul foreseeable adverse 
Part four   Factoring out foreseen risk 
 183 
consequences and thus have a particular moral responsibility to do so. Indeed, the freedom 
and autonomy of HIV/AIDS subjects is respected to the extent that their acts exclude 
foreseeable events of virus transmission. 
 
If the permissibility of health hazards posed by emerging (bio)technologies is dependent on 
the perception that the benefits are both substantive and attainable and on the duty to 
account for foreseeable risks, there is both good and bad news with regard to the 
development of xenotransplantation. 
 
8.4 Foreseen risk and benefit 
 
8.4.1 The bad news 
 
Proponents of xenotransplantation have long defended the added values of applying solid 
organ xenotransplants to resolve the organ shortage problem. An unlimited source of 
animal grafts could help not only those patients who currently die while on the waiting 
lists, but also the individuals who are not enlisted on the transplant waiting lists, who are 
withdrawn from a list prior to their death or who have not accepted human organ donation 
for ethical or cultural reasons. Moreover, if a sufficient supply of xenografts were readily 
available, the transplant procedure could be precisely scheduled and preparatory measures 
could be facilitated54. As such, both the graft and the recipient could be thoroughly 
screened prior to the transplant and the diverse patho-physiological effects of brain death 
on the organ quality could be avoided. 
 
Nevertheless, xenotransplantation is not a heaven-sent timely solution to the limits of 
allotransplantation. While attempts to transplant nonhuman animal organs to humans go 
back to the beginning of last century, xenotransplantation has not been able to live up to 
its promises to this day55. After the failures of early experiments, interest in 
xenotransplantation was rekindled in the 1960s, motivated by a first wave of human donor 
shortages (prior to the implementation of the brain death criterion) and by increased 
knowledge of immunology. During that period, several xenotransplant trials were 
conducted parallel to some of the first nonrelated human-to-human allotransplants. In 
terms of the results achieved within both experimental fields at that time, Keith 
Reemtsma achieved outstanding survival rates of 63 days and 9 months after the 
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xenotransplantation of nonhuman primate kidneys56. Those survival rates remain by far the 
longest ever achieved in animal-to-human organ transplantation, whereas 
allotransplantation has since made great strides forward. 
 
It appears unlikely that xenogeneic organs will survive and function in humans for 
prolonged periods in the near future. Sir Roy Calne, one of the pioneers of the 
xenotransplantation enterprise, recently pictured that negative outlook. In a commentary 
entitled ‘Xenografting – the future of transplantation, and always will be?’, Calne doubts 
that therapeutic xenografts will be obtained within the next five to ten years57. The 
prospect of using xenotransplantation as the medium to avert the waiting list death toll is 
currently more  based on rhetorical promise than on feasible potential. Indeed, due to the 
failure to materialize significant progress to the clinic, private industry has increasingly 
withdrawn or suspended commitment in this area58. As set out in Chapter 4, the success of 
xenotransplantation is obstructed mainly by immunological incompatibilities. Due to the 
short survival rates obtained to date, the impact of subsequent rejection phases is not yet 
entirely manifest. The many physiological and biochemical incompatibilities between 
swine and humans form yet another source of factors that stand in the way of effective 
and successful use of xenogeneic organs. 
 
Currently, most hope and effort is dedicated to various cellular xenotransplants and 
extracorporeal perfusion therapies. The transplantation of animal-derived cells is also very 
promising in terms of treating a wide variety of diseases, among which: diabetes, liver 
failure, neurodegenerative disease, anaemia, spinal cord injuries, haemophilia, 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, AIDS, hypocalcaemia, hypercholesterolernia, lyposomal 
storage disease and dwarfism59. Nevertheless, many of the cellular therapies differ in 
terms of urgency and life-sustaining benefit when compared to the need for whole organ 
replacement. Furthermore, the results of most cellular xenotransplants have thus far not 
provided compelling indications of progress in graft survival and clinical utility. As noted in 
Chapter 4, a review of the clinical experience with both extracorporeal pig liver perfusion 
and bioartificial devices containing pig hepatocytes do not demonstrate a significant 
benefit for hepatic assist in acute liver failure. The most imminent contribution of 
xenotransplantation to the clinic is likely to lie in the transplantation of porcine islets of 
Langerhans. That could provide an alternative to injections of human or porcine insulin, 
which are ineffective in fully restoring proper glucose homeostasis. Islet cell 
xenotransplantation may eliminate the need for daily insulin injections and obtain better 
glucose control. It could thereby avoid or retard development of the various ills and co-
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morbidity related to deficient treatment of chronic diabetes. Islet cells from cadaveric 
sources have been shown to provide at least 1-year insulin-independence in patients with 
very unstable diabetes (n=7)60. Two recent reports of more than 6 months of insulin 
independence in pig-to-monkey transplants provided promising indications of the feasibility 
of using islets from porcine sources too61,62. As also mentioned in Chapter 4, a recent 
report of a islet xenotransplant trial in humans suggests that combining porcine islet cells 
with Sertoli cells and encasing them in a semi-permeable encapsulation device is a 
promising means to eliminate the immune barrier to cell xenotransplants63. 
 
Although the latter study is encouraging, the fact that xenotransplantation is overall still 
“very much in its infancy”64 ultimately raises questions why that research should gain 
priority over other technical alternatives for the allograft shortage. Welsh and Evans 
indicate a fallacy of claims that portray xenotransplantation as the most realistic and rapid 
solution for those on the waiting list65. In comparison with stem cell cloning, for instance, 
it has been calculated that xenotransplants will be available for clinical use eight years 
prior to stem cell technology. Eight years is not necessarily a long interim period for the 
emergence of a novel technology, particularly if therapeutic xenotransplantation is still a 
long time coming. It is likely that there will be a long lead time between clinical trials and 
the commercial availability of significant numbers of transplantable genetically modified 
organs. In light of this, the authors guessed that it would take many years before 
xenotransplantation can alleviate the waiting lists death toll considerably. In effect, given 
the high costs and difficulties of breeding appropriate source animals, the question is 
raised whether xenotransplantation will ever make a significant impact on the waiting 
lists. Moreover, even if the technology of stem cell cloning will take much longer to 
develop than what is assessed here, it appears to offer a range of advantages over the use 
of xenotransplantation. At least theoretically, it may avoid the problem of acute 
immunological rejection altogether, as the prospect is raised that use can be made of the 
recipient’s own genetic material to generate replacement tissue. Moreover, provided the 
stem cells are not exposed to living animal-derived material, clinical use of this alternative 
does not involve a public health hazard. 
 
8.4.2 The good news 
 
In questioning the attainability of xenotransplant benefits, we must also take note of the 
progress that has been made in the understanding of the level of infectious risk during the 
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past decade. Indeed, we currently seem relatively well equipped to identify and define the 
infectious potential of most known porcine pathogens66. 
 
Broad exclusion lists have been generated which provide guidance to breeding out 
organisms particular to the source animal species, organisms that commonly cause 
infection in transplant recipients and organisms that have a high inclination for 
recombination. Those lists also facilitate the screening and studying of those organisms and 
the development of possible infection-suppressive measures. Various potential human 
pathogens can now be identified in advance, including porcine circovirus types 1 and 2, 
porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus, porcine encephalomyocarditis virus, 
hepatitis E-like virus, pseudorabies virus, parvovirus and polyomaviruses of swine67. None 
of these have been shown to cause disease in humans. Recent research suggests that 
porcine cytomegalovirus, which has been shown to cause severe disease even in 
immunosuppressed host pigs68, can be screened and excluded from herds of swine by early 
weaning of newborns69. Conversely, failed attempts to wean out porcine lymphotropic 
virus70 and the recent identification of hepatitis E virus71 subject those viruses to further 
risk defining. 
 
Significant progress has also been made in identifying and excluding the infection or 
recombination potential of PERV. Archived samples from past recipients of porcine insulin 
and clotting factors, temporary skin grafts, islet and neural cell xenotransplants, and 
extracorporeal porcine liver or spleen support have not shown any transmission of PERV or 
other porcine virus in patients treated with pig tissues thus far72,73,74,75,76,77. Nor is there a 
clear relation between PERV production and illness in pigs, although PERV-C was originally 
cloned from a malignant lymphoma cell line78. Some authors have expressed concern that 
the promising results merely reflect the small numbers of patients studied so far, their 
brief exposure to the porcine grafts, the poor graft survival and an exclusive focus on 
known PERV strains during follow-up. Although the large-scale follow-up study of 160 
patients after transplantation or exposure to pig tissue79 is generally viewed as the most 
compelling demonstration of absence of PERV transmission, Collignon and Purdy drew 
attention to the more negative outcomes of the study80. PERV was in effect detected in the 
blood of 30 patients. In 23 patients, pig cells were still detected up to 8.5 years after 
exposure. The authors suggest that at least the first two of four crucial conditions in terms 
of the potential for secondary infection have been fulfilled: the virus (or its genome) was 
present in the animal’s cells or tissue and remained viable in people after transmission of 
the virus. Furthermore, studies have recently established the presence of natural immunity 
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against PERV in human serum, showing that human serum with anti-Gal antibody can 
inhibit human cell infectivity of PERV in vitro and in vivo81. That implies that the use of 
‘knockout’ pigs that lack the anti-Gal antibody would entail additional risks. 
Notwithstanding this, significant knowledge has been gained on PERV infectivity. Previous 
findings had already suggested that only PERV-A and -B can infect human and pig cells in 
vitro, while the third subgroup, PERV-C, only infects porcine cells82. The other PERV 
families are unlikely to encode infectious virus owing to disruptions in open-reading 
frames. Certain inbred lines of miniature swine appear to be incapable of producing 
replication-competent PERV83, and progress in the science of PERV infection of human cells 
raises the possibility that the relevant PERV could be genetically engineered out of a 
source animal herd84. Moreover, evidence suggests that PERV is susceptible to currently 
available antiviral agents85. More worrisome are indications suggesting that, while PERV-C 
does not infect human cells, it is involved in extra harmful human-tropic PERV 
recombinants86. A recombinant isolate, PERV-A 14/220, has been shown to infect human 
cells with a significantly higher titer than previous PERV-A and –B families. Studies of its 
genome suggest that it is an A/C recombinant PERV and that therefore replication-
competent PERV-C should best be excluded from the source animal’s genome. Breeds of 
miniature swine have been identified which do not possess replication-competent PERV-
C87. 
 
Alongside the growing potency to recognize and exclude infection risks, a significant 
distinction must be made with regard to the different types of porcine grafts88. The 
infection risk is directly related to the degree of recipient immunosuppression and the 
nature and intensity of the epidemiological exposure of the recipient. Cell-based 
xenotransplantation products imply a significantly smaller risk of virus transmission than 
xenotransplants of vascularized organs (although at this stage, it could be maintained that 
vascularized xenogeneic organ grafts pose the least public health threat due to the limited 
survival rates of the recipients89). Cells can also be best screened for a spectrum of 
infectious agents in advance90. Moreover, xenogeneic cell transplant barriers to 
immunology, such as the above mentioned encapsulation techniques, may control viral 
transmission as well. 
 
Finally, it should not be left unsaid that immunosuppressed allograft recipients too bear a 
significant, well-documented virus risk, often with an accelerated course of accidentally-
transmitted infection (for instance, transmission of HIV-1 has been shown to manifest AIDS 
within six months91). Over the past two years, six organ transplant recipients were 
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reported to have died after graft-mediated infection of lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus, 
a zoonosis transmitted by rodents92. Use of xenografts may be advantageous in this respect 
if resistant to human pathogens such as HIV, HTLV, hepatitis and herpes viruses. Moreover, 
if a ready source of xenografts allows scheduling the transplants at the time of greatest 
clinical need, exposure to pathogens related to lengthy hospitalizations of donor and 
recipient will be reduced93. 
 
8.5 Implications of revised risk: an optimistic note 
 
Although so far not conclusive, in the following paragraphs we wish to interpret the 
development of findings related to the virus risk in an optimistic note (one which we have 
not accounted for in the previous chapter). We will consider the possibility that all 
foreseeable factors that contribute to the risks of a xenogeneic epidemic, can be excluded 
via current pre-clinical methods of porcine infectious agent detection and exclusion. 
 
8.5.1 Theoretical risk 
 
While the advanced xenogeneic virus research suggests that the probability of harm is less 
great than once feared, it does nothing to change concerns regarding the nature of the 
risk. Various screening methods may eventually exclude all pathogens identifiable in pre-
clinical models. Caesarian section and suitable containment of the source animals may 
even help to exclude the unknown94. Nonetheless, none of those approaches guarantee 
that the theoretical possibility of latent, asymptomatic infection by unknown or 
recombined exogenous and endogenous agents is eliminated. Indeed, undetectable 
organisms constitute the greatest concern of all, particularly if they can remain in a latent 
state within the source animal and recipient for indefinite time. In contrast to viruses that 
induce acute symptomatic viral infections, latent viruses can potentially spread easily 
between immunocompetent individuals and manifest long after the initial recipient is 
released from hospital containment practices. 
 
In questioning the permissibility of risky technologies, the moral duty to account for 
foreseeable adverse effects is left undoubted. That moral duty explains why less stringent 
control measures are required to preclude risks from ‘natural’ causes, such as AIDS, in 
comparison with risks from man-made causes, such as xenotransplantation and 
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recombinant DNA research. Nevertheless, a focus on optimal risk assessment to cover all 
theoretical consequences provokes the reproach that ‘one cannot prove something that is 
not there’. Granted that sufficient pre-clinical detection and exclusion of known viruses 
and mutations in the source animals may one day be feasible, it would be asking too much 
of those involved in developing a new technology to guarantee the exclusion of all risks. 
Indeed, in comparison with the rationale that underlies our attitude towards the 
emergence of other theoretical epidemics/pandemics, it is questionable why the 
xenotransplantation enterprise should be answerable to risks of introducing a novel 
epidemic or pandemic beyond the degree to which such risks are constituted by 
predictable factors. 
 
8.5.2 Natural and man-made pandemics 
 
If we were able to reduce the infectious risks related to xenotransplantation to a merely 
theoretical risk – one in which all predicable effects have been eliminated – it would be 
ambiguous whether we should persist in treating xenotransplantation as a ‘special case’ 
and in subjecting it to severe advance public health protection measures. The only thing 
that would distinguish the risk of xenogeneic virus contamination from the contamination 
of a nature-borne virus, would be the fact that the xenogeneic virus resulted from human 
agency. It is not clear why the fact that the harm results from a man-made technology 
demands for unequal consideration over nature-derived harm. The argument works both as 
a means to put the ‘unique harm’ of this man-made technology into perspective and as a 
reminder of our duty to take ‘natural’ health hazards at least as seriously. 
 
First, the distinction between a natural epidemic/pandemic and a man-made one is not a 
relevant factor for those in the medical community concerned with treating the effects95. 
Also, that distinction is not always clear-cut. In the emergence of certain pandemics of so-
called natural origin, humans have also played an inflicting role. Notions of moral 
responsibility and blame do not apply in such cases, because the effects were unforeseen. 
Explanations for the spread of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) are illustrative in that 
respect. There is compelling evidence that HIV (-2 and some types of -1) is a derivative of 
Simian Immunodeficiency Virus (SIV) and was transferred to the human population from 
sooty mangabeys and chimpanzees in Africa96. Most probably, SIV was transmitted to 
humans through blood contact during hunting and field dressing of the animals. 
Nevertheless, secondary viral transmission may not result in an epidemic unless certain 
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conditions are met. A sporadic HIV infection in a small, remote African village could have 
been restricted to the infected person and his or her sexual partner(s) and close contacts. 
Their resulting deaths would have prevented further contaminations. The rapid spread of 
the virus among larger proportions of society was interdependent upon certain 
demographic and social conditions. They are said to include the massive emigration from 
rural areas for employment opportunities, the separation of family units that resulted from 
that migration and the increased rate of extramarital relations and sexual promiscuity97. 
An alternative description of the origin of the HIV pandemic, argued for by Louis Pascal in 
199198 and recently brought to our attention again99, ascribes an even greater function to 
human agency. According to this theory, SIV was transmitted to humans through the 
world’s first mass polio vaccination campaign in central Africa during the late 1950s. Those 
polio vaccines were cultured on monkey kidneys, which would have allowed for the 
transfer of SIV. Whether or not that is the better theory, it is generally agreed that those 
involved in the African polio vaccination campaign cannot be held responsible for AIDS100. 
The reason why no one is to blame is that SIVs had not been discovered at the time and the 
contamination, when it occurred, was inadvertent. 
 
Most of the contemporary naturally-caused infections, such as the annual variants of type 
A and B influenza, also arise at least in part due to human agency. The ways we alter the 
ecology of the world in which we live – through technology, industry, agriculture, 
international travel, etc – and the interdependence of humans and animals are particularly 
conducive to the emergence of new zoonotic pathogens101,102. In a cautious approach to 
xenotransplantation, the claim is made that: 
 
Of course, animals have transmitted viruses and other infectious pathogens to 
humans ever since we learnt to hunt or husband them, yet we continue to meet 
nasty surprises.103 
 
This does not necessarily serve to demonstrate the unacceptability of the theoretical risk 
of xenogeneic infections that are beyond our control beforehand. Rather, it shows us the 
urgency to deal with the persistent manifestation of new epidemics, regardless of their 
cause. 
 
Against that, it may be argued that xenotransplantation would not be accessible for all 
those in need of it and could still increase the health burden of those who are arguably the 
worst-off in terms of health care. The worst-off are indeed the developing world, which 
bears more than 90 per cent of the global disease burden104 and has neither the financial 
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means nor the infrastructure to provide large-scale basic health care, let alone expensive 
technologies to alleviate organ shortage. Nevertheless, an unjust distribution of the health 
burdens would not be alleviated significantly by avoiding the risks of xenogeneic infections 
altogether. A much greater balance of health benefits over burdens would be achieved if 
theoretical xenogeneic infections were regarded as one of the many global pandemic 
threats that face all of us today – and in the future – and that call for rapid response. In 
thinking of those who are amongst the most disadvantaged in terms of basic health care, a 
strong emphasis should be placed on an estimated 34 to 46 million people affected with 
HIV/AIDS105, and on many other infections, such as malaria106, which are among the leading 
causes of death worldwide. AIDS is particularly illustrative of the gross discrepancies 
between the industrialized and the developing world in terms of infectious health 
burdens107. Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 75 per cent of the global AIDS-related 
mortality108. If we are in fact worried about the unjust distribution of health harms 
worldwide, then those patient populations ought to be the subject of further investigation 
and intense efforts to constrain the risks and manage the effects. In light of the fact that 
zoonoses currently constitute one of the major threats to human health, the systems for 
studying, controlling and preventing zoonotic diseases on a global basis must be further 
expanded. Others have voiced the opinion that the looming threat of bioterrorism is an 
extra motivation to invest more in a biodefence plan109,110. 
 
The optimistic account of the permissibility of a xenogeneic virus risk is nonetheless 
dependent on whether or not we can exclude predictable factors of the infectious risk 
beforehand. Even if that is feasible, the onus for those wishing to implement the various 
xenotransplantation procedures in the clinic lies in demonstrating greater proof of the 
benefits they promise to provide. That is of importance in terms of outweighing the 
remaining risks of physical harm to the future recipients. Progress in the effectiveness of 
xenotransplantation is also needed to justify the continuous financial investments in 
research, which are currently being provided mostly by governments rather than by the 
private industry. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
In attempts to balance the benefits and harms potentially involved in xenotransplantation, 
the benefits for the prospective patients have been subordinated to the potential risks of 
unleashing a xenogeneic pandemic. National and international restrictions on clinical 
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research and trials have been set in place in order to exclude the risks for the public, but 
they may not prove to be fully effective for both practical and ethical reasons. The 
question we have attempted to answer here is whether the requirement of those stringent 
public health measures is inevitable. We argued that, even though the harm principle 
dictates that harm-doing is unacceptable when it is also other-regarding, the 
impermissibility of harming public health is not a moral absolute. In particular, an 
assessment of the acceptability is dependent on whether the promised benefits are 
attainable and perceived as such by the public. Furthermore, there is a particular 
responsibility to take account of those risk factors that have a predictable, foreseeable 
effect. It can be argued that accountability for a pandemic that results from an unforeseen 
effect of xenotransplantation should not necessarily be attributed to those involved in the 
development and use of the technology alone. The permissibility of harm-doing is then 
rendered an issue of medical ethics, in which a weighing of harms against the benefits of 
the procedure for the patient is of paramount importance. 
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9 Pig tales and human chimeras: socio-ethical issues related to 
xenograft recipient self–perception 
 
Adapted from: Ravelingien A. Pig tales and human chimeras: socio-ethical 
issues related to xenograft recipient self-perception. Submitted. 
 
Abstract 
 
Several surveys have identified a fear among the public that use of porcine grafts for 
transplantation in humans will affect the recipient’s appearance, behaviour, and/or 
personality. This chapter aims to investigate both the direct and indirect effects that 
xenotransplantation may have on the recipients’ sense of self. We demonstrate that direct 
effects on personal identity are unlikely. If nonetheless effects should appear, they would 
be very similar to those in the case of allotransplantation. What rather seems to be at 
stake is the possibility that the conception of self will be indirectly affected. In the field of 
allotransplantation, there is evidence that certain perseverant cultural concepts interfere 
with the view that the human grafts are purely neutral, mechanical replacements of one’s 
body parts. In questioning whether the fact that the donor is an animal will worsen the 
danger for identity conflicts, we trace and compare various cultural categorizations that 
constitute a potential conflict between ‘self’ and ‘other’. 
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Twelve voices were shouting in anger, and they were all alike. No question, now, what had 
happened to the faces of the pigs. The creatures outside looked from pig to man, and from 
man to pig, and from pig to man again; but already it was impossible to say which was 
which.1 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Due to the shortage of human grafts for transplantation, pigs are considered a possible 
alternative source of cellular and solid organ graft replacements. One of the main 
limitations of that approach – xenotransplantation – is the short survival of the grafts when 
transplanted into humans due to severe immunological rejection. In addition to that, the 
use of animal grafts for human transplantation must also be accepted on a cultural level. 
Most importantly in this respect, society must legitimize the risk of virus transfer from the 
animal source to the human recipient, a risk that may affect the community at large. In a 
very different way, the recipient and the people that surround him, must also accept the 
socio-psychological implications of the emerging biotechnology. 
 
Various studies have established that the level of acceptance of xenotransplantation is 
most dependent on the seriousness of the prospective patient’s health condition and on 
the effectiveness of the xenotransplant to provide a safe cure2,3. When 
xenotransplantation is perceived as a means to save lives, even religious considerations do 
not override the significance of that goal4,5. Although close contact with the pig is 
prohibited in Islam and Orthodox Judaism, both religious ideologies are accepting of the 
use of porcine organs until a more suitable alternative is found6. After a careful 
examination of the acceptability of xenotransplantation, the Vatican Pontifical Academy 
for Life also pronounced no fundamental objections7. Nonetheless, the Academy did detail 
several preliminary issues which must be attended to, among which the condition that the 
xenotransplant must preserve the identity of the person who receives it. That specific 
requirement has also been brought up with regard to transplantation of human grafts 
(allotransplantation) in an official address of Pius XII (Address to the Italian Association of 
Corneal Donors, Clinical Ophthalmologists and Legal Medicine, 14 May 1956) and John Paul 
II (Address to the Eighteenth International Congress of the Transplant Society, 29 August 
2000, n. 7)8, and in the Islamic Code of Medical Ethics9. 
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Surveys demonstrate that the public shares the concern that pig graft replacements will 
have adverse effects on the recipients’ identity. In a study of the attitudes of 100 
transplant patients towards the use of xenotransplantation, 24 respondents believed a 
xenograft might influence them in appearance, personality, sexual habits or in their 
attitude towards eating meat10. In a German inquiry conducted by Schlitt et al., 15 per 
cent of the 1,049 transplant patient respondents indicated a fear for personality change11. 
In a survey questioning Parkinson’s patients on their attitudes to xenotransplantation, 
Lundin et al. found that the patients were uncertain whether the transplant could transmit 
the source animal’s identity or other nonmaterial characteristics and whether the animal 
would take up residence in them12. Lundin also conducted qualitative interview studies 
with patients who underwent a xenotransplant in the 1990’s to treat either diabetes or 
Parkinson’s disease. She found that, in contrast to the Parkinson’s patients, all diabetic 
patients indicated a need to know of the whereabouts of the porcine cells. One of the 
respondents compared the porcine cells to “small piglets,” “tiny pig cells that I have no 
control over and that can pump something animal-like into my body.”13 The fear of being 
influenced by the characteristics of the donor is also indicated in a survey conducted by 
Sanner to investigate the general public’s beliefs about receiving transplants with varying 
origins (n=69)14. Sanner lists various citations that illustrate respondents’ worries regarding 
the possibility of becoming more ‘piggish’ after receiving a porcine graft: “I would perhaps 
look more piggish with a pig’s kidney;” “Would I become half a pig, if I got an organ from a 
pig?” “What if I would start grunting?” “At least 5 per cent of me would become animal.” 
 
There is little literature on the origin of those concerns and on the ways in which identity 
alterations may indeed materialize as a concrete effect of xenotransplantation. This 
chapter aims to investigate both the direct and indirect effects that xenotransplantation 
may potentially have on the recipients’ sense of self. We will demonstrate that direct 
effects on personal identity are unlikely. If nonetheless effects should appear, they would 
be very similar to those in the case of allotransplantation. What seems to be at stake is 
rather the possibility that the conception of self will be indirectly affected. That 
phenomenon has been well identified in the field of allotransplantation and is said to 
involve culturally inspired assumptions regarding the embodied self. Granted that cultural 
notions of body and self play a preconscious role in the psychological adjustment to 
transplants of human grafts, we suggest that they may intensify difficulties to objectify 
transplanted grafts derived from animals. 
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9.2 In search of the pig’s tale: explanations for donor-mediated identity 
transformations 
 
The anxieties of the respondents expressed above reflect the fear that xenotransplantation 
may affect the recipient in such a way that he or she is no longer the same person. 
Essentially, that relates to the potential impact the procedure will have on the recipient’s 
personal identity. The concept of ‘personal identity’, in general terms, pertains to the 
whole of conscious and persistent thoughts expressed by ‘I’, the experience of being a 
unique person with particular beliefs, interests, preferences and experiences. That 
psychological continuity is what John Locke referred to in his definition of a person: 
 
(…) a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can 
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and 
places.15 
 
The importance of maintaining personal identity throughout time is clear enough. It is the 
precondition of a notion of responsibility for past actions and practices of praise and 
blame16. That reveals why it is so crucial from a moral and religious viewpoint. 
Preservation of personal identity is also the condition sine qua non for planning future 
goals in accordance with the present views, interests, preferences and characteristics that 
make up one’s self. Ultimately, within this context, a radical change of self due to a 
xenotransplantation would imply that the health-enhancing results are no longer of benefit 
to the prior person the transplant aimed to benefit, because that particular person has 
ceased to exist. 
 
When reflecting upon the nature of personal identity, however, we must acknowledge that 
our identity is in fact in a constant state of transformation. All people are, in the course of 
time, as a result of aging and of accumulative experiences, liable to changes of a gradual 
nature. Those changes do not seem to negate the impression of a continuing identity. Even 
drastic changes in body and character do not necessarily threaten the feeling that the 
resulting person is still you. Sometimes even the contrary is the case. For instance, 
patients who have undergone curative medicine treatments may feel that the changes in 
their body constitute a reinstatement of their ‘normal’, healthy personality prior to 
disease17. Dorothy Bernstein gives the example of a 14-year old boy who, one year after a 
human kidney transplant, noted that: 
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I had thirteen years of needles and feeling lousy before my transplant. Now I 
can go ahead and be myself.18 
 
The question that arises, then, is what changes could cause alterations to someone’s 
personal identity after a xenotransplantation, to such a degree that the recipient no longer 
experiences him- or herself as the same person he or she was before the transplantation? 
 
9.2.1 Personal identity: it is all in your head 
 
As a possible response to that question, the Vatican Pontifical Academy for Life states the 
following: 
 
(…) the encephalon and the gonads, are indissolubly linked with the personal 
identity of the subject because of their specific function, independently of 
their symbolic implications. Therefore one must conclude that (…) the 
transplantation of these last can never be morally legitimate, because of the 
inevitable objective consequences that they would produce in the recipient or 
in his descendants (…)19 
 
The Vatican statement hereby precludes both xenotransplants of gonads and of the 
encephalon. Tthe issue of gonad xenotransplantation is the least compelling concern in 
terms of direct effects on the identity of the recipients. Although theoretically the 
recipient could produce descendents with nonhuman DNA – and as such would violate the 
biblical order that species should multiply after their kind – that procedure does not carry 
a risk of altering the recipient’s personal identity. It rather implies the possibility that the 
genetic identity between recipient and descendent will differ significantly. Moreover, 
while the intermixing of human and nonhuman sperm and ova and the creation of a 
human/nonhuman animal hybrid zygote has been attempted in the past20, the development 
of a viable embryo through transplantation of cross-species gonads is implausible.  
 
Whole brain xenotransplantation 
 
Through vague reference to transplants of the ‘encephalon’ in the quoted statement, the 
representatives of the Catholic moral position appear to preclude xenotransplantations 
that involve the entire brain. That that would indeed result in the insertion of a new 
personal identity, or at the very least, the termination of the recipient’s personal identity, 
is evident from the fact that the brain is the controlling mechanism for psychological 
continuity. Indeed, the brain is the only part of the body that can have a pertinent role in 
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the preservation of the self. John Locke first illustrated that in a thought experiment of 
‘The Prince and the Cobbler’21, which has since inspired many other versions that make the 
same case. In its original form, a prince and a cobbler wake up one day in the other 
person’s body. The cobbler’s body carries the consciousness of the prince’s past life, and 
vice versa. We are asked to resolve whether the cobbler’s body is still accountable for his 
crimes. Reflection on the outcome of such an example forces us to acknowledge that it is 
not. In mind-swapping scenarios, the person has simply changed bodies, finding him- or 
herself wherever his or her mental life now resides22. In light of that, it is obvious why 
xenotransplantation involving the entire brain should be precluded. The transfer of a 
viable animal brain into a human body would imply that the animal is still alive and has 
merely switched bodies. Whole brain transplants would not be a new brain for the 
recipient, but rather a whole new head and body for the donor23. 
 
Brain tissue xenotransplantation 
 
It is unclear whether the Vatican statement would also preclude transplants that involve 
the transfer of partial brain tissue or neurons. That procedure stands closer to the 
therapeutic goals of current xenotransplantation research. Pig embryonic neural tissue has 
been transplanted in a few small-scale trials as part of an ongoing effort to provide 
alternatives for scarce human neural grafts. Such xenotransplants have primarily involved 
patients with Parkinson’s disease24,25,26, but patients with Huntington’s disease27, focal 
epilepsy and stroke28,29,30 have also been experimentally treated. 
 
To our knowledge, there are few31 detailed objections to neural xenotransplants on the 
basis of feared-for effects on the recipients’ personal identity. The advent of neural 
allotransplantation, by contrast, did elicit considerable debate regarding the extent to 
which certain neural replacements threaten the integrity of the recipients’ identity. In the 
establishment of the Swedish codes for neural transplantation research, there was more 
focus on that issue than on the fact that the neurons would be obtained from an ethically 
provocative source: aborted human foetuses32. The relevance of the concern relates to the 
potentially long-lasting and direct effects of cellular implants on the host brain. 
Transplanted grafts can produce more drastic and irreversible effects than 
pharmacological therapies generally do33. 
 
In debates on the risk of personal identity alterations after neural allotransplantation, the 
most radical position makes no distinction between the replacement of only a few neurons 
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and the replacement of the whole brain34. The opponents indicate that the insertion of 
however small an amount of foreign material into a recipient’s brain will result in the 
insertion of a new personality. Underlying such a view is a strong sense of personal 
identity, which is based on the presumption that the brain is not only carrier but also 
substrate of personal identity. Accordingly, personal identity preservation is strictly 
dependent on brain identity preservation; any change of the structural composition of the 
brain must necessarily entail an alteration of personal identity. From a neurophysiologic 
perspective, the condition of spatio-temporal continuity of the brain is refuted by 
evidence that the alterations in some regions of the brain seem to be particularly 
dangerous with regard to lasting effects on the patient’s personality, whereas other 
regions do not interfere with personal identity. For instance, psychosurgery has shown that 
disruption of psychological continuity can result from the removal of particular brain areas 
such as the frontal lobe and the limbic system35. 
 
From an alternative point of view, the acceptability of neural transplantation would 
perhaps depend on restrictions of the proportion of engrafted neurons. It could be argued 
that, whereas the insertion of a small amount of neurons would not interfere with personal 
identity, there is a critical threshold level beyond which the increased amount of cells 
constitutes a new or altered identity. To the extent that that position, too, rests on the 
structural composition of the self, it is implausible. The self is not structured in special 
‘personality cells’; it is rather the consequence of a set of trillions of co-active neurons 
that form a specific configuration of interconnected modules. Since changes in the brain 
structure are not necessarily accompanied by changes in character traits, the risk of 
personal identity alterations relates to the risk of interfering with the major connections 
between those modules. In other words, a change of personality and behaviour would 
require a ‘rewiring’ of that functionally organized network. Hence, if an implant does not 
alter the functional organization of the recipient’s brain and only restores the degenerated 
brain structure, there is no influence on the graft recipient’s mental or physical 
characteristics, and therefore, one can assume, no influence on his or her identity36. 
 
It is not impossible that transplants of entire brain regions between closely related, 
functionally and morphologically similar animals will affect crucial functional areas in the 
host brain and result in a transfer of functional behaviour. An experiment conducted by 
Balaban et al. indicated that possibility37. The group transplanted brain tissue from 
developing quails into the brains of foetal-stage chickens. The tissue contained the neural 
circuitry that is connected with auditory perception. Once born, the chickens exhibited the 
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vocal trills that are unique to quails. Notwithstanding that, it has long been accepted that 
transplants of dissociated cells do not interfere with the functional organization of the 
host brain38. Even transplants of small pieces of integrated tissue are often functionally 
regulated by several cortical areas39. It is thus generally accepted that the risks of personal 
identity alteration are negligible when the neural transplants consist of small tissue or 
dissociated cell grafts only. The risks of damaging personal identity are even reversed if 
neural replacements can restore the brain functions of the degenerated neurons and 
thereby alleviate pathological changes in character traits and loss of personal identity40. 
Granted that there are no substantial differences between porcine and human neurons – a 
presumption that is supported by the anatomical and functional compatibility of porcine 
grafts with the human host41,42 – there appears to be no reason why neural 
xenotransplantation would constitute more of a threat to personal identity than neural 
allotransplantation. 
 
9.2.2 Mad pig disease 
 
There is one plausible distinction between xeno- and allotransplantation in that regard. 
Xenotransplantation bears a risk of transmitting animal viruses that would not be 
transferred to humans under ‘normal’ circumstances. Theoretically, a xenogeneic virus 
could be transferred along with the xenograft into the recipient and replicate in neural 
tissue, causing an infection that affects the brain. Indeed, neurological disease is one of 
the most serious complications of virus infection. Several infections in the brain are known 
to cause changes in the patient’s personality and behaviour and may even cause severe 
intellectual impairment and death. Particularly illustrative in this regard is the emergence 
of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, which is strongly linked with exposure to the Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) agent that affects cattle43. Nonetheless, so far, no 
reports exist that demonstrate the emergence of neurological disease as a result of a 
xenotransplant. It has even been argued that the circumstances under which the xenograft 
source animals are bred and maintained provide a unique opportunity to generate an 
extensive microbiological specification of the grafts prior to transplantation44. Such assays 
will allow the exclusion of most of the known (exogenous) infectious agents from the 
source animal45. Moreover, xenogenic cells can be encapsulated in a semi-permeable 
membrane with a controlled pore size, which may modulate the risk that a virus passes 
through46. As such, the risks of obtaining a personality-affecting virus are not outstanding 
in comparison with neural allotransplantation. Allotransplantation also carries small, but 
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non-negligible risks for neurological disease through transfer of human viruses such as 
herpes virus and cytomegalovirus47. 
 
9.3 Recipient self-perception and the embodied self 
 
9.3.1 Biographical cells 
 
Above, we relied on common arguments to refute the pertinent role of the body in the 
preservation of the self. We indicated that sustained personal identity does not require 
that the identity of the whole body is unaltered; it merely requires continuity in memory, 
character and personality. Given that those mental functions are functionally organized in 
the brain, we can conclude that even if one’s entire body is replaced by porcine parts, but 
the brain is left intact, the self continues to exist. Moreover, given that the self does not 
require that the structure of the brain is unaltered, only those xenotransplants that affect 
the functional integration of the self bear a risk of altering the self. 
 
Nevertheless, the survey responses quoted above do not specifically apply to the risks of 
neural transplantation. Worries are also, perhaps even more so, evoked in questioning the 
effects of receiving a solid organ xenotransplant. The belief that the 'donor' can influence 
one's identity is a not uncommon phenomenon within standard allotransplantation 
practices. Various observations have been made of patients who received a human organ 
(other than the brain) and feel that the transplant has a transformative effect on his or her 
behaviour, habits, interests and tastes48,49,50. Extraordinary examples of such cases include 
a Ku Klux Klan member who became an advocate for black rights after receiving a black 
cadaveric donor’s kidney51. In another case, a lady recipient of a heart transplant suddenly 
felt more masculine and acquired a taste for beer and green peppers. Allegedly, it was 
later discovered that the personality of the donor mirrored those specific changes52. 
Another bizarre example is that of a young heart recipient whose recurrent nightmares are 
said to have provided her with accurate descriptions of the man who murdered the donor 
of her heart53. The peculiarity of those stories lies in the fact that recipients of cadaveric 
human organs are generally withheld of any personal descriptions of the donor, aside of 
perhaps the most general information such as age and gender. 
 
Part five   Pig tales and human chimeras 
 209 
In response to those puzzling data, theories are put forward claiming that the spirit, 
memory or, ultimately, mind of the donor can linger in the donated graft. ‘Spiritual 
mediums’ declare that because of the often abrupt death of the donors, his or her spirit 
may not have yet realized that the body it was retrieved from is dead54. Alternative 
suggestions from a more scientific standpoint have cropped up as well. The ‘gut feeling’ 
concept has been explained by reference to the brain-independent actions of the hundred 
million nerve cells in and around our guts55. By analogy, the idea is suggested that there 
are various pathways between cells throughout our body and brain which can allow for the 
transfer of biographical information regarding our personalities, tastes and histories. 
Andrew Armour, for instance, introduced the concept of ‘neurocardiology’ and suggested 
that the heart consists of its own nervous system with an independent communicative 
quality56. 
 
Surely, there is a sense in which the mind is inseparable from the body. One does not need 
to regress to the Descartian arguments and claim that the self is not any kind of body, to 
contest that the whole body is the vehicle of the self. In an obvious sense, the mental 
aspects, which constitute our psychological continuity, are the result of physical processes. 
In another sense, the self has a body with which it constantly interacts. There are a range 
of information systems throughout the body that supply information about its state and 
performance. The interaction involves both conscious and unconscious registration and 
feedback of somatosensory perceptions and sensations from the entire body. There can be 
severe distortions on the level of registration and feedback. Patients with a phantom limb, 
for instance, will continue to experience the missing limb and attempt to integrate it in 
their movements. Conversely, an existent body part can be blocked from awareness, which 
can cause an individual to no longer experience it as belonging to him- or herself 
(asomatognosias)57. Against that, however, there is no proof for the claim that information 
obtained from body parts could be in any sense biographical, which would be the result of 
a complex conscious awareness (indeed, other explanations have been provided for the 
alleged identity transfer58). The body parts are objects, not subjects of sensory and 
perceptual awareness. 
 
9.3.2 The embodied self 
 
Although there is no factual change in the mental states that constitute the persistent 
identity of the patient, the stories of donor-mediated identity transformation and the 
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alternative theories to explain them provide evidence of cultural resistance towards 
transplantation in one way or another. Clearly, the views dismiss the concept that identity 
has a merely neural locus. There appears to be a perseverant cultural endorsement of 
traditional (animistic) assumptions of bodily integrity with the self, which obstructs the 
view that grafts are purely neutral, mechanical replacements of one’s body parts59. 
Evidence of the reluctance to accept brain-centred personhood can be found, for instance, 
in the continuous public ambivalence towards the concept of brain death60. 
 
Various authors have emphasized the importance of embodiment in relation to symbolic 
conceptions of corporeality and identity61,62. Even for those who acknowledge the body as 
an object rather than a subject of awareness, embodiment is a significant aspect of how 
one perceives his or her self and body on a conceptual, partially socio-culturally 
determined level. Due to the intense relation between the experience of our identity and 
the experience of our own body, body parts may be viewed as an extension of one’s self-
concept. Indeed, for some, a concept of the self may largely converge with a concept of 
the body. As such, the convergence of body and self-concept conflicts with the transplant 
image of the body as composed of bits and pieces that are interchangeable with spare 
parts from other sources. In light of this, the question has been raised whether 
xenotransplantation: 
 
(…) takes us yet one more step away from an integrated theory of personal 
identity - seeing ourselves as unique, indivisible human beings - and further 
along the line of a modular theory of human identity - that we are simply a 
series of interchangeable parts, and these parts can now include animal parts - 
and a "gene machine" view of human life?63 
 
An integrated theory of personality renders the recipient of a transplant a compound of 
‘self’ and ‘other’. That perception may even amount to a sense of conflict, in which the 
transplanted material is experienced as a rival object of the self. This has been described 
as the cultural equivalent of the immune-based physiological processes of rejection: 
 
(…) it is important not to underestimate the cultural force behind the idea that 
self and cell are not entirely separable, that it is not only the brain in which 
the “I” resides. After all, as is made clear by even a cursory view of the process 
of rejection, the intuition of bodily integrity has a solid biological foundation.64 
 
Joralemon establishes a “non-negotiable and indelible” immunological boundary between 
self and non-self in reference to the fact that “the body never accommodates to the 
presence of foreign tissue”65. Similarly, an emotional barrier may constitute a level of 
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psychological rejection of the foreign tissue. Reluctance to psychologically accept the 
transplanted organ as a part of the own identity is well known within the 
allotransplantation field. Medical-anthropological data have long confirmed that the fact 
of having a part of another person’s body placed within the own body, causes an internal 
disturbance and a sense of ‘otherness’ for many transplant recipients, despite intense 
counselling to neutralize those feelings. Post-transplant patients commonly experience 
problems that may lead to adverse effects on perceived physical appearance, self-esteem, 
and sexual functioning66,67,68,69. Ultimately, the attribution of anthropomorphic 
characteristics to a transplanted graft can be seen as part of the coping process to resolve 
the conflict between ‘self’ and ‘other’70. 
 
Whether the integration of a transplanted graft will worsen when the source of the organ 
graft is another species is impossible to foretell from the data we have today. There are 
some indications that xenotransplantation may be more favourable in that respect. For 
instance, pig heart valves and insulin have been used for many years and have not seemed 
to raise any objections71. 
 
Also, it has been observed that struggles to objectify an organ worsen when the 
transplanted graft itself is of symbolic and iconic import. Particularly relevant in this 
respect is the dominant symbolic meaning of the heart. In their survey of heart transplant 
recipients (n=35), Inspector et al. show that nearly half of the respondents expressed a 
notion of having possibly acquired at least some of the personality characters of the donor 
along with the heart itself72. That was the case regardless of an advanced knowledge of 
the anatomy and physiology of the heart. Renée Fox and Judith Swazey bring to our 
attention a story of a widow whose desire to feel her husband’s presence drew her to visit 
the man who received his donated heart: 
 
The kidneys, liver and lungs, she decided, were hidden deep away in the bodies 
of those who had received them. How could she possibly get to hem? The 
corneas just didn’t seem right. She didn’t think she could relate to a cornea. 
That left the heart. A heart can be listened to. A heart can be felt.73 
 
In comparison, organs obtained from animals will perhaps have a neutral denotation. 
Conversely, we can imagine that the fact that the pig is typically viewed as filthy and 
demeaning will erode the symbolic meaning of certain organs for some people and will be 
experienced as offensive. 
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To some, the more a transplanted graft poses a physical threat, the greater the 
psychological difficulties to integrate the ‘other’ into the embodied self will be74. In 
support of that, for instance, a follow-up study of children who had underwent kidney 
transplantation found that a child rejected the concept of owning a new kidney when 
experiencing postoperative abdominal pain75. In a survey of ten adolescent recipients of 
porcine islet cells and their parents, Téran-Escadón et al. found that there was only one 
patient who – briefly – considered the possibility of acquiring porcine features. The authors 
referred to the level of anticipated physical rejection to explain the favourable results. 
They noted that the encapsulation technique used to implant the cells consists in 
embracing the porcine cells by device walls. That functions as an immunological, and 
perhaps also psychological barrier between the nonhuman animal and the human 
material76. The fact that cellular xenotransplants pose less of a physical encroachment on 
the human body is also one of the reasons why the general public has shown to prefer the 
use of animal cells to the use of whole organs77. 
 
Unsurprisingly, problems of psychological adjustment to a transplant have also been 
related to the ways in which the transplant compromises the appearance of the recipient. 
Obviously, visually confronting forms of transplantation will worsen the distress. Note that 
two years after receiving the first hand transplant, the recipient asked for an amputation 
because he felt mentally detached from it78. Surely xenotransplants will not involve 
transplants of eminently expressive and visually confronting parts of the body such as 
limbs. Nonetheless, xenotransplantations of larger tissues and organs will most likely 
require high levels of immunosuppressive drugs, which may also affect outward 
appearance. Adverse effects on appearance, such as the occurrence of Cushingoid 
syndrome (which causes puffiness of the face as a result of excess of cortisol hormone) 
after renal transplantation, have been shown to affect the self-concept and make it 
unstable , particularly in adolescent girls79. 
 
Another aspect that may contribute to difficulties in objectifying a transplant graft could 
be the extent to which the recipient can identify with the donor. The origin of the organs 
is not insignificant for the individuals that have incorporated them. It has been observed 
that an altered sense of self is a common reaction when the transplant is known to be 
derived from a donor with a different gender, age or ethnicity80,81. In that respect, 
xenotransplant recipients may be even more aware that their transplant identity is a 
compound of self and other. Furthermore, the conceptual dichotomy between embodied 
self and other is perhaps only one of the culturally defined dividing lines of the self that is 
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being challenged by xenotransplantation. Possibly, symbolic or ideological categorizations 
of the animal and the human world will intensify the reluctance to incorporate an animal 
graft. 
 
9.3.3 Cultural category transgression 
 
Human-to-human transplantation: flesh out of place 
 
A particularly interesting argument, which favours xenotransplantation over 
allotransplantation with regard to potential problems of self-perception, has been made in 
drawing an analogy between allotransplantation and cannibalism. When asked whether 
they would accept either a xenotransplant or an allotransplant, some respondents 
expressed the idea that they would not accept an allotransplantation because it would feel 
as though they were cannibalistic82,83. 
 
That argument is puzzling in several respects. Typically, the ‘yuck factor’ is explained as a 
response to the novelty and unfamiliarity of emerging technologies. However, while 
xenotransplantation is still in an experimental phase, allotransplantation has evolved into 
an accepted and widely applied form of medicine over the past 50 years. It is also 
worthwhile to ask the question why the current life-saving use of human graft transfer 
should bear the same connotation of the ancient taboo related to the historical 
consumption of human flesh. Conceivably, the cannibalism–allotransplant analogy can be 
explained as the perception of ‘matter out of place’. 
 
Mary Douglas’ cultural anthropological work on premodern ideas of danger and impurity84 is 
widely cited in attempts to explain cultural aspects of moral reluctance towards modern 
technologies. Douglas suggests that societies must classify their world in order to organize, 
interpret and control it. Those classificatory systems are of symbolic importance, allowing 
people to classify their social life into what is acceptable and what is not. Societies are 
likely to view things as dangerous, impure or taboo, when those things concern anomalous 
practices that do not fit neatly within the cherished existent conceptual categories. 
Hence, one could argue, whereas the grafting of animal tissue fits within the culturally 
accepted concept of meat consumption, human-to-human graft transplantation is not in 
accordance with any such preliminary judging category. The human flesh is not in its right 
place in the symbolic order. 
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Animal-to-human transplantation: ‘beast’ out of place 
 
If the argument against allotransplantation is put forward that to have another’s human 
organ in one’s body would be ‘matter out of place’ – perhaps in general, there will be 
stronger ambivalence about the use of animal grafts. Arguably, there are more conceptual 
categories at stake here. Most importantly, xenotransplantation involves the transgression 
of the concept of being ‘fully human’85 and, figuratively speaking, the creation of 
‘monsters’. 
 
We borrow the monster metaphor from Martijntje Smits, who employs it to depict 
emerging technologies that inspire both fear and fascination in the public86. That 
ambivalence is explained as the result of the ways in which those technologies produce 
problematic mixtures of established cultural categories. A monster, in her interpretation, 
is a particularly confusing situation that relates to more than ‘matter out of place’. It 
arises when a new phenomenon not only challenges the symbolic place it is normally 
accorded, but also when it simultaneously fits into two conceptual categories that would 
normally mutually exclude one another. An obvious example of a ‘problematic mixture’ is 
the monster of Frankenstein, the horror prototype par excellence. Victor Frankenstein’s 
creation is viewed as a monster because of its particular merge of at least two culturally 
perceived dichotomies: organism/machine and living/cadaveric body parts. In comparison 
with allotransplantation, xenotransplantation may be viewed as particularly ‘monstrous’ in 
that it simultaneously converges life/death, organism/machine and, in addition, 
human/animal boundaries. 
 
Although the use of certain animal products, such as porcine heart valves, for medical 
purposes is widely accepted, the xenotransplants we conceive of here are more 
problematic mixtures of culturally perceived dichotomies. Xenotransplantation by 
definition implies that the transplanted grafts are still physiologically active. As such, 
xenografts are both cadaveric body parts from dead source animals and living tissue, 
potentially capable of repairing and regenerating some of the vital functions of a living 
human body. 
 
There are various ways as to why the use of such grafts for transplantation could be 
regarded as trans-bordering cultural categorizations of the animal and human world. 
Certain aspects of our Western culture reveal symbolic or ideological constraints to the use 
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of pig organs and tissues. For instance, as Smits points out87, the prospective xenograft 
source animal has always been regarded as a ‘monster’ in traditional Hebrew culture. In 
the Old Hebrew taxonomy of animals, quadruped animals were considered to be either 
ruminants with cloven hoofs, or non-ruminants without cloven hoofs. The pig, non-
ruminant but with cloven hoofs, transgresses both orders. Moreover, whereas East Asian 
religions deny such a clear demarcation, the Judeo-Christian tradition explicitly considers 
the line that devides humans from nonhuman animals – as part of the many binary divisions 
described in Genesis – as sacred88. Throughout Western history, the ‘beast out of place’ 
metaphor has been portrayed in art, literature and architecture to serve as symbol of 
fascination, deviance, unnaturalness and even terror. The fact that the xenograft recipient 
is, literally, a cross-species chimera – an organism that in part consists of genetically 
distinct cells from different species – evokes the connotation of the term ‘Chimerae’ as it 
first occurred in Homer’s ‘Illias’: 
 
 (…) a thing of immortal make, not human, lion-fronted and snake behind, a 
goat in the middle, and snorting out the breath of the terrible flame of bright 
fire.89 
 
In mythology, the fire-spouting monster terrorized the Lycians of Asia Minor before being 
slain by the young, unwitting Bellerophon90. The ‘composite beast’ is also a regular figure 
in medieval literature, with its fascination for wondrous, exotic hybrid races, such as the 
dog-headed Cynocephali or the horse-bodied Onocentaurs91. The 16th-century Monster of 
Ravenna is a cluster of disjointed pieces of various animals that serve as symbols for pride, 
lack of ‘good works’, rapaciousness, unspiritual nature and sodomy92. Even in the more 
contemporary science fiction scenery, chimeras are rarely as attractive, good-hearted and 
clever as the ‘normal’ specimens of nature93. 
 
Just as animal composites have more often than not been represented as problematic, the 
reverse case – that problematic situations have often been conveyed as a blurring of that 
which is animal and that which is distinctly human – also applies. For instance, symbolic 
talk of the ‘beast in man’ is in reference to human’s raw, uncivilized and uncontrollable 
nature. Pathological conditions in humans have been associated with bestial characteristics 
and named accordingly. Illustrative in this respect are the ‘lobster-hand’ condition, the 
‘lion-head’ condition and the legendary example of the man nicknamed ‘The Elephant 
Man’, who suffered from deformities so severe to suggest animal shapes and to which he 
owed being treated like a beast rather than a human. 
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9.4 Discussion: implications for xenotransplant recipients 
 
The concern that xenotransplantation will cause concrete identity alterations in the 
recipient is restricted to those forms of neural xenografting that potentially affect the 
brain functions that are responsible for psychological continuity. In that respect, the safety 
profile of neural tissue xenografting is essentially comparable to that of allogeneic tissue94. 
Granted that xenotransplantation does not pose a great risk of infectious brain disease, 
there is no need to distinguish between the two in recommendations as to how to proceed. 
As part of the informed consent requirement prior to any risky therapy, it would seem 
essential that in both cases, the prospective recipients are informed on the possible 
adverse effects of neurosurgery and brain implants on personal identity. 
 
The psychological struggle to incorporate the transplant as part of how one perceives his or 
her self, is a potentially indirect effect of the xenotransplantation. We have represented 
several interpretations of how xenografting may interfere with symbolic, socio-culturally 
defined experiences of the self. Most importantly, in accordance with known coping 
processes after having received an allotransplant, a xenotransplant recipient may find it 
difficult to integrate the foreign graft into the notion of an embodied, indivisible self. 
Additionally, the recipient may feel ambivalent about the cultural boundary between that 
which is animal and that which is human. Other factors still may contribute to difficulties 
to adjust to the xenotransplant psychologically. The mere fact that xenotransplantation is 
an extraordinary, ‘state of the art’ approach to augment health, can contribute to the 
recipient’s awareness of being ‘not normal’ and ‘at risk’. Being attributed an 
‘extraordinary’ survival status has been reported to bear additional connotations of 
disability and ‘otherness’ within the context of allotransplantation95. Furthermore, 
psychological distress may be worsened by reactions from others. Conceivably, even 
besides the cultural notions that it brings to mind, xenotransplantation may stigmatize 
recipients due to the risk of animal-to-human infections. For some authors, the risks to the 
recipient’s self-image are, from the viewpoint of the individual involved, a strong ethical 
objection to xenotransplantation96. 
 
If xenotransplantation evolves into a successful procedure, it is, as mentioned earlier, 
unlikely that any psychological ambivalence will seriously affect the potential candidate’s 
decision to participate if his or her health gravely depends on it. It can also be expected 
that this type of fear would not represent a relevant problem for most patients after the 
transplant, particularly if it involves the transfer of cells rather than solid organs. If it does 
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occur, moreover, it will probably be of a temporary nature. Indeed, having conducted 
various surveys on the attitudes towards xenotransplantation, Susanne Lundin suggests that 
cultural underpinnings of xenotransplant recipients’ identity concerns will gradually fade 
away. She refers to the example of 17th century vaccinations with cowpox virus, which also 
elicited the fear that the patients would develop animal characteristics. That concern 
nevertheless steadily transformed into perceptions of a safe and self-evident treatment97. 
 
While that is likely to be the case, any possible initial concerns are nonetheless valid 
insofar as they will contribute to additional emotional distress for the patient. In the 
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Xenotransplantation (SAXC) Guidelines on Informed 
Consent in Clinical Research Involving Xenotransplantation, it is suggested that the 
informed consent process should involve a team of individuals with the expertise to 
educate the potential recipient about various areas, among which the potential social, 
economic and psychological consequences of the xenotransplant to the subject and his 
family98. While we endorse this recommendation, we believe that such attention should 
also be provided during the treatment and psychological follow-up of prospective patients. 
The relevance of being attentive to these concerns lies in the fact that psychosocial issues 
may prevent the recipients from regaining quality of life. They may also prevent the 
recipients from achieving long-term health enhancement. It is conceivable that difficulties 
to adjust psychologically to a transplant may compromise the willingness to comply with 
immunosuppressive regimens. Emotional problems such as depression and anxiety99 and a 
negative body image100 have been reported to elevate the risk of lower medication 
compliance in some patient subpopulations. It would therefore seem crucial that adverse 
factors of a patient’s psychological and emotional wellbeing are timely recognized and 
managed. 
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10 On the moral status of humanized chimeras and the concept of 
human dignity 
 
Adapted from: Ravelingien A, Braeckman J, Legge M. On the moral status of 
humanized chimeras and the concept of human dignity. Submitted. 
 
Abstract 
 
In this chapter, we will discuss an issue that is related to the broader interpretation of 
xenotransplantation (as interspecies transplantation) to include the creation of human-to-
animal chimeras. Recent advances in the technology of creating chimeras have aroused 
controversy in policy debates. The centre of controversy is the fear that a substantial 
contribution of human cells or genes in crucial areas of the animal’s body may at some 
point render the animal more humanlike than any other animals we know today. Authors 
who have commented on or contributed to policy debates specify that chimeras that would 
be too humanlike would have an altered moral status and threaten our notion of ‘human 
dignity’. That setting offers a productive opportunity to test the notion of human dignity 
and to emphasize some of its weaknesses as an ethical tool. Limiting chimerism 
experiments on the basis of whether or not it undermines or challenges human dignity, 
implies a clear demarcation of those characteristics that are typically, and importantly, 
human. Evidence of our evolutionary ties with and behavioural similarities to other animals 
seems to annul all attempts to define the uniquely human properties to which human 
dignity may be attributed. Hence, it has been suggested that the particular moral status 
associated with humans cannot be explained for beyond an intuitive basis. In what follows, 
we will argue that the difficulties inherent in the notion of human dignity, do not lie in the 
impossibility to acquire a list of properties that are unique to humans, but rather in the 
difficulty to demonstrate the moral relevance of those properties and particularly the 
relevance of their being human. We offer an alternative interpretation of the concept of 
dignity, which is not necessarily related to being human. 
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Were I (who to my cost already am) 
One of those strange, prodigious creatures, man 
A spirit free to choose for my own share 
What case of flesh and blood I pleased to wear, 
I’d be a dog, a monkey or a bear, 
Or anything but that vain animal 
Who is so proud of being rational.1 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
Our cultural history shows a great fascination for imaginary creatures that transgress 
supposed species boundaries. The mythologies, legends and arts of ancient and modern 
cultures are abundant with imagery of fantasy beasts, a great number of which contain 
features of both nonhuman animals (hereafter ‘animals’) and humans. Examples range 
from the animal-headed gods of ancient Egypt to Greek mythological depictions of the 
Centaur, Triton, Sirens, satyr, sphinx and medieval legends of werewolves and vampires. 
The meanings and values attached to those fantastic creatures are as diverse as the 
distinctive cultures from which they are generated and the audiences they are aimed at. 
More often than not, however, particularly within the Western traditions, human/animal 
composites represent evil or at least misconduct (Spiderman and Batman excluded). 
Indeed, the devil has commonly been depicted as a composite of human and snake, dragon 
or goat features. According to medieval legends, the unfortunate human that was 
possessed by the devil would transform into a werewolf. Present-day science fiction 
narratives of human/animal combinations often repeat the logic that intermixing human 
and animal characteristics is sinister. With H.G. Well’s ‘The Island of Dr. Moreau’ as a 
classic prototype, some of the most horrifying science fiction tales today sketch the 
gruesome effects of suppressing or altering an animal’s nature by raising it to a level more 
proximate to that of humans. Recent works draw upon the topicality of genetic 
engineering and cloning to recount the emergence of aggressive, rebellious freaks or 
oppressed, suffering subhumans2,3. Their dreadful destiny is depicted as the backlash to 
the attempt to reconcile bestial instinct with human intelligence or as the side effect of 
purposely enhancing a species for refined slave labour. Note that, according to recent 
press coverage, the creation of such a subhuman species has been actively and intently 
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pursued in the past under Jozef Stalin. Secret documents are said to show that Ilya Ivanov 
experimented (in vain) on human-ape crossovers in the mid-1920s in an attempt to create 
an invincible breed of Red-Army warriors and new labour forces4. 
 
We now have the potential to transgress the biological boundaries between humans and 
other animals in ways that were unthinkable during the Stalin reign. Recent advances in 
technology have brought fears concerning the creation of enhanced animals to the 
forefront of current policy debates. The centre of controversy is the anticipation that the 
blending of animal and human material will be so profound that the resulting chimeras will 
verge on the concept of what it means to be ‘human’. It is that concern, and in particular 
the difficulty of analyzing what is included in the notion of ‘humanness’, that we address 
in this chapter. 
 
10.2 The moral worth of an ambiguous entity: a ‘mind-bending’ 
controversy 
 
The chimeras we refer to here are, in the strictest sense, entities characterized by the 
side-by-side presence of both human and animal cells in embryonic, foetal or adult 
individuals. Often broader interpretations are used interchangeably in the literature to 
include genetic forms of commingling: organisms that consist of an exogenous, human gene 
(transgenics or genetic chimeras), organisms made out of cross-species gametes (genetic 
hybrids) or out of somatic cell nuclear transfers between humans and animals 
(nucleocytoplasmic hybrids). Such chimeras prove to be of great utility for many research 
and prospective therapeutic purposes. One medical therapy, currently under development, 
involves the creation of ‘animal-to-human chimeras’ through the transplantation of 
animal-derived grafts into human bodies (i.e. xenotransplantation). The use of cells, 
tissues and organs from animal sources is considered to be a possible alternative for the 
transplantation of those human grafts, of which there is a growing shortage. Most 
chimeras, however, are ‘human-to-animal chimeras’ which are created by adding human 
cells or genes to an animal’s genome or developing body. As we saw, that approach is 
applied to create source animals with more compatible grafts for transplantation in 
humans. Most chimeras, however, are developed as research models to enhance our 
understanding of the aetiology and progression of human disease and to test new 
treatments. Although the best animal models for humans are humans, animals with close 
proximity to human physiology or animals which – through artificial means – exhibit 
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significant human cell and tissue populations, provide the next best study environment. 
The use of chimeras as research tools initiated with the creation of mice with fully human 
immune systems for the study of HIV in 19885. Today, they are a particularly promising 
means to further explore the ways in which stem cells develop, contribute, integrate and 
react to the host environment and various chemical influences before stem cell technology 
can be of established clinical use for human patients. That field of research has generated 
a range of remarkable experiments. Scientists have injected human embryonic stem cells 
labelled with a fluorescent protein into mouse blastocysts, which later developed into 
embryos and were carried to term by foster mice. The fluorescence in the offspring’s 
tissues allowed the researchers to study cell line contributions to the various tissues, 
organs and the nervous system6. Human foetal neural stem cells have been transplanted in 
rat and mouse models for research, which may potentially be the basis for effective stem-
cell based treatments of various neurodegenerative diseases7,8. In a study of the 
distribution and integration of human neural stem cells, mice have been created whose 
brains are almost 1 per cent human9. The hope exists that eventually the chimeric mice 
brains will consist of 100 per cent human neurons10. Human neural stem cells have also 
been injected into the brains of vervet monkeys and Old-World monkey foetuses11,12. 
 
Although a mouse brain consisting of exclusively human neurons is not a feasible prospect 
in the near future, that sort of research has elicited a sense of moral unease. The 
controversy is conveyed by popular press coverage titles such as ‘Scientists put a bit of 
man into a mouse,’ ‘Human-brained monkeys,’ and ‘The laws of man and beast’13,14,15. 
Much of the concern relates to the (theoretical) possibility that a substantial contribution 
of human cells or genes in crucial areas of the animal’s body would render the animal 
more humanlike than any other animals we know today. Particularly disquieting in that 
respect is the potential to commingle human and animal genetic material at pre-
fertilization and pre-natal stages and to insert substantial amounts of human neural (stem) 
cells into developing animal brains whose body plans have not yet been fully completed. 
 
Past experiments of cross-species neural tissue transplantation have demonstrated the 
feasibility of transferring so-called species-specific behaviour. We referred to the 
experiment by Balaban et al. in the previous chapter. The concern about the potential to 
create more humanlike animals is also supported in reference to reports of successful 
transfer of human nuclei into enucleated cow and rabbit oocytes16,17. While the resulting 
nucleocytoplasmic hybrids would consist of an entirely human nuclear genome, the 
nonhuman mitochondria could indeed leave some traces of animal DNA18. The successful 
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fertilization of non-enucleated frog eggs with human nuclei even evokes the theoretical 
possibility of creating embryos with equal contribution of both sets of chromosomes19. 
 
On a policy level, the question that arises is whether, and on what basis, certain chimerism 
experiments should be constrained. In the US the current prohibition of experiments that 
involve the implantation of human embryonic stem cells into nonhuman primate 
blastocysts or vice versa20, emerged as a response to the US President’s Council on 
Bioethics’ request for clear lines concerning the mixing of gametes or early blastomeres is 
concerned. The Council motivated its request stating that “(…) we do not wish to have to 
judge the humanity or moral worth of such an ambiguous hybrid entity.”21 Authors who 
have commented on or contributed to policy debates specify that chimeras that would be 
so humanlike that they would have an altered moral status and threaten our notion of 
‘human dignity’, are at the forefront of the ethical controversy22,23. If the chimeras were 
to share the characteristics that are otherwise unique and important to human beings, 
human dignity would be undermined and the chimeras would deserve the same respect as 
humans. 
 
10.3 Begging the question of human dignity 
 
The notion of ‘human dignity’ is essentially a deontological one, indicative of a standard by 
which all people should be treated. It is based on the idea that there is something unique 
about the human race in comparison with the rest of the world that entitles all humans to 
an inherent moral worth and exclusive protection. The ethical mandate to respect the 
dignity of every human being forms the foundation of universal human rights and has 
played a role in the constitutional legislation of different nations. The concept is also 
increasingly applied within the context of bioethics. Nevertheless, it is a problematic tool 
to resolve bioethical questions of the sort we describe here. 
 
The controversy concerning chimeras requires that we draw a line for those organisms that 
are so human that they undermine or transfer the dignity that should be assigned to  
humans. That suggests that we have a precise demarcation of those aspects of being 
human to which dignity is attributed. Nonetheless, human dignity is among the least 
clearly defined notions24. The use of that concept in the policy behind this25 and other 
emerging scientific advances26 has been criticized to the extent that it fails to indicate or 
sufficiently support what exactly is so unique about the human race that all of its 
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members, and at the same time no others, merit a special, profound moral worth. The 
criticism applies even to the legislative context. Legally, a violation of human dignity 
occurs when a human being, or a part of a human being closely associated to the whole 
human being, is treated as a commodity27. That rationale was the original reason why 
Stuart Newman’s human/animal chimera patent application – a strategic attempt to force 
the US Patent and Trademark Office to decide on the theoretical creation of chimeras 
containing up to fifty per cent human DNA28 – was denounced. The PTO ruled that such 
chimeras would imply a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, which forbids slavery and 
the ownership of human beings. It was not at all clear where the boundaries for humanness 
were to be drawn and how human an animal-human mixture must be for human legislation 
to apply. The argumentation for the denial of the patent has since shifted towards another 
principle, the beneficial-utility doctrine, according to which inventions are excluded when 
harmful for society’s wellbeing, good policy or good morals29. 
 
In a position paper on the ethics of transplanting human stem cells into nonhuman 
embryos, Karpowicz, Cohen and van der Kooy attempt to resolve the problem by referring 
to the fact that humans possess certain functional and emergent psychological capacities 
more than any other animals30. They suggest that the acceptability of chimerism 
experiments is dependent on whether the functional and psychological characteristics 
associated with human brains develop in the chimeric experimental subject. In a different 
paper, the three authors define a working concept for human ‘dignity’ that relates to a 
rough list of capacities31. Included in that list are the capacities for reasoning, choosing 
freely, acting for moral reasons and on the basis of self-chosen purposes. Also included in 
the cluster are capacities to engage in sophisticated forms of communication and the 
presence of certain emotions, language, social relations and world-views. 
 
Intuitively, we all grasp that the cluster of capacities they list cannot be excluded from 
what it means to be human rather than any other animal. Nevertheless, that attempt to 
give content to the notion of dignity does not provide support of those characteristics 
beyond a purely intuitive basis. The cluster of properties deemed distinctively and 
importantly human, is presented as self-evident and lacks argumentation as to why it is 
superior to another filling-in and as to what degree those characteristics are lacking in 
other animals. As a consequence, it seems that we would be well advised to look again at 
the notion of human dignity, and particularly at the criteria of ‘humanness’ on which it is 
based, before we can deploy it as a threshold marker for chimerism experiments. 
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10.4 The downfall of human uniqueness 
 
Before we can determine how a specific biotechnology may threaten the human moral 
status, we need to know what functional and emergent psychological capacities that status 
is attributed to. Over two thousand years of philosophical thought on human nature have 
not provided general agreement on a list of characteristics or capacities that distinguish 
human beings from other animals32. 
 
Ever since early Greek philosophy, the changeability and variability of the world motivated 
a quest for stability and a hidden, unchanging essence that constituted the true nature of 
living things. Whether it be in reference to the true and universal Forms, an inherent 
natural telos, or the general belief that God created each species independently, species 
boundaries existed and humans could be distinguished from all other animals. Indeed, the 
precise humanesque essence which was identified from the outset, not only distinguished 
humans from other animals, it also elevated humans and brought them closer to the level 
of the divine, as the genesis narratives of the creation of humans in the image of God 
demonstrates. For centuries, the Great Chain of Being viewed humans as having a fixed 
place between the earthly and the heavenly creatures. Humans were connected to animals 
in terms of instinct and desire, but our capacity to transgress that animal nature through 
rationality marked the line in terms of what makes us ‘humans’ and what allows our 
unique position in nature to be the one closest to God33. The human capacity for reason 
and understanding was both carrier and vehicle of our human nature, be it in terms of 
human flourishing or capacity for knowledge of the divine. Reason was as much a moral as 
an intellectual faculty, granting us the power to evaluate natural events and allowing us to 
freely and rationally control the motives from which we act and achieve our ends. Starting 
from the notion that other animals are ruled by ‘instinct’, whereas we humans have 
surpassed our instincts and replaced them with ‘reason’, ‘intelligence’ or ‘learning’, more 
specific distinctions were put forward as the main ‘essence’ of Homo sapiens. Among the 
most prominent historically sanctified qualities are our tool-making, social, emotional, 
lingual, political, cultural, economical and aesthetical capacities. Our capacities for 
reasoning have also given rise to attributing to humans, and to humans only, an ability for 
abstract thought, which in turn is the basis of science, religion and conceptions of 
mortality. 
 
One of the obstacles in distinguishing humans from animals in terms of instinct and reason 
was the lack of a natural foundation for that dichotomy. In 1698, for instance, Edward 
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Tyson dissected a male chimpanzee –the first recorded great ape to be brought to England– 
and found more anatomical and functional similarities than differences between the 
chimpanzee and humans, in particular in terms of the large brain. In publishing his 
observations, Tyson was compelled to explain the difference between humans and the so-
called Pygmie34 in terms of an immaterial principle or rational soul in humans, independent 
of a physical organ: 
 
…if all depended on the Organ, not only our Pygmie, but other Brutes likewise, 
would be too near akin to us. … in truth Man is part a Brute, part an Angel; and 
it is that Link in the Creation, that joyns them both together.35 
 
The sharp distinction between humans and other animals was not left unchallenged, even 
predating Darwinian theory. David Hume, for instance, denied that reason was a uniquely 
human capacity and that it provided us with anything more than a means to achieve the 
natural desires we share with other animals36. And whereas Tyson felt challenged by the 
anatomical similarities discovered between chimpanzees and humans, three quarters of a 
century later, Lord Monboddo published the view that ‘Ourang Outangs’ were related to 
humans and capable of acquiring language37. The theory of evolution nonetheless gave the 
starting shot for fully undercutting attempts to ascribe a fixed essence or set of traits 
unique to our species and common to all members. 
 
The theory of natural and sexual selection allows for elucidating the commonality of 
features across species boundaries. All species overlap to some extent as the result of their 
common descent and of the adaptive problems that led evolution without any definite 
direction and without any sharp break amongst species. Rather than the fixed creation of 
distinguished species, species evolved over evolutionary time through the gradual variation 
between individual organisms and in particular through the natural selection of those traits 
that provided the better solution for recurring environmental demands posed by their 
particular ecological niche. If the traits were able to solve those adaptive problems, they 
may have – directly or indirectly – promoted a better prospect of survival and possibilities 
for reproduction, whether it be in the effect of the organism’s own offspring or the 
offspring of kin38. By the spreading of genes, the traits that formed the better response to 
the adaptive problems were passed on to later generations. Over evolutionary time, the 
selection of favourable traits accumulated and gradually developed an integrated, 
functional response to the adaptive problem. 
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The origin of human capacities for reason and related faculties, such as the psychological 
characteristics listed by Karpowicz et al., are as much as any traits of a given species the 
result of this process. They are the product of circuits that – systematically, and over many 
generations – have become incorporated into our neural design for their ability to cause 
adaptive behaviour. Hence, to the extent that various species share the phylogenesis and 
social and ecological adaptive problems with our hominid hunter-gatherers, they can be 
expected to share some of these traits. In this respect, the chains amongst animals, 
including humans, appear interweaved rather than linearly sequenced39. 
 
Indeed, a grasp from studies of the behaviour and cognition of animals, most significantly 
of great apes, reveals the ways in which animals border on or overlap with the so-called 
typical human characteristics. Many of the complex cognitive, emotional and psychological 
capacities which underlie the concept of Homo politicus or Homo economicus – such as the 
capacities to reason, abstract, generalize, generate symbolic representations, engage in 
sophisticated social bonds and to have a concept of self – have to a certain extent been 
recognized in other animals, most notably in the great apes. Observations of chimps in the 
wild and in captivity have long described how chimps solve problems, use and modify tools 
to retrieve food in their surroundings40,41. Recently, the first documented use of tools 
among gorillas in the wild showed how they fathom the depth of a swamp with sticks and 
stumps42. Ape language experiments strongly suggest that great apes can acquire symbolic 
communication and basic aspects of grammar, although without syntax43. Great apes and 
dolphins recognize a paint spot on their face in their own mirror reflection44,45, which some 
authors suggest is indicative of a level of self-awareness. Frans de Waal has provided many 
indications of basic human economic tendencies in animals, particularly in capacities for 
resolution, reciprocity, and political cooperation46,47. Chimpanzees use various media of 
exchange, such as grooming, sex, support in fights, food and babysitting. They act in a way 
that suggests implied reciprocity, not only for positive, but also for negative acts. 
Empirical data even suggest that the value attributed to the currencies is dependent on 
their availability. De Waal and many others also argue that great apes are cultural beings, 
when culture is defined as the social rather than genetic transmission of behaviour48. Some 
degree of moral behaviour has also been suggested by indications of reconciliation, 
empathy, and acts based on the concept of fairness49. While already non-experimentally 
observed by Darwin and described in his ‘The Descent of Man’, the first experimental 
indications of a capacity for empathy in monkeys were derived in the 1960s. Rhesus 
monkeys refused to pull a chain that delivers food for themselves if by doing so a 
companion receives a shock. One monkey persevered in not pulling the chain for 12 days 
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after witnessing another monkey receiving a shock50. Capuchin monkeys have been 
reported to respond negatively to previously acceptable awards when another monkey 
arbitrarily gets a better reward51. That suggests a relative notion of fairness in terms of the 
distribution of gains and in choosing between various alternatives to a given outcome. 
Furthermore, examples have been provided of nonhuman volitional or motivational 
behaviour. Great apes not only seem to have desires and preferences which they want to 
fulfil but also the mental abilities to satisfy them, which suggests that they have some 
degree of autonomy52. 
 
Our evolutionary ties with other animals and the evidence of a gradual behavioural 
continuum seem to annul all attempts to set out those uniquely human traits to which 
human dignity may be attributed. The lack of distinctive, fixed boundaries draws Robert 
and Baylis, in an explorative paper on the biology of species identity and the morality of 
crossing species boundaries, to reconcile with the idea that: 
 
We all know a human when we see one, but, really, that is all that is known 
about our identity as a species.53 
 
As the authors indicate, since evolution points to variability and not to essential sameness, 
attempts to identify what is uniquely human cannot even appeal to a complete sequence 
of the human genome. Our genome is for the greater part shared by a huge variety of 
apparently distantly related creatures and, for the remaining part, it lacks a genetic 
essence that is identifiable as absolutely common to all Homo sapiens54. Moreover, given 
the differing intellectual abilities, moral capacities, communication skills, and so on, 
among humans, we are a far cry from identifying a specific functional or psychological 
property on which to base human nature. 
 
10.5 Defining humans as a set of mental and emotional adaptations  
 
If we do not know how to define a human, then we can scarcely resolve the question 
whether or not a future chimera expresses a distinctively human trait. Nor can we even 
begin to discuss whether it thereby challenges our notion of human dignity. However, 
while it is one thing to establish that a distinctive essence shared by all and only the 
members of a given species is lacking, it is quite another thing to assume that we cannot 
describe our human nature or even draw some unique differences with the nature of other 
species. Although Darwin is known for his argument that humans share many of the same 
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mental properties with nonhuman animals, natural selection can just as well serve as a 
research tool to establish distinctive human features. 
 
As noted above, the only kind of traits we can expect any given species to express are 
those that proved functional in solving specific adaptive problems. The entire anatomical, 
physiological, cognitive, psychological and emotional architecture of humans – or any other 
species for that matter – is thus the result of a set of adaptations that were gradually 
‘engineered’ to respond to the specific adaptive problems of our hunter-gatherer 
ancestors. Were we able to construct the entire list of adaptations with insight of their 
functional history, we would have a very rich notion of what typifies our species. An 
understanding of the neural adaptations that have given rise to our cognitive, 
psychological and emotional architecture would also allow for a specification of those 
complex mental characteristics that constitute what most people will relate to human 
nature. 
 
Of course, not all aspects of our architecture are clearly adaptations in the technical sense 
of the word55. Particularly very specific and ‘higher’ cognitive functions did not develop 
directly for adaptive reasons, but nevertheless built on adaptations that came about for 
different purposes. Natural selection did not select any mental devices to create Non-
Euclidean geometry, for instance, given that it does not seem to reflect a relevant 
adaptive problem for our evolutionary ancestors. Indeed, in a famous debate between 
Darwin and Wallace about the origin of our capacities for mathematics and science56, 
Wallace argued that human cognition must be an exception to the theory of evolution; our 
ability to engage in higher reasoning must be the result of divine creation. However, in the 
development of skills to create geometry, we utilize the same adaptations that proved 
useful in the prehistory, such as the capacities for abstraction, orientation, and 
elementary calculations. 
 
Attempts to derive a list of those adaptations that compromise our human nature involve 
‘reverse engineering’ the structure of the human mind and behaviour by working out the 
adaptive problems that our ancestors needed to solve57. Every one of our evolved neural 
adaptations – which range from our capacity to perceive colour and dimensions to 
capacities to form social bonds through sophisticated communication and to order our 
world in abstract categories – allowed us to interact with a particular domain or to resolve 
a particular difficulty in our environment. By identifying the specific environmental 
demands that required a specific type of information processing, an adaptationist 
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perspective can provide testable hypotheses to determine the nature of the traits that 
accumulated into neural programs and were incorporated into our behaviour. 
 
A full typology of human nature would necessarily consist of characteristics that are shared 
by other animals. Nevertheless, an adaptationist perspective could also demonstrate some 
of the characteristics that are uniquely human. The degree to which humans differ from 
other animals can be drawn from those adaptations that arose in response to the particular 
adaptive problems not shared by the ancestors of other species58. The distinctively 
‘human’ nature can then be defined as the accumulated set of psychological, cognitive 
and emotional adaptations that arose in response to adaptive problems that only the 
ancestors of our species were confronted with. 
 
10.6 Discussion: implications for the concept of dignity 
 
Although research into the origin of evolved human neural modules is relatively new, the 
tools and means to derive a list of those adaptations that characterize human behaviour, 
exist and the compilation of such a list is, at least, feasible in the future. The remaining 
problem for our purposes, then, is not so much how to acquire a list of the traits that 
typify humans and distinguish them from other animals, but rather how to use such a list to 
define human dignity and to weigh the acceptability of cross-species experiments. It is not 
clear which of the characteristics that typify humans merit the superior dignity and respect 
and why that may be so. The philosophical-anthropological questions of ‘what is human 
nature?’ and ‘what is distinctively human about it?’ now shift to the question what the 
moral relevance of those human characteristics is. 
 
Various problems arise when attempting to attribute privileged moral status to factual 
descriptions of (characteristics of) human nature. Philosophical criticism regarding the is-
ought problem will hold on to the idea that there is simply no acceptable basis on which to 
relate moral status to biology59. It is arguable that ethics should not be entirely 
independent of a biological understanding of the nature of our species. Nonetheless, while 
an evolutionary psychological approach may to some extent reflect fundamental factual 
aspects of human nature, the value of that particular nature does not follow directly from 
such a description. 
 
Part five  Humanized chimeras and the concept of human dignity 
 236 
Before we can weigh the degree to which certain human characteristics merit respect, we 
need to construct a hierarchy of those characteristics. Any such moral ranking will always 
be subject to dispute rather than it will be an objective truth. In that sense, the property 
cluster proposed by Karpowicz et al. seems as good a shot as any. The functional and 
psychological capacities they sum up (capacities for emotions, reasoning, choosing freely, 
acting for moral reasons and on the basis of self-chosen purposes,…) intuitively evoke 
higher notions of respect. Those capacities resonate with descriptions of ‘personhood’, the 
notion that underlies an individual’s unique personal identity and serves as the starting 
point for the indication of various basic moral principles60. 
 
Provided that we can achieve a consensus on how to rank human capacities in terms of 
moral worth, it will remain difficult to ethically evaluate the permissibility of a chimerism 
experiment if a human-to-animal chimera happens to express some of those 
characteristics. The problem lies in the difficulty to achieve a minimum basis for human 
dignity and to demonstrate that the relevant capacities included in such a minimum basis 
are exclusively human. As demonstrated above, other animals express some of the so-
called human capacities in varying degree. As such, it is in no way clear that the minimal 
conditions for human dignity lie beyond the reach of ‘non-enhanced’ animals. Limiting 
human dignity to those capacities that are distinctly human, will not resolve the problem. 
It may be pointed out that whether a certain chimerism experiment does or does not elicit 
the expression of distinctively ‘human’ capacities is beside the point and errs on speciesist 
convictions. The dignity is not attributed to the mere fact that a certain trait is typical for 
humans; it depends on how that trait is ranked according to moral worth. 
 
Many philosophers have argued that the prevailing reasons to distinguish between the 
treatment of humans and that of animals fail the test of moral relevance. Peter Singer has 
advocated that the moral category, which is of central importance to assess the respect 
due to all living creatures, relates to the interests and capacities they have61. In that 
respect, and as was argued in Chapter 6, the most minimal criterion of moral relevance 
lies in a being’s capacity to experience pain and happiness. Jeremy Bentham identified 
that as the prerequisite to having interests. That ‘minimal’ notion of dignity does not 
necessarily strip the concept of human dignity to a single, most rudimentary capacity. 
There is a wide variety of ‘range’ in capacities to suffer and in their moral weight. The 
moral worth of the capacity to suffer depends on the specific type of suffering, be it 
merely physical suffering or more advanced forms that require emotional and rational 
capacities and that are of greater influence on the interests of any given individual. The 
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acceptability of chimerism experiments would thus depend on the degree to which the 
experiments cause the animals to suffer and affect their interests. 
 
In conclusion, several implications can be related to the weaknesses that are inherent in 
‘human dignity’ and the use of that notion to evaluate the acceptability of chimerism 
experiments. While it is not in se impossible to distinguish between uniquely human 
characteristics and characteristics shared with other species, no such distinction will be a 
direct guide for our moral actions. Rather, a typification of what it means to be human or 
some other type of species will be the starting point to discuss the particular moral 
relevance of the characteristics and to compare the degree to which various species-
typical characterizations overlap. Since we do not have a solid description of species-
typical features yet, nor a consensus on the moral ranking of those features, and since we 
lack insight in the impact of chimerism experiments on the alteration or transfer of 
potentially morally relevant features, questions regarding the dignity of chimeras and the 
acceptability of far-reaching experiments remain highly debatable. At the very least, given 
that there are certain types of capacities (minimally, capacities related to suffering) to 
which we attribute higher notions of respect, and given that those capacities are not 
necessarily unique to humans, nor shared by all humans, it makes more sense to speak of 
‘capacity dignity’ rather than ‘human dignity’. That approach allows discussing moral 
worth as a matter of varying degree, rather than an all or nothing state. 
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11 Summary, implications and recommendations 
 
Adapted from: 
Ravelingien A. The world is my patient: a discussion of Martine Rothblatt's ‘Your 
life or mine: how geoethics can resolve the conflict between public and private 
interests in xenotransplantation’. Xenotransplantation 2005; 12(2): 88-90. 
Ravelingien A, Braeckman J. The patients' perspective: comments on 
'Reluctance of French patients with type 1 diabetes to undergo pig pancreatic 
islet xenotransplantation'. Xenotransplantation 2005; 12(3): 173-4. 
Ravelingien A, Braeckman J, Mortier F, Mortier E, Kerremans I. Author’s reply: 
a body at will. Journal of Medical Ethics 2006; forthcoming. 
 
 
"The time has come," the Walrus said,  
    "To talk of many things:  
Of shoes - and ships - and sealing wax -  
    Of cabbages - and kings -  
And why the sea is burning hot -  
    And whether pigs have wings."1 
 
 
In the introduction of their book on the ethics of allotransplantation, Caplan and Coelho 
maintain that many dimensions must be considered in order to understand the ethical 
implications of allotransplantation medicine2. Those dimensions unfold in an interplay 
between complex scientific, sociological, philosophical, political, legal, economic and 
religious issues. They clearly manifest in an ethics of xenotransplantation as well. The 
previous chapters portray only some aspects of the ‘xeno-phobia’ that may arise when 
assessing the implications of this biotechnology. However, it was our intention to gain 
insight into the predominant concerns that hinder the development of 
xenotransplantation. In doing so, we restricted our scope to a debate on several unique 
harms that xenotransplantation may infer. In this final section, we reflect on the results of 
that exploration. 
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11.1 Summary and implications 
 
As set out in the General Introduction, an ethical assessment of xenotransplantation must 
apply to a plural setting, taking into account the possible harms caused to the source 
animals, the individual patients and the community at large. In our consideration of what 
constitutes harm, we opted for a broad approach and delineated the concept minimally as 
‘adversely affecting interests’. We have balanced such possible harms against the 
anticipation that xenotransplantation will offer immense benefits to humans. 
Xenotransplantation has been recognised as a potentially successful therapy for patients 
with advanced organ failure who currently have no alternative treatment. It also promises 
to improve the quality of life of thousands of people with such diverse conditions as 
degenerative brain disease, epilepsy, chronic intractable pain syndromes, paraplegia due 
to spinal cord lesions and insulin dependent diabetes. 
 
Those expected benefits prevail over many a priori concerns regarding 
xenotransplantation. As we saw, studies of public acceptance of xenotransplantation 
indicate that the seriousness of the prospective patients’ health condition and the 
effectiveness of the xenotransplant to provide a safe cure are the primary considerations. 
The same will likely be the case for the targeted patient population. Although various 
socio-cultural factors may contribute to difficulties to adjust to a xenotransplant 
psychologically, it is unlikely that any psychological ambivalence will seriously affect the 
potential candidate’s decision to participate if his or her health gravely depends on it. 
Religious considerations regarding the interference with nature, or the use of pig grafts as 
‘replacement parts’, are also overridden by the potential benefits of improved quality and 
quantity of life, at least according to studies on the positions of Catholic, Jewish and 
Islamic authorities. Sykes et al. suggest that xenotransplantation may also be an accepted 
alternative for religions that do not accept cadaveric allotransplantation3. Although 
Buddhism and Hinduism strongly instruct the protection of animals and the need to 
maintain the integrity of the human body before death, respectively, both teachings leave 
room for individual choice4. 
 
However, in order for the potential benefits to counterweigh the ways in which 
xenotransplantation threatens the wellbeing of those involved, a more delicate balancing 
is in place. In the following, we summarize our account of how such a balance can be 
secured. 
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11.1.1 Harm to non-persons 
 
The pigs used as sources for human replacement technology have interests that are of 
moral relevance in their own right. We have resisted an absolute elevation of humans 
above other creatures and have maintained that moral worth must be attributed to an 
entity’s capacity to suffer. As such, we have defended a notion of  ‘capacity dignity’ – a 
hierarchical concept that is based on the level of evolved mental and behavioural 
capacities relevant to suffering – rather than a notion that would automatically attribute 
dignity to characteristics that are or appear to be uniquely human. That approach allows 
us to discuss moral worth as a matter of varying degree, rather than an all or nothing 
state. 
 
Some of the conditions under which the pigs are born and raised are disrespectful of their 
‘capacity dignity’. Those conditions aim at enhancing the safety and quality of the 
prospective grafts prior to clinical use. Although the intrinsic concerns against transgenesis 
are not essentially relevant in this respect, the potentially harmful physiological effects of 
this imperfect technology are. Adverse effects on the wellbeing of the pigs are also related 
to the environment in which they are reared, which subjects them to sensory deprivation 
and precludes the manifestation of natural behaviour such as rooting and foraging. The 
animals are also confined to living in small groups. That may deprive them of sufficient 
social interaction, particularly the weeks before the harvest of the xenografts, during 
which the animals must be quarantined. In establishing that nonhuman primates can suffer 
significantly from those ‘psychological’ harms, it would be wrong to feel reassured that 
pigs couldn't. Hence, those conditions thwart their interest to experience pleasure and 
avoid suffering. Furthermore, the very intent for which the pigs are bred necessitates a 
premature ending of their lives, in other words, a premature termination of their interest 
to seek pleasure. 
 
This notwithstanding, there are sound arguments that do not undervalue the moral worth 
of pigs but provide a reasonable trade-off of those harms. The arguments follow the 
paradigm rule that unequal consideration of interests is morally acceptable on the 
condition that the interests themselves are unequal. The concrete (psychological) suffering 
during upbringing forms a sound basis for resisting xenotransplantation, because pigs have 
as much an interest to avoid momentary suffering, as do humans. Nonetheless, in so far as 
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humans are persons and pigs are non-persons, humans have a stronger interest in 
continued life because they have a conscious interest in actively pursuing future pleasure 
seeking, whereas pigs do not. In other words, the harm to the pigs in terms of premature 
death can be outweighed by the fact that premature death of persons would constitute an 
even greater harm. That argument is dependent on the condition that the pigs are killed 
humanely. It seems reasonable to accept that the ‘greater good’ may also, to some extent, 
outweigh the harm done to pigs during upbringing, particularly if everything is done to 
reduce unnecessary suffering. Precisely where we draw the line in resolving the conflict 
between the welfare of persons and non-persons will remain a matter of dispute. Whether 
the interests of pigs may be equally thwarted in light of nonvital benefits is even more 
contestable. We have not provided a conclusive answer to that question. However, with 
respect to the arguments of capacity-based dignity, one possible solution is to limit 
nonvital therapies to cellular-based xenotransplants, the cells of which can in principle be 
procured from foetuses during a specific developmental stage in which they are not yet 
able to experience suffering altogether. 
 
11.1.2 Harm to persons 
 
A trade-off of interests is much less appealing, however, when harm to other, non-
beneficiary, persons is at stake. The risk that a xenograft carries an infectious agent that 
will be transmitted to others than the xenotransplant recipient cannot be excluded. The 
size and nature of that particular risk – whether it be a harmless influenza or a fatal 
pandemic, the range in between, or neither – and the probability that any of those 
scenarios will occur, are essentially uncertain and unquantifiable. At worse, 
xenotransplantation may affect the health and lives of the global population. That 
constitutes a severe intrusion on the ‘harm principle’, which generally leads us to conclude 
that duties not to injure others are more compelling than duties to prevent harm or to 
provide benefit. Harming others for the benefit of xenotransplant recipients thwarts their 
interests to be treated as autonomous agents and to receive an equitable distribution of 
benefits and burdens. 
 
It is conceivable that  a part of the population is willing to ‘consent’ to the potential harm 
involved in xenotransplantation. Those people may recognize that it is to everyone’s 
advantage that progress in the treatment of diseases and in the prevention of mortality is 
pursued. They may also accept that they themselves may come to depend on replacement 
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technology in the future. Another part of the population, however, may not accept that 
risk. Indeed, it is reasonable to accept that this will foremost be the case for those who 
will not be able to share in the benefits. Particularly problematic in this respect is the 
population of the developing world that does not even have adequate access to the most 
basic health care and lacks the financial means and infrastructure to monitor and control 
possible xenozoonotic outbreaks. 
 
Many regulatory bodies across the globe nonetheless do not wish to preclude the 
development of clinical studies. They respond to the public health threat by establishing 
various measures that would make the spread of a xenozoonosis highly improbable. As 
such, xenotransplantation research must proceed with proper national oversight, organized 
international cooperation and adherence to universally-accepted, high standards of 
oversight and surveillance. The surveillance is ultimately dependent on the screening of 
source animals and on long-term monitoring schemes of xenograft recipients (and to a 
lesser extent, of their contacts and the health care and nonhuman animal care workers 
involved). It is admirable that those measures have been addressed with such diligent 
concern by those who are themselves involved in the xenotransplantation research and 
industry. However, that approach in turn undermines the therapeutic intent of the clinical 
research. Moreover, it cannot warrant absolute protection of public health. 
 
Current guidelines for clinical xenotransplantation require that prospective xenotransplant 
recipients consent to an ‘unknown risk’ of virus transfer as well as to constraints of their 
freedom in order to safeguard public health. We have indicated various reasons why that is 
problematic. 
 
Xenotransplantation is still highly experimental and all forthcoming applications will be 
clinical trials. As with all experimental therapies, xenotransplantation trials will involve a 
certain burden of risk that challenges the therapeutic value of the procedure. The risks 
include potential physical harm directly related to the surgical procedure, adverse effects 
involving the physiological incompatibilities between the xenograft and the host and 
immunological rejection of the xenograft. Moreover, if tolerance induction is lacking, 
xenografts will only survive with increased immunosuppressive regimens. That may incur 
greater health burdens than the complications that commonly arise from 
immunosuppression following an allotransplantation. Other risks, such as the formation of 
tumours, are also conceivable. Xenotransplantation may evoke extra difficulties to adjust 
to the xenograft psychologically, which, we claimed, can further distort the quality of life 
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and may increase the chances that the medical recommendations will not be observed 
properly. Furthermore, all xenotherapies imply a risk of xenozoonosis. Those risks are less 
pronounced in the case of cellular xenotransplantation, but nonetheless not excludable. 
 
Clinical trials must first and foremost be in accordance with ethical codes and rights 
regarding experimentation on humans. The general norm on clinical experimentation 
dictates that physicians should abstain from engaging in research projects involving human 
subjects, unless they are confident that the risks involved can be satisfactorily managed, 
or unless the risks are reasonable in relation to the potential therapeutic benefits. As 
noted in Chapter 4, there is uncertainty at what point the risks can be regarded as 
reasonable in order to proceed with clinical trials. Nonetheless, the risk of xenozoonosis 
renders the balance of expected therapeutic benefit over potential adverse effects on the 
subject’s wellbeing increasingly implausible. It may be in the interest of a patient to 
engage in some form of risk-taking, particularly when the stakes of the trial are high (when 
it offers a potential to save his or her life). If the transplant provokes a life-threatening 
infection, however, the alleviation would be only temporary. Moreover, the safety 
requirements imposed on future xenotransplant recipients imply an additional burden on 
the therapeutic value of xenotrials. Requiring a xenograft recipient to consent to a long-
term regime of extensive surveillance, before there is evidence of a health hazard, would 
involve a setback of significant psychological interests for the recipient – and conceivably, 
for the close contacts in his or her social environment as well. As evident from our 
discussion of the psychological effects of xenotransplantation, it will be important to 
minimize the recipients’ awareness that they are ‘not normal’. Being subjected to life-long 
monitoring will not be advantageous in that respect. Furthermore, the consent 
requirements involve infringements of an individual’s rights to non-interference in personal 
affairs and private life, the protection of confidential information and the right to 
withdraw from an experiment at any time. It is important to note that those requirements 
will apply even if the xenograft is rejected and replaced by a human substitute5. 
 
The Council of Europe has clearly stated that, in light of the public harm to be avoided,  
consent can justify the waiving of these rights6. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether 
the level of uncertainty inherent in xenotransplantation can be fully regardful of informed 
choice. Also, it has been proposed that the first trials should be reserved for patients with 
serious/life-threatening disorders, who have no alternative treatment options7. Such 
patients will be desperate and, hence, more vulnerable to what can be called “voluntary 
incompetence”8. It is also highly ambiguous whether we can expect recipients to limit 
Part six   General discussion 
 249 
their future autonomy in the various ways that xenotransplantation involves. The argument 
can be made that it is part of one’s duty as a patient to adhere to the recommendations. 
Indeed, contemporary medical and bioethics literature is increasingly attentive to the issue 
of patient responsibilities9. Nonetheless, it can be expected that consenting recipients will 
not be willing and/or able to bear that responsibility at a certain moment. We have 
referred to the high rates of non-compliance to health recommendations after an 
allotransplantation in that regard. Furthermore, for non-urgent xenotransplant 
interventions, individuals may come to regret their consent in the awareness of advances 
of alternative technologies that do not impose restrictions on their freedom10. 
 
In order to protect public health, then, it will be necessary to enforce adherence to a 
person’s prior consent against his or her later wishes. Even if it can be argued that such 
enforcement is ethical, legally effective means to ensure adherence prior to a 
demonstrable state of public health emergency have not been set in place. Infectious 
disease is the predominant concern of public health and forcible isolation of infected 
individuals goes back (at least) to cases of leprosy in the Middle Ages11. However, 
enforcement of public health measures is dependent on evidence that the individual has in 
fact contracted an infectious disease and poses a public health hazard12. Current public 
health law provisions cannot enforce long-term surveillance when the recipients are 
asymptomatic and the nature and communicability of possible pathogens is undetermined. 
It is also conceivable that transplant centres themselves will brush aside the stringent (and 
costly) surveillance, particularly in nations that do not have appropriate national oversight 
in place. There is currently an agreement that the results of trials that breach 
xenotransplantation guidelines should not be accepted for publication in high-ranked peer-
reviewed journals. Apart from that, however, there is currently no international sanction 
for non-compliance to international xenotransplant guidelines, nor, for that matter, an 
authority to impose the sanction. 
 
As a solution to those problems, we argue that, if there is to be any level of international 
cooperation on xenotransplantation regulation, it should foremost oversee that all trials 
await further evidence of non-infectiveness. That approach would compensate for the 
practical flaws and ethical problems related to post-transplant surveillance. 
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11.1.3 Out of harm’s way? 
 
As we saw in Chapter 8, the constraint against doing harm to others is not a moral 
absolute. It is rather a function of the size and nature of the danger that is exposed in 
order to bring about good results, and the probability that the harm will occur. In light of 
such an assessment, activities that involve risk of life – such as using public transport or 
even living organ donation – are permitted. In lack of sufficient descriptive components for 
a science-based risk assessment, however, the permissibility of the risk of xenogeneic 
infection depends on an individual and social normative basis. In comparing the analogies 
of the emergence of antibiotics and the development and study of recombinant DNA 
technology, we saw that the permissibility of health hazards posed by (bio)technologies is 
co-dependent on a) the perception that the potential benefits are both substantial and 
attainable, and b) the responsibility to take into account those aspects of risk that have a 
foreseeable effect. Studies suggest an overall, growing acceptance of xenotransplantation 
among the general public over the past decade13,14,15,16,17. If we can thereby presume that 
the first condition can be fulfilled, it will still be of crucial importance to fulfil the 
remaining criterion. The underlying reason would seem to be that, in developing hazardous 
technologies, we are in the position to annul foreseeable adverse consequences in advance 
and thus have a particular moral responsibility to do so. Given that the lifelong monitoring 
requirement is a weak guarantee that the foreseeable risk of xenogeneic virus transfer will 
be excluded, it is essential that pre-clinical research further identifies and excludes the 
infection or recombination potential of detectable organisms from the source animals 
before proceeding with clinical trials. In this regard, there is enthusiasm about the 
progress that has been made – and can continue to be made – in identifying and defining 
the infectious potential of most known porcine pathogens. Breeding and 
immunocompromised cloning may also further reduce infectiveness18. Ongoing research in 
the use of semi-permeable membranes and genetic alterations provides a particularly 
optimistic prospect of precluding transmission for cell-based xenotransplant products. 
 
Pre-clinical methods will not exclude the possibility that undetectable organisms will be 
transferred along with the xenograft. Nonetheless, if the risk of xenozoonosis is reduced to 
a merely theoretical risk, it would be far from clear why that would require more stringent 
control measures than risks originating from ‘natural’ causes. Our approach reduces the 
main responsibility for risks to those investigators who develop the technology and to the 
damages they foresee in their studies19. 
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Pre-clinical research with animal models may, however, have its limits. Nonhuman primate 
models may not provide conclusive data on how humans will react to a xenograft and to 
potentially infectious agents. Ideally, we suggested, the foreseeable risks before trials 
involving human subjects would be addressed through experimentation on PVS bodies in 
case of willed body donation. It would be morally preferable to acquire proof of safety 
from experiments on a ‘non-person human being’ rather than on a living patient. Indeed, 
in light of our concept of capacity-dignity, that is even morally preferable to the ongoing 
use of primate models (we will discuss this further at the end of this chapter). If the prior 
person in a PVS had, when competent, consented to participate in such trials, using their 
bodies for clinical trials of xenotransplantation is no more controversial than the range of 
uses to which we currently put cadavers in research and in the training of surgeons. For 
lack of such a scenario, and if the potential infectiveness of even detectable agents cannot 
be entirely precluded by existent pre-clinical methods, it will be essential that the pre-
clinical investigations are as extensive as possible. Triller and Bobinski indicate a difficulty 
in such reasoning. A focus on foreseeable aspects of the xenozoonosis risk could limit the 
initiative to study all possible adverse side effects on public health20. In light of this 
concern, stringent oversight at that level of research will undoubtedly remain necessary. 
 
It should be clear that by focussing on detectable infectiveness, the interests of the 
prospective patients can be better met. Some level of physical risks is by definition part of 
a xenotransplantation experiment. Indeed, trials will be the ultimate step in fully 
ascertaining the potential risks of xenotransplantations. Nonetheless restricting (or, 
ideally, excluding) the possibility that known viruses will unleash an infection in the 
recipient is an important aspect of enhancing the therapeutic value of the trial. 
Furthermore, that approach should ease the requirements of long-term and intensive 
monitoring. It will remain important that the xenotransplantation patient is informed of 
the theoretical risk of xenozoonosis. It will also be beneficial for both the recipient and 
the public at large that some samples are taken prior to and directly after the 
xenotransplantation and that public health authorities are notified as soon as possible in 
case adverse events occur. Furthermore, some lifestyle restrictions are unavoidable. In 
particular, it would be unadvisable to let a xenograft recipient donate blood, tissues or 
organs. Nonetheless, the need to enforce long-term surveillance will not be that essential. 
In our view, easing the surveillance requirements will facilitate acceptability of using 
xenotransplantation for children, who are generally not regarded as acceptable recipients 
during initial trials. 
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We also argued that, if the risk of xenozoonosis were reduced to a merely theoretical 
threat, that would provide a proper basis for addressing global health injustice. The 
problem of global health injustice is not unique to xenotransplantation but increasingly 
merits consideration. The growing gap in health care outcome, on a global scale, is  “the 
unmentioned elephant in the room of medical ethics”21. Martine Rothblatt has provided 
the most ambitious and well-considered approach to counterbalance the inequitable 
distribution of burdens and benefits related to xenotransplantation. In ‘Your Life or Mine’, 
she argues for the necessity of a global buy-in of the developing world22. In order to 
protect all nations universally against a potential xenozoonotic outbreak, randomized 
blood sampling should be conducted in those parts of the developing world that lack 
resources to perform effective xenozoonosis surveillance. In exchange, those nations must 
be offered basic health care support. In addition, they should be given partial access to 
xenotransplants. The way to implement such a ‘geo-ethical approach’, according to 
Rothblatt, is by creating a mandatory global oversight, regulation and follow-up 
organization, which she calls ‘GEOX’ (Global Enforcement Organization for 
Xenotransplantation), the activities of which could be financed by taxes on the 
pharmaceutical companies per xenograft sold. 
 
The need to augment global access to transplant activities is incontestable. In many 
developing countries, transplantation is the only type of renal replacement therapy 
available23, while the transplant rate is less than 10 per million population (in contrast to 
45 to 59 pmp in the developed world)24. That figure covers only 2 per cent of the 
estimated need25. Whether the permissibility of xenotransplantation is also dependent on 
global access to basic forms of health care, however, is less compelling. In particular, it is 
unclear to what extent GEOX could contribute to ‘basic health care’. According to the 1978 
Declaration of Altma-Ata, for instance, basic health care treatment would include 
promoting appropriate nutrition, access to clean water and essential medicines, maternal 
and child health care, appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries, control of 
communicable and endemic diseases, and access to basic sanitation26. Rothblatt’s aim 
must be modest if the expenditure of $13 per capita in low-income developing countries, 
the amount she estimates to be generated by GEOX taxes27, is to suffice. 
 
Xenotransplantation is not the unique stepping stone for the weighty responsibility of 
addressing the needs of the least well-off on a global scale. Indeed, in light of the greatest 
disparities of global health care, there is more reason to set up a Global Enforcement 
Organization for Pandemics (GEOP) rather than a Global Enforcement Organization for 
Part six   General discussion 
 253 
Xenotransplantation. Infectious diseases constitute the greatest cause of mortality in the 
developing world (see chart in Chapter 1) and continually emerge, in ever new forms, as 
global public health threats. The theoretical risk of xenozoonosis serves as a reminder of 
the urgency to deal with the persistent manifestation of existing and emerging zoonoses, 
regardless of their cause. It is interesting to note in this respect that, in July 2004, 
President G. W. Bush signed into law ‘Project BioShield’. That project allocates $5.6 billion 
over 10 years to disease surveillance and research and development of vaccines and drugs 
for smallpox, anthrax, botulinum toxin, Ebola virus, plague and other pathogens and 
infections28. Although that budget is primarily intended for biodefence, it is indicative of 
an increased sensitivity to the threat of new and re-emerging infections. The enormous 
investment in the protection of the US public health, however, contrasts sharply with the 
lack of resources of the WHO29, which has the expertise to respond rapidly to an infectious 
outbreak on a large scale (as evident from their response to the emergence of SARS and 
Influenza A/(H5N1)). 
 
11.2 Discussion 
 
Our account of how to balance the unique risks and harm involved in xenotransplantation is 
not uncontested. Both direct criticism on our writings and indirect objections found in the 
literature (and thus far not dealt with) appear to challenge three pillars of our 
argumentation: 
 
(1) that it would be wrong to allow patients to consent to trials at the current stage of 
development and under the current regulations; 
(2) that the use of PVS bodies is an ethical solution for the possible difficulties in acquiring 
more proof of safety; 
and most fundamentally: 
(3) that if xenotransplantation proves to be successful, the overall benefits of this 
procedure will be immense. 
 
In the following, we will address the objections to those most fundamental presumptions 
and attempt to provide additional support for our approach. 
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11.2.1 Xenotransplant trials: a guinea pig race? 
 
Our analysis of the permissibility of potentially harming patients and public health 
implicates the need to hold off clinical trials until more is known about the associated 
infectious disease risk and until the foreseeable aspects of that risk can be excluded as 
much as possible. However, in light of the potential benefits of various applications, it may 
be argued that xenotransplantation trials must be conducted as soon as possible. 
 
Solid organ xenotransplant trials 
 
This is the approach Neil Levy has taken in criticizing our proposal to test solid organ 
xenotransplantation on consenting PVS bodies rather than on living subjects. The 
appendices to this dissertation include both his commentary and critiques by three other 
authors. Those three other critiques will be discussed in the next section of this discussion.  
 
According to Levy, patients currently facing death would gladly accept the risks and harms 
in exchange for a chance to lengthen their lives, however stripped of fundamental rights30. 
If a xenotransplant is their only chance at avoiding death, so he argues, patients have the 
right to choose that option at the cost of some or even all of their rights. He indicates the 
paradoxical consequences if our proposal were implemented: 
 
A patient suffering from a terminal illness might volunteer to participate in 
potentially life-saving xenotransplantation clinical trials. The scientists 
conducting these trials would be forced to respond: “we cannot use you now; 
make a living will and perhaps we shall consider you once you die”. The patient 
is assured that her rights will be respected, but this seems to me small 
comfort.31 
 
We share Levy’s concern for the desperate situation of the many patients who are 
currently staring death in the face in lack of an organ transplant. We can also accept that 
extreme cases may require extreme measures. Moreover, there is little ground for 
objecting to the claim that a person may waive his or her rights if he or she is fully aware 
of the resulting consequences. A strong defence of personal sovereignty, which will grant 
autonomous beings the right to act in such a way that is of harm to them – even when the 
decisions imply an alienation rather than fulfilment of autonomy – has been embraced by 
other authors in this respect as well. Hughes, for instance, argues that the patient’s 
autonomous choice with regard to xenotransplant treatment ought to be respected, if that 
choice affects his or her own interests only32. 
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We discussed the difficulties of enforcing the long-term implications of consent above. 
Moreover, post-xenotransplantation surveillance does not only affect the interests of the 
willing patient, but also of the people closest to him or her. Close contacts will also be 
monitored and the recipient and his or her partner may be advised to use barrier 
contraception and to refrain from pregnancy. Still, we can grant that the recipient’s 
spouse and family will accept the safety requirements in exchange of an opportunity to 
save their beloved one. Notwithstanding that, more arguments are required in order to 
defend the scenario Neil Levy suggests. For one, his aim to benefit the patients is one of 
groundless optimism. Two, by accepting hasty applications on desperate patients, it will 
prove extremely difficult to avoid a problematic turn away from ethical considerations 
meant to safeguard patients involved in clinical trials. 
 
The experiments we suggested in our original article were of a nontherapeutic nature, for 
want of results that demonstrate whether solid organ xenotransplantation will be 
sufficiently safe for trials with patients. In light of the limited survival periods of pre-
clinical animal models reported to date, there is insufficient reason to assume that the 
procedure can support human life. The suggestion to take the plunge towards 
xenotransplanting solid organs in patients – without indications that we have arrived at the 
stage in which we can expect the patients to benefit – conflicts with the requirement that 
clinical research must establish, either from pre-clinical or prior clinical research, that the 
expected benefits outweigh the risks of the procedure33. 
 
Without a risk/benefit balance, Levy’s suggestion implies that, at whichever research 
stage, the slightest chance that patients with no alternative could benefit, is deserving of 
a trial run. That leaves the door open to various situations in which people beyond hope 
volunteer for unwarranted and questionable ‘therapies’. Not only is it not always clear cut 
that certain patients have no alternative, it is also highly questionable whether their 
‘informed consent’ is a sufficient condition. Problematic research in the past has indicated 
that desperate people will consent to almost anything. In such a way, patients are made 
vulnerable to experiments with purposes other than purely medical-scientific ones. Levy’s 
criticism appears to imply that reluctance to conduct experiments on terminal patients at 
a premature stage is what ultimately causes their death. It would be wrong to suggest such 
a direct connection. There is indeed a real chance that patients die while in effect they 
could have been helped by hasty trials, but that is the price we pay to protect the patient 
population at large against malpractice and irresponsible research. Also, as emphasized by 
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the International Xenotransplantation Association Ethics Committee, if the first trial 
recipients of solid organ xenotransplantation attain substantial longevity and quality of 
life, that will enhance public acceptance of the field34. 
 
Ex vivo and cell-based xenotransplant trials 
 
In contrast to solid organ xenotransplantation, there is more optimism regarding the 
efficacy of extracorporeal liver support and cellular xenotransplantations, which have 
provided the most recent clinical applications. Enthusiasm regarding those procedures has 
also raised the argument that, by further withholding clinical trials, patients are denied 
urgently needed life-prolonging or quality of life enhancing options35. 
 
However, it is agreed that, given the current level of risk, xenotransplantation should not 
be conducted if other procedures of comparable effectiveness are available for the 
patient36. While past experiments with extracorporeal pig liver perfusion and bioartificial 
liver devices have successfully bridged patients to transplantation, we noted in Chapter 4 
that there are no convincing data on the clinical efficacy of those approaches or their 
advantage over conventional intensive care therapies. 
 
Similarly, in 2001, Diacrin/Genzyme (a joint venture for the development of cellular 
therapies for Parkinson's and Huntington's diseases) announced that the results of a phase 2 
trial involving neural xenotransplantation showed no difference in outcome between the 
ten patients treated and the control group37. By contrast, recent trials involving pancreatic 
islet xenotransplants do indicate promising results in terms of a decrease in the recipients’ 
exogenous insulin requirement. It is those trials that the above quoted defenders of urgent 
trials are primarily alluding to. Nonetheless, here too, there are various reasons why the 
eagerness to proceed with such trials may be ill-considered. 
 
For one, the procedures and results of such trials are very controversial. Rood and Cooper38 
have reviewed the four most recent reports on clinical trials involving porcine islet 
xenotransplants39,40,41,42. They were not performed in accordance with some of the 
principles set out by the International Xenotransplantation Association Ethics Committee. 
The islets were not always procured from specified pathogen-free pig herds and there were 
not enough indications of appropriate oversight of post-transplant infectious organisms. 
Furthermore, no pre-clinical data from nonhuman primate models were reported. While 
experiments on nonhuman primates cannot provide conclusive indications of how humans 
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will react to a xenograft, positive results of such pre-clinical models would nonetheless 
have given some support of the trials’ reported outcomes. Without such results, Rood and 
Cooper note, the decrease in patients’ insulin requirements could just as well have been 
obtained from the improved medical follow-up of their condition. 
 
Second, it is questionable whether the potential recipients themselves will, at this stage, 
advocate access to islet xenotransplantation trials. In 2005, Deschamps et al. published 
the results of a survey that aimed to assess the willingness of 214 Type 1 diabetic 
respondents to receive pig islet xenografts43. It was found that reluctance towards the use 
of xenotransplantation as a therapeutic option grew as the respondents became better 
informed of the risks associated with the treatment. While 52 per cent of the patients 
were willing to receive pig islet xenografts at the onset of the questionnaire, 70.5 per cent 
of the respondents ultimately opted out in response to the final question. Deemed most 
worrisome were “the risk of disease transmission” and “risks not yet identified”. We were 
surprised to learn about that notable refusal rate. It conflicts with some prior assumptions 
we made with regard to public perceptions of xenotransplantation. The desire for 
applications of animal graft transplants is conceivably (and also demonstrably, as pointed 
out by the authors themselves) largest among those people most likely to benefit from 
such a treatment. And while most people, if given the choice, would currently opt for an 
allograft rather than a xenograft, we found it reasonable to assume that acceptance of 
cellular xenografts would be relatively high in comparison with vascularized organ 
xenografts44. Especially astonishing is that the results of Deschamps et al. contrast with 
the largely permissive attitude towards the use of pig islet-cells for Type 1 diabetes (82.1 
per cent) found among different population groups (n = 942) in the Dutch-speaking part of 
Belgium45. The results also contrast with a previous comparative survey conducted by 
Deschamps and published in 200046. In this study, more than half of the 697 adult 
representatives of the French general population and 64 per cent of the 377 adult Type 1 
diabetic respondents were favourable to receiving a xenograft. As to why the more recent 
survey reveals such a considerable disinclination, Deschamps et al. stress the role of full 
disclosure of the risks involved. Naturally, it would be difficult to determine that only in 
the recent survey respondents were sufficiently informed so as to be able to fully grasp the 
potential dangers involved with xenotransplantation. Nevertheless, the negative effect of 
knowledge about and the positive effect of ignorance of the risks on the acceptance of 
xenotransplantation have been observed elsewhere47,48,49. Indeed, the largely permissive 
attitude of the respondents in the Belgian study could be partly ascribed to their being 
only briefly informed of the risks. Furthermore, while we do not rule out that numerous 
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surveys have included sufficient information on the risk of transmitting xenozoonosis, the 
recent Deschamps et al. survey explicitly cited risks relating to immune rejection, 
uncertain efficacy and of infections and cancers, amongst other “unknown risks”. 
Understandably, people are not willing to solve a problem via measures that potentially 
create an even greater problem. The benefit they most desire is the discontinuation of 
insulin injections. For 73.5 per cent of the respondents, that was the principal reason to 
opt for xenotransplantation, before limitation of complications (52.5 per cent) and 
increase in life expectancy (44 per cent). While their condition can be controlled by 
treatments already available, they would prefer an alternative treatment that would 
relieve them of the ceaseless and unpleasant need to maintain target blood glucose levels. 
That benefit does not compensate for the potential risk of immunosuppression-related 
infections or cancers (which only 6.7 per cent of the respondents were willing to accept). 
Patients with Parkinson’s disease, for whom such relatively successful alternative 
treatments are currently lacking, do have a more permissive attitude towards 
xenotransplantation, despite their being informed of the potential virus risk50. 
 
Third, it is not at all clear whether the recipients of the recent islet xenograft trials 
mentioned above consented to the procedure fully aware of the risks. Valdés-González et 
al. have been criticized for their particular choice of recipients51. The published report 
notes that the recipients were twelve adolescents, whose mean age was 14.7 years (range 
11–17)52. Particularly the younger children may be incompetent to fully acknowledge the 
magnitude of the risk involved. (Furthermore, according to verbal reports, the recipients 
were street children, which would imply that they were desperate to be helped.) The 
report gives no indications of the level of information the recipients received prior to the 
transplantations. We were not granted leave to inspect the consent forms and thus cannot 
confirm these worries, but there is sufficient ground for suspicion. 
 
In short, we feel that postponing clinical trials until more pre-clinical data are acquired, is 
justified. 
 
11.2.2 The use of non-persons as experimental models: a body at will 
 
Whether or not research on bodies in a permanent vegetative state is an acceptable model 
for acquiring ‘pre-clinical’ data, however, is a different subject of criticism. Steven Curry, 
Heather Draper and Janna Thompson and Robert Sparrow have expressed three crucial 
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objections in this regard53,54,55,56. A first objection from the authors is that the permanent 
vegetative state either cannot or should not be regarded as death. Second, the argument is 
held that prior consent to willed body donation in case of a PVS is less deserving of respect 
than the wishes of surviving relatives. A third objection is that we are inconsistent to 
require prior consent for such a donation altogether, because our motivation is utilitarian 
and focused on the interests of the greater good only. 
 
The status of a PVS ‘patient’ 
 
As for the first objection, we are said to believe that “PVS patients are in fact dead”57. 
Some of the commentators hold this claim to be factually untrue, leading them to argue 
that we are dealing with living patients, “albeit with a very poor quality of life”58. 
Alternatively, it is said that this claim is logically inconsistent with the way in which we 
leave room for subjective judgement59. 
 
In response to whether “PVS patients are in fact dead”, we want to give the following 
remarks. Speaking of a ‘patient’ in a permanent vegetative state (let alone, of a ‘person’ 
in a permanent vegetative state), is a contradiction in terms and impedes the discussion. 
We argued that the word ‘patient’ is inappropriate in relation to the condition, because it 
generally refers to a living person, whereas the bodies we conceive of are permanently 
devoid of all forms of personhood, even of the minimum requirement for the capacity for 
personhood, while the body is still biologically active. Given that the person no longer 
exists, it makes sense only to speak of – indeed, living – bodies in a permanent vegetative 
state. 
 
That the person is dead while the body remains alive is the sine qua non of our proposal. It 
is neither a matter of opinion nor a matter of ethics. That a demonstrably irreversible 
vegetative state implies that the person has died leaving behind a living human body is a 
matter of fact which is in keeping with the specialization of the brain (see, for instance, 
cerebral cortex versus brain stem function). 
 
The fact that a person in a demonstrable and irreversible permanent vegetative state is 
dead, then, explains why we cannot accept the alternative justifications of PVS 
experimentation that have been suggested by Steven Curry and Heather Draper. According 
to Curry, provided that prior informed consent was sought, ‘living PVS patients’ may be 
enrolled in xenotransplantation experiments – just as healthy subjects may enrol for Phase 
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I and II drug trials – because they are ‘in exactly the right kinds of ways’ not like other 
patients:  
 
It just so happens that PVS patients do not have any of the interests listed by 
the authors. Persons who are in  a PVS will never wake up, they feel no pain or 
discomfort, and have no continuing interest in their own survival. Even if one 
thinks that PVS patients have a right to life (on even the most contentious 
meaning of this term), these patients must also have a right to risk that life for 
the common good.60 [our italics] 
 
Similarly, Draper argues that if an individual in a PVS wishes to participate in 
xenotransplantation research, this is a matter of “life-style choices”, a matter for him or 
her alone61. The authors believe that that move bypasses the need to agree on whether or 
not they are dead while maintaining the motivation to use bodies in a PVS. 
 
In effect, however, these claims miss the point and do not provide a more solid 
justification of our proposal. Persons, when in a permanent vegetative state, cannot 
decide to risk their lives for the common good, for there no longer is a person that can 
consider taking a risk. They can only decide in advance (t1) – and to a certain extent – the 
fate of their body once they, as a person, cease to exist (t2). 
 
We can distinguish various prior decisions of the fate of one’s body at t2. These include 
both decisions to keep the body alive or to let it die. In the latter case, the body becomes 
a cadaver and prior wishes concerning the retention of a corpse become applicable. In the 
case in which the body is to be kept alive, one can choose to either have it left untouched, 
or – the option that we open up – to donate it for research purposes. The question that 
remains, then, is whether such fate is acceptable for a living body. 
 
The response to that question depends on the value that can be attributed to a living, yet 
person-void, body. In other words, is the death of the person essentially sufficient to allow 
that the body is treated as a corpse? It is with regard to that question only that we leave 
room for subjective judgement. That is because it relates to the definitional or conceptual 
level of the concept of death. As stated above, the question whether or not a person is 
dead, is a matter of fact. That particular question relates to the criteriological and 
medical diagnostic levels of the concept of death, which are essentially a matter of natural 
sciences62. The definitional level, by contrast, is subject to philosophical and theological 
beliefs. That explains why people may hold different understandings of what it means for a 
human being to be dead. 
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That there can be very different understandings among people of how to define death does 
not mean that there are no limits to which concepts of death can be implemented. If that 
were the case, we would indeed need to accept an endless possibility of alternative 
definitions of death, as one commentator points out63. Nonetheless, we do feel that it is 
reasonable to claim that the death of the person is a sufficient condition of what it means 
to be dead. The reason for that lies in the common ground with the current concept of 
brain death. It is the irreversible loss of consciousness and thus of any capacity for 
personhood rather than loss of brain stem functioning that lies at the basis of accepting 
whole brain death, which was prior to involvement of the interests of the transplant field 
characterized by ‘le coma dépassé’. Death of the person is the necessary condition of 
having certain wishes with regard to treatment of the body met, and that is by definition 
the case for both whole brain death and cortical brain death. 
 
Conflicting interests between the dead and the living  
 
Janna Thompson, in stating her reluctance to treat PVS bodies as dead, contests that 
conceptual consistency. According to her, treating PVS bodies in the manner we suggest 
would cause the public to reach the ‘breaking point’ given the current tensions between 
social and medical perceptions of death64. It is unclear how Thompson can know this to be 
so, for she gives no indications to support her claim. The general and important point that 
she makes, however, is that use of PVS bodies for research purposes would cause great 
discomfort and inconvenience for the surviving relatives, an issue we also raised, and the 
significance of which we do not mean to undervalue. Nevertheless, the idea that this 
inconvenience and distress should overrule the prior consent concerning the body in a PVS, 
raises the question as to what the value of personal autonomy and informed consent of a 
person at t1 is and to what degree it must be respected at t2. 
 
Thompson is outspoken in defence of the idea that ‘the wishes of the deceased’ are less 
deserving of respect than the wishes of surviving relatives and may thus be discarded65. 
Most of the other authors would seem to agree with that view. It is however confusing to 
speak of the ‘wishes of the dead/deceased’ (or, alternatively, of the ‘right of the living 
dead’) and to use that claim as the starting point for morally weighing the significance of 
those wishes. The dead have no wishes to be (dis)respected. Rather, what is at stake is the 
right of the living to decide in advance when and how to be treated as dead and the 
question of whether that prior decision should be respected after the person has died. 
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The default position, that testamentary wishes should be respected to a certain degree, is 
generally limited only in those cases in which honouring these prior wishes would disrupt 
other values or judicial requirements without a counterbalance. For instance, a desire to 
display one’s decomposing cadaver in a public area as an artistic statement would disrupt 
the tradition-bound value of properly putting a body to rest, and is not counterbalanced by 
the satisfaction that would result from this exposure. That does not mean, however, that 
there are no circumstances under which one’s cadaver can be publicly exposed; on the 
contrary, there can be very good reasons to do so. In the ‘body farm’ (officially known as 
the University of Tennessee Forensic Anthropology Facility), bodies lay to rest in the open 
as a source of information for the science of decomposition66. The results of that research 
allow a more accurate understanding of the process of decomposition and thus a more 
precise determination of the time of death, which is crucial to crime-solving. 
 
While our suggestion may disrupt the value of properly putting a body to rest, there is also 
a weighty counterbalance. The use of a body in a PVS would serve a great societal purpose, 
comparable to the purpose that impelled the shift in policy to the whole brain death 
standard (making organs more available for transplantation). This is not an outrageous 
thing to wish. The family will know exactly where the body is located and what will take 
place. If the desire to offer one’s living body to science in the event of a permanent 
vegetative state is discussed with family members in advance, the surviving relatives need 
not necessarily be distressed. In fact, the relatives may even be consoled by the body 
donation of the deceased person, in that it gives some meaning to the death and that the 
donor will be remembered for his or her nobility and altruism. Moreover, Thompson’s 
concern that the bodies cannot be put to rest in an appropriate manner should be equally 
of concern with regard to current postmortem body donation, for which a body may be 
kept for up to three years. 
 
Prior consent and the greater good 
 
Robert Sparrow raises a third objection to our suggestion. He questions the role we 
attribute to prior consent in light of our motivation to promote a public benefit. He claims 
that we cannot but conclude that the prior consent is outweighed by the sum of benefits 
the research on their bodies would produce for the general public (and the patient 
population, more specifically). In light of these greater benefits, Sparrow argues, our 
arguments should not rely so heavily on explicit consent. They should rather endorse 
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presumed consent or even a full discarding of the moral significance of consent. Within a 
consequentialist perspective, it should be irrelevant whether or not the research is 
conducted in accordance with the prior wishes, so he argues. 
 
It is, however, not true that a utilitarian motivation must support the implications that 
Sparrow lists. For one, the radical utilitarianism that Sparrow conceives of would not, in a 
utilitarian calculation, bring about the best consequences. In analogy with a popular 
thought experiment, in which an angry mob is desperate to find and punish the 
unrecognized offender of a severe crime, sympathisers of consequentialist motivations do 
not necessarily have to accept that a sheriff must turn over an innocent man in order to 
avoid a public riot. One can still choose not to turn the man over because of a realistic 
anticipation that it would not bring about the best consequences (consider, e.g., the riot 
that would arise when the mob finds out that justice has not been served). Similarly, the 
distress that would arise from disregarding the wishes of a prior person would not be a 
better alternative than limiting experimentations to bodies that have been donated in 
consent. Moreover, it is wrong to presume that there can be no principle-based restrictions 
on utilitarian calculations. If our argumentation lacked any principle-based approach, we 
would not have arrived at the proposal to begin with, for we would not be looking for ways 
to avoid the ethical problems that arise in using patients as research subjects. We stand by 
the principle of personal autonomy and do not agree that it can in this case be thwarted by 
public benefit. We can defend presumed consent if it is in accordance with respect to 
personal autonomy, in other words, if the public does in fact largely consent and know that 
the consent is being presumed in absence of an explicit objection. That is certainly not the 
case at this stage of our suggestion. Defence of carrying out the research without or 
against the willingness of the prior person is out of the question. 
 
11.2.3 The ‘greater good’: critical notes 
 
Our argument to use PVS bodies as research models is not driven by an ultra-utilitarian 
argumentation. It is nonetheless illustrative of the fact that we have gone to great lengths 
to find acceptable conditions under which xenotransplantation may proceed, rather than 
to preclude its development altogether. Our arguments have been driven by the 
anticipation that, if xenotransplantation will one day be successful, the overall benefits of 
this procedure will be immense. Most importantly, an unlimited supply of transplantable 
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grafts could, in principle, annul the current difficulties of ensuring equitable access to life-
saving and/or quality of life enhancing transplant activities. 
 
However, various arguments have arisen in the literature, which appear to undermine the 
appeal of producing an unlimited supply of xenografts in terms of that benefit. The 
concern exists that xenotransplantation will close the gap in the ‘duty of equity’ only to 
open another. Two scenario’s can be distinguished in this regard: 
 
on the micro-level, it is possible that, under certain circumstances, solid organ 
xenotransplantation will not enhance equitable access to transplant activities; 
on the macro-level, it is questionable whether focus on augmenting the transplant rate 
through xenotransplantation is a justifiable expenditure of health care resources, with 
regard to other health care options. 
 
We will not address those concerns in depth, as we lack sufficient data to fully investigate 
the possible organisational and financial implications of a procedure that has not yet been 
established. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to mention those considerations, because they 
indicate the specific conditions under which the benefits of xenotransplantation will truly 
be substantial. 
 
11.2.3.1 Barriers to equity on the micro-level 
 
A particular problem arises with the possibility that xenotransplantation will turn out to be 
no more than a temporary solution for patients with end-stage organ disease: a bridge to 
transplant. That is the primary utility of ex vivo perfusion techniques. The in vivo 
implantation of solid xenogeneic organs may also prove to be of limited duration, at least 
during the initial trial phases, if specific immunological rejection and physiological 
incompatibilities cannot be sufficiently overcome in advance. If xenotransplantation were 
merely to develop as a bridge to transplant, that would imply that the waiting lists for a 
human organ would not decrease, rather on the contrary. Patients would become eligible 
for a human organ transplant, whereas without the temporary xenograft, they might not 
have survived. 
 
The same effect is expected for the use of totally implantable artificial hearts, at least in 
the early phases of routine clinical use. The Rathenau Institute has designed a quantitative 
simulation model to assess the effect of artificial heart transplantations on the waiting 
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list67. The simulation model shows that, by introducing artificial hearts, the number of 
people on the waiting list decreases and waiting time is reduced. Nevertheless, it also 
shows that, temporarily, more people on the waiting lists will die if artificial hearts 
provide only a short-term solution than would be the case if the normal donor heart 
programme continued. That scenario results from the expectation that recipients of an 
artificial heart will, at some point, develop an acute need for an allotransplant. Given the 
urgency of the transplantation, those patients will be given priority on the waiting list, 
thereby directly lengthening others’ time on the waiting list and indirectly affecting their 
mortality. Mortality will continue to increase unless the performance of the artificial heart 
almost equals that of a human heart. With a few exceptions (e.g. short-term liver 
perfusion may allow the liver to fully recover), it is reasonable to expect a similar increase 
in mortality when using xenotransplantation as a bridge to allotransplantation. 
 
It is also possible that xeno-organs will be of suboptimal quality in comparison with 
allografts. In that case, too, the problem of just allocation is not solved, as there will be 
competition for the best organs68. Xenotransplantation could thereby induce the same 
problems that occur in the allocation of marginal donor grafts. Alternatively, it is possible 
that quality will vary among the supply of xenogeneic organs and that access to the best 
quality xenografts will be inequitable. In that respect, it is important to note that 
xenografts will be purchasable health care ‘products’, the price of which will reflect the 
expenditures for research and development and for the patented techniques to produce 
genetically modified source animals in particular. The purchase will also cover the costs of 
ensuring that the pig herd is free of infectious disease, including requirements that relate 
to housing, breeding, feeding, medicating, testing and carcass disposal. Sanders Chae has 
suggested that the prices of xenoproducts could – within reasonable standards – vary 
according to differences in quality69. The best quality xenografts could be charged the 
sharpest prices; suboptimal grafts could be made available at lower prices. If access to 
health care operates on the material principle of ability to pay, only the rich will be able 
to afford the best treatment options. 
 
The fact that xenografts will be purchasable products also raises the concern that this will 
diminish the general motivation to donate one’s organs altruistically. Although still highly 
controversial, we have given various arguments as to why lack of altruism does not 
necessarily diminish the moral significance of strategies that help to augment the 
transplant rate (see Chapters 2 and 3). In any case, concern over the fate of altruism 
should apply just as much to the emergence of other forms of graft-engineering. 
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Nonetheless, if large-scale use of purchasable transplant products were to decrease the 
rate of human organ donation, this could be highly problematic in light of the fact that 
xenotransplantation will not eliminate the need for human grafts altogether70. Human 
organ donation will remain a necessary alternative in initial phases, but also in the long 
term, for patients who may never come to accept an animal-derived replacement graft or 
(with regard to the concern mentioned above) who cannot afford one. While we cannot 
predict the future impact of xenotransplantation on the public’s willingness to donate, a 
direct (albeit perhaps minimal) adverse effect on the human donor potential will inevitably 
result from the vital requirement that xenotransplant product recipients and their intimate 
contacts (defined as those with whom the recipient risks exchanges of bodily fluids) do not 
donate any body parts for use in humans71. 
 
Those concerns do not undermine the appeal for the use of xenotransplantation to save 
lives that would otherwise go lost. They rather indicate several conditions 
xenotransplantation must meet if it is to solve current problems of access to 
transplantation procedures. On the whole, it can be expected that problems of fair access 
to transplants can be avoided if the rescue through a xenotransplantation does not in itself 
entail subsequent rescue through an allotransplantation; if human graft donation remains 
encouraged; and if xenotransplantation does not introduce additional or inequitable 
financial restraints on transplant procedures. Whether or not the latter criterion can be 
fulfilled is for a great deal dependent on whether xenotransplantation will be made 
available by public health care resources and/or private insurance. It is at this macro-level 
of decision-making that the prospect of clinical xenotransplantation threatens yet another 
‘duty of equity’. The introduction of an unlimited supply of transplantable xenografts will 
imply an overall high rise of health care expenses. In relying on public or insurance funds, 
this will raise health care costs for all, ultimately raising the question whether 
xenotransplantation should have priority over other health care options. 
 
11.2.3.2 Barriers to equity on the macro-level 
 
Xenotransplantation: economic aspects 
 
Clinical xenotransplantation will by definition result in a high rise of health care 
expenditures given the very intention to enable treatment of virtually all patients who 
require – or could benefit from – a transplant. Organ allotransplantation is one of the most 
expensive medical procedures available today. In the US, annually, an average of $33,000 
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is spent on billed charges per organ recipient72 With inadequate graft supply, the 
transplantation rate is nonetheless a de facto rationed procedure, claiming not more than 
half a per cent of the total national health care expenditure73. If all those in need of a 
transplant were to receive an allo- or xenotransplant, however, annual expenditures would 
rise from a conservative $2.9 billion to $20.3 billion, according to The Institutes of 
Medicine74. That is likely to be an underestimate, given the possibility that 
xenotransplantation will entail a higher rate of re-transplantation, even when its utility 
transgresses the phase of providing a bridge to transplant. As the lifespan of a pig is 10 to 
20 years, the survival of porcine organs may be much shorter than that of human organs. It 
is also conceivable that chronic rejection of xenografts will develop earlier than is the case 
for allografts. Furthermore, as mentioned above, xenografts may require increased 
immunosuppression even for such shorter xenograft survival. In light of the known effects 
of immunosuppression following an allotransplantation (see Chapter 1), it is conceivable 
that that will have adverse effects on the functioning of other organs. Also, the Institute of 
Medicine’s estimate does not include the cost of cellular transplants and presupposes that 
the price per xenotransplant will be tantamount to that of an equivalent allotransplant. 
 
Costs related to transplantation appear at three levels75. During a first, pre-transplant 
phase, there are charges involving registration on the waiting list and evaluation and 
monitoring of the prospective recipients’ health status. During the transplant phase, costs 
relate to graft procurement, surgery, hospitalization and hospital staff fees. The post-
transplant phase induces varying costs of immunosuppressive therapy, follow-up and 
medical care of complication episodes. While it is difficult to estimate the expenses for 
xenotransplantation without the technology completed, it is reasonable to expect that it 
will increase the financial burdens at each of the above-mentioned levels. 
 
The greatest savings xenotransplantation will offer concern the costs currently related to 
the pre-transplant phase. Successful xenotransplantation will avoid care during the 
currently long wait for a transplant, including pre-transplant life support and expensive 
ICU facilities. Indeed, it has been assessed that waiting list expenses constitute one of the 
major costs associated with kidney transplantation76. Nonetheless, another cost factor is 
the screening of graft safety prior to surgery. Twenty percent of the costs of human kidney 
acquisition are related to pre-transplant laboratory costs77. It has been estimated that 
testing each human donor for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), Hepatitis B (HBV) and 
Hepatitis C (HCV) currently costs approximately $15078. The rate of positive screening tests 
is 0.093 per cent for HIV, 0.299 per cent for HBV and 1.091 per cent for HCV. The total 
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cost of eliminating one potentially infectious donor is estimated to be $4 million for HIV, 
$2.6 million for HBV and $2.3 million for HCV. If infectiveness cannot be completely 
precluded in the source animals, the screening of xenografts will be much more elaborate. 
Xenotransplantation will also require the drawing up of patient registries and the 
installation of blood and tissue archives. The costs of establishing a registry to archive 
samples from source animals and xenograft recipients are assessed at $250,000 to $300,000 
a year79. The archive itself would cost approximately $1 million a year. 
 
Pre-transplant savings will also be undercut by the higher costs of graft acquisition. As 
mentioned above, in contrast to human donated grafts, xenoproducts will have their price. 
It is currently uncertain what that amount will be (although critics estimate that the costs 
of pig organs may be as high as $100,00080). It is conceivable that the price of a xenograft 
will partly be dependent on the efficient use of the cells, tissues and organs from the 
source animals. Cellular xenotransplants are likely to be less expensive, particularly if a 
distinction is made between the species and the developmental stage of the source 
animals from which the cells are procured. Wright et al have presented a conservative 
measurement of the relative costs for xenogeneic islet transplantation from either 
transgenic tilapia or adult porcine donors81. The authors suggest that, on a per clinical 
transplant basis, the use of adult pigs as sources of islets would be at least hundredfold 
more expensive than transgenic tilapia islet production. For the use of adult pigs, costs of 
islet isolation per encapsulated islet xenotransplantation will exceed $60,000 – expenses 
relating to the housing requirements not included. For tilapia fish, those costs are 
estimated at $640. The authors did not compare the costs for islet retrieval from adult and 
neonatal/foetal pigs, but the latter (which we also prefer for ethical reasons) is also likely 
to be less costly. 
 
The follow-up of xenograft recipients will also be more expensive than current post-
transplant measures. In addition to the maintenance of patient registries and archives, 
infectious disease experts and staff will need to be hired to apply the long-term infection 
control measures. The expenditure on immunosuppression may also be higher, if 
xenotransplantation requires exclusively produced and patented drug regimens. There are 
also unpredictable costs associated with infectious disease outbreaks (note in this regard 
that the French government disbursed $2.2 billion to compensate victims of AIDS-
contaminated blood transfusions administered between 1980 and 198582). 
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Is xenotransplantation a health care delivery priority? 
 
In Chapter 2, we noted that, for those who grant a positive right to transplantation 
medicine, its purpose must not be rationed for health care savings. Nonetheless, a 
‘positive right’ to health care is a very problematic notion83. Aside of the invalidity of the 
theoretical notions on which the concept is founded, it is highly impracticable to grant an 
individual a right to a particular health care product. Since the 1990s, there has been a 
dramatic and universal increase in economic pressure on health care systems. The crisis 
has been felt most clearly in the US, which witnessed an increase in gross domestic 
product expenditure on health care by 10.8 per cent between 1960 and 200484. By 2005, 
the country spent almost 15 per cent of its GDP on health care85. All nations of the 
European Union, too, have been subject to an increase in health care expenditure over the 
past decades. Currently, the EU-15 spend 8.6 per cent of their GDP on health care (the 
average figure for the new member states is 5.8 per cent)86. For every health care system, 
the primary factor associated with growing expenditures, aside of the longer life 
expectancy in aging populations, is the increased development and usage of medical 
technological innovations. More and more money is allocated to medicine because there 
are more and more biomedical breakthroughs. Governments, however efficiently they may 
manage their health care system, cannot accommodate every individual’s right to health. 
In particular, they cannot ensure, on an a priori basis, access to the benefits of all 
emerging technologies. Efforts to cover expenses for emerging technologies drive up health 
care costs for all. The increasing supply of medical therapies has also resulted in an 
increase in out-of-pocket requirements for patients, even in tax-financed health care 
systems such as the one in Belgium87. If national health services are to cover the expenses 
for xenotransplantation, such a decision must invariably involve a trade-off with other 
health care options. 
 
In our justification of allocating health care funding to allotransplantation, we applied the 
maximin principle, as well as the principle of maximized net social utility. However, in 
questioning whether those justifications can be generalized to legitimize xenotransplant 
funding, some critical notes are in place. 
 
Maximin. The first approach is based on the principle that health care resources should be 
distributed so as to enhance greater health equality among all citizens. If choices must be 
made, a more substantial share of the resources should be distributed to the worst-off in 
terms of health care needs. What constitutes a health care need is a matter of debate, but 
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Daniels has delineated the concept in light of the normal range of opportunities an 
individual would have were he or she in good health88. An individual’s ‘normal range’ is 
dependent on normal species functioning, his or her specific skills and talents and the level 
of societal material wealth and historical/technological development. A normal range of 
opportunities would allow the individual, were he or she in good health, to pursue 
reasonable, happiness-producing life plans and conceptions of the good. In general, the 
disease conditions that involve a greater reduction of an individual's share of the normal 
opportunity range, should receive priority in health care allocation. 
 
Given the impact of end stage organ failure on an individual’s share of opportunities, a 
life-saving xenotransplant would obviously count as meeting a health care need. Some 
cellular nonvital xenotreatments will also be relevant in this respect, in their ability to 
alleviate chronic disabling limitations on activity. Nonetheless, from the normal 
opportunity-range perspective, not all xenotransplants will be considered equally 
important. In particular, the claim for a fair share of the range of normal opportunities 
does not always apply for all age groups. The latter argument is often used to criticize 
health care that primarily targets elderly patient populations. Note in this respect that, 
according to studies in OECD countries, patients aged 65 and above consume four times 
more health care than those aged under 6589. Daniels asserts that procedures meant to 
delay the effects of normal aging do not address a real need, since normal aging does not 
deviate from normal species functioning90. Callahan, too, limits health care to those 
treatments that are directed toward improving the quality of life within a finite life cycle 
and to conquering those diseases and conditions that bring a premature death91. In this 
respect, xenotransplants for nonvital complications that arise as a result of an aging 
population, such as neural xenotransplantation for neurodegenerative disease, will be most 
difficult to justify. And although kidney transplantation offers a lengthening of an average 
of up to 5 good quality years of life and proper graft survival for patients even older than 
75 years92, expenditures on solid organ xenotransplantation will not be legitimized if they 
target that age group only, or predominantly. Such treatments could be called disease care 
rather than health care. 
 
Proposals to ration health care for the elderly are not uncontroversial (and often labelled 
‘ageist’), particularly within societies that demand increasing productivity from their aging 
populations. Nonetheless, if age, in light of claims on life-plan opportunities, can be 
considered a relevant moral criterion to ration choices, that would not eliminate the 
appeal for xenotransplantation entirely. It would merely support the existing trend to 
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prioritize transplanting younger patients and patients with dependants. Waiting list 
statistics clarify that all age groups require, to a varying degree, vital organ replacement 
therapies. Of the 98,471 patients currently on the national US waiting list for an organ, an 
average of 13 per cent (12,980) is aged 65 or more93. However, roughly 2 per cent (2,215) 
of the patients on the waiting list is aged 0 to 17, and 11 per cent (11,116) is aged 18 to 
34. Furthermore, although only 1 death is reported on the 2005 Eurotransplant waiting list 
for kidneys among patients aged 0 to 15, the highest mortality rates are among the age 
group 16 to 55 (41 per cent of the 565 deaths)94. That age group also accounted for the 
highest death rates among patients awaiting a heart (49,8 per cent), a lung (60.7 per 
cent), a liver (53.3 per cent) and a pancreas (94 per cent) transplant95. If we are to focus 
health care on patients with the least access to a normal opportunity range, the impact of 
end stage organ failure on children and adults in their prime clearly makes way for a high 
priority claim. This is all the more compelling in light of the fact that it is most difficult to 
find appropriate replacements for certain organs, such as the heart, for very young infants. 
The pigs bred as source animals may provide organs that are of suitable size. Islet cell 
xenotransplants could also address the health care needs of an ever-growing population of 
young patients afflicted with chronic diabetes. 
 
Still, it remains highly debatable whether a focus on those who are most in need of a 
transplant will accommodate the overall neediest of patients. Daniels has questioned 
whether cardiac transplantation should be funded, given that many other options might be 
more effective and efficient in protecting the normal opportunity range for a larger group 
of patients96. Oregon has led the way in rationing transplants on the basis of such 
considerations. In 1987, the state legislature decided to stop solid organ transplant 
coverage from Medicaid, the US programme that covers certain medical expenses for low-
income individuals and families97. It was determined that cutting expenditure on 
transplants would better meet the needs of the least well-off by reducing infant mortality 
through greater investments in prenatal maternal care. 
 
Maximized utility. Although it could be argued that programs which specifically reduce 
infant mortality must be granted priority over increased expenditure on the field of 
transplantation, we have also supported the allocation of health care resources to 
allotransplantation in terms of maximized pay-off to society. As we saw in Chapter 1, in 
developed regions, the proportion of people with chronic diseases potentially treatable by 
transplantation – such as cardiovascular disease, cancer and diabetes – is enormous and is 
expected to grow. Furthermore, allotransplantation of solid organs often provides the best 
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overall anticipated health gains at lower costs in comparison with non-transplantation or 
alternative treatments. Further societal savings may also result from post-transplant re-
employment. Nonetheless, here too, some additional conditions for justifications of 
xenotransplant funding must be noted. 
 
For one, it is ambiguous whether the prospect of re-employment is a valid justification of 
transplant costs. In a review of post-allotransplant employment, Paris et al indicate that 
fewer than 50 per cent of organ transplant recipients who are clinically judged physically 
able to work, actually return to successful employment98. Post-transplant depression and 
anxiety rates, which are reported above 50 per cent, appear as important factors that 
decrease the patient’s capacity to function optimally in a work environment. It is possible 
that such psychological complications will increase after an organ xenotransplant, at least 
in the early years (see Chapter 9). 
 
The net health gains of allotransplantation are also not left uncontested. Fox and Swazey 
have critiqued an over-utilization of transplantation as an often zealous effort to save life 
at any cost99. Their concern is related to the over-glorification of the quality and quantity 
of life that may follow and the use of these procedures for patients whose overall health 
status is severely compromised. That observation again brings to light the difficulties of 
justifying xenotransplantation if it does not establish substantial benefits in terms of high-
quality life years gained. 
 
Furthermore, while in many cases allotransplantation of solid organs is more cost-effective 
than dialysis or conventional treatments, it is in no way clear that the same will be true 
for xenotransplantation. The ongoing costs of post-transplant care constitute the limiting 
factor of allotransplant cost-effectiveness against other existing treatment options100. If 
xenotransplantation, as mentioned above, requires more aggressive and expensive 
immunosuppression, the investment in follow-up will be even greater. Of course, the 
demand for such therapies could be reduced given that some patient populations, such as 
the elderly, may not be able to tolerate the toxic effects of immunosuppression. Cellular 
therapeutic modalities that do not require long-term immunosuppression are more 
attractive in this respect. If adequate graft function and survival can be obtained, cellular 
grafts could, in principle, provide cell therapies that are cheaper and less invasive 
alternatives to whole organ transplants. 
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In the long run, it will also be essential in terms of cost-effectiveness to prove that 
xenotransplantation is a better use of resources than alternatives currently still under 
development. Given that the costs and outcomes of regenerative medicine or artificial 
replacement technology are not fully known, a comparative analysis is purely speculative 
at this stage. There is, however, one alternative, which is often regarded as being by far 
the best way to maximize societal pay-off. Effective prevention would undoubtedly lead to 
greater net health benefits than the large-scale administering of replacement medicine101. 
Cardiovascular disease, cancer, chronic lung diseases and diabetes mellitus are for a great 
part induced by tobacco and alcohol use, unhealthy diets and lack of physical activity102. 
Increased focus on preventive care could reduce the future burdens of exposure to those 
risk factors and that would be the most effective and efficient way to raise overall health 
levels at lower costs103. Ideally, the emergence of new, curative biomedical technologies 
should not drain public resources from such prevention measures. However, graft-
engineering procedures emerge as a possibility for those patients who require treatment 
before the effects of prevention measures may become tangible and to those who develop 
congenitally acquired pathologies. 
 
Allocation problems are inescapable in areas of modern medicine and there can be no 
uniform answer to the question whether the expected benefits of an emerging technology 
must be granted a priority in health care funding. Unfortunately, we cannot provide a 
more comprehensive analysis of the resource implications of xenotransplantation. That 
would require a lot of additional information regarding comparative costs and outcomes, 
much of which is still a matter of speculation. What is clear, however, is that cost will play 
a major role in determining whether widespread implementation of clinical 
xenotransplantation will occur or not. In the end, it is reasonable to expect that the 
decision should lie in the authority of the public, who will (indirectly) bear the costs. 
Currently, however, there is reason to be sceptical about the favourable attitude of the 
public in this regard. In Canada, an extensive public consultation on xenotransplantation 
was conducted, consisting of citizen forums and mail-in/telephone/website surveys. 
Among the results of that consultation, only 30 per cent of the forum, 35 per cent of the 
mail-in, 22 per cent of the website and 35 per cent of the telephone survey respondents 
supported a redirection of health care resources to xenotransplantation104. The main 
objections were based on scarce funds, high costs and other health care priorities. 
 
Of course, it can be expected that such opinions will shift the more the science base of the 
technology progresses. Indeed, we believe that in light of the considerations above, there 
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are various conditions under which justifications of allocating health care funds to future 
xenotransplantation applications will be most compelling. That will be the case if 
xenotransplantation provides more than merely a bridge to allotransplantation: it should 
optimize the outlook of substantial benefits in terms of high-quality life-years gained and 
primarily be attributed to patients for whom such an outlook is realistic. It should also 
provide an appropriate replacement therapy for children. Furthermore, the cost-
effectiveness of xenotransplantation is for a great deal dependent on the level of 
immunosuppression required. The use of effective cellular therapies will be most 
advantageous in that respect, particularly if the costs are minimized through efficient use 
of adult source animals and maximized procurement from foetal animals. Further pre-
clinical research in xenogeneic infectiveness may also alleviate some of the follow-up 
costs. 
 
11.3 Pursuing xenotransplant research: time to bring home the bacon? 
 
We highlighted the importance of persistent and extensive research in pig-to-human 
infectiveness, immunology and physiology before xenotransplantation can proceed to the 
clinic. At this point, the benefits do not outweigh the risks to the public and the patient. 
The most pressing condition for a favourable risk/benefit analysis is further identification 
and exclusion of the infection or recombination potential of detectable organisms. Clinical 
trials involving solid organs, particularly, also still await major advances in countering 
immunological and physiological incompatibilities before prospective recipients can 
reasonably expect a substantial longevity and quality of life. Although such an expectation 
may be a rather high standard for an experimental therapy, it is nonetheless crucial in 
order to counterbalance inevitable levels of ‘unknown’ risk to the patient and to enhance 
public acceptance. It will also be important in order for the procedure to make a 
compelling claim on public health care funding and to produce a positive rather than a 
negative effect on the waiting list burden. 
 
While further reducing the risks of xenotransplantation is obviously in the best interests of 
patients and public, however, it implies an increasing harm to the research animals. It also 
implies an additional and substantial channelling of time and financial/infrastructural 
resources. Industry estimates indicate that the development and marketing of most new 
drugs or biological products take an average of 10 to 12 years105. The development of 
transplantable xenogeneic organs has already far exceeded this time frame, with 
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experiments sporadically attempted over the past century. Despite that long time span, 
there have not yet been major medical breakthroughs and it remains uncertain whether 
the research will eventually pay off in successful, clinical applications of the type we have 
identified. Given the uncertainty of outcome, it is worth questioning under what conditions 
it is justified to continue to invest these resources in xenotransplant research. 
 
‘Potential’ benefit versus direct losses 
 
Surely all biomedical research requires considerable financial and infrastructural means. It 
remains unclear what the proportion of xenotransplantation research is to average 
investments in those terms. However, the need to justify continued support for 
xenotransplantation research is perhaps pivotal when considering that it requires an 
enormous level of ‘investment’ in terms of animal lives. Thus far, we have justified the use 
of pigs as source animals in reference to the direct benefits that accrue to humans. Such a 
direct comparative assessment does not apply for the animals that have already been and 
will continue to be sacrificed during the long and uncertain stages of research. The harms 
done to those animals can only be weighed against a continuously postponed prospect of 
benefit. 
 
We have not addressed ethical issues regarding the use of animals for xenotransplant 
research in depth because it is not a unique concern for xenotransplantation, but rather an 
ethical problem inherent in most types of biomedical research. Specific aspects of 
xenotransplant research nonetheless indicate that there may be more at stake here than in 
other research areas. In particular, xenotransplant research is distinctive in terms of the 
proportion of animals used and the level of suffering implied by the research. Animals are 
used both as research models and as sources of the grafts that are to be tested in those 
models. The proportion of animals used will thus exceed that of research that uses animals 
only in the first sense. The research area is also inherently dependent on the use of 
nonhuman primates (mostly monkeys and baboons) as surrogate models in order to best 
extrapolate human responses to porcine immunology and physiology. In light of our 
capacity-dignity arguments, the use of primates for research purposes is a particularly 
sensitive spot in our assessment of the ethical acceptability of xenotransplantation. 
 
Given that xenotransplantation research programs are running in countless institutions 
worldwide, we cannot provide an estimate of the total number of animals (in large and 
small animal models) sacrificed to date. As a general statement, we cannot help but feel 
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frustrated by the lack of transparency of such information. The little data available reveal 
that, by 2001, up to 10,000 pigs had been killed for xenotransplant research purposes in 
the UK alone106. According to statistics cited by Schicktanz, during the 1990s, the UK and 
Germany (which, together with France, are by far the largest investors of primate lives for 
research in Europe107) used 3,500 and between 1,500 and 2,000 nonhuman primates, 
respectively, for research every year108. In Germany, between 1999 and 2000, 2 to 5 per 
cent of those animals were specifically used for xenotransplantation purposes. In the UK, 
that proportion is larger. By 1999, researchers at Imutran (a subsidiary of the multinational 
drug firm Novartis Pharma, which produced the first transgenic pig) had conducted more 
than 350 porcine organ transplants in primates109. That amounts to at least 10 per cent of 
this nation’s research involving primates. 
 
As indicated above, our defence of the use of willed body donation in case of a PVS also 
applies as a response to concerns over the interests of primates. However, we understand 
that this is, on a societal level, a controversial step and that general acceptance is not 
within reach. Even if it were, it could take many years before PVS bodies with prior 
consent are available. The mechanisms for requesting and registering such a consent must 
first be put in place and the procedure must be made known to the general public. A 
perhaps more practicable scenario would be the use of whole brain dead bodies, which has 
also been suggested as a model to study the effects of xenografts on human immune and 
complement systems. According to Thomas Starzl, even if we could observe the effects of 
such xenografts for only a few hours, the pathology study would provide more valuable 
information than any animal models110. 
 
Undoubtedly, for some people, the need to use higher primates for xenotransplantation 
research is reason enough to oppose it on the whole. We realize that a fundamental 
consideration of the interests of primates should necessarily lead us to object to all 
research involving their use. In that respect, it is interesting to note that, as suggested by 
the above percentages, xenotransplant research programs are not the major consumers of 
primate lives. Conlee et al. indicate that in the US, which uses up to five times more 
primates than the European Union (approximately 58,000 versus 11,000), the research 
focus lies on hepatitis viruses, cognition, behavioural and HIV research111. An extensive 
review of studies published in peer-reviewed journals in 2001 reveals similar results: the 
most common areas of primate research involve microbiology (including HIV/AIDS 
research), neuroscience, biochemistry and pharmacology/physiology112. 
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Most people will accept that the use of even primate models for certain types of 
biomedical research is a ‘necessary evil’ for the greater good. What is important in 
justifying their use, then, is that all is done to minimize the ‘necessary evil’ as much as 
possible. That relates to the need to conduct the research in accordance with the ethical 
standards that the number of animals used is absolutely essential to contribute to progress 
in the research field, that the animals are used only for lack of alternative models and that 
they are afflicted with the least possible level of suffering or pain. Compliance to such 
standards evidently is a first condition for further investment in xenotransplant research 
and the importance thereof has been addressed since the early advisory reports on 
xenotransplantation113. 
 
Nonetheless, there are some reasons as to why the use of primates is an especially 
sensitive issue for xenotransplantation research. For one, past experiments have been 
conducted in direct breach of legal limits on animal suffering. As was briefly mentioned in 
Chapter 6, Dan Lyons of Uncaged Campaigns published a report entitled Diaries of Despair: 
The secret history of pig-to-primate organ transplant experiments114. The report is mainly 
based on correspondence between the above-mentioned biotech company Imutran,  
Huntingdon Life Sciences (an affiliate Contract Research Organisation) and the UK Home 
Office. The confidential documents leaked in the spring of 2000 from an anonymous 
source. They included study reports that detailed the procedures and results of genetically 
modified porcine organ transplants into the necks, abdomens and chests of hundreds of 
cynomolgus monkeys and baboons. It was shown that more primates were killed than 
declared and that some of the primates were wild-caught. The duration of shipment of 
imported primates was longer than the time approved by the Home Office. The cages used 
also violated size and ventilation regulations. In various experiments, furthermore, the 
transplant procedures failed due to avoidable technical mistakes. For instance, several 
primates were overdosed with anaesthetics, one monkey was accidentally transplanted a 
frozen pig kidney and another monkey died from a lethal infection due to a swab that was 
not removed from the abdomen after surgery115. Lyons has published a letter in Nature, in 
which he accuses the UK government animal research authorities of serious malpractice116. 
 
Of course it would be wrong to stigmatize all xenotransplant research on the basis of this 
particular case of non-adherence to ethical standards of animal research. Nonetheless, 
even if we can assume that xenotransplant researchers generally do all that is required to 
minimize the necessary evil, many xenotransplant experiments inevitably involve a greater 
level of harm than general research objectives. While other programs may require a larger 
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investment of primate lives, xenotransplant primate models often involve major transplant 
surgery which – apart from the adverse effects that may arise by mishap – can cause 
painful recovery, organ rejection and/or failure, infections and complications from 
aggressive immunosuppression regimens. As such, it constitutes a significant proportion of 
the few research programs that require invasive research (2 per cent of the studies 
published in 2001117). 
 
In light of these considerations, the burden of the investment that is at stake should not be 
underestimated. Therefore, however much we depend on progress in pre-clinical research 
before we can reach a point at which it is justified to proceed to the clinic, the credit to 
continued xenotransplant research programs cannot be unconditional. 
 
Potential benefit and the Concorde Fallacy118 
 
The Concorde is widely known as the most expensive and at once most disappointing 
marketing experiment in history. The supersonic commercial aircraft took over twenty 
years of engineering and testing before regular commercial flights were conducted. 
Although the aircrafts were not lucrative, the British and French governments long 
continued their investments in the project. That decision was based on the belief that 
ending the project would mean a waste of the considerable amounts of money already 
invested. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, we can certainly recognize the impact of the flawed 
reasoning in this historical example. The dedication to past investments was an irrational 
factor in the decision to pursue the project and resulted in a dramatic waste of public 
resources without any significant recovery of the prior investment. Nonetheless, it is worth 
mentioning that during the process of decision-making about commitment to a future 
investment, we are often intuitively liable to committing that fallacy. An example often 
given in this regard is the imaginary scenario in which you pay for a movie ticket in 
advance and come to regret your purchase, perhaps because you know you will not like the 
movie or there are other activities that you would prefer. In such a case, many people 
would still consider it a waste not to use the purchased ticket. However, that decision 
would be irrational. If you decide to use the ticket, the money is wasted anyhow, as it 
could have been better spent otherwise. In addition, deciding to see the movie is an 
additional investment of time that could be valuable for other activities and thereby 
produces an overall greater ‘waste’. 
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At the very least, the example points out that the investment of money, time and animal 
lives thus far should play no role in deciding whether or not to continue 
xenotransplantation research. Neither should the enormous level of energy that has been 
devoted to the international development of xenozoonosis risk regulations and surveillance 
systems. If the research does not appear to be ‘lucrative’, in the sense of attaining the 
substantial benefits we have identified, pursuing prior investments despite that would 
consist in committing the Concorde Fallacy. 
 
Of course, the slow progress to clinical success does not in itself negate the possibility that 
xenotransplantation will attain the potential benefits at some point in time. Science 
attempts to discover what is unknown, and as such, the results are inherently 
unpredictable. The research required to resolve the issues of successful 
xenotransplantation are even more complex than those encountered in the development of 
allotransplantation, which also breached the above mentioned average time to 
development and marketing of new drugs or biological products considerably. In fact, 
further research in allotransplant immunology is still required, in want of better long-term 
outcomes. While it is inherently flawed to benchmark a research area based on time to 
success, indications that we are well on the way of attaining success, however slow we 
walk the steep tracks, are nonetheless essential. 
 
In light of the actual achievements to date, as detailed in Chapters 4 and 8, it is highly 
debatable whether we can interpret the progress in xenotransplantation favourably in 
those terms. Ringe et al quote Thomas Starzl to support a justification of pursuing 
progress: 
 
“the future of xenotransplantation is brighter than at any previous time 
because what must be done to succeed has become remarkably clear.”119 
 
While that may be the case, it is in no way clear that what must be done can be done. The 
optimism dates from the time in which there was unbound enthusiasm regarding the 
advances in the genetic manipulation of pigs to avoid hyperacute rejection. That 
enthusiasm led researchers to predict, as early as 1995, that clinical solid organ 
xenotransplants would be conducted within 5 years time. In 1996, Peter Laing predicted 
that pig-to-human kidney transplants would become possible by the year 2000 and that the 
market could reach $6 billion by 2010120. Laing was a pharmaceutical analyst and studied 
the business potential of xenotransplantation for Sandoz, a major manufacturer of 
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immunosuppressive drugs and at that time part owner of commercial rights to Imutran's 
technology for the production of transgenic pigs. Clearly, the feasibility of organ 
xenotransplantation has been seriously overestimated. Some researchers even misled 
objective assessments of the level of pre-clinical progress. Here too, Imutran has played a 
particularly unfortunate role for the reputation of xenotransplantation research. According 
to the Daily Express, the leaked Imutran-Home Office documents reveal that Imutran 
researchers deceitfully published the results of their longest surviving pig-to-baboon 
cardiac xenotransplant recipient121. The results were published in the Journal of Heart and 
Lung Transplantation in 2000. A baboon is reported to have survived for 39 days, which the 
authors identify as “significant progress in the development of a viable strategy for clinical 
xenotransplantation”122. The animal is said to have been active and energetic throughout 
that period, showing no signs of cardiopulmonary failure. According to the Express, 
however, Imutran’s log demonstrates that this particular baboon suffered a severe 
debilitation of its condition following the transplant. It also shows that the pig heart had 
grown to three times its weight by the time the baboon was killed. 
 
Contra-evidence of progress in improving survival rates may be concealed as a strategy to 
maintain private investments. Indeed, the many challenges that have hindered clinical 
success have made it very difficult for xenotransplant research programs to safeguard the 
high level of industry funding that was gained during the 1990s. The private funding was 
primarily awarded to institutes – such as Imutran, Nextran, Alexion, BioTransplant and PPL 
Therapeutics – that were dedicated to overcoming hyperacute rejection by genetic 
modifications123. By 2004, those biotech companies – as well as others, such as Circe, 
Diacrin and Immerge –effectively withdrew from the field, reorganized their business 
alliance or greatly reduced their interest in xenotransplantation124. 
 
It is clear that overcoming hyperacute rejection only to gradually discover subsequent 
processes of rejection and physiological incompatibilities does not furnish short-term pay-
offs. Before xenotransplantation can attain substantial improvement in survival rates, the 
remaining immunological barriers must be conquered and it remains highly uncertain 
whether that is possible. Cellular xenotransplants are advantageous in this respect. For 
lack of vasculature, cells have reduced immunogenicity. Notwithstanding our criticism of 
the recent clinical trials involving porcine islet xenotransplantation, the two recent reports 
of more than six months of insulin dependence in pig-to-monkey transplants (as mentioned 
in Chapter 8) provide promising indications of feasibility of this procedure125,126. Moreover, 
while it remains speculative to date to claim that solid organ xenotransplantation can 
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overcome the remaining immunological barriers, we have not yet reached the point at 
which it appears we have gone astray in this research area either. At least for cardiac and 
kidney xenotransplantation (which involve much less complex organs in comparison with 
lung and liver xenotransplantation), there have been ongoing, albeit modest increases of 
survival rates in pre-clinical models. At the last conference of the International 
Xenotransplantation Association, Byrne et al. reported life-supporting transgenic pig-to-
primate cardiac xenotransplantation in two primates surviving 5 to 8 weeks127. The 
maximum survival implies a prolongation of 17 days when compared to the 39-day survival 
reported by Imutran in 2000. In Chapter 4, we noted that pre-clinical experiments 
involving the use of GALT-KO kidneys showed prolongation of maximum survival when 
compared to the maximum survival of transgenic renal xenografts (83 days128 compared to 
78 days129). While the increase of survival in number of days is perhaps not very significant, 
the course of the graft function is. The study involving GALT-KO kidney transplants was 
combined with a protocol directed towards tolerance induction: primates received porcine 
thymic tissue (part of the immune system which generates T-cells) along with the GALT-KO 
kidneys. The three control animals only received immunosuppression and rejected the 
GALT-KO kidneys after 20, 33 and 34 days. Of the non-control group, a distinction in 
survival rates can be made based on the particular regimen of tolerance induction used. 
Three assessable recipients had received vascularized thymic lobes and survived for 31, 56 
and 68 days. Two other assessable recipients had received thymokidneys (kidneys with 
vascularized donor thymic tissue under their capsule) and both survived more than 80 days. 
Significantly, all five recipients of either tolerance protocol showed normal functioning of 
the xenograft and no rejection until time of death. If we can accept that the results of 
such recent experiments are not exaggerated, they offer proof of ongoing progress. 
 
Potential benefit and research priorities 
 
Even if incremental progress in xenotransplantation research persists, however, there is a 
last condition that we feel is relevant in determining continued dedication to this field. 
That condition is dependent on whether or not there are better options in which to invest 
the research resources. 
 
As evident from the review in Chapter 3, there are other technological research options 
that are equally dedicated to the potential benefits of xenotransplantation. In particular, 
artificial organs are being developed to provide permanent and quality-of-life-enhancing 
surrogates for organ failure. Whereas that technology is limited in scope in comparison 
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with the wide range of diseases which cellular xenotransplantation could potentially treat, 
stem cell research and tissue engineering promise to support or replace virtually any graft 
functions. 
 
At the moment, it is not clear whether those technological alternatives are ‘better’ 
research options. Mechanical organ substitutes and regenerative medicine are also still left 
wanting of results that indicate the feasibility of providing a substantial pool of durable, 
transplantable grafts in the near future. Ideally, in order to enhance quality of life, 
mechanical substitutes would be totally implantable for patients of all sizes. Such 
approaches are lacking for liver replacement. For kidney, heart and lungs, implantable 
devices have not been optimized and there are still important challenges in establishing 
mechanical support or replacement as a destination therapy. The major problems currently 
restricting the use of adult and embryonic stem cells relate to the possible rudderless 
differentiation of the cells and the risk of forming unwanted tissues and tumours (however, 
the latter risk applies to organ and tissue xenotransplantation as well). In addition, the use 
of stem cells currently does not allow for the reproduction of the complex micro-
anatomical structures and functions of multi-tissue organ structures. Gene therapy – which 
we did not discuss in our review of alternatives to human graft donation – may provide 
viable treatment for (and prevention of) virtually all diseases that have a genetic origin 
through replacement or repair of the defective genes.  However, although interest in this 
field is re-emerging, it is generally accepted that the use of gene therapy to annul 
symptoms of organ failure is in an even more primitive stage of development than the 
other alternatives. Moreover, many hereditary diseases that may benefit from a 
transplantation, such as heart disease, Alzheimer’s disease and diabetes, are caused by an 
interaction between various genes. 
 
Given the problems in the development of those alternatives, we illustrated why it is 
generally assumed that xenotransplantation stands closest to providing an overall solution 
to the human graft shortage. However, in retrospect, and again apart from the recent 
progress in islet xenotransplantation research, it is insufficiently substantiated to claim 
that this will necessarily prove to be the case. Even regardless of the need to further 
exclude the infection risk, the slow progress in attaining sufficient pre-clinical xenograft 
survival does not render it impossible that alternative research programs will eventually 
progress at a faster pace. Pre-clinical and clinical results of mechanical heart assist 
devices are still superior to those obtained with xenografts in nonhuman primates130. Apart 
from the more common bone marrow and peripheral blood stem cells transplants, the use 
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of adult stem cells for various treatments is rapidly moving forward, most notably for 
cardiac repair131. The recent report of limited experience in transplanting engineered 
autologous bladder tissues132 has also brought progress in regenerative medicine to the 
foreground. Admittedly, generating complex, vital organs will prove to be much more 
complex and that particular breakthrough does not warrant proof that regenerative 
medicine is a nearby solution of the organ shortage either. In fact, as we saw in Chapter 3, 
a new, commencing line of research involves a combination of regenerative medicine and 
xenotransplantation. It remains to be seen which of those alternatives, or which combined 
form, will develop to be the nearest safe option for the various conditions we have 
considered. 
 
However, there is reason to argue that it is merely the anticipation that 
xenotransplantation is the most imminent solution that currently justifies rational 
decisions to pursue that particular research field. If the alternative technologies, or 
certain procedures, were to gain substantial indications of feasibility, continued dedication 
to research of the equivalent xenotransplant procedures would be difficult to justify. The 
research into those alternatives requires less investment of animal lives. Particularly in the 
field of artificial organs, animals are only used as experimental recipients, not as sources 
of the products that are to be tested. In that research area, considerable advances have 
also been made to allow for the physical testing of mechanical performance of the devices 
under realistic conditions through computer simulations rather than animal models. As 
such, continued pursuit of xenotransplantation would go against a generalized norm to 
minimize the number of animals used to attain a research goal. It is also reasonable to 
expect that the overall risks, costs and harms of implementing those alternatives in the 
clinic will be less than those involved in xenotransplantation. The production of the 
alternative graft replacements is not inherently dependent on the use of animals. 
Furthermore, the alternatives do not bear a risk of harming public health (unless 
regenerative medicine involves the use of stem cells that are exposed to living animal-
derived material and unless gene therapy uses unqualified viruses as vectors for the 
replacement genes). The major risks involved in regenerative medicine and artificial 
replacement technology only apply to the patients. Not only do these conditions thereby 
minimize potential dangers for public and patients by comparison with 
xenotransplantation, they also annul many of the costs related to graft screening and 
blood and tissue archives. Regenerative medicine has the additional advantage that the 
recipient’s own cells can be used to generate replacement tissue, thereby avoiding the 
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problem of immunological rejection altogether and avoiding the long-term complications 
that limit the current acceptability of allotransplantation. 
 
In short, it appears to be of paramount importance that future investments in 
xenotransplantation are reviewed at regular intervals for indications that the various 
procedures can obtain the potential benefits sooner than other research developments. 
While xenotransplantation has not yet been outstripped in those terms, it is important to 
note that there is at least a theoretical possibility that future commitment to 
xenotransplantation research threatens to boycott a ‘fair race’. As a result of decreased 
industry funding, ongoing xenotransplant laboratory research has become increasingly 
dependent on federal funding. According to Leonard Bailey – the surgeon who conducted 
the xenotransplant on Baby Fae – the field is now almost exclusively supported by 
grantsmanship133. Increased government interference has the advantage of enhancing 
reliable information regarding the true rate of progress, rather than when knowledge is a 
privately owned commodity. However, as is the case for public health care funds, federal 
resources for research are limited and inevitably require some form of trade-off between 
competing claims for funds. It is possible that the need for further research in the field of 
xenotransplantation will divert resources from the development of those alternatives. 
From the few indications of research fund allocations we have, that does not appear to be 
the case currently. Although federal funding for the creation of embryonic stem cell 
research was until recently prohibited in the US, $3 billion is currently devoted to this 
research field in California alone. By comparison, according to an educated guess by Daniel 
Salomon134, the US National Institute of Health spends a ‘mere’ total of $25 million for 
xenotransplantation research. Unfortunately, this kind of information is extremely difficult 
to obtain for European nations. 
 
The comment is nonetheless useful to demonstrate the need for a continued and careful 
analysis of what our research priorities are and what the effect of that priority-setting will 
be on the development of overall least costly (and we use this term in its most broad 
sense) health care options. 
 
To do nothing, or to prevent others from doing anything, is itself a type of 
experiment, for the prevention of experimentation is tantamount to the 
assumption of responsibility for an experiment different from the one 
proposed.135 
 
The reader may recognize this quote from the beginning of the fourth chapter. It served 
there to illustrate the critique on ethical and regulatory restrictions to clinical trials of 
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xenotransplantation. However, in this context, the quote can be read quite differently. 
There is responsibility for experiments different from the one proposed, and it is of crucial 
importance that we do not lose sight of that responsibility by uncritical expectations that 
xenotransplantation is just over the horizon. 
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APPENDICES 
   
1 LEVY N. Respecting rights… to death 
 
Perhaps the single most important advance in moral thought occurred when it came to be 
generally recognized that all persons are protected by rights that are inviolable. The 
precise nature and content of these rights is controversial, but there is a consensus among 
reasonable people over their core. We all have a right to life, to liberty, to security of 
person and to equality before the law. Other rights – so-called positive rights, such as the 
right to economic security, or economic and cultural rights, for instance – may be 
controversial, but we all agree at least on these. 
 
Ravelingien et al. therefore seem to be on solid ground when they conclude that it would 
be impermissible to use living persons as subjects in clinical trails of xenotransplanation, 
since such trials would potentially or actually, result in the violation of the core human 
rights of the subjects. The argument proceeds as follows: Xenotransplanation carries with 
it a currently unquantifiable risk of resulting in the transmission of viruses from the animal 
that is the source of the organ transplanted to the human recipient. Such viruses could 
have potentially catastrophic consequences, including triggering a global and devastating 
pandemic. Therefore, it would be necessary to monitor the health of recipients of donated 
organs for many years, even decades, to ensure that the symptoms of such infection have 
not developed. The recipient of such a transplant would therefore need to submit to a 
regime of intensive and extensive scrutiny. They would have to make themselves available 
for regular testing and their sexual partners would have to be warned of the potential for 
infection. They might be advised to forgo having children. Worst of all, if signs of an 
infection are detected, or if the risks are felt to be great enough, they might find 
themselves confined in quarantine. But all of these actions are violations of their human 
rights. Since we have a right to shape our life as we see fit, to associate with whom we like 
and to travel where we like, we cannot morally be treated in the ways that 
xenotransplantation on persons would necessitate. 
 
Ravelingien et al. therefore suggest that xenotransplantation trials should be conducted 
only on people who are in a persistent vegetative state. Since such people no longer have 
an interest in freedom of movement and association, we do not violate their rights by 
confining them. If they had, when competent, consented to participate in such trials, using 
their bodies for clinical trials of xenotransplantation should be no more controversial than 
   
the range of uses to which we currently put cadavers in research and in the training of 
surgeons. 
 
However, this proposal faces a serious objection. If it is permissible to use PVS patients in 
clinical trials of xenotransplantation (and I think it is, if all safety considerations can be 
successfully dealt with), then why isn’t it permissible to give such transplants to patients 
who would otherwise die? Using terminally ill patients, rather than PVS patients, has 
several advantages. First, it is conceivably the case that any virus transmitted from animal 
donors to human recipients could produce effects in normal persons, but none in PVS 
patients. This would be the case, most obviously, if the virus attacked those parts of the 
brain which are irretrievably damaged in PVS patients, such as the cortices, while leaving 
the brain stem unaffected. To that extent, a competent agent would be a better subject 
for clinical trials then a PVS patient. Second, terminally ill patients could potentially 
benefit from xenotransplantation, by receiving a more or less lengthy extension of their 
lives as a result of participation in the trial. For the same reasons that PVS patients cannot 
be harmed by the restrictions the trials would require, they cannot be benefited either. 
Conversely, for the same reasons that the terminally ill could (potentially) be harmed by 
these restrictions, they can be benefited. 
 
Ravelingien et al. argue that we cannot ethically place such restrictions on people who 
have done nothing to deserve them. This seems to me false. Though we are prohibited 
from violating the rights of others, anyone is entitled – has a right to – waive their rights. If 
patients can only avoid death at the cost of sacrificing some or all of their rights to 
freedom of movement or association, then they have a right to make this choice, and – on 
the assumption that no one is responsible for the predicament that forces them to choose 
between these options – no one has acted unethically. To see this, consider the absurd 
consequences that might follow if the proposal advocated by Ravelingien et al. were to be 
implemented. A patient suffering from a terminal illness might volunteer to participate in 
potentially life-saving xenotransplantation clinical trials. The scientists conducting these 
trials would be forced to respond: “we cannot use you now; make a living will and perhaps 
we shall consider you once you die”. The patient is assured that her rights will be 
respected, but this seems to me small comfort. 
 
Of course, as Ravelingien et al. point out, patients who consent to the restrictions 
envisaged as a condition of participating in clinical trials might change their minds after 
receiving the transplant. We should have to be prepared to continue to restrict their 
   
movement, even against their wishes. I do not see this as a great worry. If there is a real 
public health risk, then we would have to be prepared to restrict their movement in any 
case, whether or not they had consented to participate in the trials. We already possess 
the right and the responsibility to protect public health, even at the cost of infringing 
rights: carriers of infectious diseases can already be quarantined against their wishes. The 
fact that recipients had agreed to participate in the trials simply makes our decision 
easier. There is, therefore, no ethical barrier to using the terminally ill in 
xenotransplantation trials. 
 
   
2 CURRY S. Living PVS patients as legitimate research subjects: a 
response to Ravelingien et al. 
 
An Ravelingien and her co-authors argue that we should re-categorize people in Permanent 
Vegetative States as dead.1 While the dilemma they describe is very real, their solution 
will not work. Other respondents to this paper have advanced several powerful arguments 
against the attempt to describe PVS patients as dead. Fortunately, the original argument 
contains sufficient resources to develop an alternative solution to this dilemma, without 
having to radically alter the current legal or social status of PVS patients. In fact, living 
PVS patients may be enrolled in xenotransplantation experiments, provided that their prior 
informed consent has been sought. 
 
The motivation for the original paper is to resolve an apparently intractable ethical 
conflict. On the one side are powerful ethical and medical reasons for proceeding with 
research into the transplantation of non-human organs into human patients. On the other 
side are equally powerful ethical reasons for blocking whole organ transplant experiments. 
These reasons are unusual in that special problems with xenotransplantation will block 
experiments that are permitted in other cases. In particular, the unquantifiable risk of a 
pandemic triggered by diseases such as porcine endogenous retrovirus crossing the species 
barrier will either block the research or expose subjects to the risk of indefinite quarantine 
(p.93). The authors also argue that the restrictions placed on transplant recipients and the 
possibility of long term and intrusive monitoring, restrictions on sexual contacts and 
reproduction, and possible confinement represent excessive and ethically unjustifiable 
burdens. Over time the recipients may wish to withdraw their consent, but the risks to 
public health would prevent them doing so, thereby violating the basic principle that 
subjects of scientific and medical experiments should be able to revise or withdraw 
consent (pp93-4). So-called “plural consent” would also have to be sought from a wide 
circle of family and social contacts. These considerations frame a substantial dilemma that 
could be solved by using PVS bodies for initial research. The authors have tried to cut this 
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Gordian knot of competing ethical considerations by placing PVS patients in the same 
ethical category as cadavers. 
 
I will not repeat the arguments against this strategy. Others have argued persuasively that 
the conceptual shift necessary to achieve this re-definition of death will either fail on the 
evidence, fail conceptually, or will founder on its consequences. However there is no need 
to make the attempt. All that must be achieved is to overcome the ethical objections that 
block experiments on “normal” subjects. We can cut the knot from a different direction, 
by showing that PVS patients are – in exactly the right kinds of ways - not like other 
patients, whether or not they are dead. 
 
Consider the reasons why the authors think xenotransplantation trials would be 
impermissible with living subjects. None of these concerns apply to PVS subjects. Bear in 
mind that our problem is that it would be wrong to impose these various burdens on 
normal subjects even if they consented. The issue is not one of consent, but of the 
interests that are stake. We commonly think that some interests are so foundational to 
human welfare that they cannot even voluntarily be given up. If a subject did not have 
these particular interests, and had given appropriate informed consent, the ethical 
problems would evaporate. It just so happens that PVS patients do not have any of the 
interests listed by the authors. Persons who are in PVS will not ever wake up, they feel no 
pain or discomfort, and have no continuing interest in their own survival. Even if one thinks 
that PVS patients have a right to life (on even the most contentious meaning of this term), 
these patients must also have a right to risk that life for the common good. Since they 
have no other interests to risk, their decision to risk their lives in transplantation research 
is ethically unproblematic. The subjects will not be able to have children, and have no 
capacity for movement, so that their possible confinement does not violate the interest 
that underpins the right to free movement. Similarly, since they will have no more sexual 
contacts, nor any uncontrolled social contacts, the issue of plural consent is irrelevant. 
There is also no risk of withdrawal of consent. 
 
Consent must still be sought from the subjects. The authors suggest that if PVS subjects 
are classified as dead, prior consent should be sought by asking the public to include their 
consent in testaments, as well as enrolling on a whole body donation register. The exact 
same technique could be used if PVS patients are thought to be alive. Willingness to be 
enrolled in trials could be communicated by opening an annexe to the whole body donation 
register, intended for living subjects. The registrar could distribute literature to intending 
   
registrants to ensure that their prior consent is fully informed. In this way PVS subjects 
could be treated just like the healthy subjects of Phase I and II drug trials. 
 
Obviously this does not exhaust the ethical obligations of researchers. The PVS person is 
still entitled to a certain level of care and respect congruent with their status as a living 
human patient, and their families and friends must also be treated with compassion and 
care. At the very least care must be taken to ensure that normal standards of clinical 
practice are maintained, and that the subject is treated at all times with dignity. Families 
should be given a right to override or cancel prior consent if the experience becomes too 
distressing for them. 
 
There is a way to conduct experiments on PVS subjects without their needing to be dead. 
It would still involve convincing regulators to open new consent mechanisms and 
convincing the public that such trials are ethically sound, but this political battle is much 
less radical than the attempt to convince the public that PVS patients are actually dead. 
 
   
3 DRAPER H. PVS patients and research 
 
The argument that PVS equates to death because it marks the death of the person is not a 
new one, but I wonder whether An Ravelingien et al.2 need to regard those in PVS as dead 
to make a case for animal to human transplantation trials taking place on people in a PVS. 
It is not an argument likely to convince anyone who refuses to accept that human persons 
are the only humans who have inherent value, dignity or a right to life, and the arguments 
on both sides have been well rehearsed with no sign of reconciliation. My own view is that 
people in a PVS are still alive, albeit with a poor quality of life. I see no objection in 
principle to the proposal that competent individuals can decide, in advance, to take part 
in research when they become incompetent. At the present time, it is generally accepted 
that an advanced refusal of consent should be respected. There is some controversy over 
whether someone can insist upon treatment in advance, but in Ravelingien et al.’s paper, 
what is being proposed is not that individuals can insist on becoming research participants, 
but rather that they can signal a willingness to become such a participant in the future. 
Indeed, this principle could be extended to competent individuals like those with early 
onset Alzheimer’s and degenerative neurological conditions who could agree in principle to 
the kinds of research, broadly conceived, they would be willing to be included in if and 
when they become incompetent in the future. Helping others by taking part in clinical 
research is undoubtedly a good way to live out what could be years in a PVS or other less 
compromised states. It may even help those for whom such a life is a virtual certainty to 
find meaning for the future they are destined to live. 
 
My endorsement of Ravelingien et al.’s proposal is, however, cautious and based on three 
assumptions. First, individuals in a PVS are still alive –they should not be regarded as dead. 
Second that PVS can be diagnosed accurately and that the procedure for diagnosing it is 
generally accepted and uncontroversial. Third, that PVS is a permanent state and not one 
from which a patient, however remote the chance, could make any recovery. If this is not 
the case, then the Ravelingien et al. solution is less compelling since someone who 
recovers generates all the ethical problems that would be present if non-PVS volunteers 
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were used; namely that severe restrictions on lifestyle would have to be imposed for 
public health reasons effectively making it impossible to withdraw consent in the normal 
sense of the concept. 
 
I do, however, think that there are practical problems with the proposal, hence the 
caution. The most obvious of these is that few, if any, people are likely to have advance 
warning that they will eventually end up in a PVS. For this proposal to work, therefore, 
many thousands of people will have to give their agreement, in principle, to be enrolled on 
the study should they be unfortunate enough to enter a PVS. A general agreement to 
donate one’s body to science or medical research will not do: people in a PVS are not 
dead, and the research is likely to last for many years, with all the attendant strains on 
the participant’s family. In such circumstances, however, keeping someone in a PVS alive 
so that they can take part in research does not raise the usual questions about the use of 
public resources, since I also assume that the research would either be funded by a 
research body, or that the health service is willing to fund such animal to human 
transplantation trials in light of possible future savings for the service as a whole. 
Accordingly, such research does not pose any burden on the health service, or if it does, 
such a burden has been considered beneficial in the longer term. Either way, resource 
concerns can be dismissed. They may, however, re-appear once the trial is over if the 
research participants are still alive, particularly if they are also unwilling to specify in 
advance that they refuse treatment such as artificial nutrition at the conclusion of the 
study. Is such an unwillingness a justifiable exclusion criterion for entry into the trial? 
 
Accepting that individuals in PVS are alive would also help to resolve some of the issues 
raised in relation to the role of relatives. Ravelingien et al. are unclear about whether 
relatives should be able to veto the decision of the individual in a PVS. On the one hand 
they give weight to the likely and particular emotional reactions of the relatives to the 
procedures being carried out (and presumably the decade or more of life in a PVS required 
for such a trial to be completed). On the other they refer to occasions when the wishes of 
the living are not permitted to over-ride those of the dead – such as in the disposal of 
property through a will. However, how people choose to live their lives is not something 
that relatives – even close relatives such as parents or children – can justifiably veto. How 
someone chooses, all things being equal, to live out their life in a PVS is a matter for them 
alone, just as how they lived their life prior to the PVS was. Of course, people are obliged 
to consider the effect on others of their life-style choices, particularly those closest to 
them, but even when they fail to do so, relatives cannot veto these choices, and 
   
sometimes people make decisions that, whilst taking into account the harmful effects they 
might have on others, they believe to be right on balance. Entering a closed religious 
order, emigrating, divorcing all occur despite the losses and discomfort of those closest to 
us, and those we hurt or disappoint have to adjust their expectations and feelings about us 
accordingly. Given that there is no practical burden to the relatives – having to provide 
daily care to the individual in a PVS, for instance – it is difficult to see what claim they 
have to veto the decision to take part in the research. 
 
   
4 THOMPSON J. Relatives of the living dead: response to A. 
Ravelingien, F. Mortier, E. Mortier and J. Braeckman, ‘Proceeding 
with clinical trials of animal to human organ transplantation’ 
 
Death in every culture has a social meaning. It is not something that concerns only the 
person who dies, but also his or her family, friends and other people in his community. 
Most people have an idea of what counts as a good death – for the person concerned 
and/or for those who survive. Some people would prefer to die suddenly and painlessly, in 
their sleep if possible. But for many people a good death involves a process in which they 
gradually lose their hold on life, become reconciled to their end and say goodbye to their 
loved ones. From the point of view of relatives and friends, a good death is likely to be one 
in which they have a chance to show their feelings for the dying person and to become 
reconciled to his loss as his life fades away. At the end of this process there is a dead body 
that can be put to rest in an appropriate ceremony, and then survivors are free to begin 
the process of learning to live without the dead person. 
 
Problems, ethical and social, arise when the social understanding of death and how the 
living should relate to the dead and dying clash with medical definitions of death or the 
perception of dead or dying people as a medical resource. In some cultures this clash is 
more serious than in others. In Japan, for example, where relatives think it is important to 
maintain a relationship with a dying person until all signs of life cease, brain death is not 
accepted as sufficient to bring the relationship to an end, and, as a result, taking organs 
from the brain dead is generally regarded as unacceptable.3 In western countries, most 
people are willing to accept that brain death constitutes the end of a person’s life and 
thus the end of their relationship with her, but there is a certain amount of unease about 
the matter and in some countries the wishes of the relatives prevail even in cases where 
the brain dead person had consented to donation. 
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If those who have entered a permanent vegetative state were to be used as subjects for 
xenotransplantation, as suggested by Ravelingien, Mortier, Mortier and Braeckman,4 the 
tension that exists even in western societies between social ideas about how to relate to 
the dying and medical perceptions of death (or being ‘as good as dead’) would reach the 
breaking point. Consider what relatives will be expected to endure.  For security reasons 
they will not be able to visit the ‘dead’ person; they will not be able to have any physical 
contact with her. On the other hand, they will have a difficult time accepting that she is 
really dead while still showing so many signs of life. Even if they do accept that she is dead 
as a person, even if not biologically dead, there will be no body to put at rest, no proper 
ceremony of death, no appropriate end to their relationship with her. And this situation 
could go on for years. This is not what most people can accept as a good death. 
 
Suppose that the person had agreed to be the subject of xenotransplantation experiments. 
Suppose that she put this in her living will. Do her wishes override the discomfort, 
inconvenience or even anguish of her relatives? In my view, they do not. Since death and 
dying have a social meaning, since her death is a process that involves relationships with 
other people, since these relationships can be extremely important for the people 
concerned, she is not entitled to make the decision. There are limits to individual freedom 
in this case as in others. Her wishes should be taken into account, but it would not be 
wrong for a society to allow her choice to be overruled by the wishes and concerns of 
those who are closely related to her. In fact, there is a stronger argument for giving 
decisive weight to the wishes of relatives in this case than in cases where brain dead 
people are used as the source of organs for transplantation. Harvesting brain dead people 
for organs does not so seriously disrupt the relationship of the living with the dying or the 
dead. 
 
Does the prospect of being able to save many more lives by means of xenotransplantation 
give us good reason to override the wishes of relatives (or, for that matter, the wishes of 
person herself)? It is even more obvious that the answer is ‘no’. To pursue the prolongation 
of life at the expense of relationships that give meaning and dignity to life and to death is 
not morally acceptable. A society should not go down that road. 
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Nevertheless, these concerns are not reasons for prohibiting xenotransplantation 
experiments. Some relatives of people in a permanent vegetative state may be willing to 
allow their loved ones to be used in this way, especially if they believe that the person 
wanted this to happen and if they are persuaded of the importance of the experiment. 
However, consent in this case ought to be a collective commitment. Ideally, a person who 
would want her body to be used for such experiments if she were to fall into a permanent 
vegetative state ought to seek the consent of the people with whom she has a close 
relationship and these people ought to be fully informed about the consequences of 
consenting. There could be a formal process of obtaining joint consent from relatives and 
spouses with appropriate counselling. Alternatively, close relatives could be asked for their 
consent after a person who has already consented to be subjected to the experiment has 
lapsed into a permanent vegetative state. However, if they are unprepared and know little 
or nothing about what their loved one had consented to, they may be extremely distressed 
by the idea or may not understand what is being asked of them. Consent would be more 
meaningful if the people directly affected were able to make a decision in advance and 
together – expressing and taking into account what they regard as a good death. 
 
   
5. SPARROW R. Right of the living dead? Consent to experimental 
surgery in the event of cortical death 
 
Introduction 
 
The unknown magnitude of the risk of xenozoonosis, and the difficulties involved in 
obtaining ethical consent to experimental surgical techniques that offer little prospect of 
benefit to the patient, stand as substantial barriers to the development of safe and 
effective xenotransplantation.5 As xenotransplantation offers the prospect of making life-
saving replacement organs available to the tens of thousands of people who currently die 
each year for want of an appropriate donor organ, there is an urgent necessity to proceed 
as quickly as is possible with research which might contribute towards the development of 
safe and effective xenotransplantation.6 Ravelingien et al. are therefore to be 
congratulated on their contribution to resolving the difficult question as to how such 
research might proceed in an ethical fashion.7 Their controversial suggestion is that early 
human xenotransplantation trials should be carried out on individuals who are in a 
permanent vegetative state (PVS) and who have previously granted their consent to the 
use of their bodies in such research in the event of their cortical death. This would make it 
possible for xenotransplantation researchers to trial their therapies on living human bodies 
 
                                            
5 Bach FH, Fishman JA, Daniels N, et al. Uncertainty in Xenotransplantation: Individual benefit 
versus  collective risk. Nat Med 1998;4:141-144; Collingen P, Purdy L. Xenografts: Are the risks so 
great that we should not proceed? Microbes Infect 2001;3:341-348; Clarke MA. This Little Piggy Went 
to Market: The Xenotransplantation and Xenozoonose Debate. J Law Med Ethics 1999; 27:137-152. 
For a recent argument that these difficulties are not insurmountable—without experiments involving 
persons in a permanent vegetative state—see Rothblatt M. Your life or Mine: How geoethics can 
resolve the conflict between public and private interests in xenotransplantation. Ashgate 
Dartmouth: Aldershot, 2004. 
 
6 The Lancet. Xenotransplantation: Time to Leave the Laboratory. Lancet 1999;354:1657. This is not 
to deny that significant ethical issues concerning the use and treatment of sentient nonhuman 
animals in xenotransplantation research and practice exist and remain to be resolved.  For a survey, 
see Daar AS. Ethics of Xenotransplantation: Animal Issues, Consent, and Likely Transformation of 
Transplant Ethics. World J Surg 1997;21:975-982. 
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and closely monitor the transplant recipients for any signs of xenozoonotic infection or any 
other unanticipated long-term effects of receiving a xenotransplant, while avoiding the 
difficult ethical issues which beset any attempts to trial these therapies on living persons. 
While they do not discuss it, it seems that the use of the bodies of individuals who are in a 
PVS might also advance research into other experimental therapies which hold out the 
prospect of significant public benefit yet involve such a high level of risk and so little hope 
of benefit to the individual patient in the initial trials that it would be unethical to 
perform them. 
 
Unfortunately, Ravelingien et al.’s philosophical defence of their proposed solution is 
unsatisfactory in its current formulation, as it equivocates on the key question of the 
status of PVS patients. Ravelingien et al. have a bet each way on the question of whether 
or not individuals who are in a permanent vegetative state are in fact dead. Their 
proposed solution rests on the idea that it should be up to individuals to determine 
themselves when they should be treated as dead. Yet the authors clearly believe (and 
state) that PVS patients are in fact dead. Finally, given the public good their proposal is 
intended to achieve, the moral importance they place on the consent of an individual to 
the use of their body in this research is ultimately only defensible insofar as this consent 
represents the wishes of a living person.  It is thus only a gentle caricature of their position 
to suggest that according to their account consent to participation in xenotransplantation 
research is a “right of the living dead”. 
 
While the idea that individuals should be able to consent to experimental surgery in the 
event of their entering a permanent vegetative state remains defensible no matter which 
of the positions described above we eventually settle for, Ravelingien et al.’s equivocation 
on the question of whether these individuals are living or dead means that they avoid 
confronting the implications of their argument. Each of these alternative positions on the 
status of PVS patients has important and somewhat unpalatable further implications for 
the treatment of such patients and for the ethics of performing experimental surgery of 
little expected benefit to the patient in similar cases. The solution that Ravelingien et al. 
propose to the problem of how we should proceed with xenotransplantation research is 
therefore not as neat as first appears. 
 
 
   
Dead or alive? 
 
The idea that individuals should be able to consent to the use of their bodies in 
xenotransplantation research in the event of entering a permanent vegetative state is 
suggested by current practices surrounding organ donation in the event of whole brain 
death (p. 96).8 However, the authors’ proposal is likely to meet with significantly more 
controversy than existing practices because the experiments that they propose should be 
carried out are likely to appear far more grotesque in the public imagination and because 
the “cadavers” on which these experiments will be performed will be living, breathing 
bodies. 
 
Ravelingien et al. acknowledge that the extension of the notion of death from circulatory 
death to whole brain death was itself controversial and that any extension to treat 
patients in permanent vegetative states as dead is likely to be even more so. In 
anticipation of this controversy, they argue -following a suggestion of Veatch’s- that 
individual and cultural differences in attitudes towards the moment of death should be 
respected by allowing individual patients to decide for themselves when they should be 
treated as dead (p. 96).9 If they decide that (for them) death occurs when they have 
suffered an irreversible loss of consciousness and regardless if they continue to have 
respiration and a pulse even in the absence of mechanical assistance, then they should be 
able to donate their body to xenotransplantation research just as individuals may currently 
donate their body to science in the event of their (circulatory or “whole brain”) death. The 
advantage of this proposal is that it seemingly avoids the necessity of resolving the 
difficult philosophical and political debate about the status of these patients. It also 
explains the importance the authors place on gaining the consent of the PVS sufferer for 
participation in experimental xenotransplantation. 
 
 
                                            
8 Fost also discusses the possibility that we might proceed with sourcing organs from persons in a 
PVS, if they had previously consented to such.  Fost N. Reconsidering the Dead Donor Rule: Is it 
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9 Veatch RM. The conscience clause: how much individual choice in defining death can our society 
tolerate? In: Youngner SJ, Arnold RM, Shapiro R, eds. The definition of death: contemporary 
controversies. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999:140, cited in Ravelingien A, Mortier F, 
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The obvious difficulty with this move is that it is prima facie implausible that whether or 
not someone is dead is a matter of individual choice. While death is a more complex 
phenomenon than first appears, especially in the light of advances in medical technology, 
it remains fundamentally a category of natural science rather than of ethics.10 As such, it is 
an objective rather than a subjective matter. To the extent that the definition of death 
does involve making value judgements, these are primarily social rather than individual 
questions.11 That is, they are questions about how other people should treat and respond 
to a person in a particular condition. When is it appropriate to bury someone, or to mourn 
them, or to extract their organs for transplant? These are questions that societies or 
cultural groups, rather than individuals, have to answer. Indeed, insofar as they necessarily 
involve the disposition and behaviour of large numbers of strangers, they are questions 
that individuals cannot answer. 
 
Although it may not be possible for individuals to settle the question of when they are 
dead, it is possible to grant them some power to determine when they should be treated 
as though they are dead and what can be done to them when they are. This is presumably 
what Ravelingien et al. intend, rather than the stronger and less plausible thesis that 
individuals should be allowed to determine when they are dead. Yet, even here, there are 
important limits on individuals’ rights to determine when they should be treated as dead.  
We don’t allow people to decide that their bodies should be available to train medical 
students in dissection while they are still conscious, for instance. Similarly, in societies 
that do use a “whole brain” criteria of death, while the medical profession may respect 
the wishes of deceased individuals, not to procure organs from them if they should suffer 
whole brain death, they do not typically allow them to insist on continuing ventilation and 
medical support on the ground that they are still alive at this point. The question remains 
 
                                            
10 Singer P. Rethinking Life and Death. Melbourne: The Text Publishing Company, 1997:20-22. .  This 
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Inst Ethics J 2004;14:301-318, at 314; Lock, M, and C Honde. Reaching Consensus About Death: 
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then, why cortical death should be held to be within the realm where it is appropriate to 
allow individuals to decide whether they should be treated as dead or not. 
 
The authors suggest, again following Veatch, that an individual’s right to determine when 
they should be treated as dead should be confined to reasonable claims, with the clear 
presumption that it is reasonable to treat PVS sufferers as either dead or alive (p. 96). 
However, it is unclear what this restriction on claims about death would amount to, given 
the range of different opinions on when people are dead. Some religious worldviews 
believe that dying is a process which does not reach its end until a point long after that at 
which an individual has stopped breathing.12 Other people, perhaps including a significant 
proportion the medical community, believe that it is clearly the case that people are dead 
when they have no higher cortical functions.13 In an age when human cloning via somatic 
cell nuclear transfer is close to becoming a reality, cellular death may mark an important 
point prior to which there is some hope of resurrection of at least part of what people care 
about when they think about their mortality. In the face of such wide-ranging 
disagreement, it is difficult to settle the bounds of the “reasonable”. Indeed, there is 
almost as large a range of opinion about what the bounds of the reasonable are in relation 
to beliefs about death as there is about the moment of death itself. Given that death is 
primarily a matter of natural science and, to a lesser extent, a social consensus, any 
attempt to settle disagreement about the limits of reasonable beliefs about death must 
inevitably refer to the matters of fact which underpin claims about death and the social 
practices which constitute our response to it.14 Pointing to disagreement about the status 
of PVS patients therefore only partially mitigates the necessity of settling the question of 
whether or not they are dead before we can decide whether it is reasonable to treat them 
as such. 
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However, the real problem with settling questions about the status of PVS patients by 
allowing people to decide for themselves when they should be treated as dead is that 
whatever they decide, they are in fact either dead or alive. Importantly, how we should 
respond to their desire as to how they should be treated depends to some extent on 
whether they are dead or alive. The wishes of the living and the dead have significantly 
different moral weights.15 Ravelingien et al. therefore cannot avoid resolving this question. 
 
Dead? 
 
In fact, Ravelingien et al. do make it clear at a number of points in the paper that they 
believe that a person who is in a permanent vegetative state is in fact dead. To be precise, 
they believe that cases of PVS present us with a situation in which a person has died 
leaving behind a living human body. Individuals in a permanent vegetative state have lost 
all those properties and/or capacities (sentience, rationality, and the ability to relate to 
others) that may plausibly be thought to be constitutive of personhood and to justify the 
moral respect that persons are owed. Moreover, because persons in a permanent 
vegetative state lack sentience, they no longer possess interests. Consequently, they 
cannot be harmed in the course of xenotransplantation research (p. 95). It is merely a 
strange matter of circumstance that their bodies retain properties such as respiration, 
circulation, and other autonomic nervous reflexes, that are normally associated with 
people who are alive. Given that people who have entered permanent vegetative states 
are dead it is reasonably straightforward to conclude that individuals should be able to will 
their remains to xenotransplantation research in the event of their cortical death just as 
they may to other forms of medical research in the event of their whole brain or 
circulatory death (p. 95). 
 
Amongst a philosophical readership, this conclusion will hardly appear surprising. The 
authors themselves note that the argument that PVS patients are in fact dead and that 
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consequently their organs should be available to be sourced for transplantation has been 
made a number of times before (p. 95).16 But what is now thrown into question is why the 
authors have restricted the range of cadavers available for xenotransplantation research to 
those where the recently deceased had provided their explicit consent to their remains 
being used in such research. Why is it so important that an individual’s consent has been 
obtained? At the very least it seems that, in nations which operate an “opt out” rather 
than an “opt in” system of organ collection after death17, a strong argument could be 
made that the bodies of individuals who are in a PVS should be made available for 
xenotransplantation research unless they have explicitly directed otherwise. If the benefit 
to the public of increasing the number of organs available for transplantation justifies a 
change in the presumption of consent for organ donation then the same is likely to be the 
case for participation in xenotransplantation research. 
 
The moral weight of the wishes of the dead 
 
In fact, the implication of declaring PVS patients to be dead is more radical than this.  
Where people do not wish their cadavers to be used for xenotransplantation research, our 
reason for respecting this desire involves respect for the wishes of the dead.  While there 
are reasons for respecting the wishes of the dead, these have always been somewhat 
philosophically controversial, given that the dead will experience no harm if their wishes 
are not respected  (pp. 95-97).18  This in turn suggests, especially to those with leanings 
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towards utilitarianism, that the interests of the dead should be discounted somewhat when 
they come into conflict with the interests of the living.19 
 
As Ravelingien et al. have emphasised, the living may have very substantial interests in 
large numbers of xenotransplantation trials being performed as quickly as is practicable.  It 
is puzzling then why the authors are so quick to concede that the wishes of the deceased 
should be allowed to stand in the way of this. 
 
Note that the balance of considerations in relation to the use of PVS cadavers20 in 
xenotransplantation research, against the wishes of the deceased individual, is 
significantly different than those when it is organ collection from patients who have 
suffered whole brain death which is at issue.  Collection of organs from a cadaver may save 
a few lives at most.  Given the revolutionary life-saving potential of xenotransplantation, 
research on PVS cadavers might save tens of thousands of lives.  Indeed, it is precisely 
because Ravelingien et al. believe this to be the case, that they have put forward their 
proposal.  Of course, drafting any individual PVS cadaver into this research may not save 
all these lives, but it might well be the case that it will make a more important 
contribution to the reduction of human suffering than would the use of this cadaver’s 
organs alone.  The reasons in favour of co-opting the remains of those who have died by 
entering a PVS—regardless of their consent—are therefore much stronger than those 
justifying the sourcing of organs for transplant without consent. 
 
It is true that many societies do give a substantial moral weight to the wishes of the 
deceased in relation to the treatment and disposal of their remains.  The public’s ideas 
about what is mandated by the notion of respect for the dead are often much stronger 
than the justifications usually provided for them by philosophers allow.  Despite this, 
decisions about the treatment of the body of the deceased against the deceased’s wishes 
are far from unprecedented.  It is already firmly established that significant and pressing 
public health interests may override individuals’ wishes about the disposal of their 
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remains.  Thus, for instance, when the cause of death of a particular individual is unknown 
but where the involvement of a dangerous infectious agent is suspected, or where a death 
has occurred as the result of a criminal act, coroners may be required to perform an 
autopsy regardless of the wishes of the deceased.21  On the other hand, as Ravelingien et 
al. point out, some countries, such as New Zealand, allow that the relatives of the 
deceased can override the wishes of the deceased to donate their organs for transplant or 
research. 
 
Our willingness to override the wishes of the deceased in other circumstances suggests that 
Ravelingien et al.’s concern for the consent of the deceased individual for the use of their 
remains is exaggerated here.  Their belief that PVS sufferers are in fact dead, alongside 
their recognition of the large public benefit that would be achieved by preceding quickly 
to human xenotransplantation trials, should push them towards the much more radical 
claim that PVS cadavers should be made available for xenotransplantation research 
regardless of the wishes of the deceased.22 
 
Respect for the wishes of the relatives? 
 
One obvious and important objection at this point, of course, is that while the wishes of 
the deceased may be overridden by the benefits to the public of proceeding with 
xenotransplantation trials, there is also the matter of the wishes of their living relations.  
The partner, parents or siblings of the deceased may be understandably distraught at 
witnessing the still-beating heart or working lungs of their recently dead relative being 
removed from their body and replaced with the organs of genetically modified pigs. 
 
However, again, there is a familiar range of cases where we neglect the wishes of relatives 
concerning the treatment of the remains of the deceased.  Ravelingien et al. themselves 
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note with approval that many countries allow the wishes of the deceased concerning the 
disposal of their remains priority over the wishes of their living relatives (p. 97) (contra the 
example of New Zealand, which they cite to a different purpose).  The interests of other 
parties may also justifying denying the wishes of relatives.  We do not allow relatives to 
discard the body of the deceased in the street or to make ornaments out of it, no matter 
how strongly they desire to.  Remains may be buried or cremated without consulting 
relatives if failing to do so will constitute a threat to public health or safety.  Where public 
health, or the investigation of a possible homicide, requires it autopsies may be performed 
against the wishes of relatives. 
 
The wishes of living relatives are an important concern when we attempt to assess the 
balance of considerations surrounding the treatment of the remains of the deceased, but 
they are not the only consideration.  Where the public interest is large enough, we may 
sacrifice the interests of the relatives for the greater good of the community.23  The harm 
to the living relatives may be minimised by ensuring that they are aware of the 
justification for the treatment of the deceased and the good it accomplishes, in the hope 
that this will cause them to reconsider their opposition to actions taken to this purpose. 
 
Public policy reasons for respect for the dead? 
 
A significant concern about policies regarding the use of cadavers is the impact that they 
may have on the willingness of individuals to donate their remains to science or, more 
importantly, to enter into a medical and/or hospital environment at all.  If people suspect 
that their wishes concerning the disposal of their remains will not be respected after they 
die they may be reluctant to remain in hospital if they are dying. 
 
However, the relative frequency of the PVS condition compared to circulatory or whole 
brain death will have a significant impact on consequentialist calculations about the 
effects that compulsory requisition of cadavers will have on the living.  Policies concerning 
the treatment of the cortically dead are likely to affect far fewer people than policies 
regarding those who have suffered circulatory or whole brain death.  The vast majority of 
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people will not end up in a permanent vegetative state and, to the extent that they 
recognise this, may judge that what might happen to them if they do enter into such a 
state is not of sufficient concern to prevent them from seeking medical care when they 
need it.24  While the impact of proceeding with xenotransplantation research involving PVS 
cadavers without the consent of the deceased on the willingness of individuals to enter a 
medical setting would need to be monitored, there is little reason to believe that this will 
be so significant as to outweigh the public benefits to be gained by carrying out 
xenotransplantation trials. 
 
Another, I think more pressing, concern is that if xenotransplantation was to become 
associated in the public mind with such macabre practices as transplanting animal organs 
into the living bodies of the recently deceased against the wishes of the deceased, this 
might have disastrous impact on public support and therefore funding for 
xenotransplantation research. Proceeding with xenotransplantation trials involving PVS 
cadavers without the consent of the deceased (and perhaps also their relatives) would then 
be self-defeating, as it would undercut support for the very research it was aiming to 
advance. 
 
However, this reason to respect the wishes of the dead concerning the disposal of their 
remains depends crucially both on some empirical facts about the link between 
experimentation on PVS cadavers and public support for xenotransplantation and on 
resisting alternative courses of action that might sever this link. It may simply not be the 
case that public support for xenotransplantation will collapse if the research necessary to 
prove its safety involves experimenting on deceased individuals in permanent vegetative 
states against their previously declared wishes. The prospect of resolving the problem of 
the scarcity of donor organs available for transplantation that xenotransplantation holds 
out may be sufficiently attractive to the public that they would continue to support 
xenotransplantation research involving PVS cadavers even if this takes place against the 
wishes of those whose remains are being used for this purpose. 
 
More problematically, it may be possible for xenotransplantation research involving PVS 
cadavers to proceed without any impact on popular support for xenotransplantation if the 
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public remains unaware of it.  If the expected public benefit from xenotransplantation 
research is large enough, it seems as though researchers may have reason to ignore even 
the explicit instructions of relatives and proceed with xenotransplantation research 
involving PVS cadavers without their consent and without their knowledge.  That is, they 
may be justified in proceeding with clandestine xenotransplantation research.  This might 
involve, for instance, telling the relatives that their relation had died (and providing them 
with a body for burial) and then abducting the PVS cadaver for research at a secure 
location. 
 
The argument here is analogous to an argument that might have been made in favour of 
the theft of corpses for early medical research and dissection in the 17th,18th and 19th 
centuries. The methods used to procure cadavers for dissection, which included theft, 
deception and perhaps—in some cases—murder, were prima facie immoral.25 However, it 
might well be argued that the apparently immoral actions of these researchers and their 
body snatching accomplices were ultimately justified by the immense public benefit that 
has been secured by modern medicine on the basis of knowledge gained from their 
activities. Dedicated xenotransplantation researchers might reason that they are in a 
similar position today. While it is normally wrong to deceive people about the fate of their 
(or their relations) remains, the benefits of proving xenotransplantation safe are so great 
that if the only way to carry out the necessary trials without xenotransplantation research 
falling victim to a public backlash which would prevent it from reaching its goals is to do so 
clandestinely, then such deception may well be justified. The consequentialist tone of 
Ravelingien et al.’s paper suggests that they may have difficulty resisting this conclusion.26 
 
Of course, there may be many other good ethical reasons not to pursue this policy. I am 
not seriously proposing it as a way forward for xenotransplantation research. My purpose in 
raising the possibility has solely been to show that there is a significant tension between 
Ravelingien et al.’s claims that individuals who are in a permanent vegetative state are 
dead and that there is an enormous public benefit to be gained by performing 
 
                                            
25 MacDonald H Human Remains: Episodes in human dissection Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 2005. 
 
26 Indeed, recent scandals in the UK suggest that at least some in the medical and research 
communities have embraced it. MacDonald H Human Remains: Episodes in human dissection 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2005:186-89. 
   
xenotransplantation research on the “living dead”, and their claim that it is essential to 
secure the prior consent of the deceased for participation in such research. 
 
Alive? 
 
One way to justify the authors’ concern for the consent of PVS patients is to concede that 
these individuals are still alive. By virtue of the fact that their heart beats and their lungs 
respire unaided, they are still “one of us”, a living human being and as such a member of a 
community whose respect for each other in a medical context is expressed in a concern for 
consent to treatment. In some ways this is not a terribly attractive philosophical position 
to hold given that, as we observed above, persons who are in a permanent vegetative state 
seem to have so few of the morally significant properties that ground respect for living 
human beings. In defence of this position, however, it should be noted that PVS sufferers 
remain legal persons.27 We also have strong intuitions that despite their lack of sentience 
they are—in some sense at least—alive and that for this reason to experiment upon them 
while they are in this state without their consent is more morally problematic than if they 
were dead. 
 
If PVS patients are in fact alive this need not lead to the conclusion that they may not 
volunteer their bodies for xenotransplantation trials. It might be argued, for instance, that 
while they are alive and that their previously expressed wishes are worthy of respect 
because of this, they are also in the unique position of having very few, if any interests, 
once they are in a permanent vegetative state. They will not suffer any harm even if 
participation in xenotransplantation research leads to their death. Thus as long as they 
consent to such research taking place there are no reasons of a paternalistic nature to 
object to their participation in it.28 
 
 
                                            
27 Singer P. Rethinking Life and Death. Melbourne: The Text Publishing Company, 1997:27; 
Hoffenburg R, Lock M, Tilney N, et al. Should organs from patients in permanent vegetative state be 
used for transplantation? Lancet 1997;350:1320–1321. 
 
28 I owe this point to Neil Levy who made it in a seminar at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and 
Public Ethics, at the University of Melbourne, at which An Ravelingien presented her and her co-
authors’ ideas. 
   
However, any argument that it is legitimate for PVS sufferers to consent to participation in 
xenotransplantation research is likely to lead to further, stronger conclusions about the 
rights of individuals to volunteer for experimental surgery when doing so is unlikely to 
harm their interests. There are, after all, other circumstances in which - it might be 
argued - that people are unlikely to be harmed by participation in experimental research 
even when it offers them little hope of benefit. Most obviously, if individuals are dying of 
organ failure, with no prospect of sourcing a human organ for transplant surgery, then 
receiving a xenotransplant is unlikely to make them worse off. Despite this, they may be 
willing to consent to participate in research for altruistic reasons in the hope that their 
participation will assist in the development of a technology which will provide benefits to 
others in the future. If what justifies experimentation on persons in a permanent 
vegetative state is that they are unlikely to suffer any harm in the process then consent to 
altruistic participation in experimental medical research in cases of medical extremity will 
also be permissible.29 
 
This conclusion in itself is not especially surprising. There is an ongoing debate about the 
morality of allowing patients to participate in research which is unlikely to provide them 
with any benefit if their motives are altruistic. However, altruistic participation in 
research in a situation of medical extremity is also generally recognised to be ethically 
fraught and to open individuals to the danger of exploitation. Further argument is 
therefore required before we can accept this possible implication of the authors’ 
argument. More importantly, for the purposes of this discussion, the conclusion that it is 
ethical to allow individuals to volunteer for participation in research in a situation of 
medical extremity will remove much of the need for xenotransplantation trials to involve 
individuals who are in a permanent vegetative state in the first place, as research into the 
dangers of xenozoonosis and other long-term health effects on transplant recipients could 
now be performed on living patients with their consent. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
29 The argument here presumes that harm that is measured according to a baseline of interests 
which would exist independently of the action being considered. 
   
Conclusion 
 
None of this discussion is intended as a direct criticism of Ravelingien et al.’s proposal as 
to how xenotransplantation research might proceed past the current ethical impasse. From 
a public policy perspective, it seems likely that the proposal that we attempt to secure the 
consent of individuals to allow their remains to be used for research purposes should they 
enter into a permanent vegetative state is indeed the best way of ensuring public support 
for xenotransplantation research involving human bodies in a permanent vegetative state. 
However, the argumentative route that they take to this conclusion is confused. The 
existence of controversy concerning the status of individuals who are in a permanent 
vegetative state is itself insufficient to justify the conclusion that it is legitimate to trial 
experimental surgery on them as long as their consent is secured. The underlying 
philosophical question remains the status of these individuals. If we decide that they are in 
fact dead then it seems that the requirement for their consent is weaker than Ravelingien 
et al. indicate and that, given the large public benefit to be gained from developing 
xenotransplantation technology, we may need to look further at the possibility that 
research would be justified without the consent of the deceased. If we decide that they 
are in fact alive then the authors’ concern that we seek their consent is better founded. 
However, allowing that such research is ethical suggests that it may also be ethical to 
proceed with experimental surgery involving consenting individuals in other circumstances 
of medical extremity and consequently that the need for xenotransplantation trials to be 
conducted on individuals who are in permanent vegetative states is less pressing than the 
authors suggest. Significant philosophical work therefore remains to be done before we can 
properly assess the ethics of proceeding to human trials of xenotransplantation involving 
individuals in a permanent vegetative state. By drawing attention to the issues, 
Ravelingien et al. have made an important contribution to this project. 
